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Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
[wrt350n-kernel.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
blobd9cd16c2d5a3b2287a26cb2b16389602a6271b5d
1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
48 #include <linux/fs.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
50 #include <linux/mm.h>
51 #include <linux/module.h>
52 #include <linux/mount.h>
53 #include <linux/socket.h>
54 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
55 #include <linux/audit.h>
56 #include <linux/personality.h>
57 #include <linux/time.h>
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/compiler.h>
60 #include <asm/unistd.h>
61 #include <linux/security.h>
62 #include <linux/list.h>
63 #include <linux/tty.h>
64 #include <linux/selinux.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/inotify.h>
69
70 #include "audit.h"
71
72 extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
73 extern int audit_ever_enabled;
74
75 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
76 * for saving names from getname(). */
77 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
78
79 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
80 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
81
82 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
83 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
84
85 /* number of audit rules */
86 int audit_n_rules;
87
88 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
89 int audit_signals;
90
91 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
92 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
93 * pointers at syscall exit time).
94 *
95 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
96 struct audit_names {
97 const char *name;
98 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
99 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
100 unsigned long ino;
101 dev_t dev;
102 umode_t mode;
103 uid_t uid;
104 gid_t gid;
105 dev_t rdev;
106 u32 osid;
107 };
108
109 struct audit_aux_data {
110 struct audit_aux_data *next;
111 int type;
112 };
113
114 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
115
116 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
117 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
118
119 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
120 struct audit_aux_data d;
121 int oflag;
122 mode_t mode;
123 struct mq_attr attr;
124 };
125
126 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
127 struct audit_aux_data d;
128 mqd_t mqdes;
129 size_t msg_len;
130 unsigned int msg_prio;
131 struct timespec abs_timeout;
132 };
133
134 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
135 struct audit_aux_data d;
136 mqd_t mqdes;
137 struct sigevent notification;
138 };
139
140 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
141 struct audit_aux_data d;
142 mqd_t mqdes;
143 struct mq_attr mqstat;
144 };
145
146 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
147 struct audit_aux_data d;
148 struct ipc_perm p;
149 unsigned long qbytes;
150 uid_t uid;
151 gid_t gid;
152 mode_t mode;
153 u32 osid;
154 };
155
156 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
157 struct audit_aux_data d;
158 int argc;
159 int envc;
160 struct mm_struct *mm;
161 };
162
163 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
164 struct audit_aux_data d;
165 int nargs;
166 unsigned long args[0];
167 };
168
169 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
170 struct audit_aux_data d;
171 int len;
172 char a[0];
173 };
174
175 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
176 struct audit_aux_data d;
177 int fd[2];
178 };
179
180 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
181 struct audit_aux_data d;
182 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
183 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
184 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
185 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
186 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
187 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
188 int pid_count;
189 };
190
191 struct audit_tree_refs {
192 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
193 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
194 };
195
196 /* The per-task audit context. */
197 struct audit_context {
198 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
199 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
200 enum audit_state state;
201 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
202 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
203 int major; /* syscall number */
204 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
205 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
206 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
207 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
208 int name_count;
209 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
210 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
211 struct path pwd;
212 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
213 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
214 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
215
216 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
217 pid_t pid, ppid;
218 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
219 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
220 unsigned long personality;
221 int arch;
222
223 pid_t target_pid;
224 uid_t target_auid;
225 uid_t target_uid;
226 unsigned int target_sessionid;
227 u32 target_sid;
228 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
229
230 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
231 int tree_count;
232
233 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
234 int put_count;
235 int ino_count;
236 #endif
237 };
238
239 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
240 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
241 {
242 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
243 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
244 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
245 return n & mask;
246 }
247
248 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
249 {
250 unsigned n = ctx->major;
251 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
252 case 0: /* native */
253 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
254 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
255 return 1;
256 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
257 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
258 return 1;
259 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
260 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
261 return 1;
262 return 0;
263 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
264 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
265 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
266 return 1;
267 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
268 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
269 return 1;
270 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
271 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
272 return 1;
273 return 0;
274 case 2: /* open */
275 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
276 case 3: /* openat */
277 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
278 case 4: /* socketcall */
279 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
280 case 5: /* execve */
281 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
282 default:
283 return 0;
284 }
285 }
286
287 /*
288 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
289 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
290 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
291 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
292 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
293 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
294 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
295 */
296
297 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
298 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
299 {
300 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
301 int left = ctx->tree_count;
302 if (likely(left)) {
303 p->c[--left] = chunk;
304 ctx->tree_count = left;
305 return 1;
306 }
307 if (!p)
308 return 0;
309 p = p->next;
310 if (p) {
311 p->c[30] = chunk;
312 ctx->trees = p;
313 ctx->tree_count = 30;
314 return 1;
315 }
316 return 0;
317 }
318
319 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
320 {
321 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
322 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
323 if (!ctx->trees) {
324 ctx->trees = p;
325 return 0;
326 }
327 if (p)
328 p->next = ctx->trees;
329 else
330 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
331 ctx->tree_count = 31;
332 return 1;
333 }
334 #endif
335
336 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
337 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
338 {
339 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
340 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
341 int n;
342 if (!p) {
343 /* we started with empty chain */
344 p = ctx->first_trees;
345 count = 31;
346 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
347 if (!p)
348 return;
349 }
350 n = count;
351 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
352 while (n--) {
353 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
354 q->c[n] = NULL;
355 }
356 }
357 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
358 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
359 q->c[n] = NULL;
360 }
361 ctx->trees = p;
362 ctx->tree_count = count;
363 #endif
364 }
365
366 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
367 {
368 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
369 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
370 q = p->next;
371 kfree(p);
372 }
373 }
374
375 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
376 {
377 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
378 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
379 int n;
380 if (!tree)
381 return 0;
382 /* full ones */
383 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
384 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
385 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
386 return 1;
387 }
388 /* partial */
389 if (p) {
390 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
391 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
392 return 1;
393 }
394 #endif
395 return 0;
396 }
397
398 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
399 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
400 * otherwise. */
401 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
402 struct audit_krule *rule,
403 struct audit_context *ctx,
404 struct audit_names *name,
405 enum audit_state *state)
406 {
407 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
408 u32 sid;
409
410 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
411 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
412 int result = 0;
413
414 switch (f->type) {
415 case AUDIT_PID:
416 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
417 break;
418 case AUDIT_PPID:
419 if (ctx) {
420 if (!ctx->ppid)
421 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
422 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
423 }
424 break;
425 case AUDIT_UID:
426 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
427 break;
428 case AUDIT_EUID:
429 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
430 break;
431 case AUDIT_SUID:
432 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
433 break;
434 case AUDIT_FSUID:
435 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
436 break;
437 case AUDIT_GID:
438 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
439 break;
440 case AUDIT_EGID:
441 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
442 break;
443 case AUDIT_SGID:
444 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
445 break;
446 case AUDIT_FSGID:
447 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
448 break;
449 case AUDIT_PERS:
450 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
451 break;
452 case AUDIT_ARCH:
453 if (ctx)
454 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
455 break;
456
457 case AUDIT_EXIT:
458 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
459 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
460 break;
461 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
462 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
463 if (f->val)
464 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
465 else
466 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
467 }
468 break;
469 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
470 if (name)
471 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
472 f->op, f->val);
473 else if (ctx) {
474 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
475 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
476 ++result;
477 break;
478 }
479 }
480 }
481 break;
482 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
483 if (name)
484 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
485 f->op, f->val);
486 else if (ctx) {
487 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
488 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
489 ++result;
490 break;
491 }
492 }
493 }
494 break;
495 case AUDIT_INODE:
496 if (name)
497 result = (name->ino == f->val);
498 else if (ctx) {
499 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
500 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
501 ++result;
502 break;
503 }
504 }
505 }
506 break;
507 case AUDIT_WATCH:
508 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
509 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
510 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
511 break;
512 case AUDIT_DIR:
513 if (ctx)
514 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
515 break;
516 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
517 result = 0;
518 if (ctx)
519 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
520 break;
521 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
522 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
523 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
524 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
525 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
526 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
527 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
528 match for now to avoid losing information that
529 may be wanted. An error message will also be
530 logged upon error */
531 if (f->se_rule) {
532 if (need_sid) {
533 selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
534 need_sid = 0;
535 }
536 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
537 f->op,
538 f->se_rule,
539 ctx);
540 }
541 break;
542 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
543 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
544 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
545 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
546 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
547 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
548 also applies here */
549 if (f->se_rule) {
550 /* Find files that match */
551 if (name) {
552 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
553 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
554 f->se_rule, ctx);
555 } else if (ctx) {
556 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
557 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
558 ctx->names[j].osid,
559 f->type, f->op,
560 f->se_rule, ctx)) {
561 ++result;
562 break;
563 }
564 }
565 }
566 /* Find ipc objects that match */
567 if (ctx) {
568 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
569 for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
570 aux = aux->next) {
571 if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
572 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
573 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
574 ++result;
575 break;
576 }
577 }
578 }
579 }
580 }
581 break;
582 case AUDIT_ARG0:
583 case AUDIT_ARG1:
584 case AUDIT_ARG2:
585 case AUDIT_ARG3:
586 if (ctx)
587 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
588 break;
589 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
590 /* ignore this field for filtering */
591 result = 1;
592 break;
593 case AUDIT_PERM:
594 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
595 break;
596 }
597
598 if (!result)
599 return 0;
600 }
601 if (rule->filterkey)
602 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
603 switch (rule->action) {
604 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
605 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
606 }
607 return 1;
608 }
609
610 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
611 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
612 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
613 */
614 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
615 {
616 struct audit_entry *e;
617 enum audit_state state;
618
619 rcu_read_lock();
620 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
621 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
622 rcu_read_unlock();
623 return state;
624 }
625 }
626 rcu_read_unlock();
627 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
628 }
629
630 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
631 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
632 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
633 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
634 */
635 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
636 struct audit_context *ctx,
637 struct list_head *list)
638 {
639 struct audit_entry *e;
640 enum audit_state state;
641
642 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
643 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
644
645 rcu_read_lock();
646 if (!list_empty(list)) {
647 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
648 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
649
650 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
651 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
652 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
653 &state)) {
654 rcu_read_unlock();
655 return state;
656 }
657 }
658 }
659 rcu_read_unlock();
660 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
661 }
662
663 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
664 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
665 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
666 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
667 */
668 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
669 struct audit_context *ctx)
670 {
671 int i;
672 struct audit_entry *e;
673 enum audit_state state;
674
675 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
676 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
677
678 rcu_read_lock();
679 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
680 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
681 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
682 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
683 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
684 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
685
686 if (list_empty(list))
687 continue;
688
689 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
690 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
691 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
692 rcu_read_unlock();
693 return state;
694 }
695 }
696 }
697 rcu_read_unlock();
698 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
699 }
700
701 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
702 {
703 ctx->auditable = 1;
704 }
705
706 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
707 int return_valid,
708 int return_code)
709 {
710 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
711
712 if (likely(!context))
713 return NULL;
714 context->return_valid = return_valid;
715
716 /*
717 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
718 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
719 * signal handlers
720 *
721 * This is actually a test for:
722 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
723 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
724 *
725 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
726 */
727 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
728 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
729 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
730 context->return_code = -EINTR;
731 else
732 context->return_code = return_code;
733
734 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
735 enum audit_state state;
736
737 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
738 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
739 context->auditable = 1;
740 goto get_context;
741 }
742
743 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
744 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
745 context->auditable = 1;
746
747 }
748
749 get_context:
750
751 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
752 return context;
753 }
754
755 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
756 {
757 int i;
758
759 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
760 if (context->auditable
761 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
762 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
763 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
764 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
765 __FILE__, __LINE__,
766 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
767 context->name_count, context->put_count,
768 context->ino_count);
769 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
770 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
771 context->names[i].name,
772 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
773 }
774 dump_stack();
775 return;
776 }
777 #endif
778 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
779 context->put_count = 0;
780 context->ino_count = 0;
781 #endif
782
783 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
784 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
785 __putname(context->names[i].name);
786 }
787 context->name_count = 0;
788 path_put(&context->pwd);
789 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
790 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
791 }
792
793 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
794 {
795 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
796
797 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
798 context->aux = aux->next;
799 kfree(aux);
800 }
801 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
802 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
803 kfree(aux);
804 }
805 }
806
807 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
808 enum audit_state state)
809 {
810 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
811 context->state = state;
812 }
813
814 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
815 {
816 struct audit_context *context;
817
818 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
819 return NULL;
820 audit_zero_context(context, state);
821 return context;
822 }
823
824 /**
825 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
826 * @tsk: task
827 *
828 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
829 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
830 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
831 * needed.
832 */
833 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
834 {
835 struct audit_context *context;
836 enum audit_state state;
837
838 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
839 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
840
841 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
842 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
843 return 0;
844
845 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
846 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
847 return -ENOMEM;
848 }
849
850 tsk->audit_context = context;
851 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
852 return 0;
853 }
854
855 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
856 {
857 struct audit_context *previous;
858 int count = 0;
859
860 do {
861 previous = context->previous;
862 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
863 ++count;
864 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
865 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
866 context->serial, context->major,
867 context->name_count, count);
868 }
869 audit_free_names(context);
870 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
871 free_tree_refs(context);
872 audit_free_aux(context);
873 kfree(context->filterkey);
874 kfree(context);
875 context = previous;
876 } while (context);
877 if (count >= 10)
878 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
879 }
880
881 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
882 {
883 char *ctx = NULL;
884 unsigned len;
885 int error;
886 u32 sid;
887
888 selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
889 if (!sid)
890 return;
891
892 error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
893 if (error) {
894 if (error != -EINVAL)
895 goto error_path;
896 return;
897 }
898
899 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
900 kfree(ctx);
901 return;
902
903 error_path:
904 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
905 return;
906 }
907
908 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
909
910 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
911 {
912 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
913 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
914 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
915
916 /* tsk == current */
917
918 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
919 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
920 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
921
922 if (mm) {
923 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
924 vma = mm->mmap;
925 while (vma) {
926 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
927 vma->vm_file) {
928 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
929 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
930 break;
931 }
932 vma = vma->vm_next;
933 }
934 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
935 }
936 audit_log_task_context(ab);
937 }
938
939 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
940 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
941 u32 sid, char *comm)
942 {
943 struct audit_buffer *ab;
944 char *s = NULL;
945 u32 len;
946 int rc = 0;
947
948 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
949 if (!ab)
950 return rc;
951
952 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
953 uid, sessionid);
954 if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) {
955 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
956 rc = 1;
957 } else
958 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", s);
959 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
960 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
961 audit_log_end(ab);
962 kfree(s);
963
964 return rc;
965 }
966
967 /*
968 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
969 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
970 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
971 *
972 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
973 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
974 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
975 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
976 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
977 */
978 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
979 struct audit_buffer **ab,
980 int arg_num,
981 size_t *len_sent,
982 const char __user *p,
983 char *buf)
984 {
985 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
986 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
987 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
988 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
989 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
990 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
991 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
992 int ret;
993
994 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
995 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
996
997 /*
998 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
999 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1000 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1001 * any.
