1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
3 * Asm versions of Xen pv-ops, suitable for direct use.
5 * We only bother with direct forms (ie, vcpu in percpu data) of the
6 * operations here; the indirect forms are better handled in C.
10 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
11 #include <asm/percpu.h>
12 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
13 #include <asm/segment.h>
14 #include <asm/thread_info.h>
16 #include <asm/frame.h>
17 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
19 #include <xen/interface/xen.h>
21 #include <linux/init.h>
22 #include <linux/linkage.h>
23 #include <../entry/calling.h>
25 .pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax"
27 * Disabling events is simply a matter of making the event mask
30 SYM_FUNC_START(xen_irq_disable_direct)
31 movb $1, PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info + XEN_vcpu_info_mask)
33 SYM_FUNC_END(xen_irq_disable_direct)
36 * Force an event check by making a hypercall, but preserve regs
37 * before making the call.
39 SYM_FUNC_START(check_events)
50 call xen_force_evtchn_callback
62 SYM_FUNC_END(check_events)
65 * Enable events. This clears the event mask and tests the pending
66 * event status with one and operation. If there are pending events,
67 * then enter the hypervisor to get them handled.
69 SYM_FUNC_START(xen_irq_enable_direct)
72 movb $0, PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info + XEN_vcpu_info_mask)
75 * Preempt here doesn't matter because that will deal with any
76 * pending interrupts. The pending check may end up being run
77 * on the wrong CPU, but that doesn't hurt.
80 /* Test for pending */
81 testb $0xff, PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info + XEN_vcpu_info_pending)
88 SYM_FUNC_END(xen_irq_enable_direct)
91 * (xen_)save_fl is used to get the current interrupt enable status.
92 * Callers expect the status to be in X86_EFLAGS_IF, and other bits
93 * may be set in the return value. We take advantage of this by
94 * making sure that X86_EFLAGS_IF has the right value (and other bits
95 * in that byte are 0), but other bits in the return value are
96 * undefined. We need to toggle the state of the bit, because Xen and
97 * x86 use opposite senses (mask vs enable).
99 SYM_FUNC_START(xen_save_fl_direct)
100 testb $0xff, PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info + XEN_vcpu_info_mask)
104 SYM_FUNC_END(xen_save_fl_direct)
106 SYM_FUNC_START(xen_read_cr2)
108 _ASM_MOV PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu), %_ASM_AX
109 _ASM_MOV XEN_vcpu_info_arch_cr2(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
112 SYM_FUNC_END(xen_read_cr2);
114 SYM_FUNC_START(xen_read_cr2_direct)
116 _ASM_MOV PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info + XEN_vcpu_info_arch_cr2), %_ASM_AX
119 SYM_FUNC_END(xen_read_cr2_direct);
122 .macro xen_pv_trap name
123 SYM_CODE_START(xen_\name)
129 SYM_CODE_END(xen_\name)
130 _ASM_NOKPROBE(xen_\name)
133 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_divide_error
134 xen_pv_trap asm_xenpv_exc_debug
135 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_int3
136 xen_pv_trap asm_xenpv_exc_nmi
137 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_overflow
138 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_bounds
139 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_invalid_op
140 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_device_not_available
141 xen_pv_trap asm_xenpv_exc_double_fault
142 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_coproc_segment_overrun
143 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_invalid_tss
144 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_segment_not_present
145 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_stack_segment
146 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_general_protection
147 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_page_fault
148 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_spurious_interrupt_bug
149 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_coprocessor_error
150 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_alignment_check
151 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
152 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_control_protection
154 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
155 xen_pv_trap asm_xenpv_exc_machine_check
156 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_MCE */
157 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_simd_coprocessor_error
158 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
159 xen_pv_trap asm_int80_emulation
161 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_xen_unknown_trap
162 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_xen_hypervisor_callback
165 SYM_CODE_START(xen_early_idt_handler_array)
167 .rept NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS
168 UNWIND_HINT_UNDEFINED
172 jmp early_idt_handler_array + i*EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE
174 .fill xen_early_idt_handler_array + i*XEN_EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE - ., 1, 0xcc
176 SYM_CODE_END(xen_early_idt_handler_array)
179 hypercall_iret = hypercall_page + __HYPERVISOR_iret * 32
187 * rip <-- standard iret frame
192 * r11 }<-- pushed by hypercall page
195 SYM_CODE_START(xen_iret)
196 UNWIND_HINT_UNDEFINED
200 SYM_CODE_END(xen_iret)
203 * XEN pv doesn't use trampoline stack, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is
204 * also the kernel stack. Reusing swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode()
205 * in XEN pv would cause %rsp to move up to the top of the kernel stack and
206 * leave the IRET frame below %rsp, which is dangerous to be corrupted if #NMI
207 * interrupts. And swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() pushing the IRET
208 * frame at the same address is useless.
210 SYM_CODE_START(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
214 /* stackleak_erase() can work safely on the kernel stack. */
215 STACKLEAK_ERASE_NOCLOBBER
217 addq $8, %rsp /* skip regs->orig_ax */
219 SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
222 * Xen handles syscall callbacks much like ordinary exceptions, which
226 * - an iret-like stack frame on the stack (including rcx and r11):
236 /* Normal 64-bit system call target */
237 SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64)
244 * Neither Xen nor the kernel really knows what the old SS and
245 * CS were. The kernel expects __USER_DS and __USER_CS, so
246 * report those values even though Xen will guess its own values.
248 movq $__USER_DS, 4*8(%rsp)
249 movq $__USER_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
251 jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
252 SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64)
254 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
256 /* 32-bit compat syscall target */
257 SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
264 * Neither Xen nor the kernel really knows what the old SS and
265 * CS were. The kernel expects __USER_DS and __USER32_CS, so
266 * report those values even though Xen will guess its own values.
268 movq $__USER_DS, 4*8(%rsp)
269 movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
271 jmp entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe
272 SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
274 /* 32-bit compat sysenter target */
275 SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
279 * NB: Xen is polite and clears TF from EFLAGS for us. This means
280 * that we don't need to guard against single step exceptions here.
286 * Neither Xen nor the kernel really knows what the old SS and
287 * CS were. The kernel expects __USER_DS and __USER32_CS, so
288 * report those values even though Xen will guess its own values.
290 movq $__USER_DS, 4*8(%rsp)
291 movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)
293 jmp entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe
294 SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
296 #else /* !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */
298 SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
299 SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
302 lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */
306 SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
307 SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)
309 #endif /* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */