| commit | dd0859dccbe291cf8179a96390f5c0e45cb9af1d | |
| author | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | |
| Tue, 14 Feb 2017 13:17:24 +0000 (15 00:17 +1100) | ||
| committer | James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> | |
| Mon, 6 Mar 2017 00:00:12 +0000 (6 11:00 +1100) | ||
| tree | e7a2b67dfdb2beaa07d42a314eb142289599d381 | treesnapshot (tar.gz zip) |
| parent | 84e6885e9e6a818d1ca1eabb9b720b357ab07a8b | commitdiff |
security: introduce CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
Subsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however, SELinux
still needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to handle
architectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not feasible.
Introduce a new kernel configuration parameter CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS,
and a helper macro __lsm_ro_after_init, to handle this case.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however, SELinux
still needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to handle
architectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not feasible.
Introduce a new kernel configuration parameter CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS,
and a helper macro __lsm_ro_after_init, to handle this case.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | diffblobblamehistory | |
| security/Kconfig | diffblobblamehistory | |
| security/selinux/Kconfig | diffblobblamehistory |