net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc.h"
   6
   7 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h"
   8 #include "base/sha1.h"
   9 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  10 #include "build/build_config.h"
  11 #include "net/base/net_errors.h"
  12 #include "net/base/net_util.h"
  13 #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
  14 #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
  15 #include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h"
  16 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
  17 #include "net/cert/crl_set.h"
  18 #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
  19 #include "url/url_canon.h"
  20
  21 #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS)
  22 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_nss.h"
  23 #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
  24 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_openssl.h"
  25 #elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
  26 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_android.h"
  27 #elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
  28 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_mac.h"
  29 #elif defined(OS_WIN)
  30 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.h"
  31 #else
  32 #error Implement certificate verification.
  33 #endif
  34
  35
  36 namespace net {
  37
  38 namespace {
  39
  40 // Constants used to build histogram names
  41 const char kLeafCert[] = "Leaf";
  42 const char kIntermediateCert[] = "Intermediate";
  43 const char kRootCert[] = "Root";
  44 // Matches the order of X509Certificate::PublicKeyType
  45 const char* const kCertTypeStrings[] = {
  46     "Unknown",
  47     "RSA",
  48     "DSA",
  49     "ECDSA",
  50     "DH",
  51     "ECDH"
  52 };
  53 // Histogram buckets for RSA/DSA/DH key sizes.
  54 const int kRsaDsaKeySizes[] = {512, 768, 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192,
  55                                16384};
  56 // Histogram buckets for ECDSA/ECDH key sizes. The list is based upon the FIPS
  57 // 186-4 approved curves.
  58 const int kEccKeySizes[] = {163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 384, 409, 521, 571};
  59
  60 const char* CertTypeToString(int cert_type) {
  61   if (cert_type < 0 ||
  62       static_cast<size_t>(cert_type) >= arraysize(kCertTypeStrings)) {
  63     return "Unsupported";
  64   }
  65   return kCertTypeStrings[cert_type];
  66 }
  67
  68 void RecordPublicKeyHistogram(const char* chain_position,
  69                               bool baseline_keysize_applies,
  70                               size_t size_bits,
  71                               X509Certificate::PublicKeyType cert_type) {
  72   std::string histogram_name =
  73       base::StringPrintf("CertificateType2.%s.%s.%s",
  74                          baseline_keysize_applies ? "BR" : "NonBR",
  75                          chain_position,
  76                          CertTypeToString(cert_type));
  77   // Do not use UMA_HISTOGRAM_... macros here, as it caches the Histogram
  78   // instance and thus only works if |histogram_name| is constant.
  79   base::HistogramBase* counter = NULL;
  80
  81   // Histogram buckets are contingent upon the underlying algorithm being used.
  82   if (cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDH ||
  83       cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDSA) {
  84     // Typical key sizes match SECP/FIPS 186-3 recommendations for prime and
  85     // binary curves - which range from 163 bits to 571 bits.
  86     counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet(
  87         histogram_name,
  88         base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kEccKeySizes,
  89                                                    arraysize(kEccKeySizes)),
  90         base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
  91   } else {
  92     // Key sizes < 1024 bits should cause errors, while key sizes > 16K are not
  93     // uniformly supported by the underlying cryptographic libraries.
  94     counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet(
  95         histogram_name,
  96         base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kRsaDsaKeySizes,
  97                                                    arraysize(kRsaDsaKeySizes)),
  98         base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
  99   }
 100   counter->Add(size_bits);
 101 }
 102
 103 // Returns true if |type| is |kPublicKeyTypeRSA| or |kPublicKeyTypeDSA|, and
 104 // if |size_bits| is < 1024. Note that this means there may be false
 105 // negatives: keys for other algorithms and which are weak will pass this
 106 // test.
 107 bool IsWeakKey(X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type, size_t size_bits) {
 108   switch (type) {
 109     case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeRSA:
 110     case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeDSA:
 111       return size_bits < 1024;
 112     default:
 113       return false;
 114   }
 115 }
 116
 117 // Returns true if |cert| contains a known-weak key. Additionally, histograms
 118 // the observed keys for future tightening of the definition of what
 119 // constitutes a weak key.
