proc: protect mm start_code/end_code in /proc/pid/stat
commit56df433ee53f5131fa58d467e68c478c06f90892
authorKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Wed, 23 Mar 2011 23:42:53 +0000 (23 16:42 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Sun, 27 Mar 2011 18:30:37 +0000 (27 11:30 -0700)
treea26a35cbf2d52a530af3fc49ca44eac50dd2dbfd
parent513d46817231bd1741c3cc330f959f091bfc93f9
proc: protect mm start_code/end_code in /proc/pid/stat

commit 5883f57ca0008ffc93e09cbb9847a1928e50c6f3 upstream.

While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit
f83ce3e6b02d5 ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged
processes")), the start_code and end_code values were not.  This would
allow the text location of a PIE binary to leak, defeating ASLR.

Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value since
"ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take
start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave.  Thanks to
Brad Spengler for pointing this out.

Addresses CVE-2011-0726

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
fs/proc/array.c