1002 */
1003 <<<<<<< HEAD:kernel/auditsc.c
1004 if (unlikely((len = -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1005 =======
1006 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1007 >>>>>>> 264e3e889d86e552b4191d69bb60f4f3b383135a:kernel/auditsc.c
1008 WARN_ON(1);
1009 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1010 <<<<<<< HEAD:kernel/auditsc.c
1011 =======
1012 return -1;
1013 >>>>>>> 264e3e889d86e552b4191d69bb60f4f3b383135a:kernel/auditsc.c
1014 }
1015
1016 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1017 do {
1018 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1019 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1020 else
1021 to_send = len_left;
1022 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1023 /*
1024 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1025 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1026 * space yet.
1027 */
1028 if (ret) {
1029 WARN_ON(1);
1030 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1031 <<<<<<< HEAD:kernel/auditsc.c
1032 =======
1033 return -1;
1034 >>>>>>> 264e3e889d86e552b4191d69bb60f4f3b383135a:kernel/auditsc.c
1035 }
1036 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1037 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1038 if (has_cntl) {
1039 /*
1040 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1041 * send half as much in each message
1042 */
1043 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1044 break;
1045 }
1046 len_left -= to_send;
1047 tmp_p += to_send;
1048 } while (len_left > 0);
1049
1050 len_left = len;
1051
1052 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1053 too_long = 1;
1054
1055 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1056 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1057 int room_left;
1058
1059 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1060 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1061 else
1062 to_send = len_left;
1063
1064 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1065 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1066 if (has_cntl)
1067 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1068 else
1069 room_left -= to_send;
1070 if (room_left < 0) {
1071 *len_sent = 0;
1072 audit_log_end(*ab);
1073 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1074 if (!*ab)
1075 return 0;
1076 }
1077
1078 /*
1079 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1080 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1081 */
1082 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1083 <<<<<<< HEAD:kernel/auditsc.c
1084 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%ld ", arg_num,
1085 =======
1086 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
1087 >>>>>>> 264e3e889d86e552b4191d69bb60f4f3b383135a:kernel/auditsc.c
1088 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1089
1090 /*
1091 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1092 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1093 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1094 */
1095 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1096 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1097 else
1098 ret = 0;
1099 if (ret) {
1100 WARN_ON(1);
1101 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1102 <<<<<<< HEAD:kernel/auditsc.c
1103 =======
1104 return -1;
1105 >>>>>>> 264e3e889d86e552b4191d69bb60f4f3b383135a:kernel/auditsc.c
1106 }
1107 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1108
1109 /* actually log it */
1110 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
1111 if (too_long)
1112 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1113 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1114 if (has_cntl)
1115 audit_log_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1116 else
1117 audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
1118 audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
1119
1120 p += to_send;
1121 len_left -= to_send;
1122 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1123 if (has_cntl)
1124 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1125 else
1126 *len_sent += to_send;
1127 }
1128 /* include the null we didn't log */
1129 return len + 1;
1130 }
1131
1132 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1133 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1134 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1135 {
1136 int i;
1137 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1138 const char __user *p;
1139 char *buf;
1140
1141 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1142 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1143
1144 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1145
1146 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
1147
1148 /*
1149 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1150 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1151 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1152 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1153 */
1154 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1155 if (!buf) {
1156 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1157 return;
1158 }
1159
1160 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1161 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1162 &len_sent, p, buf);
1163 if (len <= 0)
1164 break;
1165 p += len;
1166 }
1167 kfree(buf);
1168 }
1169
1170 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1171 {
1172 int i, call_panic = 0;
1173 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1174 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1175 const char *tty;
1176
1177 /* tsk == current */
1178 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1179 if (!context->ppid)
1180 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
1181 context->uid = tsk->uid;
1182 context->gid = tsk->gid;
1183 context->euid = tsk->euid;
1184 context->suid = tsk->suid;
1185 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
1186 context->egid = tsk->egid;
1187 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
1188 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
1189 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1190
1191 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1192 if (!ab)
1193 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1194 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1195 context->arch, context->major);
1196 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1197 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1198 if (context->return_valid)
1199 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1200 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1201 context->return_code);
1202
1203 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1204 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
1205 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1206 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1207 else
1208 tty = "(none)";
1209 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
1210 audit_log_format(ab,
1211 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1212 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1213 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1214 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1215 context->argv[0],
1216 context->argv[1],
1217 context->argv[2],
1218 context->argv[3],
1219 context->name_count,
1220 context->ppid,
1221 context->pid,
1222 tsk->loginuid,
1223 context->uid,
1224 context->gid,
1225 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1226 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1227 tsk->sessionid);
1228
1229 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1230
1231 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1232 if (context->filterkey) {
1233 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
1234 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
1235 } else
1236 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
1237 audit_log_end(ab);
1238
1239 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1240
1241 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1242 if (!ab)
1243 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1244
1245 switch (aux->type) {
1246 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1247 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
1248 audit_log_format(ab,
1249 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1250 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1251 axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
1252 axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
1253 axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
1254 break; }
1255
1256 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1257 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
1258 audit_log_format(ab,
1259 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1260 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1261 axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
1262 axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1263 break; }
1264
1265 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1266 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
1267 audit_log_format(ab,
1268 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1269 axi->mqdes,
1270 axi->notification.sigev_signo);
1271 break; }
1272
1273 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1274 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
1275 audit_log_format(ab,
1276 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1277 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1278 axi->mqdes,
