drm: Drop explicit initialization of struct i2c_device_id::driver_data to 0

[drm/drm-misc.git] / fs / crypto / keyring.c

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
 * Filesystem-level keyring for fscrypt
 *
 * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
 */

/*
 * This file implements management of fscrypt master keys in the
 * filesystem-level keyring, including the ioctls:
 *
 * - FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY
 * - FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
 * - FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS
 * - FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS
 *
 * See the "User API" section of Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst for more
 * information about these ioctls.
 */

#include <linux/unaligned.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/once.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>

#include "fscrypt_private.h"

/* The master encryption keys for a filesystem (->s_master_keys) */
struct fscrypt_keyring {
        /*
         * Lock that protects ->key_hashtable.  It does *not* protect the
         * fscrypt_master_key structs themselves.
         */
        spinlock_t lock;

        /* Hash table that maps fscrypt_key_specifier to fscrypt_master_key */
        struct hlist_head key_hashtable[128];
};

static void wipe_master_key_secret(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
{
        fscrypt_destroy_hkdf(&secret->hkdf);
        memzero_explicit(secret, sizeof(*secret));
}

static void move_master_key_secret(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *dst,
                                   struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *src)
{
        memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(*dst));
        memzero_explicit(src, sizeof(*src));
}

static void fscrypt_free_master_key(struct rcu_head *head)
{
        struct fscrypt_master_key *mk =
                container_of(head, struct fscrypt_master_key, mk_rcu_head);
        /*
         * The master key secret and any embedded subkeys should have already
         * been wiped when the last active reference to the fscrypt_master_key
         * struct was dropped; doing it here would be unnecessarily late.
         * Nevertheless, use kfree_sensitive() in case anything was missed.
         */
        kfree_sensitive(mk);
}

void fscrypt_put_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
        if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&mk->mk_struct_refs))
                return;
        /*
         * No structural references left, so free ->mk_users, and also free the
         * fscrypt_master_key struct itself after an RCU grace period ensures
         * that concurrent keyring lookups can no longer find it.
         */
        WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 0);
        if (mk->mk_users) {
                /* Clear the keyring so the quota gets released right away. */
                keyring_clear(mk->mk_users);
                key_put(mk->mk_users);
                mk->mk_users = NULL;
        }
        call_rcu(&mk->mk_rcu_head, fscrypt_free_master_key);
}

void fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(struct super_block *sb,
                                      struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
        size_t i;

        if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&mk->mk_active_refs))
                return;
        /*
         * No active references left, so complete the full removal of this
         * fscrypt_master_key struct by removing it from the keyring and
         * destroying any subkeys embedded in it.
         */

        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sb->s_master_keys))
                return;
        spin_lock(&sb->s_master_keys->lock);
        hlist_del_rcu(&mk->mk_node);
        spin_unlock(&sb->s_master_keys->lock);

        /*
         * ->mk_active_refs == 0 implies that ->mk_present is false and
         * ->mk_decrypted_inodes is empty.
         */
        WARN_ON_ONCE(mk->mk_present);
        WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes));

        for (i = 0; i <= FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX; i++) {
                fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(
                                sb, &mk->mk_direct_keys[i]);
                fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(
                                sb, &mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[i]);
                fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(
                                sb, &mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[i]);
        }
        memzero_explicit(&mk->mk_ino_hash_key,
                         sizeof(mk->mk_ino_hash_key));
        mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized = false;

        /* Drop the structural ref associated with the active refs. */
        fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
}

/*
 * This transitions the key state from present to incompletely removed, and then
 * potentially to absent (depending on whether inodes remain).
 */
static void fscrypt_initiate_key_removal(struct super_block *sb,
                                         struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
        WRITE_ONCE(mk->mk_present, false);
        wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret);
        fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(sb, mk);
}

static inline bool valid_key_spec(const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *spec)
{
        if (spec->__reserved)
                return false;
        return master_key_spec_len(spec) != 0;
}

static int fscrypt_user_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
                                        struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
        /*
         * We just charge FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE bytes to the user's key quota for
         * each key, regardless of the exact key size.  The amount of memory
         * actually used is greater than the size of the raw key anyway.
         */
        return key_payload_reserve(key, FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
}

static void fscrypt_user_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
        seq_puts(m, key->description);
}

