2 * X.509 certificate parsing and verification
4 * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
5 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
7 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
8 * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
9 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
11 * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
13 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
14 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
15 * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
16 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
17 * limitations under the License.
20 * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI.
22 * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs)
23 * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs)
24 * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10)
26 * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf
27 * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf
29 * [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf
34 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
36 #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
37 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
38 #include "mbedtls/oid.h"
39 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
43 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
44 #include "mbedtls/pem.h"
47 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
48 #include "psa/crypto.h"
49 #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
52 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
53 #include "mbedtls/platform.h"
57 #define mbedtls_free free
58 #define mbedtls_calloc calloc
59 #define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf
62 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
63 #include "mbedtls/threading.h"
66 #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
72 #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
74 #if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32)
75 #include <sys/types.h>
78 #endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */
82 * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it
85 mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
;
87 } x509_crt_verify_chain_item
;
90 * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root
92 #define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 )
97 const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default
= {
98 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES)
99 /* Allow SHA-1 (weak, but still safe in controlled environments) */
100 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1
) |
102 /* Only SHA-2 hashes */
103 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224
) |
104 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
) |
105 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
) |
106 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512
),
107 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */
108 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */
113 * Next-default profile
115 const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next
= {
116 /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above */
117 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
) |
118 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
) |
119 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512
),
120 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */
121 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
122 /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level */
123 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1
) |
124 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1
) |
125 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1
) |
126 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1
) |
127 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1
) |
128 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1
) |
129 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1
),
137 * NSA Suite B Profile
139 const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb
= {
140 /* Only SHA-256 and 384 */
141 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
) |
142 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
),
144 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA
) |
145 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY
),
146 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
147 /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */
148 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1
) |
149 MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1
),
157 * Check md_alg against profile
158 * Return 0 if md_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
160 static int x509_profile_check_md_alg(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
*profile
,
161 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg
) {
162 if (md_alg
== MBEDTLS_MD_NONE
)
165 if ((profile
->allowed_mds
& MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(md_alg
)) != 0)
172 * Check pk_alg against profile
173 * Return 0 if pk_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
175 static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
*profile
,
176 mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg
) {
177 if (pk_alg
== MBEDTLS_PK_NONE
)
180 if ((profile
->allowed_pks
& MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(pk_alg
)) != 0)
187 * Check key against profile
188 * Return 0 if pk is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
190 static int x509_profile_check_key(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
*profile
,
191 const mbedtls_pk_context
*pk
) {
192 const mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg
= mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk
);
194 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
195 if (pk_alg
== MBEDTLS_PK_RSA
|| pk_alg
== MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS
) {
196 if (mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(pk
) >= profile
->rsa_min_bitlen
)
203 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
204 if (pk_alg
== MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA
||
205 pk_alg
== MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY
||
206 pk_alg
== MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH
) {
207 const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid
= mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk
)->grp
.id
;
209 if (gid
== MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE
)
212 if ((profile
->allowed_curves
& MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(gid
)) != 0)
223 * Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different
225 static int x509_memcasecmp(const void *s1
, const void *s2
, size_t len
) {
228 const unsigned char *n1
= s1
, *n2
= s2
;
230 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++) {
231 diff
= n1
[i
] ^ n2
[i
];
237 ((n1
[i
] >= 'a' && n1
[i
] <= 'z') ||
238 (n1
[i
] >= 'A' && n1
[i
] <= 'Z'))) {
249 * Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise
251 static int x509_check_wildcard(const char *cn
, const mbedtls_x509_buf
*name
) {
253 size_t cn_idx
= 0, cn_len
= strlen(cn
);
255 /* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */
256 if (name
->len
< 3 || name
->p
[0] != '*' || name
->p
[1] != '.')
259 for (i
= 0; i
< cn_len
; ++i
) {
269 if (cn_len
- cn_idx
== name
->len
- 1 &&
270 x509_memcasecmp(name
->p
+ 1, cn
+ cn_idx
, name
->len
- 1) == 0) {
278 * Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding
279 * variations (but not all).
281 * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
283 static int x509_string_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_buf
*a
, const mbedtls_x509_buf
*b
) {
284 if (a
->tag
== b
->tag
&&
286 memcmp(a
->p
, b
->p
, b
->len
) == 0) {
290 if ((a
->tag
== MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING
|| a
->tag
== MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING
) &&
291 (b
->tag
== MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING
|| b
->tag
== MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING
) &&
293 x509_memcasecmp(a
->p
, b
->p
, b
->len
) == 0) {
301 * Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence).
