content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  12 #include "base/files/file_util.h"
  13 #include "base/hash.h"
  14 #include "base/metrics/sparse_histogram.h"
  15 #include "base/path_service.h"
  16 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  17 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  19 #include "base/trace_event/trace_event.h"
  20 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  21 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  22 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  23 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  24 #include "content/common/content_switches_internal.h"
  25 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  26 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  27 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  28 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  29 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  30 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  31 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  32 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h"
  33 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  34 #include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h"
  35
  36 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  37 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  38
  39 namespace content {
  40 namespace {
  41
  42 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  43 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  44 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  45 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  46 // of it, see:
  47 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  48 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  49   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  50   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  51   L"airfoilinject3.dll",          // Airfoil.
  52   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  53   L"assistant_x64.dll",           // Unknown.
  54   L"avcuf64.dll",                 // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
  55   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  56   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  57   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  58   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  59   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  60   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  61   L"cplushook.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  62   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  63   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  64   L"esspd.dll",                   // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  65   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  66   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  67   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  68   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  69   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  70   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  71   L"icatcdll.dll",                // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  72   L"icdcnl.dll",                  // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  73   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  74   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  75   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  76   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  77   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  78   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  79   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  80   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  81   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  82   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  83   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  84   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  85   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  86   L"pastali32.dll",               // PastaLeads.
  87   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  88   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  89   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  90   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  91   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  92   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  93   L"picrmi32.dll",                // PicRec.
  94   L"picrmi64.dll",                // PicRec.
  95   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  96   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  97   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  98   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  99   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
 100   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
 101   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
 102   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
 103   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
 104   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
 105   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
 106   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
 107   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
 108   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
 109   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
 110   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
 111   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
 112   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
 113   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 114   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 115   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 116   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 117   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 118   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 119 };
 120
 121 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 122 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 123 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 124 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 125                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 126                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 127   base::FilePath directory;
 128   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 129     return false;
 130
 131   if (sub_dir)
 132     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 133
 134   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 135   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 136                            directory.value().c_str());
 137   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 138     return false;
 139
 140   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 141   if (children)
 142     directory_str += L"*";
 143   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 144
 145   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 146                            directory_str.c_str());
 147   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 148     return false;
 149
 150   return true;
 151 }
 152
 153 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
 154 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
 155 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
 156                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 157                       sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 158   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 159   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 160                            key.c_str());
 161   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 162     return false;
 163
 164   key += L"\\*";
 165   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 166                            key.c_str());
 167   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 168     return false;
 169
 170   return true;
 171 }
 172
 173 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 174 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 175   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 176   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 177   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 178     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 179     return false;
 180   }
 181   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 182     return false;
 183   base::FilePath fname(path);
 184   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 185 }
 186
 187 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 188 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 189 // is also loaded in this process.
 190 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 191                         bool check_in_browser,
 192                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 193   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 194   if (!module) {
 195     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 196     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 197     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 198     std::wstring name(module_name);
 199     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 200     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 201     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 202     if (period <= 8)
 203       return;
 204     for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) {
 205       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0};
 206       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 207       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 208       if (check_in_browser) {
 209         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 210         if (!module)
 211           return;
 212         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 213         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 214         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 215           return;
 216       }
 217       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 218       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 219     }
 220   }
 221   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 222   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 223   return;
 224 }
 225
 226 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 227 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 228 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 229 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 230   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 231     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 232 }
 233
 234 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 235 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 236   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 237   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 238   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 239     HANDLE token;
 240     DWORD session_id_length;
 241     DWORD session_id = 0;
 242
 243     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 244     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 245         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 246     CloseHandle(token);
 247     if (session_id)
 248       s_session_id = session_id;
 249   }
 250
 251   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 252 }
 253
 254 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 255 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 256   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 257     return true;
 258
 259   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 260   // job.