/*
 * Type of key in ->mk_users.  Each key of this type represents a particular
 * user who has added a particular master key.
 *
 * Note that the name of this key type really should be something like
 * ".fscrypt-user" instead of simply ".fscrypt".  But the shorter name is chosen
 * mainly for simplicity of presentation in /proc/keys when read by a non-root
 * user.  And it is expected to be rare that a key is actually added by multiple
 * users, since users should keep their encryption keys confidential.
 */
static struct key_type key_type_fscrypt_user = {
        .name                   = ".fscrypt",
        .instantiate            = fscrypt_user_key_instantiate,
        .describe               = fscrypt_user_key_describe,
};

#define FSCRYPT_MK_USERS_DESCRIPTION_SIZE       \
        (CONST_STRLEN("fscrypt-") + 2 * FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE + \
         CONST_STRLEN("-users") + 1)

#define FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE        \
        (2 * FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE + CONST_STRLEN(".uid.") + 10 + 1)

static void format_mk_users_keyring_description(
                        char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USERS_DESCRIPTION_SIZE],
                        const u8 mk_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE])
{
        sprintf(description, "fscrypt-%*phN-users",
                FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, mk_identifier);
}

static void format_mk_user_description(
                        char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE],
                        const u8 mk_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE])
{

        sprintf(description, "%*phN.uid.%u", FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE,
                mk_identifier, __kuid_val(current_fsuid()));
}

/* Create ->s_master_keys if needed.  Synchronized by fscrypt_add_key_mutex. */
static int allocate_filesystem_keyring(struct super_block *sb)
{
        struct fscrypt_keyring *keyring;

        if (sb->s_master_keys)
                return 0;

        keyring = kzalloc(sizeof(*keyring), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!keyring)
                return -ENOMEM;
        spin_lock_init(&keyring->lock);
        /*
         * Pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in fscrypt_find_master_key().
         * I.e., here we publish ->s_master_keys with a RELEASE barrier so that
         * concurrent tasks can ACQUIRE it.
         */
        smp_store_release(&sb->s_master_keys, keyring);
        return 0;
}

/*
 * Release all encryption keys that have been added to the filesystem, along
 * with the keyring that contains them.
 *
 * This is called at unmount time, after all potentially-encrypted inodes have
 * been evicted.  The filesystem's underlying block device(s) are still
 * available at this time; this is important because after user file accesses
 * have been allowed, this function may need to evict keys from the keyslots of
 * an inline crypto engine, which requires the block device(s).
 */
void fscrypt_destroy_keyring(struct super_block *sb)
{
        struct fscrypt_keyring *keyring = sb->s_master_keys;
        size_t i;

        if (!keyring)
                return;

        for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(keyring->key_hashtable); i++) {
                struct hlist_head *bucket = &keyring->key_hashtable[i];
                struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
                struct hlist_node *tmp;

                hlist_for_each_entry_safe(mk, tmp, bucket, mk_node) {
                        /*
                         * Since all potentially-encrypted inodes were already
                         * evicted, every key remaining in the keyring should
                         * have an empty inode list, and should only still be in
                         * the keyring due to the single active ref associated
                         * with ->mk_present.  There should be no structural
                         * refs beyond the one associated with the active ref.
                         */
                        WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 1);
                        WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&mk->mk_struct_refs) != 1);
                        WARN_ON_ONCE(!mk->mk_present);
                        fscrypt_initiate_key_removal(sb, mk);
                }
        }
        kfree_sensitive(keyring);
        sb->s_master_keys = NULL;
}

static struct hlist_head *
fscrypt_mk_hash_bucket(struct fscrypt_keyring *keyring,
                       const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
{
        /*
         * Since key specifiers should be "random" values, it is sufficient to
         * use a trivial hash function that just takes the first several bits of
         * the key specifier.
         */
        unsigned long i = get_unaligned((unsigned long *)&mk_spec->u);

        return &keyring->key_hashtable[i % ARRAY_SIZE(keyring->key_hashtable)];
}

/*
 * Find the specified master key struct in ->s_master_keys and take a structural
 * ref to it.  The structural ref guarantees that the key struct continues to
 * exist, but it does *not* guarantee that ->s_master_keys continues to contain
 * the key struct.  The structural ref needs to be dropped by
 * fscrypt_put_master_key().  Returns NULL if the key struct is not found.
 */
struct fscrypt_master_key *
fscrypt_find_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
                        const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
{
        struct fscrypt_keyring *keyring;
        struct hlist_head *bucket;
        struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;