303 * See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm:
304 * we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal,
305 * but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation
308 * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
310 static int x509_name_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_name
*a
, const mbedtls_x509_name
*b
) {
311 /* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */
312 while (a
!= NULL
|| b
!= NULL
) {
313 if (a
== NULL
|| b
== NULL
)
317 if (a
->oid
.tag
!= b
->oid
.tag
||
318 a
->oid
.len
!= b
->oid
.len
||
319 memcmp(a
->oid
.p
, b
->oid
.p
, b
->oid
.len
) != 0) {
324 if (x509_string_cmp(&a
->val
, &b
->val
) != 0)
327 /* structure of the list of sets */
328 if (a
->next_merged
!= b
->next_merged
)
340 * Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain
342 static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(
343 mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain
*ver_chain
) {
346 for (i
= 0; i
< MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE
; i
++) {
347 ver_chain
->items
[i
].crt
= NULL
;
348 ver_chain
->items
[i
].flags
= (uint32_t) -1;
353 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
354 ver_chain
->trust_ca_cb_result
= NULL
;
355 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
359 * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
361 static int x509_get_version(unsigned char **p
,
362 const unsigned char *end
,
364 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
367 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, end
, &len
,
368 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| 0)) != 0) {
369 if (ret
== MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
) {
374 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT
+ ret
);
379 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p
, end
, ver
)) != 0)
380 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION
+ ret
);
383 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION
+
384 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
390 * Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
394 static int x509_get_dates(unsigned char **p
,
395 const unsigned char *end
,
396 mbedtls_x509_time
*from
,
397 mbedtls_x509_time
*to
) {
398 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
401 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, end
, &len
,
402 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
)) != 0)
403 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE
+ ret
);
407 if ((ret
= mbedtls_x509_get_time(p
, end
, from
)) != 0)
410 if ((ret
= mbedtls_x509_get_time(p
, end
, to
)) != 0)
414 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE
+
415 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
421 * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed)
423 static int x509_get_uid(unsigned char **p
,
424 const unsigned char *end
,
425 mbedtls_x509_buf
*uid
, int n
) {
426 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
433 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, end
, &uid
->len
,
434 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| n
)) != 0) {
435 if (ret
== MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
)
438 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT
+ ret
);
447 static int x509_get_basic_constraints(unsigned char **p
,
448 const unsigned char *end
,
451 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
455 * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
456 * cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
457 * pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
459 *ca_istrue
= 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */
460 *max_pathlen
= 0; /* endless */
462 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, end
, &len
,
463 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
)) != 0)
464 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
469 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p
, end
, ca_istrue
)) != 0) {
470 if (ret
== MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
)
471 ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p
, end
, ca_istrue
);
474 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
483 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p
, end
, max_pathlen
)) != 0)
484 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
487 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
488 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
490 /* Do not accept max_pathlen equal to INT_MAX to avoid a signed integer
491 * overflow, which is an undefined behavior. */
492 if (*max_pathlen
== INT_MAX
)
493 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
494 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH
);
501 static int x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p
,
502 const unsigned char *end
,
503 unsigned char *ns_cert_type
) {
504 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
505 mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs
= { 0, 0, NULL
};
507 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p
, end
, &bs
)) != 0)
508 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
511 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
512 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH
);
514 /* Get actual bitstring */
515 *ns_cert_type
= *bs
.p
;
519 static int x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p
,
520 const unsigned char *end
,
521 unsigned int *key_usage
) {
522 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
524 mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs
= { 0, 0, NULL
};
526 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p
, end
, &bs
)) != 0)
527 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
530 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
531 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH
);
533 /* Get actual bitstring */
535 for (i
= 0; i
< bs
.len
&& i
< sizeof(unsigned int); i
++) {
536 *key_usage
|= (unsigned int) bs
.p
[i
] << (8 * i
);
543 * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
545 * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
547 static int x509_get_ext_key_usage(unsigned char **p
,
548 const unsigned char *end
,
549 mbedtls_x509_sequence
*ext_key_usage
) {
550 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
552 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(p
, end
, ext_key_usage
, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID
)) != 0)
553 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
555 /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */
556 if (ext_key_usage
->buf
.p
== NULL
)
557 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
558 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH
);
564 * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
566 * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
568 * GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
569 * otherName [0] OtherName,
570 * rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
571 * dNSName [2] IA5String,
572 * x400Address [3] ORAddress,
573 * directoryName [4] Name,
574 * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
575 * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
576 * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
577 * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
579 * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
580 * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
581 * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
583 * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {
584 * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
585 * partyName [1] DirectoryString }
587 * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName
588 * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point.
