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[SCSI] sd: Issue correct protection operation
[linux-2.6/next.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
blob59cedfb040e7864cdfa3199ae2557f236cdd1122
1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
48 #include <linux/fs.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
50 #include <linux/mm.h>
51 #include <linux/module.h>
52 #include <linux/mount.h>
53 #include <linux/socket.h>
54 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
55 #include <linux/audit.h>
56 #include <linux/personality.h>
57 #include <linux/time.h>
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/compiler.h>
60 #include <asm/unistd.h>
61 #include <linux/security.h>
62 #include <linux/list.h>
63 #include <linux/tty.h>
64 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
65 #include <linux/highmem.h>
66 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
67 #include <linux/inotify.h>
68
69 #include "audit.h"
70
71 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
72 * for saving names from getname(). */
73 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
74
75 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
76 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
77
78 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
79 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
80
81 /* number of audit rules */
82 int audit_n_rules;
83
84 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
85 int audit_signals;
86
87 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
88 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
89 * pointers at syscall exit time).
90 *
91 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
92 struct audit_names {
93 const char *name;
94 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
95 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
96 unsigned long ino;
97 dev_t dev;
98 umode_t mode;
99 uid_t uid;
100 gid_t gid;
101 dev_t rdev;
102 u32 osid;
103 };
104
105 struct audit_aux_data {
106 struct audit_aux_data *next;
107 int type;
108 };
109
110 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
111
112 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
113 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
114
115 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
116 struct audit_aux_data d;
117 int oflag;
118 mode_t mode;
119 struct mq_attr attr;
120 };
121
122 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
123 struct audit_aux_data d;
124 mqd_t mqdes;
125 size_t msg_len;
126 unsigned int msg_prio;
127 struct timespec abs_timeout;
128 };
129
130 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
131 struct audit_aux_data d;
132 mqd_t mqdes;
133 struct sigevent notification;
134 };
135
136 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
137 struct audit_aux_data d;
138 mqd_t mqdes;
139 struct mq_attr mqstat;
140 };
141
142 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
143 struct audit_aux_data d;
144 struct ipc_perm p;
145 unsigned long qbytes;
146 uid_t uid;
147 gid_t gid;
148 mode_t mode;
149 u32 osid;
150 };
151
152 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
153 struct audit_aux_data d;
154 int argc;
155 int envc;
156 struct mm_struct *mm;
157 };
158
159 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
160 struct audit_aux_data d;
161 int nargs;
162 unsigned long args[0];
163 };
164
165 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
166 struct audit_aux_data d;
167 int len;
168 char a[0];
169 };
170
171 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
172 struct audit_aux_data d;
173 int fd[2];
174 };
175
176 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
177 struct audit_aux_data d;
178 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
179 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
180 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
181 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
182 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
183 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
184 int pid_count;
185 };
186
187 struct audit_tree_refs {
188 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
189 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
190 };
191
192 /* The per-task audit context. */
193 struct audit_context {
194 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
195 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
196 enum audit_state state;
197 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
198 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
199 int major; /* syscall number */
200 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
201 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
202 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
203 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
204 int name_count;
205 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
206 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
207 struct path pwd;
208 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
209 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
210 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
211
212 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
213 pid_t pid, ppid;
214 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
215 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
216 unsigned long personality;
217 int arch;
218
219 pid_t target_pid;
220 uid_t target_auid;
221 uid_t target_uid;
222 unsigned int target_sessionid;
223 u32 target_sid;
224 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
225
226 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
227 int tree_count;
228
229 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
230 int put_count;
231 int ino_count;
232 #endif
233 };
234
235 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
236 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
237 {
238 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
239 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
240 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
241 return n & mask;
242 }
243
244 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
245 {
246 unsigned n;
247 if (unlikely(!ctx))
248 return 0;
249
250 n = ctx->major;
251 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
252 case 0: /* native */
253 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
254 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
255 return 1;
256 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
257 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
258 return 1;
259 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
260 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
261 return 1;
262 return 0;
263 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
264 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
265 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
266 return 1;
267 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
268 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
269 return 1;
270 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
271 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
272 return 1;
273 return 0;
274 case 2: /* open */
275 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
276 case 3: /* openat */
277 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
278 case 4: /* socketcall */
279 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
280 case 5: /* execve */
281 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
282 default:
283 return 0;
284 }
285 }
286
287 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
288 {
289 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
290 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
291
292 if (unlikely(!ctx))
293 return 0;
294
295 if (index >= ctx->name_count)
296 return 0;
297 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
298 return 0;
299 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
300 return 0;
301 return 1;
302 }
303
304 /*
305 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
306 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
307 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
308 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
309 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
310 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
311 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
312 */
313
314 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
315 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
316 {
317 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
318 int left = ctx->tree_count;
319 if (likely(left)) {
320 p->c[--left] = chunk;
321 ctx->tree_count = left;
322 return 1;
323 }
324 if (!p)
325 return 0;
326 p = p->next;
327 if (p) {
328 p->c[30] = chunk;
329 ctx->trees = p;
330 ctx->tree_count = 30;
331 return 1;
332 }
333 return 0;
334 }
335
336 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
337 {
338 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
339 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
340 if (!ctx->trees) {
341 ctx->trees = p;
342 return 0;
343 }
344 if (p)
345 p->next = ctx->trees;
346 else
347 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
348 ctx->tree_count = 31;
349 return 1;
350 }
351 #endif
352
353 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
354 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
355 {
356 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
357 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
358 int n;
359 if (!p) {
360 /* we started with empty chain */
361 p = ctx->first_trees;
362 count = 31;
363 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
364 if (!p)
365 return;
366 }
367 n = count;
