Check for SYS/GL during library init. Reason is that

[AROS.git] / workbench / network / stacks / AROSTCP / dhcp / doc / draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-14.txt

Network Working Group                                   R. Droms, Editor
INTERNET DRAFT                                       Bucknell University
Obsoletes: draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-13.txt       W. Arbaugh, Editor
                                                  University of Maryland
                                                               July 2000
                                                   Expires December 2000


                    Authentication for DHCP Messages
                 <draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-14.txt>

Status of this memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt, and the list of
   Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.


Abstract

   The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) provides a framework
   for passing configuration information to hosts on a TCP/IP network.
   In some situations, network administrators may wish to constrain the
   allocation of addresses to authorized hosts.  Additionally, some
   network administrators may wish to provide for authentication of the
   source and contents of DHCP messages.  This document defines a new
   DHCP option through which authorization tickets can be easily
   generated and newly attached hosts with proper authorization can be
   automatically configured from an authenticated DHCP server.

1. Introduction

   DHCP [1] transports protocol stack configuration parameters from
   centrally administered servers to TCP/IP hosts.  Among those
   parameters are an IP address.  DHCP servers can be configured to
   dynamically allocate addresses from a pool of addresses, eliminating



Droms, Arbaugh                                                  [Page 1]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


   a manual step in configuration of TCP/IP hosts.

   Some network administrators may wish to provide authentication of the
   source and contents of DHCP messages.  For example, clients may be
   subject to denial of service attacks through the use of bogus DHCP
   servers, or may simply be misconfigured due to unintentionally
   instantiated DHCP servers.  Network administrators may wish to
   constrain the allocation of addresses to authorized hosts to avoid
   denial of service attacks in "hostile" environments where the network
   medium is not physically secured, such as wireless networks or
   college residence halls.

   This document defines a technique that can provide both entity
   authentication and message authentication.

   DISCUSSION:

      This draft combines the original Schiller-Huitema-Droms
      authentication mechanism defined in a previous Internet Draft with
      the "delayed authentication" proposal developed by Bill Arbaugh.

1.1 DHCP threat model

   The threat to DHCP is inherently an insider threat (assuming a
   properly configured network where BOOTP ports are blocked on the
   enterprise's perimeter gateways.)  Regardless of the gateway
   configuration, however, the potential attacks by insiders and
   outsiders are the same.

   The attack specific to a DHCP client is the possibility of the
   establishment of a "rogue" server with the intent of providing
   incorrect configuration information to the client. The motivation for
   doing so may be to establish a "man in the middle" attack or it may
   be for a "denial of service" attack.

   There is another threat to DHCP clients from mistakenly or
   accidentally configured DHCP servers that answer DHCP client requests
   with unintentionally incorrect configuration parameters.

   The threat specific to a DHCP server is an invalid client
   masquerading as a valid client. The motivation for this may be for
   "theft of service", or to circumvent auditing for any number of
   nefarious purposes.

   The threat common to both the client and the server is the resource
   "denial of service" (DoS) attack. These attacks typically involve the
   exhaustion of valid addresses, or the exhaustion of CPU or network
   bandwidth, and are present anytime there is a shared resource. In



Droms, Arbaugh                                                  [Page 2]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


   current practice, redundancy mitigates DoS attacks the best.

1.2 Design goals

   These are the goals that were used in the development of the
   authentication protocol, listed in order of importance:

   1. Address the threats presented in Section 1.1.
   2. Avoid changing the current protocol.
   3. Limit state required by the server.
   4. Limit complexity (complexity breeds design and implementation
      errors).

1.3 Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [5].

1.4 DHCP Terminology

   This document uses the following terms:

      o "DHCP client"

        A DHCP client or "client" is an Internet host using DHCP to obtain
        configuration parameters such as a network address.

      o "DHCP server"

        A DHCP server or "server" is an Internet host that returns
        configuration parameters to DHCP clients.

2. Format of the authentication option

   The following diagram defines the format of the DHCP
   authentication option:


   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code      |    Length     |  Protocol     |   Algorithm   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     RDM       | Replay Detection (64 bits)                    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Replay cont. |                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                                               |



Droms, Arbaugh                                                  [Page 3]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


   |                                                               |
   |           Authentication Information                          |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+



   The code for the authentication option is TBD, and the length field
   contains the length of the protocol, RDM, algorithm, Replay Detection
   fields and authentication information fields in octets.

   The protocol field defines the particular technique for
   authentication used in the option.  New protocols are defined as
   described in Section 6.

   The algorithm field defines the specific algorithm within the
   technique identified by the protocol field.