590 static int x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p
,
591 const unsigned char *end
,
592 mbedtls_x509_sequence
*subject_alt_name
) {
593 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
595 mbedtls_asn1_buf
*buf
;
597 mbedtls_asn1_sequence
*cur
= subject_alt_name
;
599 /* Get main sequence tag */
600 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, end
, &len
,
601 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
)) != 0)
602 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
605 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
606 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
609 mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf
;
610 memset(&dummy_san_buf
, 0, sizeof(dummy_san_buf
));
614 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p
, end
, &tag_len
)) != 0)
615 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
617 if ((tag
& MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK
) !=
618 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC
) {
619 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
620 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
);
624 * Check that the SAN is structured correctly.
626 ret
= mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&(cur
->buf
), &dummy_san_buf
);
628 * In case the extension is malformed, return an error,
629 * and clear the allocated sequences.
631 if (ret
!= 0 && ret
!= MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
) {
632 mbedtls_x509_sequence
*seq_cur
= subject_alt_name
->next
;
633 mbedtls_x509_sequence
*seq_prv
;
634 while (seq_cur
!= NULL
) {
636 seq_cur
= seq_cur
->next
;
637 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv
,
638 sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence
));
639 mbedtls_free(seq_prv
);
641 subject_alt_name
->next
= NULL
;
645 /* Allocate and assign next pointer */
646 if (cur
->buf
.p
!= NULL
) {
647 if (cur
->next
!= NULL
)
648 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
);
650 cur
->next
= mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence
));
652 if (cur
->next
== NULL
)
653 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
654 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED
);
666 /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */
670 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
671 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
677 * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 }
679 * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }
681 * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
683 * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
684 * policyIdentifier CertPolicyId,
685 * policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
686 * PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
688 * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
690 * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
691 * policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId,
692 * qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }
694 * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers
696 * id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 }
697 * id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 }
698 * id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 }
700 * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice )
702 * Qualifier ::= CHOICE {
704 * userNotice UserNotice }
706 * CPSuri ::= IA5String
708 * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
709 * noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
710 * explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL }
712 * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
713 * organization DisplayText,
714 * noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
716 * DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
717 * ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)),
718 * visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
719 * bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
720 * utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
722 * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point
723 * as defined in RFC 5280.
725 static int x509_get_certificate_policies(unsigned char **p
,
726 const unsigned char *end
,
727 mbedtls_x509_sequence
*certificate_policies
) {
728 int ret
, parse_ret
= 0;
730 mbedtls_asn1_buf
*buf
;
731 mbedtls_asn1_sequence
*cur
= certificate_policies
;
733 /* Get main sequence tag */
734 ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, end
, &len
,
735 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
);
737 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
740 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
741 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
744 * Cannot be an empty sequence.
747 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
748 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
751 mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid
;
752 const unsigned char *policy_end
;
755 * Get the policy sequence
757 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, end
, &len
,
758 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
)) != 0)
759 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
761 policy_end
= *p
+ len
;
763 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, policy_end
, &len
,
764 MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID
)) != 0)
765 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
767 policy_oid
.tag
= MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID
;
768 policy_oid
.len
= len
;
772 * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy.
774 if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY
, &policy_oid
) != 0) {
776 * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this
777 * extension is critical and MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
780 parse_ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
;
783 /* Allocate and assign next pointer */
784 if (cur
->buf
.p
!= NULL
) {
785 if (cur
->next
!= NULL
)
786 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
);
788 cur
->next
= mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence
));
790 if (cur
->next
== NULL
)
791 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
792 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED
);
798 buf
->tag
= policy_oid
.tag
;
799 buf
->p
= policy_oid
.p
;
800 buf
->len
= policy_oid
.len
;
805 * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end
806 * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end.
808 if (*p
< policy_end
) {
809 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, policy_end
, &len
,
810 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
)) != 0)
811 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
813 * Skip the optional policy qualifiers.
