4 * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
7 #include <linux/module.h>
9 #include <linux/utsname.h>
10 #include <linux/mman.h>
11 #include <linux/notifier.h>
12 #include <linux/reboot.h>
13 #include <linux/prctl.h>
14 #include <linux/highuid.h>
16 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
17 #include <linux/resource.h>
18 #include <linux/kernel.h>
19 #include <linux/kexec.h>
20 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
21 #include <linux/capability.h>
22 #include <linux/device.h>
23 #include <linux/key.h>
24 #include <linux/times.h>
25 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
26 #include <linux/security.h>
27 #include <linux/dcookies.h>
28 #include <linux/suspend.h>
29 #include <linux/tty.h>
30 #include <linux/signal.h>
31 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
32 #include <linux/getcpu.h>
33 #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
34 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
35 #include <linux/cpu.h>
36 #include <linux/personality.h>
37 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
38 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
39 #include <linux/gfp.h>
41 #include <linux/compat.h>
42 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
43 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
44 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
46 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
48 #include <asm/unistd.h>
50 #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
51 # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
53 #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
54 # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
57 # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
60 # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
63 # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
66 # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
69 # define GET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
72 # define SET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
75 # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
78 # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
82 * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
83 * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
86 int overflowuid
= DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID
;
87 int overflowgid
= DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID
;
90 EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid
);
91 EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid
);
95 * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
96 * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
99 int fs_overflowuid
= DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID
;
100 int fs_overflowgid
= DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID
;
102 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid
);
103 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid
);
106 * this indicates whether you can reboot with ctrl-alt-del: the default is yes
111 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cad_pid
);
114 * If set, this is used for preparing the system to power off.
117 void (*pm_power_off_prepare
)(void);
120 * set the priority of a task
121 * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
123 static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct
*p
, int niceval
, int error
)
125 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred(), *pcred
= __task_cred(p
);
128 if (pcred
->uid
!= cred
->euid
&&
129 pcred
->euid
!= cred
->euid
&& !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE
)) {
133 if (niceval
< task_nice(p
) && !can_nice(p
, niceval
)) {
137 no_nice
= security_task_setnice(p
, niceval
);
144 set_user_nice(p
, niceval
);
149 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority
, int, which
, int, who
, int, niceval
)
151 struct task_struct
*g
, *p
;
152 struct user_struct
*user
;
153 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
157 if (which
> PRIO_USER
|| which
< PRIO_PROCESS
)
160 /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */
168 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
172 p
= find_task_by_vpid(who
);
176 error
= set_one_prio(p
, niceval
, error
);
180 pgrp
= find_vpid(who
);
182 pgrp
= task_pgrp(current
);
183 do_each_pid_thread(pgrp
, PIDTYPE_PGID
, p
) {
184 error
= set_one_prio(p
, niceval
, error
);
185 } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp
, PIDTYPE_PGID
, p
);
188 user
= (struct user_struct
*) cred
->user
;
191 else if ((who
!= cred
->uid
) &&
192 !(user
= find_user(who
)))
193 goto out_unlock
; /* No processes for this user */
195 do_each_thread(g
, p
) {
196 if (__task_cred(p
)->uid
== who
)
197 error
= set_one_prio(p
, niceval
, error
);
198 } while_each_thread(g
, p
);
199 if (who
!= cred
->uid
)
200 free_uid(user
); /* For find_user() */
204 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
211 * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
212 * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that
213 * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)
214 * to stay compatible.
216 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority
, int, which
, int, who
)
218 struct task_struct
*g
, *p
;
219 struct user_struct
*user
;
220 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
221 long niceval
, retval
= -ESRCH
;
224 if (which
> PRIO_USER
|| which
< PRIO_PROCESS
)
228 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
232 p
= find_task_by_vpid(who
);
236 niceval
= 20 - task_nice(p
);
237 if (niceval
> retval
)
243 pgrp
= find_vpid(who
);
245 pgrp
= task_pgrp(current
);
246 do_each_pid_thread(pgrp
, PIDTYPE_PGID
, p
) {
247 niceval
= 20 - task_nice(p
);
248 if (niceval
> retval
)
250 } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp
, PIDTYPE_PGID
, p
);
253 user
= (struct user_struct
*) cred
->user
;
256 else if ((who
!= cred
->uid
) &&
257 !(user
= find_user(who
)))
258 goto out_unlock
; /* No processes for this user */
260 do_each_thread(g
, p
) {
261 if (__task_cred(p
)->uid
== who
) {
262 niceval
= 20 - task_nice(p
);
263 if (niceval
> retval
)
266 } while_each_thread(g
, p
);
267 if (who
!= cred
->uid
)
268 free_uid(user
); /* for find_user() */
272 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
279 * emergency_restart - reboot the system
281 * Without shutting down any hardware or taking any locks
282 * reboot the system. This is called when we know we are in
283 * trouble so this is our best effort to reboot. This is
284 * safe to call in interrupt context.