 120 bool ExaminePublicKeys(const scoped_refptr<X509Certificate>& cert,
 121                        bool should_histogram) {
 122   // The effective date of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements -
 123   // 2012-07-01 00:00:00 UTC.
 124   const base::Time kBaselineEffectiveDate =
 125       base::Time::FromInternalValue(GG_INT64_C(12985574400000000));
 126   // The effective date of the key size requirements from Appendix A, v1.1.5
 127   // 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC.
 128   const base::Time kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate =
 129       base::Time::FromInternalValue(GG_INT64_C(13033008000000000));
 130
 131   size_t size_bits = 0;
 132   X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type = X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeUnknown;
 133   bool weak_key = false;
 134   bool baseline_keysize_applies =
 135       cert->valid_start() >= kBaselineEffectiveDate &&
 136       cert->valid_expiry() >= kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate;
 137
 138   X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(cert->os_cert_handle(), &size_bits, &type);
 139   if (should_histogram) {
 140     RecordPublicKeyHistogram(kLeafCert, baseline_keysize_applies, size_bits,
 141                              type);
 142   }
 143   if (IsWeakKey(type, size_bits))
 144     weak_key = true;
 145
 146   const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& intermediates =
 147       cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
 148   for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediates.size(); ++i) {
 149     X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(intermediates[i], &size_bits, &type);
 150     if (should_histogram) {
 151       RecordPublicKeyHistogram(
 152           (i < intermediates.size() - 1) ? kIntermediateCert : kRootCert,
 153           baseline_keysize_applies,
 154           size_bits,
 155           type);
 156     }
 157     if (!weak_key && IsWeakKey(type, size_bits))
 158       weak_key = true;
 159   }
 160
 161   return weak_key;
 162 }
 163
 164 }  // namespace
 165
 166 // static
 167 CertVerifyProc* CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault() {
 168 #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS)
 169   return new CertVerifyProcNSS();
 170 #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
 171   return new CertVerifyProcOpenSSL();
 172 #elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
 173   return new CertVerifyProcAndroid();
 174 #elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
 175   return new CertVerifyProcMac();
 176 #elif defined(OS_WIN)
 177   return new CertVerifyProcWin();
 178 #else
 179   return NULL;
 180 #endif
 181 }
 182
 183 CertVerifyProc::CertVerifyProc() {}
 184
 185 CertVerifyProc::~CertVerifyProc() {}
 186
 187 int CertVerifyProc::Verify(X509Certificate* cert,
 188                            const std::string& hostname,
 189                            int flags,
 190                            CRLSet* crl_set,
 191                            const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
 192                            CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
 193   verify_result->Reset();
 194   verify_result->verified_cert = cert;
 195
 196   if (IsBlacklisted(cert)) {
 197     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
 198     return ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
 199   }
 200
 201   // We do online revocation checking for EV certificates that aren't covered
 202   // by a fresh CRLSet.
 203   // TODO(rsleevi): http://crbug.com/142974 - Allow preferences to fully
 204   // disable revocation checking.
 205   if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT)
 206     flags |= CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY;
 207
 208   int rv = VerifyInternal(cert, hostname, flags, crl_set,
 209                           additional_trust_anchors, verify_result);
 210
 211   UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallback",
 212                         verify_result->common_name_fallback_used);
 213   if (!verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root) {
 214     UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallbackPrivateCA",
 215                           verify_result->common_name_fallback_used);
 216   }
 217
 218   // This check is done after VerifyInternal so that VerifyInternal can fill
 219   // in the list of public key hashes.