818 if (*p
!= policy_end
)
819 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
820 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
823 /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */
827 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
828 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
834 * X.509 v3 extensions
837 static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p
,
838 const unsigned char *end
,
839 mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
840 mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb
,
842 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
844 unsigned char *end_ext_data
, *start_ext_octet
, *end_ext_octet
;
849 if ((ret
= mbedtls_x509_get_ext(p
, end
, &crt
->v3_ext
, 3)) != 0)
852 end
= crt
->v3_ext
.p
+ crt
->v3_ext
.len
;
855 * Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
856 * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
857 * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
858 * extnValue OCTET STRING }
860 mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid
= {0, 0, NULL
};
861 int is_critical
= 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */
864 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, end
, &len
,
865 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
)) != 0)
866 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
868 end_ext_data
= *p
+ len
;
870 /* Get extension ID */
871 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, end_ext_data
, &extn_oid
.len
,
872 MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID
)) != 0)
873 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
875 extn_oid
.tag
= MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID
;
879 /* Get optional critical */
880 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p
, end_ext_data
, &is_critical
)) != 0 &&
881 (ret
!= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
))
882 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
884 /* Data should be octet string type */
885 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p
, end_ext_data
, &len
,
886 MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING
)) != 0)
887 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
889 start_ext_octet
= *p
;
890 end_ext_octet
= *p
+ len
;
892 if (end_ext_octet
!= end_ext_data
)
893 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
894 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
897 * Detect supported extensions
899 ret
= mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type(&extn_oid
, &ext_type
);
902 /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */
904 ret
= cb(p_ctx
, crt
, &extn_oid
, is_critical
, *p
, end_ext_octet
);
905 if (ret
!= 0 && is_critical
)
911 /* No parser found, skip extension */
914 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)
916 /* Data is marked as critical: fail */
917 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
918 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
);
924 /* Forbid repeated extensions */
925 if ((crt
->ext_types
& ext_type
) != 0)
926 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
);
928 crt
->ext_types
|= ext_type
;
931 case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
:
932 /* Parse basic constraints */
933 if ((ret
= x509_get_basic_constraints(p
, end_ext_octet
,
934 &crt
->ca_istrue
, &crt
->max_pathlen
)) != 0)
938 case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE
:
939 /* Parse key usage */
940 if ((ret
= x509_get_key_usage(p
, end_ext_octet
,
941 &crt
->key_usage
)) != 0)
945 case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
:
946 /* Parse extended key usage */
947 if ((ret
= x509_get_ext_key_usage(p
, end_ext_octet
,
948 &crt
->ext_key_usage
)) != 0)
952 case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
:
953 /* Parse subject alt name */
954 if ((ret
= x509_get_subject_alt_name(p
, end_ext_octet
,
955 &crt
->subject_alt_names
)) != 0)
959 case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE
:
960 /* Parse netscape certificate type */
961 if ((ret
= x509_get_ns_cert_type(p
, end_ext_octet
,
962 &crt
->ns_cert_type
)) != 0)
966 case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES
:
967 /* Parse certificate policies type */
968 if ((ret
= x509_get_certificate_policies(p
, end_ext_octet
,
969 &crt
->certificate_policies
)) != 0) {
970 /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension
971 * if it contains unsupported policies */
972 if (ret
== MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
&& cb
!= NULL
&&
973 cb(p_ctx
, crt
, &extn_oid
, is_critical
,
974 start_ext_octet
, end_ext_octet
) == 0)
977 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)
983 * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we
984 * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to
985 * the user to choose how to enforce the policies,
986 * unless the extension is critical.
988 if (ret
!= MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
)
995 * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer
996 * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it,
997 * skip the extension.