1279 axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
1280 axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
1281 break; }
1282
1283 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1284 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
1285 audit_log_format(ab,
1286 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1287 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
1288 if (axi->osid != 0) {
1289 char *ctx = NULL;
1290 u32 len;
1291 if (selinux_sid_to_string(
1292 axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1293 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
1294 axi->osid);
1295 call_panic = 1;
1296 } else
1297 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1298 kfree(ctx);
1299 }
1300 break; }
1301
1302 case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
1303 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
1304 audit_log_format(ab,
1305 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1306 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
1307 break; }
1308
1309 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1310 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1311 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1312 break; }
1313
1314 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1315 int i;
1316 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
1317 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
1318 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
1319 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
1320 break; }
1321
1322 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
1323 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
1324
1325 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1326 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
1327 break; }
1328
1329 case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
1330 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
1331 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
1332 break; }
1333
1334 }
1335 audit_log_end(ab);
1336 }
1337
1338 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1339 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1340 int i;
1341
1342 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1343 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1344 axs->target_auid[i],
1345 axs->target_uid[i],
1346 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1347 axs->target_sid[i],
1348 axs->target_comm[i]))
1349 call_panic = 1;
1350 }
1351
1352 if (context->target_pid &&
1353 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1354 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1355 context->target_sessionid,
1356 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1357 call_panic = 1;
1358
1359 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1360 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1361 if (ab) {
1362 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1363 audit_log_end(ab);
1364 }
1365 }
1366 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1367 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
1368
1369 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1370 if (!ab)
1371 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1372
1373 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1374
1375 if (n->name) {
1376 switch(n->name_len) {
1377 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1378 /* log the full path */
1379 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1380 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1381 break;
1382 case 0:
1383 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1384 * directory component is the cwd */
1385 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1386 break;
1387 default:
1388 /* log the name's directory component */
1389 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1390 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name_len,
1391 n->name);
1392 }
1393 } else
1394 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1395
1396 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1397 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1398 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1399 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1400 n->ino,
1401 MAJOR(n->dev),
1402 MINOR(n->dev),
1403 n->mode,
1404 n->uid,
1405 n->gid,
1406 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1407 MINOR(n->rdev));
1408 }
1409 if (n->osid != 0) {
1410 char *ctx = NULL;
1411 u32 len;
1412 if (selinux_sid_to_string(
1413 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1414 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1415 call_panic = 2;
1416 } else
1417 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1418 kfree(ctx);
1419 }
1420
1421 audit_log_end(ab);
1422 }
1423
1424 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1425 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1426 if (ab)
1427 audit_log_end(ab);
1428 if (call_panic)
1429 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1430 }
1431
1432 /**
1433 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1434 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1435 *
1436 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1437 */
1438 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1439 {
1440 struct audit_context *context;
1441
1442 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1443 if (likely(!context))
1444 return;
1445
1446 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1447 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1448 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1449 * in the context of the idle thread */
1450 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1451 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1452 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1453
1454 audit_free_context(context);
1455 }
1456
1457 /**
1458 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1459 * @tsk: task being audited
1460 * @arch: architecture type
1461 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1462 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1463 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1464 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1465 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1466 *
1467 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1468 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1469 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1470 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1471 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1472 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1473 * be written).
1474 */
1475 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1476 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1477 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1478 {
1479 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1480 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1481 enum audit_state state;
1482
1483 BUG_ON(!context);
1484
1485 /*
1486 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1487 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1488 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1489 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1490 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1491 *
1492 * i386 no
1493 * x86_64 no
1494 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1495 *
1496 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1497 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1498 */
1499 if (context->in_syscall) {
1500 struct audit_context *newctx;
1501
1502 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1503 printk(KERN_ERR
1504 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1505 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1506 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1507 #endif
1508 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1509 if (newctx) {
1510 newctx->previous = context;
1511 context = newctx;
1512 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1513 } else {
1514 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1515 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1516 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1517 * to abandon auditing. */
1518 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1519 }
1520 }
1521 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1522
1523 if (!audit_enabled)
1524 return;
1525
1526 context->arch = arch;
1527 context->major = major;
1528 context->argv[0] = a1;
1529 context->argv[1] = a2;
1530 context->argv[2] = a3;
1531 context->argv[3] = a4;
1532
1533 state = context->state;
1534 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1535 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1536 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1537 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1538 return;
1539
1540 context->serial = 0;
1541 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1542 context->in_syscall = 1;
1543 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1544 context->ppid = 0;
1545 }
1546
1547 /**
1548 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1549 * @tsk: task being audited
1550 * @valid: success/failure flag
1551 * @return_code: syscall return value
1552 *
1553 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1554 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1555 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1556 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1557 * free the names stored from getname().