368 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
369 while (n--) {
370 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
371 q->c[n] = NULL;
372 }
373 }
374 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
375 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
376 q->c[n] = NULL;
377 }
378 ctx->trees = p;
379 ctx->tree_count = count;
380 #endif
381 }
382
383 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
384 {
385 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
386 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
387 q = p->next;
388 kfree(p);
389 }
390 }
391
392 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
393 {
394 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
395 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
396 int n;
397 if (!tree)
398 return 0;
399 /* full ones */
400 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
401 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
402 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
403 return 1;
404 }
405 /* partial */
406 if (p) {
407 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
408 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
409 return 1;
410 }
411 #endif
412 return 0;
413 }
414
415 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
416 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
417 * otherwise. */
418 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
419 struct audit_krule *rule,
420 struct audit_context *ctx,
421 struct audit_names *name,
422 enum audit_state *state)
423 {
424 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
425 u32 sid;
426
427 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
428 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
429 int result = 0;
430
431 switch (f->type) {
432 case AUDIT_PID:
433 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
434 break;
435 case AUDIT_PPID:
436 if (ctx) {
437 if (!ctx->ppid)
438 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
439 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
440 }
441 break;
442 case AUDIT_UID:
443 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
444 break;
445 case AUDIT_EUID:
446 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
447 break;
448 case AUDIT_SUID:
449 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
450 break;
451 case AUDIT_FSUID:
452 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
453 break;
454 case AUDIT_GID:
455 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
456 break;
457 case AUDIT_EGID:
458 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
459 break;
460 case AUDIT_SGID:
461 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
462 break;
463 case AUDIT_FSGID:
464 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
465 break;
466 case AUDIT_PERS:
467 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
468 break;
469 case AUDIT_ARCH:
470 if (ctx)
471 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
472 break;
473
474 case AUDIT_EXIT:
475 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
476 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
477 break;
478 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
479 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
480 if (f->val)
481 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
482 else
483 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
484 }
485 break;
486 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
487 if (name)
488 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
489 f->op, f->val);
490 else if (ctx) {
491 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
492 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
493 ++result;
494 break;
495 }
496 }
497 }
498 break;
499 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
500 if (name)
501 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
502 f->op, f->val);
503 else if (ctx) {
504 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
505 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
506 ++result;
507 break;
508 }
509 }
510 }
511 break;
512 case AUDIT_INODE:
513 if (name)
514 result = (name->ino == f->val);
515 else if (ctx) {
516 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
517 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
518 ++result;
519 break;
520 }
521 }
522 }
523 break;
524 case AUDIT_WATCH:
525 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
526 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
527 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
528 break;
529 case AUDIT_DIR:
530 if (ctx)
531 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
532 break;
533 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
534 result = 0;
535 if (ctx)
536 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
537 break;
538 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
539 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
540 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
541 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
542 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
543 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
544 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
545 match for now to avoid losing information that
546 may be wanted. An error message will also be
547 logged upon error */
548 if (f->lsm_rule) {
549 if (need_sid) {
550 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
551 need_sid = 0;
552 }
553 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
554 f->op,
555 f->lsm_rule,
556 ctx);
557 }
558 break;
559 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
560 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
561 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
562 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
563 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
564 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
565 also applies here */
566 if (f->lsm_rule) {
567 /* Find files that match */
568 if (name) {
569 result = security_audit_rule_match(
570 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
571 f->lsm_rule, ctx);
572 } else if (ctx) {
573 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
574 if (security_audit_rule_match(
575 ctx->names[j].osid,
576 f->type, f->op,
577 f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
578 ++result;
579 break;
580 }
581 }
582 }
583 /* Find ipc objects that match */
584 if (ctx) {
585 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
586 for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
587 aux = aux->next) {
588 if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
589 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
590 if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
591 ++result;
592 break;
593 }
594 }
595 }
596 }
597 }
598 break;
599 case AUDIT_ARG0:
600 case AUDIT_ARG1:
601 case AUDIT_ARG2:
602 case AUDIT_ARG3:
603 if (ctx)
604 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
605 break;
606 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
607 /* ignore this field for filtering */
608 result = 1;
609 break;
610 case AUDIT_PERM:
611 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
612 break;
613 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
614 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
615 break;
616 }
617
618 if (!result)
619 return 0;
620 }
621 if (rule->filterkey && ctx)
622 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
623 switch (rule->action) {
624 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
625 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
626 }
627 return 1;
628 }
629
630 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
631 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
632 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
633 */
634 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
635 {
636 struct audit_entry *e;
637 enum audit_state state;
638
639 rcu_read_lock();
640 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
641 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
642 rcu_read_unlock();
643 return state;
644 }
645 }
646 rcu_read_unlock();
647 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
648 }
649
650 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
651 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
652 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
653 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
654 */
655 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
656 struct audit_context *ctx,
657 struct list_head *list)
658 {
659 struct audit_entry *e;
660 enum audit_state state;
661
662 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
663 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
664
665 rcu_read_lock();
666 if (!list_empty(list)) {
667 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
668 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
669
670 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
671 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
672 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
673 &state)) {
674 rcu_read_unlock();
675 return state;
676 }
677 }
678 }
679 rcu_read_unlock();
680 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
681 }
682
683 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
684 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
685 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
686 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
687 */
688 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
689 struct audit_context *ctx)
690 {
691 int i;
692 struct audit_entry *e;
693 enum audit_state state;
694
695 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
696 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
697
698 rcu_read_lock();
699 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
700 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
701 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
702 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
703 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
704 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
705
706 if (list_empty(list))
707 continue;
708
709 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
710 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
711 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
712 rcu_read_unlock();
713 return state;
714 }
715 }
716 }
717 rcu_read_unlock();
718 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
719 }
720
721 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
722 {
723 ctx->auditable = 1;
724 }
725
726 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
727 int return_valid,
728 int return_code)
729 {
730 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
731
732 if (likely(!context))
733 return NULL;
734 context->return_valid = return_valid;
735
736 /*
737 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
738 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
739 * signal handlers
740 *
741 * This is actually a test for:
742 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
743 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
744 *
745 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
746 */
747 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
748 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
749 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
750 context->return_code = -EINTR;
751 else
752 context->return_code = return_code;
753
754 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
755 enum audit_state state;
756
757 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
758 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
759 context->auditable = 1;
760 goto get_context;
761 }
762
763 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
764 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
765 context->auditable = 1;
766
767 }
768
769 get_context:
770
771 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
772 return context;
773 }
774
775 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
776 {
777 int i;
778
779 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
780 if (context->auditable
781 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
782 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
783 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
784 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
785 __FILE__, __LINE__,
786 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
787 context->name_count, context->put_count,
788 context->ino_count);
789 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
790 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
791 context->names[i].name,
792 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
793 }
794 dump_stack();
795 return;
796 }
797 #endif
798 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
799 context->put_count = 0;
800 context->ino_count = 0;
801 #endif
802
803 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
804 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
805 __putname(context->names[i].name);
806 }
807 context->name_count = 0;
808 path_put(&context->pwd);
809 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
810 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
811 }
812
813 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
814 {
815 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
816
817 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
818 context->aux = aux->next;
819 kfree(aux);
820 }
821 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
822 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
823 kfree(aux);
824 }
825 }
826
827 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
828 enum audit_state state)
829 {
830 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
831 context->state = state;
832 }
833
834 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
835 {
836 struct audit_context *context;
837
838 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
839 return NULL;
840 audit_zero_context(context, state);
841 return context;
842 }
843
844 /**
845 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
846 * @tsk: task
847 *
848 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
849 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
850 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
851 * needed.
852 */
853 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
854 {
855 struct audit_context *context;
856 enum audit_state state;
857
858 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
859 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
860
861 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
862 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
863 return 0;
864
865 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
866 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
867 return -ENOMEM;
868 }
869
870 tsk->audit_context = context;
871 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
872 return 0;
873 }
874
875 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
876 {
877 struct audit_context *previous;
878 int count = 0;
879
880 do {
881 previous = context->previous;
882 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
883 ++count;
884 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
885 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
886 context->serial, context->major,
887 context->name_count, count);
888 }
889 audit_free_names(context);
890 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
891 free_tree_refs(context);
892 audit_free_aux(context);
893 kfree(context->filterkey);
894 kfree(context);
895 context = previous;
896 } while (context);
897 if (count >= 10)
898 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
899 }
900
901 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
902 {
903 char *ctx = NULL;
904 unsigned len;
905 int error;
906 u32 sid;
907
908 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
909 if (!sid)
910 return;
911
912 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
913 if (error) {
914 if (error != -EINVAL)
915 goto error_path;
916 return;
917 }
918
919 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
920 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
921 return;
922
923 error_path:
924 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
925 return;
926 }
927
928 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
929
930 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
931 {
932 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
933 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
934 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
935
936 /* tsk == current */
937
938 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
939 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
940 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
941
942 if (mm) {
943 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
944 vma = mm->mmap;
945 while (vma) {
946 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
947 vma->vm_file) {
948 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
949 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
950 break;
951 }
952 vma = vma->vm_next;
953 }
954 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
955 }
956 audit_log_task_context(ab);
957 }
958
959 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
960 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
961 u32 sid, char *comm)
962 {
963 struct audit_buffer *ab;
964 char *ctx = NULL;
965 u32 len;
966 int rc = 0;
967
968 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
969 if (!ab)
970 return rc;
971
972 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
973 uid, sessionid);
974 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
975 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
976 rc = 1;
977 } else {
978 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
979 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
980 }
981 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
982 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
983 audit_log_end(ab);
984
985 return rc;
986 }
987
988 /*
989 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
990 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
991 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
992 *
993 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
994 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
995 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
996 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
997 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
998 */
999 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1000 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1001 int arg_num,
1002 size_t *len_sent,
1003 const char __user *p,
1004 char *buf)
1005 {
1006 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1007 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1008 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
1009 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
1010 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1011 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1012 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1013 int ret;
1014
1015 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1016 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1017
1018 /*
1019 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1020 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1021 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1022 * any.
