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[linux/fpc-iii.git] / kernel / capability.c
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1 /*
2 * linux/kernel/capability.c
4 * Copyright (C) 1997 Andrew Main <zefram@fysh.org>
6 * Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
7 * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net>
8 */
10 #include <linux/capability.h>
11 #include <linux/mm.h>
12 #include <linux/module.h>
13 #include <linux/security.h>
14 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
15 #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
16 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
19 * This lock protects task->cap_* for all tasks including current.
20 * Locking rule: acquire this prior to tasklist_lock.
22 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock);
25 * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
28 const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
29 const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set = CAP_FULL_SET;
30 const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
32 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
33 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set);
34 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set);
37 * More recent versions of libcap are available from:
39 * http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
42 static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void)
44 static int warned;
45 if (!warned) {
46 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
48 printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities"
49 " (legacy support in use)\n",
50 get_task_comm(name, current));
51 warned = 1;
56 * For sys_getproccap() and sys_setproccap(), any of the three
57 * capability set pointers may be NULL -- indicating that that set is
58 * uninteresting and/or not to be changed.
61 /**
62 * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process.
63 * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
64 * target pid data
65 * @dataptr: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
66 * and inheritable capabilities that are returned
68 * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
70 asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)
72 int ret = 0;
73 pid_t pid;
74 __u32 version;
75 struct task_struct *target;
76 unsigned tocopy;
77 kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
79 if (get_user(version, &header->version))
80 return -EFAULT;
82 switch (version) {
83 case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
84 warn_legacy_capability_use();
85 tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
86 break;
87 case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
88 tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2;
89 break;
90 default:
91 if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
92 return -EFAULT;
93 return -EINVAL;
96 if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
97 return -EFAULT;
99 if (pid < 0)
100 return -EINVAL;
102 spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
103 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
105 if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) {
106 target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
107 if (!target) {
108 ret = -ESRCH;
109 goto out;
111 } else
112 target = current;
114 ret = security_capget(target, &pE, &pI, &pP);
116 out:
117 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
118 spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
120 if (!ret) {
121 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S];
122 unsigned i;
124 for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
125 kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i];
126 kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i];
127 kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i];
131 * Note, in the case, tocopy < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S,
132 * we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This
133 * has the effect of making older libcap
134 * implementations implicitly drop upper capability
135 * bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset
136 * sequence.
138 * This behavior is considered fail-safe
139 * behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer
140 * version of libcap will enable access to the newer
141 * capabilities.
143 * An alternative would be to return an error here
144 * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to
145 * unexpectidly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts
146 * before modification is attempted and the application
147 * fails.
150 if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy
151 * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
152 return -EFAULT;
156 return ret;
160 * cap_set_pg - set capabilities for all processes in a given process
161 * group. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
163 static inline int cap_set_pg(int pgrp_nr, kernel_cap_t *effective,
164 kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
165 kernel_cap_t *permitted)
167 struct task_struct *g, *target;
168 int ret = -EPERM;
169 int found = 0;
170 struct pid *pgrp;
172 pgrp = find_vpid(pgrp_nr);
173 do_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g) {
174 target = g;
175 while_each_thread(g, target) {
176 if (!security_capset_check(target, effective,
177 inheritable,
178 permitted)) {
179 security_capset_set(target, effective,
180 inheritable,
181 permitted);
182 ret = 0;
184 found = 1;
186 } while_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g);
188 if (!found)
189 ret = 0;
190 return ret;
194 * cap_set_all - set capabilities for all processes other than init
195 * and self. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
197 static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective,
198 kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
199 kernel_cap_t *permitted)
201 struct task_struct *g, *target;
202 int ret = -EPERM;
203 int found = 0;
205 do_each_thread(g, target) {
206 if (target == current || is_container_init(target->group_leader))
207 continue;
208 found = 1;
209 if (security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable,
210 permitted))
211 continue;
212 ret = 0;
213 security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
214 } while_each_thread(g, target);
216 if (!found)
217 ret = 0;
218 return ret;
222 * sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or a group of processes
223 * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
224 * target pid data
225 * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
226 * and inheritable capabilities
228 * Set capabilities for a given process, all processes, or all
229 * processes in a given process group.
231 * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as:
233 * [pid is for the 'target' task. 'current' is the calling task.]
235 * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted
236 * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted
237 * E: must be set to a subset of (new target) permitted
239 * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
241 asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
243 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S];
244 unsigned i, tocopy;
245 kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
246 __u32 version;
247 struct task_struct *target;
248 int ret;
249 pid_t pid;
251 if (get_user(version, &header->version))
252 return -EFAULT;
254 switch (version) {
255 case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
256 warn_legacy_capability_use();
257 tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
258 break;
259 case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
260 tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2;
261 break;
262 default:
263 if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
264 return -EFAULT;
265 return -EINVAL;
268 if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
269 return -EFAULT;
271 if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current) && !capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
272 return -EPERM;
274 if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, tocopy
275 * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
276 return -EFAULT;
279 for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
280 effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective;
281 permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted;
282 inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable;
284 while (i < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S) {
285 effective.cap[i] = 0;
286 permitted.cap[i] = 0;
287 inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
288 i++;
291 spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
292 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
294 if (pid > 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) {
295 target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
296 if (!target) {
297 ret = -ESRCH;
298 goto out;
300 } else
301 target = current;
303 ret = 0;
305 /* having verified that the proposed changes are legal,
306 we now put them into effect. */
307 if (pid < 0) {
308 if (pid == -1) /* all procs other than current and init */
309 ret = cap_set_all(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
311 else /* all procs in process group */
312 ret = cap_set_pg(-pid, &effective, &inheritable,
313 &permitted);
314 } else {
315 ret = security_capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable,
316 &permitted);
317 if (!ret)
318 security_capset_set(target, &effective, &inheritable,
319 &permitted);
322 out:
323 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
324 spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
326 return ret;
329 int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
331 if (security_capable(t, cap) == 0) {
332 t->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
333 return 1;
335 return 0;
338 int capable(int cap)
340 return __capable(current, cap);
342 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);