286 void emergency_restart(void)
288 machine_emergency_restart();
290 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(emergency_restart
);
292 void kernel_restart_prepare(char *cmd
)
294 blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list
, SYS_RESTART
, cmd
);
295 system_state
= SYSTEM_RESTART
;
301 * kernel_restart - reboot the system
302 * @cmd: pointer to buffer containing command to execute for restart
305 * Shutdown everything and perform a clean reboot.
306 * This is not safe to call in interrupt context.
308 void kernel_restart(char *cmd
)
310 kernel_restart_prepare(cmd
);
312 printk(KERN_EMERG
"Restarting system.\n");
314 printk(KERN_EMERG
"Restarting system with command '%s'.\n", cmd
);
315 machine_restart(cmd
);
317 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_restart
);
319 static void kernel_shutdown_prepare(enum system_states state
)
321 blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list
,
322 (state
== SYSTEM_HALT
)?SYS_HALT
:SYS_POWER_OFF
, NULL
);
323 system_state
= state
;
327 * kernel_halt - halt the system
329 * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system halt.
331 void kernel_halt(void)
333 kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_HALT
);
335 printk(KERN_EMERG
"System halted.\n");
339 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_halt
);
342 * kernel_power_off - power_off the system
344 * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system power_off.
346 void kernel_power_off(void)
348 kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_POWER_OFF
);
349 if (pm_power_off_prepare
)
350 pm_power_off_prepare();
351 disable_nonboot_cpus();
353 printk(KERN_EMERG
"Power down.\n");
356 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_power_off
);
358 static DEFINE_MUTEX(reboot_mutex
);
361 * Reboot system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it,
362 * and even root needs to set up some magic numbers in the registers
363 * so that some mistake won't make this reboot the whole machine.
364 * You can also set the meaning of the ctrl-alt-del-key here.
366 * reboot doesn't sync: do that yourself before calling this.
368 SYSCALL_DEFINE4(reboot
, int, magic1
, int, magic2
, unsigned int, cmd
,
374 /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
375 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT
))
378 /* For safety, we require "magic" arguments. */
379 if (magic1
!= LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1
||
380 (magic2
!= LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2
&&
381 magic2
!= LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2A
&&
382 magic2
!= LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2B
&&
383 magic2
!= LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2C
))
386 /* Instead of trying to make the power_off code look like
387 * halt when pm_power_off is not set do it the easy way.
389 if ((cmd
== LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF
) && !pm_power_off
)
390 cmd
= LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT
;
392 mutex_lock(&reboot_mutex
);
394 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART
:
395 kernel_restart(NULL
);
398 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON
:
402 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_OFF
:
406 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT
:
409 panic("cannot halt");
411 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF
:
416 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2
:
417 if (strncpy_from_user(&buffer
[0], arg
, sizeof(buffer
) - 1) < 0) {
421 buffer
[sizeof(buffer
) - 1] = '\0';
423 kernel_restart(buffer
);
427 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC
:
428 ret
= kernel_kexec();
432 #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
433 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_SW_SUSPEND
:
442 mutex_unlock(&reboot_mutex
);
446 static void deferred_cad(struct work_struct
*dummy
)
448 kernel_restart(NULL
);
452 * This function gets called by ctrl-alt-del - ie the keyboard interrupt.
453 * As it's called within an interrupt, it may NOT sync: the only choice
454 * is whether to reboot at once, or just ignore the ctrl-alt-del.
456 void ctrl_alt_del(void)
458 static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work
, deferred_cad
);
461 schedule_work(&cad_work
);
463 kill_cad_pid(SIGINT
, 1);
467 * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
468 * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
470 * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
471 * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
473 * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
474 * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
475 * a security audit over a program.