1023 */
1024 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1025 WARN_ON(1);
1026 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1027 return -1;
1028 }
1029
1030 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1031 do {
1032 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1033 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1034 else
1035 to_send = len_left;
1036 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1037 /*
1038 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1039 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1040 * space yet.
1041 */
1042 if (ret) {
1043 WARN_ON(1);
1044 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1045 return -1;
1046 }
1047 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1048 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1049 if (has_cntl) {
1050 /*
1051 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1052 * send half as much in each message
1053 */
1054 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1055 break;
1056 }
1057 len_left -= to_send;
1058 tmp_p += to_send;
1059 } while (len_left > 0);
1060
1061 len_left = len;
1062
1063 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1064 too_long = 1;
1065
1066 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1067 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1068 int room_left;
1069
1070 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1071 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1072 else
1073 to_send = len_left;
1074
1075 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1076 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1077 if (has_cntl)
1078 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1079 else
1080 room_left -= to_send;
1081 if (room_left < 0) {
1082 *len_sent = 0;
1083 audit_log_end(*ab);
1084 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1085 if (!*ab)
1086 return 0;
1087 }
1088
1089 /*
1090 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1091 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1092 */
1093 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1094 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
1095 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1096
1097 /*
1098 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1099 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1100 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1101 */
1102 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1103 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1104 else
1105 ret = 0;
1106 if (ret) {
1107 WARN_ON(1);
1108 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1109 return -1;
1110 }
1111 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1112
1113 /* actually log it */
1114 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
1115 if (too_long)
1116 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1117 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1118 if (has_cntl)
1119 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1120 else
1121 audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
1122 audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
1123
1124 p += to_send;
1125 len_left -= to_send;
1126 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1127 if (has_cntl)
1128 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1129 else
1130 *len_sent += to_send;
1131 }
1132 /* include the null we didn't log */
1133 return len + 1;
1134 }
1135
1136 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1137 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1138 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1139 {
1140 int i;
1141 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1142 const char __user *p;
1143 char *buf;
1144
1145 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1146 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1147
1148 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1149
1150 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
1151
1152 /*
1153 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1154 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1155 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1156 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1157 */
1158 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1159 if (!buf) {
1160 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1161 return;
1162 }
1163
1164 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1165 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1166 &len_sent, p, buf);
1167 if (len <= 0)
1168 break;
1169 p += len;
1170 }
1171 kfree(buf);
1172 }
1173
1174 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1175 {
1176 int i, call_panic = 0;
1177 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1178 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1179 const char *tty;
1180
1181 /* tsk == current */
1182 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1183 if (!context->ppid)
1184 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
1185 context->uid = tsk->uid;
1186 context->gid = tsk->gid;
1187 context->euid = tsk->euid;
1188 context->suid = tsk->suid;
1189 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
1190 context->egid = tsk->egid;
1191 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
1192 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
1193 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1194
1195 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1196 if (!ab)
1197 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1198 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1199 context->arch, context->major);
1200 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1201 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1202 if (context->return_valid)
1203 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1204 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1205 context->return_code);
1206
1207 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1208 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
1209 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1210 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1211 else
1212 tty = "(none)";
1213 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
1214 audit_log_format(ab,
1215 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1216 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1217 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1218 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1219 context->argv[0],
1220 context->argv[1],
1221 context->argv[2],
1222 context->argv[3],
1223 context->name_count,
1224 context->ppid,
1225 context->pid,
1226 tsk->loginuid,
1227 context->uid,
1228 context->gid,
1229 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1230 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1231 tsk->sessionid);
1232
1233 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1234
1235 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1236 if (context->filterkey) {
1237 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
1238 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
1239 } else
1240 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
1241 audit_log_end(ab);
1242
1243 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1244
1245 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1246 if (!ab)
1247 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1248
1249 switch (aux->type) {
1250 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1251 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
1252 audit_log_format(ab,
1253 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1254 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1255 axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
1256 axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
1257 axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
1258 break; }
1259
1260 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1261 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
1262 audit_log_format(ab,
1263 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1264 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1265 axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
1266 axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1267 break; }
1268
1269 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1270 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
1271 audit_log_format(ab,
1272 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1273 axi->mqdes,
1274 axi->notification.sigev_signo);
1275 break; }
1276
1277 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1278 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
1279 audit_log_format(ab,
1280 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1281 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1282 axi->mqdes,
1283 axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
1284 axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
1285 break; }
1286
1287 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1288 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
1289 audit_log_format(ab,
1290 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1291 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
1292 if (axi->osid != 0) {
1293 char *ctx = NULL;