 220   if (IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(verify_result->public_key_hashes)) {
 221     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
 222     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 223   }
 224
 225   std::vector<std::string> dns_names, ip_addrs;
 226   cert->GetSubjectAltName(&dns_names, &ip_addrs);
 227   if (HasNameConstraintsViolation(verify_result->public_key_hashes,
 228                                   cert->subject().common_name,
 229                                   dns_names,
 230                                   ip_addrs)) {
 231     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
 232     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 233   }
 234
 235   // Check for weak keys in the entire verified chain.
 236   bool weak_key = ExaminePublicKeys(verify_result->verified_cert,
 237                                     verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root);
 238
 239   if (weak_key) {
 240     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY;
 241     // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure,
 242     // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate
 243     // error.
 244     if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv))
 245       rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 246   }
 247
 248   // Treat certificates signed using broken signature algorithms as invalid.
 249   if (verify_result->has_md2 || verify_result->has_md4) {
 250     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
 251     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 252   }
 253
 254   // Flag certificates using weak signature algorithms.
 255   if (verify_result->has_md5) {
 256     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
 257     // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure,
 258     // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate
 259     // error.
 260     if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv))
 261       rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 262   }
 263
 264   // Flag certificates from publicly-trusted CAs that are issued to intranet
 265   // hosts. While the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (v1.1) permit
 266   // these to be issued until 1 November 2015, they represent a real risk for
 267   // the deployment of gTLDs and are being phased out ahead of the hard
 268   // deadline.
 269   if (verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && IsHostnameNonUnique(hostname)) {
 270     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME;
 271     // CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME will eventually become a hard error. For
 272     // now treat it as a warning and do not map it to an error return value.
 273   }
 274
 275   return rv;
 276 }
 277
 278 // static
 279 bool CertVerifyProc::IsBlacklisted(X509Certificate* cert) {
 280   static const unsigned kComodoSerialBytes = 16;
 281   static const uint8 kComodoSerials[][kComodoSerialBytes] = {
 282     // Not a real certificate. For testing only.
 283     {0x07,0x7a,0x59,0xbc,0xd5,0x34,0x59,0x60,0x1c,0xa6,0x90,0x72,0x67,0xa6,0xdd,0x1c},
 284
 285     // The next nine certificates all expire on Fri Mar 14 23:59:59 2014.
 286     // Some serial numbers actually have a leading 0x00 byte required to
 287     // encode a positive integer in DER if the most significant bit is 0.
 288     // We omit the leading 0x00 bytes to make all serial numbers 16 bytes.
 289
 290     // Subject: CN=mail.google.com
 291     // subjectAltName dNSName: mail.google.com, www.mail.google.com
 292     {0x04,0x7e,0xcb,0xe9,0xfc,0xa5,0x5f,0x7b,0xd0,0x9e,0xae,0x36,0xe1,0x0c,0xae,0x1e},
 293     // Subject: CN=global trustee
 294     // subjectAltName dNSName: global trustee
 295     // Note: not a CA certificate.
 296     {0xd8,0xf3,0x5f,0x4e,0xb7,0x87,0x2b,0x2d,0xab,0x06,0x92,0xe3,0x15,0x38,0x2f,0xb0},
 297     // Subject: CN=login.live.com
 298     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.live.com, www.login.live.com
 299     {0xb0,0xb7,0x13,0x3e,0xd0,0x96,0xf9,0xb5,0x6f,0xae,0x91,0xc8,0x74,0xbd,0x3a,0xc0},
 300     // Subject: CN=addons.mozilla.org
 301     // subjectAltName dNSName: addons.mozilla.org, www.addons.mozilla.org
 302     {0x92,0x39,0xd5,0x34,0x8f,0x40,0xd1,0x69,0x5a,0x74,0x54,0x70,0xe1,0xf2,0x3f,0x43},
 303     // Subject: CN=login.skype.com
 304     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.skype.com, www.login.skype.com