   The Replay Detection field is per the RDM, and the authentication
   information field is per the protocol in use.

   The Replay Detection Method (RDM) field determines the type of replay
   detection used in the Replay Detection field.

      If the RDM field contains 0x00, the replay detection field MUST be
      set to the value of a monotonically increasing counter.  Using a
      counter value such as the current time of day (e.g., an NTP-format
      timestamp [4]) can reduce the danger of replay attacks. This
      method MUST be supported by all protocols.

      Other values of the RDM field are reserved for future definition
      according to the procedures described in section 6.

   This document defines two protocols in sections 4 and 5, encoded with
   protocol field values 0 and 1.  Protocol field values 2-254 are
   reserved for future use.  Other protocols may be defined according to
   the procedure described in section 6.

3. Interaction with Relay Agents

   Because a DHCP relay agent may alter the values of the 'giaddr' and
    'hops' fields in the DHCP message, the contents of those two fields
   MUST be set to zero for the computation of any hash function over the
   message header. Additionally, a relay agent may append the DHCP relay
   agent information option 82 [7] as the last option in a message to
   servers. If a server finds option 82 included in a received message,
   the server MUST compute any hash function as if the option were NOT
   included in the message without changing the order of options.



Droms, Arbaugh                                                  [Page 4]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


   Whenever the server sends back option 82 to a relay agent, the server
   MUST not include the option in the computation of any hash function
   over the message.


4. Protocol 0

   If the protocol field is 0, the authentication information field
   holds a simple authentication token:


   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code      |    Length     |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0| Replay Detection (64 bits)                    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Replay cont. |                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                                               |
   |                                                               |
   |           Authentication Information                          |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   The authentication token is an opaque, unencoded value known to both
   the sender and receiver.  The sender inserts the authentication token
   in the DHCP message and the receiver matches the token from the
   message to the shared token.  If the authentication option is present
   and the token from the message does not match the shared token, the
   receiver MUST discard the message.

   Protocol 0 may be used to pass a plain-text password and provides
   only weak entity authentication and no message authentication.  This
   protocol is only useful for rudimentary protection against
   inadvertently instantiated DHCP servers.

   DISCUSSION:

      The intent here is to pass a constant, non-computed token such as
      a plain-text password.  Other types of entity authentication using
      computed tokens such as Kerberos tickets or one-time passwords
      will be defined as separate protocols.


5. Protocol 1




Droms, Arbaugh                                                  [Page 5]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


   If the protocol field is 1, the message is using the "delayed
   authentication" mechanism.  In delayed authentication, the client
   requests authentication in its DHCPDISCOVER message and the server
   replies with a DHCPOFFER message that includes authentication
   information. This authentication information contains a nonce value
   generated by the source as a message authentication code (MAC) to
   provide message authentication and entity authentication.

   This document defines the use of a particular technique based on the
   HMAC protocol [3] using the MD5 hash [2].

5.1 Management Issues

   The "delayed authentication" protocol does not attempt to address
   situations where a client may roam from one administrative domain to
   another, i.e. interdomain roaming.  This protocol is focused on
   solving the intradomain problem where the out-of-band exchange of a
   shared secret is feasible.

5.2 Format

   The format of the authentication request in a DHCPDISCOVER message
   for protocol 1 is:



   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code      |    Length     |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|   Algorithm   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     RDM       | Replay Detection (64 bits)                    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Replay cont. |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   The format of the authentication information for protocol 1 is:













Droms, Arbaugh                                                  [Page 6]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code      |    Length     |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|   Algorithm   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     RDM       | Replay Detection (64 bits)                    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Replay cont. | Secret ID (32 bits)                           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | secret id cont| HMAC-MD5 (128 bits) ....
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   This document defines one technique for use with protocol 1, which is
   identified by setting the algorithm field to 1.  Other techniques
   that use different algorithms may be defined by future
   specifications, see section 6.  The following definitions will be
   used in the description of the authentication information for
   protocol 1, algorithm 1:

   Replay Detection       - as defined by the RDM field
   K                      - a secret value shared between the source and
                            destination of the message; each secret has a
                            unique identifier (not shown in figures)
   secret ID              - the unique identifier for the secret value
                            used to generate the MAC for this message
   HMAC-MD5               - the MAC generating function [3, 2].

   The sender computes the MAC using the HMAC generation algorithm [3]
   and the MD5 hash function [2].  The entire DHCP message (except as
   noted below), including the DHCP message header and the options
   field, is used as input to the HMAC-MD5 computation function.  The
   'secret ID' field MUST be set to the identifier of the secret used to
   generate the MAC.