999 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)
1001 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
);
1009 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
1010 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1016 * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format
1018 static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
1019 const unsigned char *buf
,
1022 mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb
,
1024 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
1026 unsigned char *p
, *end
, *crt_end
;
1027 mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1
, sig_params2
, sig_oid2
;
1029 memset(&sig_params1
, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf
));
1030 memset(&sig_params2
, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf
));
1031 memset(&sig_oid2
, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf
));
1034 * Check for valid input
1036 if (crt
== NULL
|| buf
== NULL
)
1037 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA
);
1039 /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */
1040 p
= (unsigned char *) buf
;
1045 * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
1046 * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
1047 * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
1048 * signatureValue BIT STRING }
1050 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p
, end
, &len
,
1051 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
)) != 0) {
1052 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1053 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT
);
1056 end
= crt_end
= p
+ len
;
1057 crt
->raw
.len
= crt_end
- buf
;
1058 if (make_copy
!= 0) {
1059 /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */
1060 crt
->raw
.p
= p
= mbedtls_calloc(1, crt
->raw
.len
);
1061 if (crt
->raw
.p
== NULL
)
1062 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
);
1064 memcpy(crt
->raw
.p
, buf
, crt
->raw
.len
);
1065 crt
->own_buffer
= 1;
1067 p
+= crt
->raw
.len
- len
;
1068 end
= crt_end
= p
+ len
;
1070 crt
->raw
.p
= (unsigned char *) buf
;
1071 crt
->own_buffer
= 0;
1075 * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
1079 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p
, end
, &len
,
1080 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
)) != 0) {
1081 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1082 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT
+ ret
);
1086 crt
->tbs
.len
= end
- crt
->tbs
.p
;
1089 * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
1091 * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
1093 * signature AlgorithmIdentifier
1095 if ((ret
= x509_get_version(&p
, end
, &crt
->version
)) != 0 ||
1096 (ret
= mbedtls_x509_get_serial(&p
, end
, &crt
->serial
)) != 0 ||
1097 (ret
= mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p
, end
, &crt
->sig_oid
,
1098 &sig_params1
)) != 0) {
1099 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1103 if (crt
->version
< 0 || crt
->version
> 2) {
1104 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1105 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION
);
1110 if ((ret
= mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&crt
->sig_oid
, &sig_params1
,
1111 &crt
->sig_md
, &crt
->sig_pk
,
1112 &crt
->sig_opts
)) != 0) {
1113 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1120 crt
->issuer_raw
.p
= p
;
1122 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p
, end
, &len
,
1123 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
)) != 0) {
1124 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1125 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT
+ ret
);
1128 if ((ret
= mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p
, p
+ len
, &crt
->issuer
)) != 0) {
1129 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1133 crt
->issuer_raw
.len
= p
- crt
->issuer_raw
.p
;
1136 * Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
1141 if ((ret
= x509_get_dates(&p
, end
, &crt
->valid_from
,
1142 &crt
->valid_to
)) != 0) {
1143 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1150 crt
->subject_raw
.p
= p
;
1152 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p
, end
, &len
,
1153 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
)) != 0) {
1154 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1155 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT
+ ret
);
1158 if (len
&& (ret
= mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p
, p
+ len
, &crt
->subject
)) != 0) {
1159 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1163 crt
->subject_raw
.len
= p
- crt
->subject_raw
.p
;
1166 * SubjectPublicKeyInfo
1169 if ((ret
= mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p
, end
, &crt
->pk
)) != 0) {
1170 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1173 crt
->pk_raw
.len
= p
- crt
->pk_raw
.p
;
1176 * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
1177 * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3
1178 * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
1179 * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3
1180 * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
1181 * -- If present, version shall be v3
1183 if (crt
->version
== 2 || crt
->version
== 3) {
1184 ret
= x509_get_uid(&p
, end
, &crt
->issuer_id
, 1);
1186 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1191 if (crt
->version
== 2 || crt
->version
== 3) {
1192 ret
= x509_get_uid(&p
, end
, &crt
->subject_id
, 2);
1194 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1199 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3)
1200 if (crt
->version
== 3)
1203 ret
= x509_get_crt_ext(&p
, end
, crt
, cb
, p_ctx
);
1205 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1211 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1212 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT
+
1213 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1220 * -- end of TBSCertificate
1222 * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
1223 * signatureValue BIT STRING
1225 if ((ret
= mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p
, end
, &sig_oid2
, &sig_params2
)) != 0) {
1226 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1230 if (crt
->sig_oid
.len
!= sig_oid2
.len
||
1231 memcmp(crt
->sig_oid
.p
, sig_oid2
.p
, crt
->sig_oid
.len
) != 0 ||
1232 sig_params1
.tag
!= sig_params2
.tag
||
1233 sig_params1
.len
!= sig_params2
.len
||
1234 (sig_params1
.len
!= 0 &&
1235 memcmp(sig_params1
.p
, sig_params2
.p
, sig_params1
.len
) != 0)) {
1236 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1237 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH
);
1240 if ((ret
= mbedtls_x509_get_sig(&p
, end
, &crt
->sig
)) != 0) {
1241 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1246 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt
);
1247 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT
+
1248 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1255 * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a
1258 static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(mbedtls_x509_crt
*chain
,
1259 const unsigned char *buf
,
1262 mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb
,
1264 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
1265 mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
= chain
, *prev
= NULL
;
1268 * Check for valid input
1270 if (crt
== NULL
|| buf
== NULL
)
1271 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA
);
1273 while (crt
->version
!= 0 && crt
->next
!= NULL
) {
1279 * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed.