        /*
         * Pairs with the smp_store_release() in allocate_filesystem_keyring().
         * I.e., another task can publish ->s_master_keys concurrently,
         * executing a RELEASE barrier.  We need to use smp_load_acquire() here
         * to safely ACQUIRE the memory the other task published.
         */
        keyring = smp_load_acquire(&sb->s_master_keys);
        if (keyring == NULL)
                return NULL; /* No keyring yet, so no keys yet. */

        bucket = fscrypt_mk_hash_bucket(keyring, mk_spec);
        rcu_read_lock();
        switch (mk_spec->type) {
        case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR:
                hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mk, bucket, mk_node) {
                        if (mk->mk_spec.type ==
                                FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR &&
                            memcmp(mk->mk_spec.u.descriptor,
                                   mk_spec->u.descriptor,
                                   FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
                            refcount_inc_not_zero(&mk->mk_struct_refs))
                                goto out;
                }
                break;
        case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER:
                hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mk, bucket, mk_node) {
                        if (mk->mk_spec.type ==
                                FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER &&
                            memcmp(mk->mk_spec.u.identifier,
                                   mk_spec->u.identifier,
                                   FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE) == 0 &&
                            refcount_inc_not_zero(&mk->mk_struct_refs))
                                goto out;
                }
                break;
        }
        mk = NULL;
out:
        rcu_read_unlock();
        return mk;
}

static int allocate_master_key_users_keyring(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
        char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USERS_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
        struct key *keyring;

        format_mk_users_keyring_description(description,
                                            mk->mk_spec.u.identifier);
        keyring = keyring_alloc(description, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
                                current_cred(), KEY_POS_SEARCH |
                                  KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_VIEW,
                                KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
        if (IS_ERR(keyring))
                return PTR_ERR(keyring);

        mk->mk_users = keyring;
        return 0;
}

/*
 * Find the current user's "key" in the master key's ->mk_users.
 * Returns ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) if not found.
 */
static struct key *find_master_key_user(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
        char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
        key_ref_t keyref;

        format_mk_user_description(description, mk->mk_spec.u.identifier);

        /*
         * We need to mark the keyring reference as "possessed" so that we
         * acquire permission to search it, via the KEY_POS_SEARCH permission.
         */
        keyref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(mk->mk_users, true /*possessed*/),
                                &key_type_fscrypt_user, description, false);
        if (IS_ERR(keyref)) {
                if (PTR_ERR(keyref) == -EAGAIN || /* not found */
                    PTR_ERR(keyref) == -EKEYREVOKED) /* recently invalidated */
                        keyref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
                return ERR_CAST(keyref);
        }
        return key_ref_to_ptr(keyref);
}

/*
 * Give the current user a "key" in ->mk_users.  This charges the user's quota
 * and marks the master key as added by the current user, so that it cannot be
 * removed by another user with the key.  Either ->mk_sem must be held for
 * write, or the master key must be still undergoing initialization.
 */
static int add_master_key_user(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
        char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
        struct key *mk_user;
        int err;

        format_mk_user_description(description, mk->mk_spec.u.identifier);
        mk_user = key_alloc(&key_type_fscrypt_user, description,
                            current_fsuid(), current_gid(), current_cred(),
                            KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW, 0, NULL);
        if (IS_ERR(mk_user))
                return PTR_ERR(mk_user);

        err = key_instantiate_and_link(mk_user, NULL, 0, mk->mk_users, NULL);
        key_put(mk_user);
        return err;
}

/*
 * Remove the current user's "key" from ->mk_users.
 * ->mk_sem must be held for write.
 *
 * Returns 0 if removed, -ENOKEY if not found, or another -errno code.
 */
static int remove_master_key_user(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
        struct key *mk_user;
        int err;

        mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk);
        if (IS_ERR(mk_user))
                return PTR_ERR(mk_user);
        err = key_unlink(mk->mk_users, mk_user);
        key_put(mk_user);
        return err;
}

/*
 * Allocate a new fscrypt_master_key, transfer the given secret over to it, and
 * insert it into sb->s_master_keys.
 */
static int add_new_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
                              struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret,
                              const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
{
        struct fscrypt_keyring *keyring = sb->s_master_keys;
        struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
        int err;

        mk = kzalloc(sizeof(*mk), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!mk)
                return -ENOMEM;

        init_rwsem(&mk->mk_sem);
        refcount_set(&mk->mk_struct_refs, 1);
        mk->mk_spec = *mk_spec;