477 * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
478 * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be
479 * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
481 * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
482 * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
484 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid
, gid_t
, rgid
, gid_t
, egid
)
486 const struct cred
*old
;
490 new = prepare_creds();
493 old
= current_cred();
495 retval
= security_task_setgid(rgid
, egid
, (gid_t
)-1, LSM_SETID_RE
);
500 if (rgid
!= (gid_t
) -1) {
501 if (old
->gid
== rgid
||
508 if (egid
!= (gid_t
) -1) {
509 if (old
->gid
== egid
||
518 if (rgid
!= (gid_t
) -1 ||
519 (egid
!= (gid_t
) -1 && egid
!= old
->gid
))
520 new->sgid
= new->egid
;
521 new->fsgid
= new->egid
;
523 return commit_creds(new);
531 * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS
533 * SMP: Same implicit races as above.
535 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid
, gid_t
, gid
)
537 const struct cred
*old
;
541 new = prepare_creds();
544 old
= current_cred();
546 retval
= security_task_setgid(gid
, (gid_t
)-1, (gid_t
)-1, LSM_SETID_ID
);
551 if (capable(CAP_SETGID
))
552 new->gid
= new->egid
= new->sgid
= new->fsgid
= gid
;
553 else if (gid
== old
->gid
|| gid
== old
->sgid
)
554 new->egid
= new->fsgid
= gid
;
558 return commit_creds(new);
566 * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID
568 static int set_user(struct cred
*new)
570 struct user_struct
*new_user
;
572 new_user
= alloc_uid(current_user_ns(), new->uid
);
576 if (atomic_read(&new_user
->processes
) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC
) &&
577 new_user
!= INIT_USER
) {
583 new->user
= new_user
;
588 * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
589 * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
591 * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
592 * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
594 * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
595 * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
596 * a security audit over a program.
598 * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
599 * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be
600 * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
602 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid
, uid_t
, ruid
, uid_t
, euid
)
604 const struct cred
*old
;
608 new = prepare_creds();
611 old
= current_cred();
613 retval
= security_task_setuid(ruid
, euid
, (uid_t
)-1, LSM_SETID_RE
);
618 if (ruid
!= (uid_t
) -1) {
620 if (old
->uid
!= ruid
&&
622 !capable(CAP_SETUID
))
626 if (euid
!= (uid_t
) -1) {
628 if (old
->uid
!= euid
&&
631 !capable(CAP_SETUID
))
635 if (new->uid
!= old
->uid
) {
636 retval
= set_user(new);
640 if (ruid
!= (uid_t
) -1 ||
641 (euid
!= (uid_t
) -1 && euid
!= old
->uid
))
642 new->suid
= new->euid
;
643 new->fsuid
= new->euid
;
645 retval
= security_task_fix_setuid(new, old
, LSM_SETID_RE
);
649 return commit_creds(new);
657 * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS
659 * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
660 * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal
661 * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
662 * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people
663 * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
664 * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
665 * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.
667 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid
, uid_t
, uid
)
669 const struct cred
*old
;
673 new = prepare_creds();
676 old
= current_cred();
678 retval
= security_task_setuid(uid
, (uid_t
)-1, (uid_t
)-1, LSM_SETID_ID
);
683 if (capable(CAP_SETUID
)) {
684 new->suid
= new->uid
= uid
;
685 if (uid
!= old
->uid
) {
686 retval
= set_user(new);
690 } else if (uid
!= old
->uid
&& uid
!= new->suid
) {
694 new->fsuid
= new->euid
= uid
;
696 retval
= security_task_fix_setuid(new, old
, LSM_SETID_ID
);
700 return commit_creds(new);
709 * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
710 * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
712 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid
, uid_t
, ruid
, uid_t
, euid
, uid_t
, suid
)
714 const struct cred
*old
;
718 new = prepare_creds();
722 retval
= security_task_setuid(ruid
, euid
, suid
, LSM_SETID_RES
);
725 old
= current_cred();
728 if (!capable(CAP_SETUID
)) {