 261   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 262     return true;
 263
 264   BOOL in_job = true;
 265   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 266   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 267     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 268   if (!in_job)
 269     return true;
 270
 271   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 272   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
 273   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 274                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 275                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 276     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 277     return true;
 278   }
 279   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 280     return true;
 281
 282   return false;
 283 }
 284
 285 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 286 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 287   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 288
 289   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 290   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 291   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 292                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 293                            L"Section");
 294   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 295     return false;
 296
 297   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 298   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 299   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 300   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 301                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 302                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 303   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 304     return false;
 305
 306   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 307   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 308   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 309   // system services.
 310   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 311                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 312                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 313   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 314     return false;
 315
 316   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 317   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 318   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 319                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 320                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 321   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 322     return false;
 323
 324   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 325 #ifndef NDEBUG
 326   base::FilePath app_dir;
 327   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 328     return false;
 329
 330   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 331   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 332                                                  long_path_buf,
 333                                                  MAX_PATH);
 334   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 335     return false;
 336
 337   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 338   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 339   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 340                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 341                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 342   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 343     return false;
 344 #endif  // NDEBUG
 345
 346   // Add the policy for read-only PDB file access for AddressSanitizer.
 347 #if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
 348   base::FilePath exe;
 349   if (!PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &exe))
 350     return false;
 351   base::FilePath pdb_path = exe.DirName().Append(L"*.pdb");
 352   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 353                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 354                            pdb_path.value().c_str());
 355   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 356     return false;
 357 #endif
 358
 359   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 360   return true;
 361 }
 362
 363 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 364   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 365   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 366   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 367                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 368                            L"Event");
 369   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 370     return false;
 371
 372   // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
 373   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 374     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
 375   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 376     return false;
 377
 378   // Close the proxy settings on XP.
 379   if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003)
 380     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key",
 381                  L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \
 382                      L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings");
 383   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 384     return false;
 385
 386
 387   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 388   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 389     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 390     // token is restricted.
 391     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 392   }
 393
 394   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 395   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 396   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 397   policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
 398
 399   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) {
 400     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 401   }
 402
 403   return true;
 404 }
 405
 406 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 407 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 408 // command_line as needed.
 409 void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
 410   const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line =
 411       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 412   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 413   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 414     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 415     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 416         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 417     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 418       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 419     }
 420     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 421   }
 422 }
 423
 424 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 425 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 426 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 427 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 428
 429 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 430                                                   HANDLE source_handle,
 431                                                   HANDLE target_process_handle,
 432                                                   LPHANDLE target_handle,
 433                                                   DWORD desired_access,
 434                                                   BOOL inherit_handle,
 435                                                   DWORD options);
 436
 437 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
 438
 439 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 440
 441 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 442     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 443     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 444     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 445
 446 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 447   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 448   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 449   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 450       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 451   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 452   NTSTATUS error;
 453   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 454   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 455   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 456
 457   // Get the object basic information.
 458   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 459   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 460   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 461                         &size);
 462   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 463
 464   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 465       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 466
 467   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 468     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask =
 469         ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
 470     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 471         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 472   }
 473 }
 474
 475 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 476                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 477                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 478                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 479                                  DWORD desired_access,
 480                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 481                                  DWORD options) {
 482   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 483   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 484                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 485                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 486     return FALSE;
 487
 488   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 489   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 490       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 491     return TRUE;
 492
 493   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 494   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 495   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 496     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 497     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 498       HANDLE temp_handle;
 499       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 500                                         target_process_handle,
 501                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 502                                         &temp_handle,
 503                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 504                                         FALSE, 0));
 505       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 506       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 507     }
 508   }
 509
 510   if (is_in_job) {
 511     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 512     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 513
 514     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 515     HANDLE temp_handle;
 516     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 517                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 518                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 519     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 520
 521     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 522     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get());
 523   }
 524
 525   return TRUE;
 526 }
 527 #endif
 528
 529 }  // namespace
 530
 531 void SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
 532                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 533                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 534                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 535   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) {
 536 #ifdef _WIN64
 537     policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
 538 #endif
 539     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 540   } else {
 541     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 542   }
 543 }
 544
 545 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 546 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 547 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 548   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 549   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 550       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 551   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 552 }
 553
 554 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 555   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 556   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 557   DCHECK(broker_services);
 558   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 559   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 560   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 561
 562   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 563 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 564   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 565   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 566   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 567   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 568   // original function.