1294 u32 len;
1295 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1296 axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1297 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
1298 axi->osid);
1299 call_panic = 1;
1300 } else {
1301 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1302 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1303 }
1304 }
1305 break; }
1306
1307 case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
1308 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
1309 audit_log_format(ab,
1310 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1311 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
1312 break; }
1313
1314 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1315 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1316 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1317 break; }
1318
1319 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1320 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
1321 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
1322 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
1323 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
1324 break; }
1325
1326 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
1327 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
1328
1329 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1330 audit_log_n_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
1331 break; }
1332
1333 case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
1334 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
1335 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
1336 break; }
1337
1338 }
1339 audit_log_end(ab);
1340 }
1341
1342 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1343 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1344
1345 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1346 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1347 axs->target_auid[i],
1348 axs->target_uid[i],
1349 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1350 axs->target_sid[i],
1351 axs->target_comm[i]))
1352 call_panic = 1;
1353 }
1354
1355 if (context->target_pid &&
1356 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1357 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1358 context->target_sessionid,
1359 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1360 call_panic = 1;
1361
1362 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1363 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1364 if (ab) {
1365 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1366 audit_log_end(ab);
1367 }
1368 }
1369 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1370 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
1371
1372 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1373 if (!ab)
1374 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1375
1376 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1377
1378 if (n->name) {
1379 switch(n->name_len) {
1380 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1381 /* log the full path */
1382 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1383 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1384 break;
1385 case 0:
1386 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1387 * directory component is the cwd */
1388 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1389 break;
1390 default:
1391 /* log the name's directory component */
1392 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1393 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1394 n->name_len);
1395 }
1396 } else
1397 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1398
1399 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1400 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1401 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1402 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1403 n->ino,
1404 MAJOR(n->dev),
1405 MINOR(n->dev),
1406 n->mode,
1407 n->uid,
1408 n->gid,
1409 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1410 MINOR(n->rdev));
1411 }
1412 if (n->osid != 0) {
1413 char *ctx = NULL;
1414 u32 len;
1415 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1416 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1417 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1418 call_panic = 2;
1419 } else {
1420 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1421 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1422 }
1423 }
1424
1425 audit_log_end(ab);
1426 }
1427
1428 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1429 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1430 if (ab)
1431 audit_log_end(ab);
1432 if (call_panic)
1433 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1434 }
1435
1436 /**
1437 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1438 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1439 *
1440 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1441 */
1442 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1443 {
1444 struct audit_context *context;
1445
1446 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1447 if (likely(!context))
1448 return;
1449
1450 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1451 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1452 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1453 * in the context of the idle thread */
1454 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1455 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1456 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1457
1458 audit_free_context(context);
1459 }
1460
1461 /**
1462 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1463 * @tsk: task being audited
1464 * @arch: architecture type
1465 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1466 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1467 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1468 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1469 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1470 *
1471 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1472 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1473 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1474 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1475 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1476 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1477 * be written).
1478 */
1479 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1480 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1481 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1482 {
1483 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1484 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1485 enum audit_state state;
1486
1487 if (unlikely(!context))
1488 return;
1489
1490 /*
1491 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1492 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1493 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1494 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1495 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1496 *
1497 * i386 no
1498 * x86_64 no
1499 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1500 *
1501 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1502 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1503 */
1504 if (context->in_syscall) {
1505 struct audit_context *newctx;
1506
1507 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1508 printk(KERN_ERR
1509 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1510 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1511 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1512 #endif
1513 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1514 if (newctx) {
1515 newctx->previous = context;
1516 context = newctx;
1517 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1518 } else {
1519 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1520 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1521 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1522 * to abandon auditing. */
1523 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1524 }
1525 }
1526 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1527
1528 if (!audit_enabled)
1529 return;
1530
1531 context->arch = arch;
1532 context->major = major;
1533 context->argv[0] = a1;
1534 context->argv[1] = a2;
1535 context->argv[2] = a3;
1536 context->argv[3] = a4;
1537
1538 state = context->state;
1539 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1540 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1541 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1542 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1543 return;
1544
1545 context->serial = 0;
1546 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1547 context->in_syscall = 1;
1548 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1549 context->ppid = 0;
1550 }
1551
1552 /**
1553 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1554 * @tsk: task being audited
1555 * @valid: success/failure flag
1556 * @return_code: syscall return value
1557 *
1558 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1559 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1560 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1561 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1562 * free the names stored from getname().