729 if (ruid
!= (uid_t
) -1 && ruid
!= old
->uid
&&
730 ruid
!= old
->euid
&& ruid
!= old
->suid
)
732 if (euid
!= (uid_t
) -1 && euid
!= old
->uid
&&
733 euid
!= old
->euid
&& euid
!= old
->suid
)
735 if (suid
!= (uid_t
) -1 && suid
!= old
->uid
&&
736 suid
!= old
->euid
&& suid
!= old
->suid
)
740 if (ruid
!= (uid_t
) -1) {
742 if (ruid
!= old
->uid
) {
743 retval
= set_user(new);
748 if (euid
!= (uid_t
) -1)
750 if (suid
!= (uid_t
) -1)
752 new->fsuid
= new->euid
;
754 retval
= security_task_fix_setuid(new, old
, LSM_SETID_RES
);
758 return commit_creds(new);
765 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid
, uid_t __user
*, ruid
, uid_t __user
*, euid
, uid_t __user
*, suid
)
767 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
770 if (!(retval
= put_user(cred
->uid
, ruid
)) &&
771 !(retval
= put_user(cred
->euid
, euid
)))
772 retval
= put_user(cred
->suid
, suid
);
778 * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
780 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid
, gid_t
, rgid
, gid_t
, egid
, gid_t
, sgid
)
782 const struct cred
*old
;
786 new = prepare_creds();
789 old
= current_cred();
791 retval
= security_task_setgid(rgid
, egid
, sgid
, LSM_SETID_RES
);
796 if (!capable(CAP_SETGID
)) {
797 if (rgid
!= (gid_t
) -1 && rgid
!= old
->gid
&&
798 rgid
!= old
->egid
&& rgid
!= old
->sgid
)
800 if (egid
!= (gid_t
) -1 && egid
!= old
->gid
&&
801 egid
!= old
->egid
&& egid
!= old
->sgid
)
803 if (sgid
!= (gid_t
) -1 && sgid
!= old
->gid
&&
804 sgid
!= old
->egid
&& sgid
!= old
->sgid
)
808 if (rgid
!= (gid_t
) -1)
810 if (egid
!= (gid_t
) -1)
812 if (sgid
!= (gid_t
) -1)
814 new->fsgid
= new->egid
;
816 return commit_creds(new);
823 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid
, gid_t __user
*, rgid
, gid_t __user
*, egid
, gid_t __user
*, sgid
)
825 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
828 if (!(retval
= put_user(cred
->gid
, rgid
)) &&
829 !(retval
= put_user(cred
->egid
, egid
)))
830 retval
= put_user(cred
->sgid
, sgid
);
837 * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
838 * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
839 * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
840 * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
842 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid
, uid_t
, uid
)
844 const struct cred
*old
;
848 new = prepare_creds();
850 return current_fsuid();
851 old
= current_cred();
852 old_fsuid
= old
->fsuid
;
854 if (security_task_setuid(uid
, (uid_t
)-1, (uid_t
)-1, LSM_SETID_FS
) < 0)
857 if (uid
== old
->uid
|| uid
== old
->euid
||
858 uid
== old
->suid
|| uid
== old
->fsuid
||
859 capable(CAP_SETUID
)) {
860 if (uid
!= old_fsuid
) {
862 if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old
, LSM_SETID_FS
) == 0)
877 * Samma på svenska..
879 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid
, gid_t
, gid
)
881 const struct cred
*old
;
885 new = prepare_creds();
887 return current_fsgid();
888 old
= current_cred();
889 old_fsgid
= old
->fsgid
;
891 if (security_task_setgid(gid
, (gid_t
)-1, (gid_t
)-1, LSM_SETID_FS
))
894 if (gid
== old
->gid
|| gid
== old
->egid
||
895 gid
== old
->sgid
|| gid
== old
->fsgid
||
896 capable(CAP_SETGID
)) {
897 if (gid
!= old_fsgid
) {
912 void do_sys_times(struct tms
*tms
)
914 cputime_t tgutime
, tgstime
, cutime
, cstime
;
916 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
917 thread_group_times(current
, &tgutime
, &tgstime
);
918 cutime
= current
->signal
->cutime
;
919 cstime
= current
->signal
->cstime
;
920 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
921 tms
->tms_utime
= cputime_to_clock_t(tgutime
);
922 tms
->tms_stime
= cputime_to_clock_t(tgstime
);
923 tms
->tms_cutime
= cputime_to_clock_t(cutime
);
924 tms
->tms_cstime
= cputime_to_clock_t(cstime
);
927 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times
, struct tms __user
*, tbuf
)
933 if (copy_to_user(tbuf
, &tmp
, sizeof(struct tms
)))
936 force_successful_syscall_return();
937 return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
941 * This needs some heavy checking ...
942 * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
943 * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
945 * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
946 * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
947 * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91
949 * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX.
