content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  12 #include "base/debug/trace_event.h"
  13 #include "base/file_util.h"
  14 #include "base/hash.h"
  15 #include "base/path_service.h"
  16 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  17 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  19 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  20 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  21 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  22 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  23 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  24 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  25 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  26 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  27 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  28 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  29 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  30 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  31
  32 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  33 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  34
  35 namespace content {
  36 namespace {
  37
  38 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  39 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  40 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  41 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  42 // of it, see:
  43 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  44 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  45   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  46   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  47   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  48   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  49   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  50   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  51   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  52   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  53   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  54   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  55   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  56   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  57   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  58   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  59   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  60   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  61   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  62   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  63   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  64   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  65   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  66   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  67   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  68   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  69   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  70   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  71   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  72   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  73   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  74   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  75   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  76   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  77   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  78   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  79   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  80   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  81   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  82   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  83   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  84   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  85   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
  86   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
  87   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
  88   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
  89   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
  90   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  91   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
  92   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
  93   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
  94   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
  95   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
  96   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
  97   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
  98   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  99   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 100   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 101   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 102   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 103   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 104   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 105 };
 106
 107 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 108 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 109 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 110 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 111                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 112                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 113   base::FilePath directory;
 114   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 115     return false;
 116
 117   if (sub_dir)
 118     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 119
 120   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 121   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 122                            directory.value().c_str());
 123   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 124     return false;
 125
 126   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 127   if (children)
 128     directory_str += L"*";
 129   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 130
 131   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 132                            directory_str.c_str());
 133   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 134     return false;
 135
 136   return true;
 137 }
 138
 139 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
 140 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
 141 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
 142                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 143                       sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 144   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 145   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 146                            key.c_str());
 147   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 148     return false;
 149
 150   key += L"\\*";
 151   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 152                            key.c_str());
 153   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 154     return false;
 155
 156   return true;
 157 }
 158
 159 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 160 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 161   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 162   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 163   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 164     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 165     return false;
 166   }
 167   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 168     return false;
 169   base::FilePath fname(path);
 170   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 171 }
 172
 173 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 174 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 175 // is also loaded in this process.
 176 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 177                         bool check_in_browser,
 178                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 179   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 180   if (!module) {
 181     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 182     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 183     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 184     std::wstring name(module_name);
 185     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 186     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 187     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 188     if (period <= 8)
 189       return;
 190     for (int ix = 0; ix < 3; ++ix) {
 191       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ('1' + ix), 0};
 192       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 193       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 194       if (check_in_browser) {
 195         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 196         if (!module)
 197           return;
 198         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 199         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 200         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 201           return;
 202       }
 203       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 204       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 205     }
 206   }
 207   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 208   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 209   return;
 210 }
 211
 212 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 213 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 214 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 215 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 216   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 217     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 218 }
 219
 220 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 221 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 222   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 223   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 224   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 225     HANDLE token;
 226     DWORD session_id_length;
 227     DWORD session_id = 0;
 228
 229     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 230     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 231         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 232     CloseHandle(token);
 233     if (session_id)
 234       s_session_id = session_id;
 235   }
 236
 237   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 238 }
 239
 240 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 241 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 242   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 243     return true;
 244
 245   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 246   // job.
 247   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 248     return true;
 249
 250   BOOL in_job = true;
 251   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 252   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 253     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 254   if (!in_job)
 255     return true;
 256
 257   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 258   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
 259   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 260                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 261                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 262     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 263     return true;
 264   }
 265   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 266     return true;
 267
 268   return false;
 269 }
 270
 271 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 272 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 273   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 274
 275   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 276   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 277   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 278                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 279                            L"Section");
 280   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 281     return false;
 282
 283   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 284   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 285   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 286   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 287                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 288                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 289   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 290     return false;
 291
 292   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 293   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 294   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 295   // system services.
 296   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 297                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 298                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 299   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 300     return false;
 301
 302   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 303   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 304   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 305                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 306                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 307   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 308     return false;
 309
 310   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 311 #ifndef NDEBUG
 312   base::FilePath app_dir;
 313   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 314     return false;
 315
 316   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 317   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 318                                                  long_path_buf,
 319                                                  MAX_PATH);
 320   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 321     return false;
 322
 323   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 324   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 325   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 326                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 327                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 328   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 329     return false;
 330 #endif  // NDEBUG
 331
 332   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 333
 334   return true;
 335 }
 336
 337 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 338   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 339   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 340   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 341                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 342                            L"Event");
 343   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 344     return false;
 345
 346   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 347   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 348     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 349     // token is restricted.
 350     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 351   }
 352
 353   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 354   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 355   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 356
 357   bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
 358                         switches::kDisableAltWinstation);
 359
 360   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) {
 361     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 362   }
 363
 364   return true;
 365 }
 366
 367 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 368 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 369 // command_line as needed.
 370 void ProcessDebugFlags(CommandLine* command_line) {
 371   const CommandLine& current_cmd_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 372   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 373   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 374     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 375     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 376         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 377     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 378       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 379     }
 380     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 381   }
 382 }
 383
 384 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 385 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 386 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 387 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 388
 389 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 390                                                   HANDLE source_handle,
 391                                                   HANDLE target_process_handle,
 392                                                   LPHANDLE target_handle,
 393                                                   DWORD desired_access,
 394                                                   BOOL inherit_handle,
 395                                                   DWORD options);
 396
 397 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
 398
 399 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 400
 401 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 402     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 403     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 404     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 405
 406 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 407   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 408   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 409   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 410       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 411   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 412   NTSTATUS error;
 413   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 414   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 415   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 416
 417   // Get the object basic information.