   DISCUSSION:

      Algorithm 1 specifies the use of HMAC-MD5.  Use of a different
      technique, such as HMAC-SHA, will be specified as a separate
      protocol.

      Protocol 1 requires a shared secret key for each client on each
      DHCP server with which that client may wish to use the DHCP
      protocol.  Each secret key has a unique identifier that can be
      used by a receiver to determine which secret was used to generate
      the MAC in the DHCP message.  Therefore, protocol 1 may not scale
      well in an architecture in which a DHCP client connects to
      multiple administrative domains.



Droms, Arbaugh                                                  [Page 7]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


      Note that the meaning of an authentication option can be changed
      by removing the secret ID, and MAC, transforming an authentication
      option with authentication information into a request for
      authentication.  Therefore, the authentication request form of
      this option can only appear in a DHCPDISCOVER message or a
      DHCPINFORM message.

5.3 Message validation

      To validate an incoming message, the receiver first checks that
      the value in the replay detection field is acceptable according to
      the replay detection method specified by the RDM field.  Next, the
      receiver computes the MAC as described in [3]. The receiver MUST
      set the 'MAC' field of the authentication option to all 0s for
      computation of the MAC, and because a DHCP relay agent may alter
      the values of the 'giaddr' and 'hops' fields in the DHCP message,
      the contents of those two fields MUST also be set to zero for the
      computation of the MAC. If the MAC computed by the receiver does
      not match the MAC contained in the authentication option, the
      receiver MUST discard the DHCP message.

      Section 3 provides additional information on handling messages
      that include option 82 (Relay Agents).

5.4 Key utilization

      Each DHCP client has a key, K.  The client uses its key to encode
      any messages it sends to the server and to authenticate and verify
      any messages it receives from the server.  The client's key SHOULD
      be initially distributed to the client through some out-of-band
      mechanism, and SHOULD be stored locally on the client for use in
      all authenticated DHCP messages.  Once the client has been given
      its key, it SHOULD use that key for all transactions even if the
      client's configuration changes; e.g., if the client is assigned a
      new network address.

      Each DHCP server MUST know, or be able to obtain in a secure
      manner, the keys for all authorized clients.  If all clients use
      the same key, clients can perform both entity and message
      authentication for all messages received from servers.  However,
      the sharing of keys is strongly discouraged as it allows for
      unauthorized clients to masquerade as authorized clients by
      obtaining a copy of the shared key. To authenticate the identity
      of individual clients, each client MUST be configured with a
      unique key.  Appendix A describes a technique for key management.

5.5 Client considerations




Droms, Arbaugh                                                  [Page 8]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


      This section describes the behavior of a DHCP client using
      authentication protocol 1.

5.5.1 INIT state

      When in INIT state, the client uses protocol 1 as follows:

      1. The client MUST include the authentication request option in
         its DHCPDISCOVER message along with option 61 [6] to identify
         itself uniquely to the server.

      2. The client MUST validate any DHCPOFFER messages that include
         authentication information using the mechanism specified in
         section 5.3.  The client MUST discard any messages which fail
         to pass validation and MAY log the validation failure.  The
         client selects one DHCPOFFER message as its selected
         configuration.  If none of the DHCPOFFER messages received by
         the client include authentication information, the client MAY
         choose an unauthenticated message as its selected
         configuration.  The client SHOULD be configurable to accept or
         reject unauthenticated DHCPOFFER messages.
      3. The client replies with a DHCPREQUEST message that MUST include
         authentication information encoded with the same secret used by
         the server in the selected DHCPOFFER message.
      4. The client MUST validate the DHCPACK message from the server.
         The client MUST discard the DHCPACK if the message fails to
         pass validation and MAY log the validation failure.  If the
         DHCPACK fails to pass validation, the client MUST revert to
         INIT state and returns to step 1.  The client MAY choose to
         remember which server replied with a DHCPACK message that
         failed to pass validation and discard subsequent messages from
         that server.

5.5.2 INIT-REBOOT state

      When in INIT-REBOOT state, the client MUST use the secret it used
      in its DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to
      generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message.
      The client MAY choose to accept unauthenticated DHCPACK/DHCPNAK
      messages if no authenticated messages were received.  The client
      MUST treat the receipt (or lack thereof) of any DHCPACK/DHCPNAK
      messages as specified in section 3.2 of [1].

5.5.3 RENEWING state

      When in RENEWING state, the client uses the secret it used in its
      initial DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to
      generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message.



Droms, Arbaugh                                                  [Page 9]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


      If client receives no DHCPACK messages or none of the DHCPACK
      messages pass validation, the client behaves as if it had not
      received a DHCPACK message in section 4.4.5 of the DHCP
      specification [1].