952 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid
, pid_t
, pid
, pid_t
, pgid
)
954 struct task_struct
*p
;
955 struct task_struct
*group_leader
= current
->group_leader
;
960 pid
= task_pid_vnr(group_leader
);
966 /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock
967 * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
969 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock
);
972 p
= find_task_by_vpid(pid
);
977 if (!thread_group_leader(p
))
980 if (same_thread_group(p
->real_parent
, group_leader
)) {
982 if (task_session(p
) != task_session(group_leader
))
989 if (p
!= group_leader
)
994 if (p
->signal
->leader
)
999 struct task_struct
*g
;
1001 pgrp
= find_vpid(pgid
);
1002 g
= pid_task(pgrp
, PIDTYPE_PGID
);
1003 if (!g
|| task_session(g
) != task_session(group_leader
))
1007 err
= security_task_setpgid(p
, pgid
);
1011 if (task_pgrp(p
) != pgrp
)
1012 change_pid(p
, PIDTYPE_PGID
, pgrp
);
1016 /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */
1017 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock
);
1021 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid
, pid_t
, pid
)
1023 struct task_struct
*p
;
1029 grp
= task_pgrp(current
);
1032 p
= find_task_by_vpid(pid
);
1039 retval
= security_task_getpgid(p
);
1043 retval
= pid_vnr(grp
);
1049 #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP
1051 SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp
)
1053 return sys_getpgid(0);
1058 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid
, pid_t
, pid
)
1060 struct task_struct
*p
;
1066 sid
= task_session(current
);
1069 p
= find_task_by_vpid(pid
);
1072 sid
= task_session(p
);
1076 retval
= security_task_getsid(p
);
1080 retval
= pid_vnr(sid
);
1086 SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid
)
1088 struct task_struct
*group_leader
= current
->group_leader
;
1089 struct pid
*sid
= task_pid(group_leader
);
1090 pid_t session
= pid_vnr(sid
);
1093 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock
);
1094 /* Fail if I am already a session leader */
1095 if (group_leader
->signal
->leader
)
1098 /* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the
1099 * proposed session id.
1101 if (pid_task(sid
, PIDTYPE_PGID
))
1104 group_leader
->signal
->leader
= 1;
1105 __set_special_pids(sid
);
1107 proc_clear_tty(group_leader
);
1111 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock
);
1113 proc_sid_connector(group_leader
);
1117 DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem
);
1119 #ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE
1120 #define override_architecture(name) \
1121 (current->personality == PER_LINUX32 && \
1122 copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \
1123 sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE)))
1125 #define override_architecture(name) 0
1128 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname
, struct new_utsname __user
*, name
)
1132 down_read(&uts_sem
);
1133 if (copy_to_user(name
, utsname(), sizeof *name
))
1137 if (!errno
&& override_architecture(name
))
1142 #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME
1146 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname
, struct old_utsname __user
*, name
)
1153 down_read(&uts_sem
);
1154 if (copy_to_user(name
, utsname(), sizeof(*name
)))
1158 if (!error
&& override_architecture(name
))
1163 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname
, struct oldold_utsname __user
*, name
)
1169 if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE
, name
, sizeof(struct oldold_utsname
)))
1172 down_read(&uts_sem
);
1173 error
= __copy_to_user(&name
->sysname
, &utsname()->sysname
,
1175 error
|= __put_user(0, name
->sysname
+ __OLD_UTS_LEN
);
1176 error
|= __copy_to_user(&name
->nodename
, &utsname()->nodename
,
1178 error
|= __put_user(0, name
->nodename
+ __OLD_UTS_LEN
);
1179 error
|= __copy_to_user(&name
->release
, &utsname()->release
,
1181 error
|= __put_user(0, name
->release
+ __OLD_UTS_LEN
);
1182 error
|= __copy_to_user(&name
->version
, &utsname()->version
,
1184 error
|= __put_user(0, name
->version
+ __OLD_UTS_LEN
);
1185 error
|= __copy_to_user(&name
->machine
, &utsname()->machine
,
1187 error
|= __put_user(0, name
->machine
+ __OLD_UTS_LEN
);
1190 if (!error
&& override_architecture(name
))
1192 return error
? -EFAULT
: 0;
1196 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname
, char __user
*, name
, int, len
)
1199 char tmp
[__NEW_UTS_LEN
];
1201 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
))
1203 if (len
< 0 || len
> __NEW_UTS_LEN
)
1205 down_write(&uts_sem
);
1207 if (!copy_from_user(tmp
, name
, len
)) {
1208 struct new_utsname
*u
= utsname();
1210 memcpy(u
->nodename
, tmp
, len
);
1211 memset(u
->nodename
+ len
, 0, sizeof(u
->nodename
) - len
);