1563 */
1564 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1565 {
1566 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1567 struct audit_context *context;
1568
1569 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1570
1571 if (likely(!context))
1572 return;
1573
1574 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1575 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1576
1577 context->in_syscall = 0;
1578 context->auditable = 0;
1579
1580 if (context->previous) {
1581 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1582 context->previous = NULL;
1583 audit_free_context(context);
1584 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1585 } else {
1586 audit_free_names(context);
1587 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1588 audit_free_aux(context);
1589 context->aux = NULL;
1590 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1591 context->target_pid = 0;
1592 context->target_sid = 0;
1593 kfree(context->filterkey);
1594 context->filterkey = NULL;
1595 tsk->audit_context = context;
1596 }
1597 }
1598
1599 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1600 {
1601 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1602 struct audit_context *context;
1603 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1604 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1605 int count;
1606 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1607 return;
1608 context = current->audit_context;
1609 p = context->trees;
1610 count = context->tree_count;
1611 rcu_read_lock();
1612 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1613 rcu_read_unlock();
1614 if (!chunk)
1615 return;
1616 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1617 return;
1618 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1619 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1620 audit_set_auditable(context);
1621 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1622 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1623 return;
1624 }
1625 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1626 #endif
1627 }
1628
1629 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1630 {
1631 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1632 struct audit_context *context;
1633 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1634 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1635 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1636 unsigned long seq;
1637 int count;
1638
1639 context = current->audit_context;
1640 p = context->trees;
1641 count = context->tree_count;
1642 retry:
1643 drop = NULL;
1644 d = dentry;
1645 rcu_read_lock();
1646 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1647 for(;;) {
1648 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1649 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1650 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1651 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1652 if (chunk) {
1653 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1654 drop = chunk;
1655 break;
1656 }
1657 }
1658 }
1659 parent = d->d_parent;
1660 if (parent == d)
1661 break;
1662 d = parent;
1663 }
1664 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1665 rcu_read_unlock();
1666 if (!drop) {
1667 /* just a race with rename */
1668 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1669 goto retry;
1670 }
1671 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1672 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1673 /* OK, got more space */
1674 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1675 goto retry;
1676 }
1677 /* too bad */
1678 printk(KERN_WARNING
1679 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1680 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1681 audit_set_auditable(context);
1682 return;
1683 }
1684 rcu_read_unlock();
1685 #endif
1686 }
1687
1688 /**
1689 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1690 * @name: name to add
1691 *
1692 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1693 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1694 */
1695 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1696 {
1697 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1698
1699 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1700 return;
1701
1702 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1703 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1704 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1705 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1706 dump_stack();
1707 #endif
1708 return;
1709 }
1710 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1711 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1712 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1713 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1714 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1715 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
1716 ++context->name_count;
1717 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
1718 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
1719 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1720 path_get(&current->fs->pwd);
1721 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
1722 }
1723
1724 }
1725
1726 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1727 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1728 *
1729 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1730 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1731 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1732 */
1733 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1734 {
1735 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1736
1737 BUG_ON(!context);
1738 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1739 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1740 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1741 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1742 if (context->name_count) {
1743 int i;
1744 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1745 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1746 context->names[i].name,
1747 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1748 }
1749 #endif
1750 __putname(name);
1751 }
1752 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1753 else {
1754 ++context->put_count;
1755 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1756 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1757 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1758 " put_count=%d\n",
1759 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1760 context->serial, context->major,
1761 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1762 context->put_count);
1763 dump_stack();
1764 }
1765 }
1766 #endif
1767 }
1768
1769 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1770 const struct inode *inode)
1771 {
1772 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1773 if (inode)
1774 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1775 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
1776 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1777 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1778 inode->i_ino);
1779
1780 else
1781 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
1782 return 1;
1783 }
1784 context->name_count++;
1785 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1786 context->ino_count++;
1787 #endif
1788 return 0;
1789 }
1790
1791 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1792 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
1793 {
1794 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1795 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1796 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1797 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1798 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1799 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1800 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1801 }
1802
1803 /**
1804 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1805 * @name: name being audited
1806 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1807 *
1808 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1809 */
1810 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1811 {
1812 int idx;
1813 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1814 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1815
1816 if (!context->in_syscall)
1817 return;
1818 if (context->name_count
1819 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1820 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1821 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1822 else if (context->name_count > 1
1823 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1824 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1825 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1826 else {
1827 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1828 * associated name? */
1829 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1830 return;
1831 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1832 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1833 }
1834 handle_path(dentry);
1835 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1836 }
1837
1838 /**
1839 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1840 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1841 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1842 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1843 *
1844 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1845 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1846 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1847 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1848 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1849 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1850 * unsuccessful attempts.