1558 */
1559 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1560 {
1561 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1562 struct audit_context *context;
1563
1564 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1565
1566 if (likely(!context))
1567 return;
1568
1569 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1570 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1571
1572 context->in_syscall = 0;
1573 context->auditable = 0;
1574
1575 if (context->previous) {
1576 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1577 context->previous = NULL;
1578 audit_free_context(context);
1579 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1580 } else {
1581 audit_free_names(context);
1582 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1583 audit_free_aux(context);
1584 context->aux = NULL;
1585 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1586 context->target_pid = 0;
1587 context->target_sid = 0;
1588 kfree(context->filterkey);
1589 context->filterkey = NULL;
1590 tsk->audit_context = context;
1591 }
1592 }
1593
1594 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1595 {
1596 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1597 struct audit_context *context;
1598 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1599 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1600 int count;
1601 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1602 return;
1603 context = current->audit_context;
1604 p = context->trees;
1605 count = context->tree_count;
1606 rcu_read_lock();
1607 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1608 rcu_read_unlock();
1609 if (!chunk)
1610 return;
1611 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1612 return;
1613 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1614 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference");
1615 audit_set_auditable(context);
1616 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1617 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1618 return;
1619 }
1620 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1621 #endif
1622 }
1623
1624 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1625 {
1626 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1627 struct audit_context *context;
1628 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1629 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1630 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1631 unsigned long seq;
1632 int count;
1633
1634 context = current->audit_context;
1635 p = context->trees;
1636 count = context->tree_count;
1637 retry:
1638 drop = NULL;
1639 d = dentry;
1640 rcu_read_lock();
1641 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1642 for(;;) {
1643 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1644 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1645 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1646 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1647 if (chunk) {
1648 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1649 drop = chunk;
1650 break;
1651 }
1652 }
1653 }
1654 parent = d->d_parent;
1655 if (parent == d)
1656 break;
1657 d = parent;
1658 }
1659 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1660 rcu_read_unlock();
1661 if (!drop) {
1662 /* just a race with rename */
1663 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1664 goto retry;
1665 }
1666 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1667 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1668 /* OK, got more space */
1669 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1670 goto retry;
1671 }
1672 /* too bad */
1673 printk(KERN_WARNING
1674 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference");
1675 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1676 audit_set_auditable(context);
1677 return;
1678 }
1679 rcu_read_unlock();
1680 #endif
1681 }
1682
1683 /**
1684 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1685 * @name: name to add
1686 *
1687 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1688 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1689 */
1690 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1691 {
1692 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1693
1694 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1695 return;
1696
1697 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1698 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1699 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1700 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1701 dump_stack();
1702 #endif
1703 return;
1704 }
1705 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1706 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1707 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1708 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1709 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1710 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
1711 ++context->name_count;
1712 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
1713 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
1714 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1715 path_get(&current->fs->pwd);
1716 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
1717 }
1718
1719 }
1720
1721 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1722 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1723 *
1724 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1725 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1726 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1727 */
1728 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1729 {
1730 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1731
1732 BUG_ON(!context);
1733 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1734 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1735 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1736 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1737 if (context->name_count) {
1738 int i;
1739 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1740 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1741 context->names[i].name,
1742 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1743 }
1744 #endif
1745 __putname(name);
1746 }
1747 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1748 else {
1749 ++context->put_count;
1750 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1751 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1752 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1753 " put_count=%d\n",
1754 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1755 context->serial, context->major,
1756 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1757 context->put_count);
1758 dump_stack();
1759 }
1760 }
1761 #endif
1762 }
1763
1764 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1765 const struct inode *inode)
1766 {
1767 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1768 if (inode)
1769 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1770 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu",
1771 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1772 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1773 inode->i_ino);
1774
1775 else
1776 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data");
1777 return 1;
1778 }
1779 context->name_count++;
1780 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1781 context->ino_count++;
1782 #endif
1783 return 0;
1784 }
1785
1786 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1787 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
1788 {
1789 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1790 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1791 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1792 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1793 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1794 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1795 selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
1796 }
1797
1798 /**
1799 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1800 * @name: name being audited
1801 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1802 *
1803 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1804 */
1805 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1806 {
1807 int idx;
1808 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1809 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1810
1811 if (!context->in_syscall)
1812 return;
1813 if (context->name_count
1814 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1815 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1816 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1817 else if (context->name_count > 1
1818 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1819 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1820 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1821 else {
1822 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1823 * associated name? */
1824 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1825 return;
1826 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1827 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1828 }
1829 handle_path(dentry);
1830 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1831 }
1832
1833 /**
1834 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1835 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1836 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1837 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1838 *
1839 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1840 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1841 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1842 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1843 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1844 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1845 * unsuccessful attempts.