 305     {0xe9,0x02,0x8b,0x95,0x78,0xe4,0x15,0xdc,0x1a,0x71,0x0a,0x2b,0x88,0x15,0x44,0x47},
 306     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 307     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com, www.login.yahoo.com
 308     {0xd7,0x55,0x8f,0xda,0xf5,0xf1,0x10,0x5b,0xb2,0x13,0x28,0x2b,0x70,0x77,0x29,0xa3},
 309     // Subject: CN=www.google.com
 310     // subjectAltName dNSName: www.google.com, google.com
 311     {0xf5,0xc8,0x6a,0xf3,0x61,0x62,0xf1,0x3a,0x64,0xf5,0x4f,0x6d,0xc9,0x58,0x7c,0x06},
 312     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 313     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com
 314     {0x39,0x2a,0x43,0x4f,0x0e,0x07,0xdf,0x1f,0x8a,0xa3,0x05,0xde,0x34,0xe0,0xc2,0x29},
 315     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 316     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com
 317     {0x3e,0x75,0xce,0xd4,0x6b,0x69,0x30,0x21,0x21,0x88,0x30,0xae,0x86,0xa8,0x2a,0x71},
 318   };
 319
 320   const std::string& serial_number = cert->serial_number();
 321   if (!serial_number.empty() && (serial_number[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
 322     // This is a negative serial number, which isn't technically allowed but
 323     // which probably happens. In order to avoid confusing a negative serial
 324     // number with a positive one once the leading zeros have been removed, we
 325     // disregard it.
 326     return false;
 327   }
 328
 329   base::StringPiece serial(serial_number);
 330   // Remove leading zeros.
 331   while (serial.size() > 1 && serial[0] == 0)
 332     serial.remove_prefix(1);
 333
 334   if (serial.size() == kComodoSerialBytes) {
 335     for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kComodoSerials); i++) {
 336       if (memcmp(kComodoSerials[i], serial.data(), kComodoSerialBytes) == 0) {
 337         UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.SSLCertBlacklisted", i,
 338                                   arraysize(kComodoSerials) + 1);
 339         return true;
 340       }
 341     }
 342   }
 343
 344   return false;
 345 }
 346
 347 // static
 348 // NOTE: This implementation assumes and enforces that the hashes are SHA1.
 349 bool CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(
 350     const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes) {
 351   static const unsigned kNumHashes = 14;
 352   static const uint8 kHashes[kNumHashes][base::kSHA1Length] = {
 353     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Root CA
 354     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net x2 and self-signed
 355     {0x41, 0x0f, 0x36, 0x36, 0x32, 0x58, 0xf3, 0x0b, 0x34, 0x7d,
 356      0x12, 0xce, 0x48, 0x63, 0xe4, 0x33, 0x43, 0x78, 0x06, 0xa8},
 357     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Cyber CA
 358     // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root
 359     {0xc4, 0xf9, 0x66, 0x37, 0x16, 0xcd, 0x5e, 0x71, 0xd6, 0x95,
 360      0x0b, 0x5f, 0x33, 0xce, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x95, 0xb4, 0x35, 0xd1},
 361     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Services 1024 CA
 362     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net
 363     {0xe2, 0x3b, 0x8d, 0x10, 0x5f, 0x87, 0x71, 0x0a, 0x68, 0xd9,
 364      0x24, 0x80, 0x50, 0xeb, 0xef, 0xc6, 0x27, 0xbe, 0x4c, 0xa6},
 365     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2
 366     // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Organisatie CA - G2
 367     {0x7b, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x39, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x2b, 0x45, 0x6e,
 368      0x9f, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x1d, 0xe6, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x49, 0x45, 0xdb},
 369     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Overheid en Bedrijven
 370     // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Overheid CA
 371     {0xe8, 0xf9, 0x12, 0x00, 0xc6, 0x5c, 0xee, 0x16, 0xe0, 0x39,
 372      0xb9, 0xf8, 0x83, 0x84, 0x16, 0x61, 0x63, 0x5f, 0x81, 0xc5},
 373     // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd.
 374     // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root
 375     // Expires: Jul 17 15:16:54 2012 GMT
 376     {0x01, 0x29, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xae, 0x8d, 0x24, 0x96,
 377      0xd1, 0xc3, 0xe1, 0x97, 0x23, 0x91, 0x90, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x52},
 378     // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd.