1281 if (crt
->version
!= 0 && crt
->next
== NULL
) {
1282 crt
->next
= mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt
));
1284 if (crt
->next
== NULL
)
1285 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
);
1288 mbedtls_x509_crt_init(crt
->next
);
1292 ret
= x509_crt_parse_der_core(crt
, buf
, buflen
, make_copy
, cb
, p_ctx
);
1306 int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy(mbedtls_x509_crt
*chain
,
1307 const unsigned char *buf
,
1309 return (mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain
, buf
, buflen
, 0, NULL
, NULL
));
1312 int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt
*chain
,
1313 const unsigned char *buf
,
1316 mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb
,
1318 return (mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain
, buf
, buflen
, make_copy
, cb
, p_ctx
));
1321 int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crt
*chain
,
1322 const unsigned char *buf
,
1324 return (mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain
, buf
, buflen
, 1, NULL
, NULL
));
1328 * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained
1331 int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(mbedtls_x509_crt
*chain
,
1332 const unsigned char *buf
,
1334 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
1335 int success
= 0, first_error
= 0, total_failed
= 0;
1336 int buf_format
= MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER
;
1340 * Check for valid input
1342 if (chain
== NULL
|| buf
== NULL
)
1343 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA
);
1346 * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or
1347 * one or more PEM certificates.
1349 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
1350 if (buflen
!= 0 && buf
[buflen
- 1] == '\0' &&
1351 strstr((const char *) buf
, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----") != NULL
) {
1352 buf_format
= MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM
;
1355 if (buf_format
== MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER
)
1356 return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain
, buf
, buflen
);
1358 return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain
, buf
, buflen
);
1361 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
1362 if (buf_format
== MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM
) {
1363 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
1364 mbedtls_pem_context pem
;
1366 /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */
1367 while (buflen
> 1) {
1369 mbedtls_pem_init(&pem
);
1371 /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */
1372 ret
= mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem
,
1373 "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----",
1374 "-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
1375 buf
, NULL
, 0, &use_len
);
1383 } else if (ret
== MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
) {
1385 } else if (ret
!= MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT
) {
1386 mbedtls_pem_free(&pem
);
1389 * PEM header and footer were found
1394 if (first_error
== 0)
1402 ret
= mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain
, pem
.buf
, pem
.buflen
);
1404 mbedtls_pem_free(&pem
);
1408 * Quit parsing on a memory error
1410 if (ret
== MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
)
1413 if (first_error
== 0)
1425 return (total_failed
);
1426 else if (first_error
)
1427 return (first_error
);
1429 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT
);
1430 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
1433 #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
1435 * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list
1437 int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crt
*chain
, const char *path
) {
1438 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
1442 if ((ret
= mbedtls_pk_load_file(path
, &buf
, &n
)) != 0)
1445 ret
= mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(chain
, buf
, n
);
1447 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf
, n
);
1453 int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt
*chain
, const char *path
) {
1455 #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
1457 WCHAR szDir
[MAX_PATH
];
1458 char filename
[MAX_PATH
];
1460 size_t len
= strlen(path
);
1462 WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data
;
1465 if (len
> MAX_PATH
- 3)
1466 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA
);
1468 memset(szDir
, 0, sizeof(szDir
));
1469 memset(filename
, 0, MAX_PATH
);
1470 memcpy(filename
, path
, len
);
1471 filename
[len
++] = '\\';
1473 filename
[len
++] = '*';
1475 w_ret
= MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP
, 0, filename
, (int)len
, szDir
,
1478 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA
);
1480 hFind
= FindFirstFileW(szDir
, &file_data
);
1481 if (hFind
== INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE
)
1482 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR
);
1484 len
= MAX_PATH
- len
;
1488 if (file_data
.dwFileAttributes
& FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY
)
1491 w_ret
= WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP
, 0, file_data
.cFileName
,
1492 lstrlenW(file_data
.cFileName
),
1496 ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR
;
1500 w_ret
= mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(chain
, filename
);
1505 } while (FindNextFileW(hFind
, &file_data
) != 0);
1507 if (GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES
)
1508 ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR
;
1516 struct dirent
*entry
;
1517 char entry_name
[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN
];
1518 DIR *dir
= opendir(path
);
1521 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR
);
1523 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
1524 if ((ret
= mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex
)) != 0) {
1528 #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
1530 memset(&sb
, 0, sizeof(sb
));
1532 while ((entry
= readdir(dir
)) != NULL
) {
1533 snp_ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(entry_name
, sizeof entry_name
,
1534 "%s/%s", path
, entry
->d_name
);
1536 if (snp_ret
< 0 || (size_t)snp_ret
>= sizeof entry_name
) {
1537 ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
;
1539 } else if (stat(entry_name
, &sb
) == -1) {
1540 ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR
;
1544 if (!S_ISREG(sb
.st_mode
))
1547 // Ignore parse errors
1549 t_ret
= mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(chain
, entry_name
);
1559 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
1560 if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex
) != 0)
1561 ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR
;
1562 #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
1568 #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
1571 * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
1572 * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
1573 * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
1575 * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE {
1576 * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
1577 * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING }
1579 * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName,
1580 * as defined in RFC 4108.