 418   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 419   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 420   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 421                         &size);
 422   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 423
 424   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 425       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 426
 427   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 428     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask = ~(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION |
 429                                          SYNCHRONIZE);
 430     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 431         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 432   }
 433 }
 434
 435 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 436                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 437                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 438                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 439                                  DWORD desired_access,
 440                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 441                                  DWORD options) {
 442   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 443   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 444                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 445                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 446     return FALSE;
 447
 448   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 449   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 450       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 451     return TRUE;
 452
 453   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 454   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 455   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 456     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 457     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 458       HANDLE temp_handle;
 459       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 460                                         target_process_handle,
 461                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 462                                         &temp_handle,
 463                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 464                                         FALSE, 0));
 465       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 466       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process, NULL, &is_in_job));
 467     }
 468   }
 469
 470   if (is_in_job) {
 471     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 472     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 473
 474     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 475     HANDLE temp_handle;
 476     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 477                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 478                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 479     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 480
 481     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 482     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle);
 483   }
 484
 485   return TRUE;
 486 }
 487 #endif
 488
 489 }  // namespace
 490
 491 void SetJobLevel(const CommandLine& cmd_line,
 492                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 493                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 494                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 495   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line))
 496     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 497   else
 498     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 499 }
 500
 501 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 502 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 503 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 504   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 505   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 506       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 507   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 508 }
 509
 510 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 511   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 512   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 513   DCHECK(broker_services);
 514   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 515   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 516   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 517
 518   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 519 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 520   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 521   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 522   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 523   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 524   // original function.
 525   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 526       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 527     HMODULE module = NULL;
 528     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 529     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 530                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 531                               &module));
 532     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 533     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 534       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 535       result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 536           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 537           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 538       CHECK(result == 0);
 539       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
 540           reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
 541               g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
 542     }
 543   }
 544 #endif
 545
 546   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 547 }
 548
 549 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 550   DCHECK(target_services);
 551   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 552   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 553   g_target_services = target_services;
 554   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 555 }
 556
 557 bool ShouldUseDirectWrite() {
 558   // If the flag is currently on, and we're on Win7 or above, we enable
 559   // DirectWrite. Skia does not require the additions to DirectWrite in QFE
 560   // 2670838, so a Win7 check is sufficient. We do not currently attempt to
 561   // support Vista, where SP2 and the Platform Update are required.
 562   const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 563   return command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDirectWrite) &&
 564          base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN7;
 565 }
 566
 567 base::ProcessHandle StartSandboxedProcess(
 568     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 569     CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 570   const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 571   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 572
 573   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 574
 575   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 576   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 577       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 578     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 579   }
 580
 581   ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
 582
 583   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 584   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 585   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 586   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 587
 588   if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
 589       browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 590       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 591     base::ProcessHandle process = 0;
 592     base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &process);
 593     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process);
 594     return process;
 595   }
 596
 597   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 598
 599   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 600                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 601                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 602                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 603                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 604
 605   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 606     return 0;
 607
 608   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 609                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 610
 611   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 612     return 0;
 613
 614   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 615
 616   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 617   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 618   if (delegate)
 619     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 620
 621   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 622     return 0;
 623
 624   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
 625     if (ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
 626       AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
 627                   NULL,
 628                   true,
 629                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 630                   policy);
 631     }
 632   } else {
 633     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 634     // this subprocess. See
 635     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 636     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 637   }
 638
 639   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 640   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 641     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 642                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 643                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 644     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 645       return 0;
 646
 647     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 648     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 649                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 650                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 651     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 652       return 0;
 653   }
 654
 655   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 656     NOTREACHED();
 657     return 0;
 658   }
 659
 660   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 661     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 662     // have no effect.
 663     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 664     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 665   }
 666
 667   if (delegate) {
 668     bool success = true;
 669     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 670     if (!success)
 671       return 0;
 672   }
 673
 674   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 675
 676   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 677   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 678                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 679                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 680                policy, &temp_process_info);
 681   policy->Release();
 682   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 683
 684   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 685
 686   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 687     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 688       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 689     else
 690       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 691     return 0;
 692   }
 693
 694   if (delegate)
 695     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 696
 697   ResumeThread(target.thread_handle());
 698   return target.TakeProcessHandle();
 699 }
 700
 701 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 702                            DWORD target_process_id,
 703                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 704                            DWORD desired_access,
 705                            DWORD options) {
 706   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 707   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 708     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 709                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 710                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 711
 712   }
 713
 714   // Try the broker next
 715   if (g_target_services &&
 716       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 717                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 718                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 719     return true;
 720   }
 721
 722   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 723   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 724   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 725                                     target_process_id));
 726   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 727     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 728                                 target_process, target_handle,
 729                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 730   }
 731
 732   return false;
 733 }
 734
 735 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 736   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 737 }
 738
 739 }  // namespace content