 379     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048)
 380     // Expires: Jul 16 17:53:37 2015 GMT
 381     {0xd3, 0x3c, 0x5b, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0xb3, 0xbe, 0x9a,
 382      0xd6, 0x95, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0xcc, 0x25, 0x28, 0x03, 0x29, 0x81},
 383     // Issuer: CN=Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2
 384     // Covers two certificates, the latter of which expires Apr 15 21:09:30
 385     // 2021 GMT.
 386     {0xe1, 0x2d, 0x89, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x22, 0x76, 0xf8, 0x30, 0xe6,
 387      0xce, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x41, 0xa9, 0x32},
 388     // Cyberoam CA certificate. Private key leaked, but this certificate would
 389     // only have been installed by Cyberoam customers. The certificate expires
 390     // in 2036, but we can probably remove in a couple of years (2014).
 391     {0xd9, 0xf5, 0xc6, 0xce, 0x57, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xcc, 0x7e,
 392      0xd1, 0x72, 0xbd, 0x53, 0xe0, 0xd3, 0x07, 0x83, 0x4b, 0xd1},
 393     // Win32/Sirefef.gen!C generates fake certificates with this public key.
 394     {0xa4, 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x9e, 0x1d, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0xc3,
 395      0x31, 0xcf, 0x64, 0xfc, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0x51, 0xfb, 0xa4},
 396     // ANSSI certificate under which a MITM proxy was mistakenly operated.
 397     // Expires: Jul 18 10:05:28 2014 GMT
 398     {0x3e, 0xcf, 0x4b, 0xbb, 0xe4, 0x60, 0x96, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xbb,
 399      0x53, 0x9b, 0xb9, 0x13, 0xd7, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0xef, 0x31, 0xbf},
 400     // Three retired intermediate certificates from Symantec. No compromise;
 401     // just for robustness. All expire May 17 23:59:59 2018.
 402     // See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=966060
 403     {0x68, 0x5e, 0xec, 0x0a, 0x39, 0xf6, 0x68, 0xae, 0x8f, 0xd8,
 404      0x96, 0x4f, 0x98, 0x74, 0x76, 0xb4, 0x50, 0x4f, 0xd2, 0xbe},
 405     {0x0e, 0x50, 0x2d, 0x4d, 0xd1, 0xe1, 0x60, 0x36, 0x8a, 0x31,
 406      0xf0, 0x6a, 0x81, 0x04, 0x31, 0xba, 0x6f, 0x72, 0xc0, 0x41},
 407     {0x93, 0xd1, 0x53, 0x22, 0x29, 0xcc, 0x2a, 0xbd, 0x21, 0xdf,
 408      0xf5, 0x97, 0xee, 0x32, 0x0f, 0xe4, 0x24, 0x6f, 0x3d, 0x0c},
 409   };
 410
 411   for (unsigned i = 0; i < kNumHashes; i++) {
 412     for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin();
 413          j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) {
 414       if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 &&
 415           memcmp(j->data(), kHashes[i], base::kSHA1Length) == 0) {
 416         return true;
 417       }
 418     }
 419   }
 420
 421   return false;
 422 }
 423
 424 static const size_t kMaxTLDLength = 4;
 425
 426 // CheckNameConstraints verifies that every name in |dns_names| is in one of
 427 // the domains specified by |tlds|. The |tlds| array is terminated by an empty
 428 // string.
 429 static bool CheckNameConstraints(const std::vector<std::string>& dns_names,
 430                                  const char tlds[][kMaxTLDLength]) {
 431   for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator i = dns_names.begin();
 432        i != dns_names.end(); ++i) {
 433     bool ok = false;
 434     url::CanonHostInfo host_info;
 435     const std::string dns_name = CanonicalizeHost(*i, &host_info);
 436     if (host_info.IsIPAddress())
 437       continue;
 438
 439     const size_t registry_len = registry_controlled_domains::GetRegistryLength(
 440         dns_name,
 441         registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
 442         registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
 443     // If the name is not in a known TLD, ignore it. This permits internal
 444     // names.