        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes);
        spin_lock_init(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);

        if (mk_spec->type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER) {
                err = allocate_master_key_users_keyring(mk);
                if (err)
                        goto out_put;
                err = add_master_key_user(mk);
                if (err)
                        goto out_put;
        }

        move_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret, secret);
        mk->mk_present = true;
        refcount_set(&mk->mk_active_refs, 1); /* ->mk_present is true */

        spin_lock(&keyring->lock);
        hlist_add_head_rcu(&mk->mk_node,
                           fscrypt_mk_hash_bucket(keyring, mk_spec));
        spin_unlock(&keyring->lock);
        return 0;

out_put:
        fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
        return err;
}

#define KEY_DEAD        1

static int add_existing_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
                                   struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
{
        int err;

        /*
         * If the current user is already in ->mk_users, then there's nothing to
         * do.  Otherwise, we need to add the user to ->mk_users.  (Neither is
         * applicable for v1 policy keys, which have NULL ->mk_users.)
         */
        if (mk->mk_users) {
                struct key *mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk);

                if (mk_user != ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY)) {
                        if (IS_ERR(mk_user))
                                return PTR_ERR(mk_user);
                        key_put(mk_user);
                        return 0;
                }
                err = add_master_key_user(mk);
                if (err)
                        return err;
        }

        /* If the key is incompletely removed, make it present again. */
        if (!mk->mk_present) {
                if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&mk->mk_active_refs)) {
                        /*
                         * Raced with the last active ref being dropped, so the
                         * key has become, or is about to become, "absent".
                         * Therefore, we need to allocate a new key struct.
                         */
                        return KEY_DEAD;
                }
                move_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret, secret);
                WRITE_ONCE(mk->mk_present, true);
        }

        return 0;
}

static int do_add_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
                             struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret,
                             const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
{
        static DEFINE_MUTEX(fscrypt_add_key_mutex);
        struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
        int err;

        mutex_lock(&fscrypt_add_key_mutex); /* serialize find + link */

        mk = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, mk_spec);
        if (!mk) {
                /* Didn't find the key in ->s_master_keys.  Add it. */
                err = allocate_filesystem_keyring(sb);
                if (!err)
                        err = add_new_master_key(sb, secret, mk_spec);
        } else {
                /*
                 * Found the key in ->s_master_keys.  Add the user to ->mk_users
                 * if needed, and make the key "present" again if possible.
                 */
                down_write(&mk->mk_sem);
                err = add_existing_master_key(mk, secret);
                up_write(&mk->mk_sem);
                if (err == KEY_DEAD) {
                        /*
                         * We found a key struct, but it's already been fully
                         * removed.  Ignore the old struct and add a new one.
                         * fscrypt_add_key_mutex means we don't need to worry
                         * about concurrent adds.
                         */
                        err = add_new_master_key(sb, secret, mk_spec);
                }
                fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
        }
        mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_add_key_mutex);
        return err;
}

static int add_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
                          struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret,
                          struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec)
{
        int err;

        if (key_spec->type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER) {
                err = fscrypt_init_hkdf(&secret->hkdf, secret->raw,
                                        secret->size);
                if (err)
                        return err;

                /*
                 * Now that the HKDF context is initialized, the raw key is no
                 * longer needed.
                 */
                memzero_explicit(secret->raw, secret->size);

                /* Calculate the key identifier */
                err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&secret->hkdf,
                                          HKDF_CONTEXT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, NULL, 0,
                                          key_spec->u.identifier,
                                          FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
                if (err)
                        return err;
        }
        return do_add_master_key(sb, secret, key_spec);
}

static int fscrypt_provisioning_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
        const struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload *payload = prep->data;

        if (prep->datalen < sizeof(*payload) + FSCRYPT_MIN_KEY_SIZE ||
            prep->datalen > sizeof(*payload) + FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
                return -EINVAL;

        if (payload->type != FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR &&
            payload->type != FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER)
                return -EINVAL;

        if (payload->__reserved)
                return -EINVAL;

        prep->payload.data[0] = kmemdup(payload, prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!prep->payload.data[0])
                return -ENOMEM;

        prep->quotalen = prep->datalen;
        return 0;
}

static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_free_preparse(
                                        struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
        kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[0]);
}