1218 #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME
1220 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname
, char __user
*, name
, int, len
)
1223 struct new_utsname
*u
;
1227 down_read(&uts_sem
);
1229 i
= 1 + strlen(u
->nodename
);
1233 if (copy_to_user(name
, u
->nodename
, i
))
1242 * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling
1245 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname
, char __user
*, name
, int, len
)
1248 char tmp
[__NEW_UTS_LEN
];
1250 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
))
1252 if (len
< 0 || len
> __NEW_UTS_LEN
)
1255 down_write(&uts_sem
);
1257 if (!copy_from_user(tmp
, name
, len
)) {
1258 struct new_utsname
*u
= utsname();
1260 memcpy(u
->domainname
, tmp
, len
);
1261 memset(u
->domainname
+ len
, 0, sizeof(u
->domainname
) - len
);
1268 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit
, unsigned int, resource
, struct rlimit __user
*, rlim
)
1270 if (resource
>= RLIM_NLIMITS
)
1273 struct rlimit value
;
1274 task_lock(current
->group_leader
);
1275 value
= current
->signal
->rlim
[resource
];
1276 task_unlock(current
->group_leader
);
1277 return copy_to_user(rlim
, &value
, sizeof(*rlim
)) ? -EFAULT
: 0;
1281 #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
1284 * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps.
1287 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit
, unsigned int, resource
,
1288 struct rlimit __user
*, rlim
)
1291 if (resource
>= RLIM_NLIMITS
)
1294 task_lock(current
->group_leader
);
1295 x
= current
->signal
->rlim
[resource
];
1296 task_unlock(current
->group_leader
);
1297 if (x
.rlim_cur
> 0x7FFFFFFF)
1298 x
.rlim_cur
= 0x7FFFFFFF;
1299 if (x
.rlim_max
> 0x7FFFFFFF)
1300 x
.rlim_max
= 0x7FFFFFFF;
1301 return copy_to_user(rlim
, &x
, sizeof(x
))?-EFAULT
:0;
1306 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit
, unsigned int, resource
, struct rlimit __user
*, rlim
)
1308 struct rlimit new_rlim
, *old_rlim
;
1311 if (resource
>= RLIM_NLIMITS
)
1313 if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim
, rlim
, sizeof(*rlim
)))
1315 if (new_rlim
.rlim_cur
> new_rlim
.rlim_max
)
1317 old_rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
1318 if ((new_rlim
.rlim_max
> old_rlim
->rlim_max
) &&
1319 !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
))
1321 if (resource
== RLIMIT_NOFILE
&& new_rlim
.rlim_max
> sysctl_nr_open
)
1324 retval
= security_task_setrlimit(resource
, &new_rlim
);
1328 if (resource
== RLIMIT_CPU
&& new_rlim
.rlim_cur
== 0) {
1330 * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU
1331 * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was
1332 * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second
1335 new_rlim
.rlim_cur
= 1;
1338 task_lock(current
->group_leader
);
1339 *old_rlim
= new_rlim
;
1340 task_unlock(current
->group_leader
);
1342 if (resource
!= RLIMIT_CPU
)
1346 * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error
1347 * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a
1348 * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of
1349 * applications, so we live with it
1351 if (new_rlim
.rlim_cur
== RLIM_INFINITY
)
1354 update_rlimit_cpu(new_rlim
.rlim_cur
);
1360 * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct,
1361 * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After
1362 * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would
1363 * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information
1364 * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not
1365 * measuring them yet).
1367 * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have
1368 * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word
1369 * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't
1370 * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading
1371 * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those
1372 * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a
1373 * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping.
1376 * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH
1377 * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded
1378 * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with
1380 * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and
1381 * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one
1382 * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else
1383 * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the
1384 * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just
1385 * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock.
1386 * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal
1387 * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal->
1388 * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple.