 445     if (registry_len == 0)
 446       continue;
 447
 448     for (size_t j = 0; tlds[j][0]; ++j) {
 449       const size_t tld_length = strlen(tlds[j]);
 450       // The DNS name must have "." + tlds[j] as a suffix.
 451       if (i->size() <= (1 /* period before TLD */ + tld_length))
 452         continue;
 453
 454       const char* suffix = &dns_name[i->size() - tld_length - 1];
 455       if (suffix[0] != '.')
 456         continue;
 457       if (memcmp(&suffix[1], tlds[j], tld_length) != 0)
 458         continue;
 459       ok = true;
 460       break;
 461     }
 462
 463     if (!ok)
 464       return false;
 465   }
 466
 467   return true;
 468 }
 469
 470 // PublicKeyTLDLimitation contains a SHA1, SPKI hash and a pointer to an array
 471 // of fixed-length strings that contain the TLDs that the SPKI is allowed to
 472 // issue for.
 473 struct PublicKeyTLDLimitation {
 474   uint8 public_key[base::kSHA1Length];
 475   const char (*tlds)[kMaxTLDLength];
 476 };
 477
 478 // static
 479 bool CertVerifyProc::HasNameConstraintsViolation(
 480     const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes,
 481     const std::string& common_name,
 482     const std::vector<std::string>& dns_names,
 483     const std::vector<std::string>& ip_addrs) {
 484   static const char kTLDsANSSI[][kMaxTLDLength] = {
 485     "fr",  // France
 486     "gp",  // Guadeloupe
 487     "gf",  // Guyane
 488     "mq",  // Martinique
 489     "re",  // Réunion
 490     "yt",  // Mayotte
 491     "pm",  // Saint-Pierre et Miquelon
 492     "bl",  // Saint Barthélemy
 493     "mf",  // Saint Martin
 494     "wf",  // Wallis et Futuna
 495     "pf",  // Polynésie française
 496     "nc",  // Nouvelle Calédonie
 497     "tf",  // Terres australes et antarctiques françaises
 498     "",
 499   };
 500
 501   static const char kTLDsTest[][kMaxTLDLength] = {
 502     "com",
 503     "",
 504   };
 505
 506   static const PublicKeyTLDLimitation kLimits[] = {
 507     // C=FR, ST=France, L=Paris, O=PM/SGDN, OU=DCSSI,
 508     // CN=IGC/A/emailAddress=igca@sgdn.pm.gouv.fr
 509     {
 510       {0x79, 0x23, 0xd5, 0x8d, 0x0f, 0xe0, 0x3c, 0xe6, 0xab, 0xad,
 511        0xae, 0x27, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x14, 0xd1, 0xa8, 0x73},
 512       kTLDsANSSI,
 513     },
 514     // Not a real certificate - just for testing. This is the SPKI hash of
 515     // the keys used in net/data/ssl/certificates/name_constraint_*.crt.
 516     {
 517       {0x15, 0x45, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0x58, 0x6b, 0x47, 0xcf, 0xc1, 0x44,
 518        0xa2, 0xc9, 0xaa, 0xab, 0x98, 0x3d, 0x21, 0xcc, 0x42, 0xde},
 519       kTLDsTest,
 520     },
 521   };
 522
 523   for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kLimits); ++i) {
 524     for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin();
 525          j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) {
 526       if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 &&
 527           memcmp(j->data(), kLimits[i].public_key, base::kSHA1Length) == 0) {
 528         if (dns_names.empty() && ip_addrs.empty()) {
 529           std::vector<std::string> dns_names;
 530           dns_names.push_back(common_name);
 531           if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].tlds))
 532             return true;
 533         } else {
 534           if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].tlds))
 535             return true;
 536         }
 537       }
 538     }
 539   }
 540
 541   return false;
 542 }
 543
 544 }  // namespace net