static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_describe(const struct key *key,
                                              struct seq_file *m)
{
        seq_puts(m, key->description);
        if (key_is_positive(key)) {
                const struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload *payload =
                        key->payload.data[0];

                seq_printf(m, ": %u [%u]", key->datalen, payload->type);
        }
}

static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
        kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
}

static struct key_type key_type_fscrypt_provisioning = {
        .name                   = "fscrypt-provisioning",
        .preparse               = fscrypt_provisioning_key_preparse,
        .free_preparse          = fscrypt_provisioning_key_free_preparse,
        .instantiate            = generic_key_instantiate,
        .describe               = fscrypt_provisioning_key_describe,
        .destroy                = fscrypt_provisioning_key_destroy,
};

/*
 * Retrieve the raw key from the Linux keyring key specified by 'key_id', and
 * store it into 'secret'.
 *
 * The key must be of type "fscrypt-provisioning" and must have the field
 * fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload::type set to 'type', indicating that it's
 * only usable with fscrypt with the particular KDF version identified by
 * 'type'.  We don't use the "logon" key type because there's no way to
 * completely restrict the use of such keys; they can be used by any kernel API
 * that accepts "logon" keys and doesn't require a specific service prefix.
 *
 * The ability to specify the key via Linux keyring key is intended for cases
 * where userspace needs to re-add keys after the filesystem is unmounted and
 * re-mounted.  Most users should just provide the raw key directly instead.
 */
static int get_keyring_key(u32 key_id, u32 type,
                           struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
{
        key_ref_t ref;
        struct key *key;
        const struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload *payload;
        int err;

        ref = lookup_user_key(key_id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
        if (IS_ERR(ref))
                return PTR_ERR(ref);
        key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);

        if (key->type != &key_type_fscrypt_provisioning)
                goto bad_key;
        payload = key->payload.data[0];

        /* Don't allow fscrypt v1 keys to be used as v2 keys and vice versa. */
        if (payload->type != type)
                goto bad_key;

        secret->size = key->datalen - sizeof(*payload);
        memcpy(secret->raw, payload->raw, secret->size);
        err = 0;
        goto out_put;

bad_key:
        err = -EKEYREJECTED;
out_put:
        key_ref_put(ref);
        return err;
}

/*
 * Add a master encryption key to the filesystem, causing all files which were
 * encrypted with it to appear "unlocked" (decrypted) when accessed.
 *
 * When adding a key for use by v1 encryption policies, this ioctl is
 * privileged, and userspace must provide the 'key_descriptor'.
 *
 * When adding a key for use by v2+ encryption policies, this ioctl is
 * unprivileged.  This is needed, in general, to allow non-root users to use
 * encryption without encountering the visibility problems of process-subscribed
 * keyrings and the inability to properly remove keys.  This works by having
 * each key identified by its cryptographically secure hash --- the
 * 'key_identifier'.  The cryptographic hash ensures that a malicious user
 * cannot add the wrong key for a given identifier.  Furthermore, each added key
 * is charged to the appropriate user's quota for the keyrings service, which
 * prevents a malicious user from adding too many keys.  Finally, we forbid a
 * user from removing a key while other users have added it too, which prevents
 * a user who knows another user's key from causing a denial-of-service by
 * removing it at an inopportune time.  (We tolerate that a user who knows a key
 * can prevent other users from removing it.)
 *
 * For more details, see the "FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY" section of
 * Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst.
 */
int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
{
        struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
        struct fscrypt_add_key_arg __user *uarg = _uarg;
        struct fscrypt_add_key_arg arg;
        struct fscrypt_master_key_secret secret;
        int err;

        if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
                return -EFAULT;

        if (!valid_key_spec(&arg.key_spec))
                return -EINVAL;

        if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
                return -EINVAL;

        /*
         * Only root can add keys that are identified by an arbitrary descriptor
         * rather than by a cryptographic hash --- since otherwise a malicious
         * user could add the wrong key.
         */
        if (arg.key_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR &&
            !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                return -EACCES;

        memset(&secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
        if (arg.key_id) {
                if (arg.raw_size != 0)
                        return -EINVAL;
                err = get_keyring_key(arg.key_id, arg.key_spec.type, &secret);
                if (err)
                        goto out_wipe_secret;
        } else {
                if (arg.raw_size < FSCRYPT_MIN_KEY_SIZE ||
                    arg.raw_size > FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
                        return -EINVAL;
                secret.size = arg.raw_size;
                err = -EFAULT;
                if (copy_from_user(secret.raw, uarg->raw, secret.size))
                        goto out_wipe_secret;
        }

        err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, &arg.key_spec);
        if (err)
                goto out_wipe_secret;