1851 */
1852 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
1853 const struct inode *parent)
1854 {
1855 int idx;
1856 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1857 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1858 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1859 int dirlen = 0;
1860
1861 if (!context->in_syscall)
1862 return;
1863
1864 if (inode)
1865 handle_one(inode);
1866 /* determine matching parent */
1867 if (!dname)
1868 goto add_names;
1869
1870 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
1871 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
1872 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
1873
1874 if (!n->name)
1875 continue;
1876
1877 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
1878 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
1879 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
1880 found_parent = n->name;
1881 goto add_names;
1882 }
1883 }
1884
1885 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
1886 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
1887 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
1888
1889 if (!n->name)
1890 continue;
1891
1892 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
1893 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
1894 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
1895 if (inode)
1896 audit_copy_inode(n, inode);
1897 else
1898 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1899 found_child = n->name;
1900 goto add_names;
1901 }
1902 }
1903
1904 add_names:
1905 if (!found_parent) {
1906 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
1907 return;
1908 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1909 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1910 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
1911 }
1912
1913 if (!found_child) {
1914 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1915 return;
1916 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1917
1918 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1919 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1920 * audit_free_names() */
1921 if (found_parent) {
1922 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
1923 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1924 /* don't call __putname() */
1925 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
1926 } else {
1927 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1928 }
1929
1930 if (inode)
1931 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1932 else
1933 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1934 }
1935 }
1936 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
1937
1938 /**
1939 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1940 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1941 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1942 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1943 *
1944 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1945 */
1946 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1947 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1948 {
1949 if (!ctx->serial)
1950 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1951 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1952 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1953 *serial = ctx->serial;
1954 ctx->auditable = 1;
1955 }
1956
1957 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1958 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1959
1960 /**
1961 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1962 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1963 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1964 *
1965 * Returns 0.
1966 *
1967 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1968 */
1969 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1970 {
1971 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
1972 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
1973
1974 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
1975 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1976
1977 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1978 if (ab) {
1979 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1980 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
1981 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
1982 task->pid, task->uid,
1983 task->loginuid, loginuid,
1984 task->sessionid, sessionid);
1985 audit_log_end(ab);
1986 }
1987 }
1988 task->sessionid = sessionid;
1989 task->loginuid = loginuid;
1990 return 0;
1991 }
1992
1993 /**
1994 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
1995 * @oflag: open flag
1996 * @mode: mode bits
1997 * @u_attr: queue attributes
1998 *
1999 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2000 */
2001 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
2002 {
2003 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
2004 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2005
2006 if (!audit_enabled)
2007 return 0;
2008
2009 if (likely(!context))
2010 return 0;
2011
2012 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2013 if (!ax)
2014 return -ENOMEM;
2015
2016 if (u_attr != NULL) {
2017 if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
2018 kfree(ax);
2019 return -EFAULT;
2020 }
2021 } else
2022 memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
2023
2024 ax->oflag = oflag;
2025 ax->mode = mode;
2026
2027 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2028 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2029 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2030 return 0;
2031 }
2032
2033 /**
2034 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
2035 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2036 * @msg_len: Message length
2037 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2038 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2039 *
2040 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2041 */
2042 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2043 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2044 {
2045 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2046 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2047
2048 if (!audit_enabled)
2049 return 0;
2050
2051 if (likely(!context))
2052 return 0;
2053
2054 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2055 if (!ax)
2056 return -ENOMEM;
2057
2058 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2059 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2060 kfree(ax);
2061 return -EFAULT;
2062 }
2063 } else
2064 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2065
2066 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
2067 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2068 ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
2069
2070 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2071 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2072 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2073 return 0;
2074 }
2075
2076 /**
2077 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
2078 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2079 * @msg_len: Message length
2080 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
2081 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2082 *
2083 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2084 */
2085 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
2086 unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
2087 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2088 {
2089 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2090 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2091
2092 if (!audit_enabled)
2093 return 0;
2094
2095 if (likely(!context))
2096 return 0;
2097
2098 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2099 if (!ax)
2100 return -ENOMEM;
2101
2102 if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
2103 if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
2104 kfree(ax);
2105 return -EFAULT;
2106 }
2107 } else
2108 ax->msg_prio = 0;
2109
2110 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2111 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2112 kfree(ax);
2113 return -EFAULT;
2114 }
2115 } else
2116 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2117
2118 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
2119 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2120
2121 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2122 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2123 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2124 return 0;
2125 }
2126
2127 /**
2128 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2129 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2130 * @u_notification: Notification event
2131 *
2132 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2133 */
2134
2135 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
2136 {
2137 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
2138 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2139
2140 if (!audit_enabled)
2141 return 0;
2142
2143 if (likely(!context))
2144 return 0;
2145
2146 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2147 if (!ax)
2148 return -ENOMEM;
2149
2150 if (u_notification != NULL) {
2151 if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
2152 kfree(ax);
2153 return -EFAULT;
2154 }
2155 } else
2156 memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
2157
2158 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
2159
2160 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2161 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2162 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2163 return 0;
2164 }
2165
2166 /**
2167 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2168 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2169 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2170 *
2171 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2172 */