1582 static int x509_get_other_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf
*subject_alt_name
,
1583 mbedtls_x509_san_other_name
*other_name
) {
1586 unsigned char *p
= subject_alt_name
->p
;
1587 const unsigned char *end
= p
+ subject_alt_name
->len
;
1588 mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid
;
1590 if ((subject_alt_name
->tag
&
1591 (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK
)) !=
1592 (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME
)) {
1594 * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername".
1596 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA
);
1599 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p
, end
, &len
,
1600 MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID
)) != 0)
1601 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
1603 cur_oid
.tag
= MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID
;
1608 * Only HwModuleName is currently supported.
1610 if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME
, &cur_oid
) != 0) {
1611 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
);
1614 if (p
+ len
>= end
) {
1615 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(other_name
, sizeof(*other_name
));
1616 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
1617 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1620 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p
, end
, &len
,
1621 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC
)) != 0)
1622 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
1624 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p
, end
, &len
,
1625 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE
)) != 0)
1626 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
1628 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p
, end
, &len
, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID
)) != 0)
1629 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
1631 other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.oid
.tag
= MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID
;
1632 other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.oid
.p
= p
;
1633 other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.oid
.len
= len
;
1635 if (p
+ len
>= end
) {
1636 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(other_name
, sizeof(*other_name
));
1637 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
1638 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1641 if ((ret
= mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p
, end
, &len
,
1642 MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING
)) != 0)
1643 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+ ret
);
1645 other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.val
.tag
= MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING
;
1646 other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.val
.p
= p
;
1647 other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.val
.len
= len
;
1650 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(other_name
,
1651 sizeof(*other_name
));
1652 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
1653 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1658 static int x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf
, size_t *size
,
1659 const mbedtls_x509_sequence
1661 const char *prefix
) {
1662 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
1665 const mbedtls_x509_sequence
*cur
= subject_alt_name
;
1666 mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san
;
1669 while (cur
!= NULL
) {
1670 memset(&san
, 0, sizeof(san
));
1671 parse_ret
= mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&cur
->buf
, &san
);
1672 if (parse_ret
!= 0) {
1673 if (parse_ret
== MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
) {
1674 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix
);
1675 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1677 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%s <malformed>", prefix
);
1678 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1688 case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME
: {
1689 mbedtls_x509_san_other_name
*other_name
= &san
.san
.other_name
;
1691 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%s otherName :", prefix
);
1692 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1694 if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME
,
1695 &other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.oid
) != 0) {
1696 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix
);
1697 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1698 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix
);
1699 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1701 ret
= mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(p
, n
, &other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.oid
);
1702 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1704 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix
);
1705 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1707 if (other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.val
.len
>= n
) {
1709 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
);
1712 memcpy(p
, other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.val
.p
,
1713 other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.val
.len
);
1714 p
+= other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.val
.len
;
1716 n
-= other_name
->value
.hardware_module_name
.val
.len
;
1718 }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */
1725 case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME
: {
1726 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix
);
1727 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1728 if (san
.san
.unstructured_name
.len
>= n
) {
1730 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
);
1733 memcpy(p
, san
.san
.unstructured_name
.p
, san
.san
.unstructured_name
.len
);
1734 p
+= san
.san
.unstructured_name
.len
;
1735 n
-= san
.san
.unstructured_name
.len
;
1740 * Type not supported, skip item.