1392 static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct
*t
, struct rusage
*r
)
1394 r
->ru_nvcsw
+= t
->nvcsw
;
1395 r
->ru_nivcsw
+= t
->nivcsw
;
1396 r
->ru_minflt
+= t
->min_flt
;
1397 r
->ru_majflt
+= t
->maj_flt
;
1398 r
->ru_inblock
+= task_io_get_inblock(t
);
1399 r
->ru_oublock
+= task_io_get_oublock(t
);
1402 static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct
*p
, int who
, struct rusage
*r
)
1404 struct task_struct
*t
;
1405 unsigned long flags
;
1406 cputime_t tgutime
, tgstime
, utime
, stime
;
1407 unsigned long maxrss
= 0;
1409 memset((char *) r
, 0, sizeof *r
);
1410 utime
= stime
= cputime_zero
;
1412 if (who
== RUSAGE_THREAD
) {
1413 task_times(current
, &utime
, &stime
);
1414 accumulate_thread_rusage(p
, r
);
1415 maxrss
= p
->signal
->maxrss
;
1419 if (!lock_task_sighand(p
, &flags
))
1424 case RUSAGE_CHILDREN
:
1425 utime
= p
->signal
->cutime
;
1426 stime
= p
->signal
->cstime
;
1427 r
->ru_nvcsw
= p
->signal
->cnvcsw
;
1428 r
->ru_nivcsw
= p
->signal
->cnivcsw
;
1429 r
->ru_minflt
= p
->signal
->cmin_flt
;
1430 r
->ru_majflt
= p
->signal
->cmaj_flt
;
1431 r
->ru_inblock
= p
->signal
->cinblock
;
1432 r
->ru_oublock
= p
->signal
->coublock
;
1433 maxrss
= p
->signal
->cmaxrss
;
1435 if (who
== RUSAGE_CHILDREN
)
1439 thread_group_times(p
, &tgutime
, &tgstime
);
1440 utime
= cputime_add(utime
, tgutime
);
1441 stime
= cputime_add(stime
, tgstime
);
1442 r
->ru_nvcsw
+= p
->signal
->nvcsw
;
1443 r
->ru_nivcsw
+= p
->signal
->nivcsw
;
1444 r
->ru_minflt
+= p
->signal
->min_flt
;
1445 r
->ru_majflt
+= p
->signal
->maj_flt
;
1446 r
->ru_inblock
+= p
->signal
->inblock
;
1447 r
->ru_oublock
+= p
->signal
->oublock
;
1448 if (maxrss
< p
->signal
->maxrss
)
1449 maxrss
= p
->signal
->maxrss
;
1452 accumulate_thread_rusage(t
, r
);
1460 unlock_task_sighand(p
, &flags
);
1463 cputime_to_timeval(utime
, &r
->ru_utime
);
1464 cputime_to_timeval(stime
, &r
->ru_stime
);
1466 if (who
!= RUSAGE_CHILDREN
) {
1467 struct mm_struct
*mm
= get_task_mm(p
);
1469 setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss
, mm
);
1473 r
->ru_maxrss
= maxrss
* (PAGE_SIZE
/ 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */
1476 int getrusage(struct task_struct
*p
, int who
, struct rusage __user
*ru
)
1479 k_getrusage(p
, who
, &r
);
1480 return copy_to_user(ru
, &r
, sizeof(r
)) ? -EFAULT
: 0;
1483 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage
, int, who
, struct rusage __user
*, ru
)
1485 if (who
!= RUSAGE_SELF
&& who
!= RUSAGE_CHILDREN
&&
1486 who
!= RUSAGE_THREAD
)
1488 return getrusage(current
, who
, ru
);
1491 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask
, int, mask
)
1493 mask
= xchg(¤t
->fs
->umask
, mask
& S_IRWXUGO
);
1497 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl
, int, option
, unsigned long, arg2
, unsigned long, arg3
,
1498 unsigned long, arg4
, unsigned long, arg5
)
1500 struct task_struct
*me
= current
;
1501 unsigned char comm
[sizeof(me
->comm
)];
1504 error
= security_task_prctl(option
, arg2
, arg3
, arg4
, arg5
);
1505 if (error
!= -ENOSYS
)
1510 case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
:
1511 if (!valid_signal(arg2
)) {
1515 me
->pdeath_signal
= arg2
;
1518 case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG
:
1519 error
= put_user(me
->pdeath_signal
, (int __user
*)arg2
);
1521 case PR_GET_DUMPABLE
:
1522 error
= get_dumpable(me
->mm
);
1524 case PR_SET_DUMPABLE
:
1525 if (arg2
< 0 || arg2
> 1) {
1529 set_dumpable(me
->mm
, arg2
);
1533 case PR_SET_UNALIGN
:
1534 error
= SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me
, arg2
);
1536 case PR_GET_UNALIGN
:
1537 error
= GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me
, arg2
);
1540 error
= SET_FPEMU_CTL(me
, arg2
);
1543 error