2173 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2174 {
2175 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
2176 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2177
2178 if (!audit_enabled)
2179 return 0;
2180
2181 if (likely(!context))
2182 return 0;
2183
2184 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2185 if (!ax)
2186 return -ENOMEM;
2187
2188 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
2189 ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
2190
2191 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2192 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2193 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2194 return 0;
2195 }
2196
2197 /**
2198 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2199 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2200 *
2201 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2202 */
2203 int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2204 {
2205 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
2206 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2207
2208 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2209 if (!ax)
2210 return -ENOMEM;
2211
2212 ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
2213 ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
2214 ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
2215 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
2216 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
2217 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2218 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2219 return 0;
2220 }
2221
2222 /**
2223 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2224 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2225 * @uid: msgq user id
2226 * @gid: msgq group id
2227 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2228 *
2229 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2230 */
2231 int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
2232 {
2233 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
2234 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2235
2236 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2237 if (!ax)
2238 return -ENOMEM;
2239
2240 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
2241 ax->uid = uid;
2242 ax->gid = gid;
2243 ax->mode = mode;
2244
2245 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
2246 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2247 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2248 return 0;
2249 }
2250
2251 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2252 {
2253 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2254 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2255
2256 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2257 return 0;
2258
2259 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2260 if (!ax)
2261 return -ENOMEM;
2262
2263 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2264 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2265 ax->mm = bprm->mm;
2266 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2267 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2268 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2269 return 0;
2270 }
2271
2272
2273 /**
2274 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2275 * @nargs: number of args
2276 * @args: args array
2277 *
2278 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2279 */
2280 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2281 {
2282 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
2283 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2284
2285 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2286 return 0;
2287
2288 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
2289 if (!ax)
2290 return -ENOMEM;
2291
2292 ax->nargs = nargs;
2293 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2294
2295 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2296 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2297 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2298 return 0;
2299 }
2300
2301 /**
2302 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2303 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2304 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2305 *
2306 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2307 */
2308 int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2309 {
2310 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2311 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *ax;
2312
2313 if (likely(!context)) {
2314 return 0;
2315 }
2316
2317 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2318 if (!ax) {
2319 return -ENOMEM;
2320 }
2321
2322 ax->fd[0] = fd1;
2323 ax->fd[1] = fd2;
2324
2325 ax->d.type = AUDIT_FD_PAIR;
2326 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2327 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2328 return 0;
2329 }
2330
2331 /**
2332 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2333 * @len: data length in user space
2334 * @a: data address in kernel space
2335 *
2336 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2337 */
2338 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2339 {
2340 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
2341 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2342
2343 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2344 return 0;
2345
2346 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
2347 if (!ax)
2348 return -ENOMEM;
2349
2350 ax->len = len;
2351 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
2352
2353 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
2354 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2355 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2356 return 0;
2357 }
2358
2359 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2360 {
2361 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2362
2363 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2364 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2365 context->target_uid = t->uid;
2366 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2367 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2368 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2369 }
2370
2371 /**
2372 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2373 * @sig: signal value
2374 * @t: task being signaled
2375 *
2376 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2377 * and uid that is doing that.
2378 */
2379 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2380 {
2381 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2382 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2383 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2384
2385 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2386 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2387 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2388 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2389 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2390 else
2391 audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
2392 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2393 }
2394 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2395 return 0;
2396 }
2397
2398 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2399 * in audit_context */
2400 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2401 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2402 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2403 ctx->target_uid = t->uid;
2404 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2405 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2406 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2407 return 0;
2408 }
2409
2410 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2411 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2412 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2413 if (!axp)
2414 return -ENOMEM;
2415
2416 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2417 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2418 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2419 }
2420 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2421
2422 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2423 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2424 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid;
2425 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2426 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2427 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2428 axp->pid_count++;
2429
2430 return 0;
2431 }
2432
2433 /**
2434 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2435 * @signr: signal value
2436 *
2437 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2438 * should record the event for investigation.
2439 */
2440 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2441 {
2442 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2443 u32 sid;
2444 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2445 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2446
2447 if (!audit_enabled)
2448 return;
2449
2450 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2451 return;
2452
2453 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2454 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2455 auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid);
2456 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
2457 if (sid) {
2458 char *ctx = NULL;
2459 u32 len;
2460
2461 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
2462 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
2463 else {
2464 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
2465 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2466 }
2467 }
2468 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2469 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2470 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2471 audit_log_end(ab);
2472 }
linux-next