 569   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 570       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 571     HMODULE module = NULL;
 572     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 573     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 574                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 575                               &module));
 576     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 577     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 578       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 579       result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 580           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 581           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 582       CHECK(result == 0);
 583       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
 584           reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
 585               g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
 586     }
 587   }
 588 #endif
 589
 590   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 591 }
 592
 593 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 594   DCHECK(target_services);
 595   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 596   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 597   g_target_services = target_services;
 598   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 599 }
 600
 601 base::Process StartSandboxedProcess(
 602     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 603     base::CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 604   const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
 605       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 606   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 607
 608   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 609
 610   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 611   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 612       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 613     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 614   }
 615
 616   ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
 617
 618   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 619   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 620   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 621   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 622
 623   if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
 624       browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 625       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 626     base::Process process =
 627         base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions());
 628     // TODO(rvargas) crbug.com/417532: Don't share a raw handle.
 629     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process.Handle());
 630     return process.Pass();
 631   }
 632
 633   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 634
 635   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 636                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 637                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 638                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 639                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 640
 641 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 642   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess &&
 643       IsWin32kRendererLockdownEnabled()) {
 644     if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
 645                         sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
 646                         NULL) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 647       return base::Process();
 648     }
 649     mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
 650   }
 651 #endif
 652
 653   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 654     return base::Process();
 655
 656   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 657                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 658
 659   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 660     return base::Process();
 661
 662   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 663
 664   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 665   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 666   if (delegate)
 667     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 668
 669   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 670     return base::Process();
 671
 672   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
 673 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 674     if (gfx::win::ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
 675       AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
 676                   NULL,
 677                   true,
 678                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 679                   policy);
 680     }
 681 #endif
 682   } else {
 683     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 684     // this subprocess. See
 685     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 686     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 687   }
 688
 689   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 690   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 691     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 692                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 693                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 694     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 695       return base::Process();
 696
 697     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 698     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 699                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 700                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 701     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 702       return base::Process();
 703   }
 704
 705   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 706     NOTREACHED();
 707     return base::Process();
 708   }
 709
 710   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 711     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 712     // have no effect.
 713     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 714     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 715   }
 716
 717   if (delegate) {
 718     bool success = true;
 719     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 720     if (!success)
 721       return base::Process();
 722   }
 723
 724   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 725
 726   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 727   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 728                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 729                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 730                policy, &temp_process_info);
 731   DWORD last_error = ::GetLastError();
 732   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 733
 734   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 735
 736   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 737     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 738       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 739     else if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_PROCESS) {
 740       // TODO(shrikant): Remove this special case handling after determining
 741       // cause for lowbox/createprocess errors.
 742       sandbox::PolicyBase* policy_base =
 743           static_cast<sandbox::PolicyBase*>(policy);
 744       UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY(policy_base->GetLowBoxSid() ?
 745                                       "Process.Sandbox.Lowbox.Launch.Error" :
 746                                       "Process.Sandbox.Launch.Error",
 747                                   last_error);
 748     } else
 749       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 750
 751     policy->Release();
 752     return base::Process();
 753   }
 754   policy->Release();
 755
 756   if (delegate)
 757     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 758
 759   CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != -1);
 760   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 761   return base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle());
 762 }
 763
 764 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 765                            DWORD target_process_id,
 766                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 767                            DWORD desired_access,
 768                            DWORD options) {
 769   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 770   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 771     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 772                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 773                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 774
 775   }
 776
 777   // Try the broker next
 778   if (g_target_services &&
 779       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 780                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 781                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 782     return true;
 783   }
 784
 785   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 786   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 787   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 788                                     target_process_id));
 789   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 790     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 791                                 target_process.Get(), target_handle,
 792                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 793   }
 794
 795   return false;
 796 }
 797
 798 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 799   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 800 }
 801
 802 }  // namespace content