= GET_FPEMU_CTL(me
, arg2
);
1546 error
= SET_FPEXC_CTL(me
, arg2
);
1549 error
= GET_FPEXC_CTL(me
, arg2
);
1552 error
= PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL
;
1555 if (arg2
!= PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL
)
1562 comm
[sizeof(me
->comm
)-1] = 0;
1563 if (strncpy_from_user(comm
, (char __user
*)arg2
,
1564 sizeof(me
->comm
) - 1) < 0)
1566 set_task_comm(me
, comm
);
1569 get_task_comm(comm
, me
);
1570 if (copy_to_user((char __user
*)arg2
, comm
,
1575 error
= GET_ENDIAN(me
, arg2
);
1578 error
= SET_ENDIAN(me
, arg2
);
1581 case PR_GET_SECCOMP
:
1582 error
= prctl_get_seccomp();
1584 case PR_SET_SECCOMP
:
1585 error
= prctl_set_seccomp(arg2
);
1588 error
= GET_TSC_CTL(arg2
);
1591 error
= SET_TSC_CTL(arg2
);
1593 case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE
:
1594 error
= perf_event_task_disable();
1596 case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE
:
1597 error
= perf_event_task_enable();
1599 case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK
:
1600 error
= current
->timer_slack_ns
;
1602 case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
:
1604 current
->timer_slack_ns
=
1605 current
->default_timer_slack_ns
;
1607 current
->timer_slack_ns
= arg2
;
1614 case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR
:
1617 current
->flags
&= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS
;
1619 case PR_MCE_KILL_SET
:
1620 current
->flags
|= PF_MCE_PROCESS
;
1621 if (arg3
== PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY
)
1622 current
->flags
|= PF_MCE_EARLY
;
1623 else if (arg3
== PR_MCE_KILL_LATE
)
1624 current
->flags
&= ~PF_MCE_EARLY
;
1625 else if (arg3
== PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT
)
1627 ~(PF_MCE_EARLY
|PF_MCE_PROCESS
);
1636 case PR_MCE_KILL_GET
:
1637 if (arg2
| arg3
| arg4
| arg5
)
1639 if (current
->flags
& PF_MCE_PROCESS
)
1640 error
= (current
->flags
& PF_MCE_EARLY
) ?
1641 PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY
: PR_MCE_KILL_LATE
;
1643 error
= PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT
;
1652 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu
, unsigned __user
*, cpup
, unsigned __user
*, nodep
,
1653 struct getcpu_cache __user
*, unused
)
1656 int cpu
= raw_smp_processor_id();
1658 err
|= put_user(cpu
, cpup
);
1660 err
|= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu
), nodep
);
1661 return err
? -EFAULT
: 0;
1664 char poweroff_cmd
[POWEROFF_CMD_PATH_LEN
] = "/sbin/poweroff";
1666 static void argv_cleanup(char **argv
, char **envp
)
1672 * orderly_poweroff - Trigger an orderly system poweroff
1673 * @force: force poweroff if command execution fails
1675 * This may be called from any context to trigger a system shutdown.
1676 * If the orderly shutdown fails, it will force an immediate shutdown.
1678 int orderly_poweroff(bool force
)
1681 char **argv
= argv_split(GFP_ATOMIC
, poweroff_cmd
, &argc
);
1682 static char *envp
[] = {
1684 "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin",
1688 struct subprocess_info
*info
;
1691 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s failed to allocate memory for \"%s\"\n",
1692 __func__
, poweroff_cmd
);
1696 info
= call_usermodehelper_setup(argv
[0], argv
, envp
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
1702 call_usermodehelper_setcleanup(info
, argv_cleanup
);
1704 ret
= call_usermodehelper_exec(info
, UMH_NO_WAIT
);
1708 printk(KERN_WARNING
"Failed to start orderly shutdown: "
1709 "forcing the issue\n");
1711 /* I guess this should try to kick off some daemon to
1712 sync and poweroff asap. Or not even bother syncing
1713 if we're doing an emergency shutdown? */
1720 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(orderly_poweroff
);