1846 */
1847 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
1848 const struct inode *parent)
1849 {
1850 int idx;
1851 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1852 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1853 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1854 int dirlen = 0;
1855
1856 if (!context->in_syscall)
1857 return;
1858
1859 if (inode)
1860 handle_one(inode);
1861 /* determine matching parent */
1862 if (!dname)
1863 goto add_names;
1864
1865 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
1866 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
1867 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
1868
1869 if (!n->name)
1870 continue;
1871
1872 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
1873 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
1874 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
1875 found_parent = n->name;
1876 goto add_names;
1877 }
1878 }
1879
1880 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
1881 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
1882 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
1883
1884 if (!n->name)
1885 continue;
1886
1887 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
1888 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
1889 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
1890 if (inode)
1891 audit_copy_inode(n, inode);
1892 else
1893 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1894 found_child = n->name;
1895 goto add_names;
1896 }
1897 }
1898
1899 add_names:
1900 if (!found_parent) {
1901 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
1902 return;
1903 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1904 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1905 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
1906 }
1907
1908 if (!found_child) {
1909 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1910 return;
1911 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1912
1913 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1914 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1915 * audit_free_names() */
1916 if (found_parent) {
1917 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
1918 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1919 /* don't call __putname() */
1920 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
1921 } else {
1922 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1923 }
1924
1925 if (inode)
1926 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1927 else
1928 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1929 }
1930 }
1931 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
1932
1933 /**
1934 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1935 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1936 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1937 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1938 *
1939 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1940 */
1941 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1942 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1943 {
1944 if (!ctx->serial)
1945 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1946 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1947 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1948 *serial = ctx->serial;
1949 ctx->auditable = 1;
1950 }
1951
1952 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1953 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1954
1955 /**
1956 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1957 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1958 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1959 *
1960 * Returns 0.
1961 *
1962 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1963 */
1964 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1965 {
1966 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
1967 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
1968
1969 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
1970 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1971
1972 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1973 if (ab) {
1974 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1975 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
1976 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
1977 task->pid, task->uid,
1978 task->loginuid, loginuid,
1979 task->sessionid, sessionid);
1980 audit_log_end(ab);
1981 }
1982 }
1983 task->sessionid = sessionid;
1984 task->loginuid = loginuid;
1985 return 0;
1986 }
1987
1988 /**
1989 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
1990 * @oflag: open flag
1991 * @mode: mode bits
1992 * @u_attr: queue attributes
1993 *
1994 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1995 */
1996 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
1997 {
1998 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
1999 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2000
2001 if (!audit_enabled)
2002 return 0;
2003
2004 if (likely(!context))
2005 return 0;
2006
2007 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2008 if (!ax)
2009 return -ENOMEM;
2010
2011 if (u_attr != NULL) {
2012 if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
2013 kfree(ax);
2014 return -EFAULT;
2015 }
2016 } else
2017 memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
2018
2019 ax->oflag = oflag;
2020 ax->mode = mode;
2021
2022 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2023 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2024 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2025 return 0;
2026 }
2027
2028 /**
2029 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
2030 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2031 * @msg_len: Message length
2032 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2033 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2034 *
2035 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2036 */
2037 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2038 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2039 {
2040 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2041 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2042
2043 if (!audit_enabled)
2044 return 0;
2045
2046 if (likely(!context))
2047 return 0;
2048
2049 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2050 if (!ax)
2051 return -ENOMEM;
2052
2053 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2054 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2055 kfree(ax);
2056 return -EFAULT;
2057 }
2058 } else
2059 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2060
2061 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
2062 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2063 ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
2064
2065 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2066 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2067 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2068 return 0;
2069 }
2070
2071 /**
2072 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
2073 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2074 * @msg_len: Message length
2075 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
2076 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2077 *
2078 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2079 */
2080 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
2081 unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
2082 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2083 {
2084 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2085 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2086
2087 if (!audit_enabled)
2088 return 0;
2089
2090 if (likely(!context))
2091 return 0;
2092
2093 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2094 if (!ax)
2095 return -ENOMEM;
2096
2097 if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
2098 if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
2099 kfree(ax);
2100 return -EFAULT;
2101 }
2102 } else
2103 ax->msg_prio = 0;
2104
2105 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2106 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2107 kfree(ax);
2108 return -EFAULT;
2109 }
2110 } else
2111 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2112
2113 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
2114 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2115
2116 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2117 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2118 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2119 return 0;
2120 }
2121
2122 /**
2123 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2124 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2125 * @u_notification: Notification event
2126 *
2127 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2128 */
2129
2130 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
2131 {
2132 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
2133 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2134
2135 if (!audit_enabled)
2136 return 0;
2137
2138 if (likely(!context))
2139 return 0;
2140
2141 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2142 if (!ax)
2143 return -ENOMEM;
2144
2145 if (u_notification != NULL) {
2146 if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
2147 kfree(ax);
2148 return -EFAULT;
2149 }
2150 } else
2151 memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
2152
2153 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
2154
2155 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2156 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2157 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2158 return 0;
2159 }
2160
2161 /**
2162 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2163 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2164 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2165 *
2166 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2167 */
2168 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2169 {