        /* Return the key identifier to userspace, if applicable */
        err = -EFAULT;
        if (arg.key_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER &&
            copy_to_user(uarg->key_spec.u.identifier, arg.key_spec.u.identifier,
                         FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE))
                goto out_wipe_secret;
        err = 0;
out_wipe_secret:
        wipe_master_key_secret(&secret);
        return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_add_key);

static void
fscrypt_get_test_dummy_secret(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
{
        static u8 test_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];

        get_random_once(test_key, FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE);

        memset(secret, 0, sizeof(*secret));
        secret->size = FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE;
        memcpy(secret->raw, test_key, FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
}

int fscrypt_get_test_dummy_key_identifier(
                                u8 key_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE])
{
        struct fscrypt_master_key_secret secret;
        int err;

        fscrypt_get_test_dummy_secret(&secret);

        err = fscrypt_init_hkdf(&secret.hkdf, secret.raw, secret.size);
        if (err)
                goto out;
        err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&secret.hkdf, HKDF_CONTEXT_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
                                  NULL, 0, key_identifier,
                                  FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
out:
        wipe_master_key_secret(&secret);
        return err;
}

/**
 * fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key() - add the test dummy encryption key
 * @sb: the filesystem instance to add the key to
 * @key_spec: the key specifier of the test dummy encryption key
 *
 * Add the key for the test_dummy_encryption mount option to the filesystem.  To
 * prevent misuse of this mount option, a per-boot random key is used instead of
 * a hardcoded one.  This makes it so that any encrypted files created using
 * this option won't be accessible after a reboot.
 *
 * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
 */
int fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key(struct super_block *sb,
                               struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec)
{
        struct fscrypt_master_key_secret secret;
        int err;

        fscrypt_get_test_dummy_secret(&secret);
        err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, key_spec);
        wipe_master_key_secret(&secret);
        return err;
}

/*
 * Verify that the current user has added a master key with the given identifier
 * (returns -ENOKEY if not).  This is needed to prevent a user from encrypting
 * their files using some other user's key which they don't actually know.
 * Cryptographically this isn't much of a problem, but the semantics of this
 * would be a bit weird, so it's best to just forbid it.
 *
 * The system administrator (CAP_FOWNER) can override this, which should be
 * enough for any use cases where encryption policies are being set using keys
 * that were chosen ahead of time but aren't available at the moment.
 *
 * Note that the key may have already removed by the time this returns, but
 * that's okay; we just care whether the key was there at some point.
 *
 * Return: 0 if the key is added, -ENOKEY if it isn't, or another -errno code
 */
int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb,
                             const u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE])
{
        struct fscrypt_key_specifier mk_spec;
        struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
        struct key *mk_user;
        int err;

        mk_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER;
        memcpy(mk_spec.u.identifier, identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);

        mk = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, &mk_spec);
        if (!mk) {
                err = -ENOKEY;
                goto out;
        }
        down_read(&mk->mk_sem);
        mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk);
        if (IS_ERR(mk_user)) {
                err = PTR_ERR(mk_user);
        } else {
                key_put(mk_user);
                err = 0;
        }
        up_read(&mk->mk_sem);
        fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
out:
        if (err == -ENOKEY && capable(CAP_FOWNER))
                err = 0;
        return err;
}

/*
 * Try to evict the inode's dentries from the dentry cache.  If the inode is a
 * directory, then it can have at most one dentry; however, that dentry may be
 * pinned by child dentries, so first try to evict the children too.
 */
static void shrink_dcache_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
        struct dentry *dentry;

        if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
                dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
                if (dentry) {
                        shrink_dcache_parent(dentry);
                        dput(dentry);
                }
        }
        d_prune_aliases(inode);
}

static void evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
        struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci;
        struct inode *inode;
        struct inode *toput_inode = NULL;

        spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);

        list_for_each_entry(ci, &mk->mk_decrypted_inodes, ci_master_key_link) {
                inode = ci->ci_inode;
                spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
                if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
                        spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
                        continue;
                }
                __iget(inode);
                spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
                spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);

                shrink_dcache_inode(inode);
                iput(toput_inode);
                toput_inode = inode;

                spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
        }

        spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
        iput(toput_inode);
}

static int check_for_busy_inodes(struct super_block *sb,
                                 struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
        struct list_head *pos;
        size_t busy_count = 0;
        unsigned long ino;
        char ino_str[50] = "";

        spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);

        list_for_each(pos, &mk->mk_decrypted_inodes)
                busy_count++;

        if (busy_count == 0) {
                spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
                return 0;
        }