5.5.4 REBINDING state

      When in REBINDING state, the client uses the secret it used in its
      initial DHCPREQUEST message to obtain its current configuration to
      generate authentication information for the DHCPREQUEST message.
      If client receives no DHCPACK messages or none of the DHCPACK
      messages pass validation, the client behaves as if it had not
      received a DHCPACK message in section 4.4.5 of the DHCP
      specification [1].

5.5.5 DHCPINFORM message

      Since the client already has some configuration information, the
      client may also have established a shared secret value, K, with a
      server. Therefore, the client SHOULD use the authentication
      request as in a DHCPDISCOVER message when a shared secret value
      exists. The client MUST treat any received DHCPACK messages as it
      does DHCPOFFER messages, see section 5.5.1.

5.5.6 DHCPRELEASE message

      Since the client is already in the BOUND state, the client will
      have a security association already established with the server.
      Therefore, the client MUST include authentication information with
      the DHCPRELEASE message.

5.6 Server considerations

      This section describes the behavior of a server in response to
      client messages using authentication protocol 1.

5.6.1 General considerations

      Each server maintains a list of secrets and identifiers for those
      secrets that it shares with clients and potential clients.  This
      information must be maintained in such a way that the server can:

      * Identify an appropriate secret and the identifier for that
        secret for use with a client that the server may not have
        previously communicated with
      * Retrieve the secret and identifier used by a client to which the
        server has provided previous configuration information




Droms, Arbaugh                                                 [Page 10]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


      Each server MUST save the counter from the previous authenticated
      message.  A server MUST discard any incoming message which fails
      the replay detection check as defined by the RDM avoid replay
      attacks.

      DISCUSSION:

         The authenticated DHCPREQUEST message from a client in INIT-
         REBOOT state can only be validated by servers that used the
         same secret in their DHCPOFFER messages.  Other servers will
         discard the DHCPREQUEST messages.  Thus, only servers that used
         the secret selected by the client will be able to determine
         that their offered configuration information was not selected
         and the offered network address can be returned to the server's
         pool of available addresses.  The servers that cannot validate
         the DHCPREQUEST message will eventually return their offered
         network addresses to their pool of available addresses as
         described in section 3.1 of the DHCP specification [1].

5.6.2 After receiving a DHCPDISCOVER message

      The server selects a secret for the client and includes
      authentication information in the DHCPOFFER message as specified
      in section 5, above. The server MUST record the identifier of the
      secret selected for the client and use that same secret for
      validating subsequent messages with the client.

5.6.3 After receiving a DHCPREQUEST message

      The server uses the secret identified in the message and validates
      the message as specified in section 5.3.  If the message fails to
      pass validation or the server does not know the secret identified
      by the 'secret ID' field, the server MUST discard the message and
      MAY choose to log the validation failure.

      If the message passes the validation procedure, the server
      responds as described in the DHCP specification.  The server MUST
      include authentication information generated as specified in
      section 5.2.

5.6.4 After receiving a DHCPINFORM message

      The server MAY choose to accept unauthenticated DHCPINFORM
      messages, or only accept authenticated DHCPINFORM messages based
      on a site policy.

      When a client includes the authentication request in a DHCPINFORM
      message, the server MUST respond with an authenticated DHCPACK



Droms, Arbaugh                                                 [Page 11]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


      message. If the server does not have a shared secret value
      established with the sender of the DHCPINFORM message, then the
      server MAY respond with an unauthenticated DHCPACK message, or a
      DHCPNAK if the server does not accept unauthenticated clients
      based on the site policy, or the server MAY choose not to respond
      to the DHCPINFORM message.

6. IANA Considerations

      The author of a new DHCP authentication protocol, algorithm or
      replay detection method will follow these steps to obtain
      acceptance of the new procedure as a part of the DHCP Internet
      Standard:

      1. The author devises the new authentication protocol, algorithm
         or replay detection method.
      2. The author documents the new technique as an Internet Draft.
         The protocol, algorithm or RDM code for any new procedure is
         left as "To Be Determined" (TBD).
      3. The author submits the Internet Draft for review through the
         IETF standards process as defined in "Internet Official
         Protocol Standards" (STD 1).
      4. The new protocol progresses through the IETF standards process;
         the specification of the new protocol will be reviewed by the
         Dynamic Host Configuration Working Group (if that group still
         exists), or as an Internet Draft not submitted by an IETF
         working group.  If the option is accepted as a Standard, the
         specification for the option is published as a separate RFC.
      5. At the time of acceptance as a Proposed Internet Standard and
         publication as an RFC, IANA assigns a DHCP authentication
         protocol number to the new protocol.