2170 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
2171 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2172
2173 if (!audit_enabled)
2174 return 0;
2175
2176 if (likely(!context))
2177 return 0;
2178
2179 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2180 if (!ax)
2181 return -ENOMEM;
2182
2183 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
2184 ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
2185
2186 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2187 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2188 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2189 return 0;
2190 }
2191
2192 /**
2193 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2194 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2195 *
2196 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2197 */
2198 int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2199 {
2200 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
2201 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2202
2203 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2204 if (!ax)
2205 return -ENOMEM;
2206
2207 ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
2208 ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
2209 ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
2210 selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
2211
2212 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
2213 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2214 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2215 return 0;
2216 }
2217
2218 /**
2219 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2220 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2221 * @uid: msgq user id
2222 * @gid: msgq group id
2223 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2224 *
2225 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2226 */
2227 int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
2228 {
2229 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
2230 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2231
2232 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2233 if (!ax)
2234 return -ENOMEM;
2235
2236 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
2237 ax->uid = uid;
2238 ax->gid = gid;
2239 ax->mode = mode;
2240
2241 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
2242 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2243 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2244 return 0;
2245 }
2246
2247 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2248 {
2249 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2250 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2251
2252 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2253 return 0;
2254
2255 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2256 if (!ax)
2257 return -ENOMEM;
2258
2259 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2260 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2261 ax->mm = bprm->mm;
2262 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2263 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2264 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2265 return 0;
2266 }
2267
2268
2269 /**
2270 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2271 * @nargs: number of args
2272 * @args: args array
2273 *
2274 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2275 */
2276 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2277 {
2278 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
2279 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2280
2281 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2282 return 0;
2283
2284 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
2285 if (!ax)
2286 return -ENOMEM;
2287
2288 ax->nargs = nargs;
2289 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2290
2291 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2292 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2293 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2294 return 0;
2295 }
2296
2297 /**
2298 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2299 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2300 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2301 *
2302 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2303 */
2304 int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2305 {
2306 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2307 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *ax;
2308
2309 if (likely(!context)) {
2310 return 0;
2311 }
2312
2313 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2314 if (!ax) {
2315 return -ENOMEM;
2316 }
2317
2318 ax->fd[0] = fd1;
2319 ax->fd[1] = fd2;
2320
2321 ax->d.type = AUDIT_FD_PAIR;
2322 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2323 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2324 return 0;
2325 }
2326
2327 /**
2328 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2329 * @len: data length in user space
2330 * @a: data address in kernel space
2331 *
2332 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2333 */
2334 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2335 {
2336 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
2337 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2338
2339 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2340 return 0;
2341
2342 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
2343 if (!ax)
2344 return -ENOMEM;
2345
2346 ax->len = len;
2347 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
2348
2349 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
2350 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2351 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2352 return 0;
2353 }
2354
2355 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2356 {
2357 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2358
2359 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2360 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2361 context->target_uid = t->uid;
2362 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2363 selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid);
2364 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2365 }
2366
2367 /**
2368 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2369 * @sig: signal value
2370 * @t: task being signaled
2371 *
2372 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2373 * and uid that is doing that.
2374 */
2375 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2376 {
2377 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2378 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2379 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2380 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
2381 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
2382 extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
2383
2384 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2385 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
2386 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2387 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2388 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2389 else
2390 audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
2391 selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2392 }
2393 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2394 return 0;
2395 }
2396
2397 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2398 * in audit_context */
2399 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2400 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2401 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2402 ctx->target_uid = t->uid;
2403 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2404 selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2405 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2406 return 0;
2407 }
2408
2409 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2410 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2411 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2412 if (!axp)
2413 return -ENOMEM;
2414
2415 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2416 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2417 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2418 }
2419 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2420
2421 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2422 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2423 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid;
2424 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2425 selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2426 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2427 axp->pid_count++;
2428
2429 return 0;
2430 }
2431
2432 /**
2433 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2434 * @signr: signal value
2435 *
2436 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2437 * should record the event for investigation.
2438 */
2439 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2440 {
2441 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2442 u32 sid;
2443 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2444 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2445
2446 if (!audit_enabled)
2447 return;
2448
2449 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2450 return;
2451
2452 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2453 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2454 auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid);
2455 selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
2456 if (sid) {
2457 char *ctx = NULL;
2458 u32 len;
2459
2460 if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
2461 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
2462 else
2463 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
2464 kfree(ctx);
2465 }
2466 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2467 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2468 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2469 audit_log_end(ab);
2470 }
WRT350N Kernel Patches