        {
                /* select an example file to show for debugging purposes */
                struct inode *inode =
                        list_first_entry(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes,
                                         struct fscrypt_inode_info,
                                         ci_master_key_link)->ci_inode;
                ino = inode->i_ino;
        }
        spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);

        /* If the inode is currently being created, ino may still be 0. */
        if (ino)
                snprintf(ino_str, sizeof(ino_str), ", including ino %lu", ino);

        fscrypt_warn(NULL,
                     "%s: %zu inode(s) still busy after removing key with %s %*phN%s",
                     sb->s_id, busy_count, master_key_spec_type(&mk->mk_spec),
                     master_key_spec_len(&mk->mk_spec), (u8 *)&mk->mk_spec.u,
                     ino_str);
        return -EBUSY;
}

static int try_to_lock_encrypted_files(struct super_block *sb,
                                       struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
        int err1;
        int err2;

        /*
         * An inode can't be evicted while it is dirty or has dirty pages.
         * Thus, we first have to clean the inodes in ->mk_decrypted_inodes.
         *
         * Just do it the easy way: call sync_filesystem().  It's overkill, but
         * it works, and it's more important to minimize the amount of caches we
         * drop than the amount of data we sync.  Also, unprivileged users can
         * already call sync_filesystem() via sys_syncfs() or sys_sync().
         */
        down_read(&sb->s_umount);
        err1 = sync_filesystem(sb);
        up_read(&sb->s_umount);
        /* If a sync error occurs, still try to evict as much as possible. */

        /*
         * Inodes are pinned by their dentries, so we have to evict their
         * dentries.  shrink_dcache_sb() would suffice, but would be overkill
         * and inappropriate for use by unprivileged users.  So instead go
         * through the inodes' alias lists and try to evict each dentry.
         */
        evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes(mk);

        /*
         * evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes() already iput() each inode in
         * the list; any inodes for which that dropped the last reference will
         * have been evicted due to fscrypt_drop_inode() detecting the key
         * removal and telling the VFS to evict the inode.  So to finish, we
         * just need to check whether any inodes couldn't be evicted.
         */
        err2 = check_for_busy_inodes(sb, mk);

        return err1 ?: err2;
}

/*
 * Try to remove an fscrypt master encryption key.
 *
 * FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY (all_users=false) removes the current user's
 * claim to the key, then removes the key itself if no other users have claims.
 * FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS (all_users=true) always removes the
 * key itself.
 *
 * To "remove the key itself", first we transition the key to the "incompletely
 * removed" state, so that no more inodes can be unlocked with it.  Then we try
 * to evict all cached inodes that had been unlocked with the key.
 *
 * If all inodes were evicted, then we unlink the fscrypt_master_key from the
 * keyring.  Otherwise it remains in the keyring in the "incompletely removed"
 * state where it tracks the list of remaining inodes.  Userspace can execute
 * the ioctl again later to retry eviction, or alternatively can re-add the key.
 *
 * For more details, see the "Removing keys" section of
 * Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst.
 */
static int do_remove_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg, bool all_users)
{
        struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
        struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg __user *uarg = _uarg;
        struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg arg;
        struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
        u32 status_flags = 0;
        int err;
        bool inodes_remain;

        if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
                return -EFAULT;

        if (!valid_key_spec(&arg.key_spec))
                return -EINVAL;

        if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
                return -EINVAL;

        /*
         * Only root can add and remove keys that are identified by an arbitrary
         * descriptor rather than by a cryptographic hash.
         */
        if (arg.key_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR &&
            !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                return -EACCES;

        /* Find the key being removed. */
        mk = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, &arg.key_spec);
        if (!mk)
                return -ENOKEY;
        down_write(&mk->mk_sem);