      This procedure for defining new authentication protocols will
      ensure that:

      * allocation of new protocol numbers is coordinated from a single
        authority,
      * new protocols are reviewed for technical correctness and
        appropriateness, and
      * documentation for new protocols is complete and published.


      DISCUSSION:
         This procedure is patterned after the procedure for acceptance
         of new DHCP options.

7. References




Droms, Arbaugh                                                 [Page 12]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


      [1] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131,
          Bucknell University, March 1997.

      [2] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm",
          RFC-1321, April 1992.

      [3] Krawczyk H., M. Bellare and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
          Message Authentication," RFC-2104, February 1997.

      [4] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3)", RFC-1305, March
          1992.

      [5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
          Levels," RFC-2219, March 1997.

      [6] Henry, M., "DHCP Option 61 UUID Type Definition,"
          <draft-henry-DHCP-opt61-UUID-type-00.txt> (work in
          progress, November 1998.

      [7] Patrick, M., "DHCP Relay Agent Information Option,"
          <draft-ietf-dhc-agent-options-05.txt> (work in progress),
          November 1998.

      [8] Gupta, V., "Flexible Authentication for DHCP Messages,"
          <draft-gupta-dhcp-auth-00.txt> (work in progress, June
          1998.

8. Acknowledgments

      Jeff Schiller and Christian Huitema developed this scheme during a
      terminal room BOF at the Dallas IETF meeting, December 1995.  The
      editor transcribed the notes from that discussion, which form the
      basis for this document.  The editor appreciates Jeff's and
      Christian's patience in reviewing this document and its earlier
      drafts.

      The "delayed authentication" mechanism used in section 5 is due to
      Bill Arbaugh.  The threat model and requirements in sections 1.1
      and 1.2 come from Bill's negotiation protocol proposal. The
      attendees of an interim meeting of the DHC WG held in June, 1998,
      including Peter Ford, Kim Kinnear, Glenn Waters, Rob Stevens, Bill
      Arbaugh, Baiju Patel, Carl Smith, Thomas Narten, Stewart Kwan,
      Munil Shah, Olafur Gudmundsson, Robert Watson, Ralph Droms, Mike
      Dooley, Greg Rabil and Arun Kapur, developed the threat model and
      reviewed several alternative proposals.

      The replay detection method field is due to Vipul Gupta [8].




Droms, Arbaugh                                                 [Page 13]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


      Other input from Bill Sommerfield is gratefully acknowledged.

      Thanks also to John Wilkins, Ran Atkinson, Shawn Mamros and Thomas
      Narten for reviewing earlier drafts of this document.

9. Security considerations

      This document describes authentication and verification mechanisms
      for DHCP.

10. Editors' addresses

   Ralph Droms
   Computer Science Department
   323 Dana Engineering
   Bucknell University
   Lewisburg, PA 17837

   Phone: (717) 524-1145
   EMail: droms@bucknell.edu

   Bill Arbaugh
   Department of Computer Science
   University of Maryland
   A.V. Williams Building
   College Park, MD 20742

   Phone: (301) 455-2774
   Email: waa@cs.umd.edu

10. Expiration

   This document will expire on December 31, 2000.


















Droms, Arbaugh                                                 [Page 14]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


   Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and
   distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind,
   provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing
   Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined
   in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to
   translate it into languages other than English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT
   NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN
   WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

























Droms, Arbaugh                                                 [Page 15]
\f
DRAFT               Authentication for DHCP Messages          March 2000


   Appendix A - Key Management Technique

   To avoid centralized management of a list of random keys, suppose K
   for each client is generated from the pair (client identifier [6],
   subnet address, e.g. 192.168.1.0), which must be unique to that
   client.  That is, K = MAC(MK, unique-id), where MK is a secret master
   key and MAC is a keyed one-way function such as HMAC-MD5.

   Without knowledge of the master key MK, an unauthorized client cannot
   generate its own key K.  The server can quickly validate an incoming
   message from a new client by regenerating K from the client-id.  For
   known clients, the server can choose to recover the client's K
   dynamically from the client-id in the DHCP message, or can choose to
   precompute and cache all of the Ks a priori.

   To avoid compromis of this key management system, the master key, MK,
   MUST NOT be stored by any clients.  The client SHOULD only be given
   its key, K.  If MK is compromised, a new MK SHOULD be chosen and all
   clients given new individual keys.
































Droms, Arbaugh                                                 [Page 16]
\f