        /* If relevant, remove current user's (or all users) claim to the key */
        if (mk->mk_users && mk->mk_users->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0) {
                if (all_users)
                        err = keyring_clear(mk->mk_users);
                else
                        err = remove_master_key_user(mk);
                if (err) {
                        up_write(&mk->mk_sem);
                        goto out_put_key;
                }
                if (mk->mk_users->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0) {
                        /*
                         * Other users have still added the key too.  We removed
                         * the current user's claim to the key, but we still
                         * can't remove the key itself.
                         */
                        status_flags |=
                                FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_OTHER_USERS;
                        err = 0;
                        up_write(&mk->mk_sem);
                        goto out_put_key;
                }
        }

        /* No user claims remaining.  Initiate removal of the key. */
        err = -ENOKEY;
        if (mk->mk_present) {
                fscrypt_initiate_key_removal(sb, mk);
                err = 0;
        }
        inodes_remain = refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) > 0;
        up_write(&mk->mk_sem);

        if (inodes_remain) {
                /* Some inodes still reference this key; try to evict them. */
                err = try_to_lock_encrypted_files(sb, mk);
                if (err == -EBUSY) {
                        status_flags |=
                                FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_FILES_BUSY;
                        err = 0;
                }
        }
        /*
         * We return 0 if we successfully did something: removed a claim to the
         * key, initiated removal of the key, or tried locking the files again.
         * Users need to check the informational status flags if they care
         * whether the key has been fully removed including all files locked.
         */
out_put_key:
        fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
        if (err == 0)
                err = put_user(status_flags, &uarg->removal_status_flags);
        return err;
}

int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg)
{
        return do_remove_key(filp, uarg, false);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key);

int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg)
{
        if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                return -EACCES;
        return do_remove_key(filp, uarg, true);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users);

/*
 * Retrieve the status of an fscrypt master encryption key.
 *
 * We set ->status to indicate whether the key is absent, present, or
 * incompletely removed.  (For an explanation of what these statuses mean and
 * how they are represented internally, see struct fscrypt_master_key.)  This
 * field allows applications to easily determine the status of an encrypted
 * directory without using a hack such as trying to open a regular file in it
 * (which can confuse the "incompletely removed" status with absent or present).
 *
 * In addition, for v2 policy keys we allow applications to determine, via
 * ->status_flags and ->user_count, whether the key has been added by the
 * current user, by other users, or by both.  Most applications should not need
 * this, since ordinarily only one user should know a given key.  However, if a
 * secret key is shared by multiple users, applications may wish to add an
 * already-present key to prevent other users from removing it.  This ioctl can
 * be used to check whether that really is the case before the work is done to
 * add the key --- which might e.g. require prompting the user for a passphrase.
 *
 * For more details, see the "FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS" section of
 * Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst.
 */
int fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg)
{
        struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
        struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg arg;
        struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
        int err;

        if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
                return -EFAULT;

        if (!valid_key_spec(&arg.key_spec))
                return -EINVAL;

        if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
                return -EINVAL;

        arg.status_flags = 0;
        arg.user_count = 0;
        memset(arg.__out_reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__out_reserved));

        mk = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, &arg.key_spec);
        if (!mk) {
                arg.status = FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_ABSENT;
                err = 0;
                goto out;
        }
        down_read(&mk->mk_sem);

        if (!mk->mk_present) {
                arg.status = refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) > 0 ?
                        FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_INCOMPLETELY_REMOVED :
                        FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_ABSENT /* raced with full removal */;
                err = 0;
                goto out_release_key;
        }

        arg.status = FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_PRESENT;
        if (mk->mk_users) {
                struct key *mk_user;

                arg.user_count = mk->mk_users->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree;
                mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk);
                if (!IS_ERR(mk_user)) {
                        arg.status_flags |=
                                FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_FLAG_ADDED_BY_SELF;
                        key_put(mk_user);
                } else if (mk_user != ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY)) {
                        err = PTR_ERR(mk_user);
                        goto out_release_key;
                }
        }
        err = 0;
out_release_key:
        up_read(&mk->mk_sem);
        fscrypt_put_master_key(mk);
out:
        if (!err && copy_to_user(uarg, &arg, sizeof(arg)))
                err = -EFAULT;
        return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status);

int __init fscrypt_init_keyring(void)
{
        int err;

        err = register_key_type(&key_type_fscrypt_user);
        if (err)
                return err;

        err = register_key_type(&key_type_fscrypt_provisioning);
        if (err)
                goto err_unregister_fscrypt_user;

        return 0;

err_unregister_fscrypt_user:
        unregister_key_type(&key_type_fscrypt_user);
        return err;
}