1743 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix
);
1744 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1759 int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf
*san_buf
,
1760 mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name
*san
) {
1761 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
1762 switch (san_buf
->tag
&
1763 (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK
|
1764 MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK
)) {
1768 case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME
): {
1769 mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name
;
1771 ret
= x509_get_other_name(san_buf
, &other_name
);
1775 memset(san
, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name
));
1776 san
->type
= MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME
;
1777 memcpy(&san
->san
.other_name
,
1778 &other_name
, sizeof(other_name
));
1786 case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME
): {
1787 memset(san
, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name
));
1788 san
->type
= MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME
;
1790 memcpy(&san
->san
.unstructured_name
,
1791 san_buf
, sizeof(*san_buf
));
1797 * Type not supported
1800 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
);
1805 #define PRINT_ITEM(i) \
1807 ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s" i, sep ); \
1808 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \
1812 #define CERT_TYPE(type,name) \
1813 if( ns_cert_type & (type) ) \
1816 static int x509_info_cert_type(char **buf
, size_t *size
,
1817 unsigned char ns_cert_type
) {
1818 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
1821 const char *sep
= "";
1823 CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT
, "SSL Client");
1824 CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER
, "SSL Server");
1825 CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL
, "Email");
1826 CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING
, "Object Signing");
1827 CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED
, "Reserved");
1828 CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA
, "SSL CA");
1829 CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA
, "Email CA");
1830 CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA
, "Object Signing CA");
1838 #define KEY_USAGE(code,name) \
1839 if( key_usage & (code) ) \
1842 static int x509_info_key_usage(char **buf
, size_t *size
,
1843 unsigned int key_usage
) {
1844 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
1847 const char *sep
= "";
1849 KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
, "Digital Signature");
1850 KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION
, "Non Repudiation");
1851 KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
, "Key Encipherment");
1852 KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT
, "Data Encipherment");
1853 KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT
, "Key Agreement");
1854 KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
, "Key Cert Sign");
1855 KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN
, "CRL Sign");
1856 KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY
, "Encipher Only");
1857 KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY
, "Decipher Only");
1865 static int x509_info_ext_key_usage(char **buf
, size_t *size
,
1866 const mbedtls_x509_sequence
*extended_key_usage
) {
1867 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
1871 const mbedtls_x509_sequence
*cur
= extended_key_usage
;
1872 const char *sep
= "";
1874 while (cur
!= NULL
) {
1875 if (mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage(&cur
->buf
, &desc
) != 0)
1878 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "%s%s", sep
, desc
);
1879 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1892 static int x509_info_cert_policies(char **buf
, size_t *size
,
1893 const mbedtls_x509_sequence
*certificate_policies
) {
1894 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
1898 const mbedtls_x509_sequence
*cur
= certificate_policies
;
1899 const char *sep
= "";
1901 while (cur
!= NULL
) {
1902 if (mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies(&cur
->buf
, &desc
) != 0)
1905 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "%s%s", sep
, desc
);
1906 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1920 * Return an informational string about the certificate.
1922 #define BEFORE_COLON 18
1924 int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf
, size_t size
, const char *prefix
,
1925 const mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
) {
1926 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
1929 char key_size_str
[BEFORE_COLON
];
1935 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n");
1936 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1938 return ((int)(size
- n
));
1941 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "%scert. version : %d\n",
1942 prefix
, crt
->version
);
1943 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1944 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "%sserial number : ",
1946 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1948 ret
= mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(p
, n
, &crt
->serial
);
1949 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1951 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix
);
1952 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1953 ret
= mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p
, n
, &crt
->issuer
);
1954 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1956 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix
);
1957 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1958 ret
= mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p
, n
, &crt
->subject
);
1959 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1961 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%sissued on : " \
1962 "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix
,
1963 crt
->valid_from
.year
, crt
->valid_from
.mon
,
1964 crt
->valid_from
.day
, crt
->valid_from
.hour
,
1965 crt
->valid_from
.min
, crt
->valid_from
.sec
);
1966 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1968 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%sexpires on : " \
1969 "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix
,
1970 crt
->valid_to
.year
, crt
->valid_to
.mon
,
1971 crt
->valid_to
.day
, crt
->valid_to
.hour
,
1972 crt
->valid_to
.min
, crt
->valid_to
.sec
);
1973 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1975 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix
);
1976 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1978 ret
= mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(p
, n
, &crt
->sig_oid
, crt
->sig_pk
,
1979 crt
->sig_md
, crt
->sig_opts
);
1980 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1983 if ((ret
= mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(key_size_str
, BEFORE_COLON
,
1984 mbedtls_pk_get_name(&crt
->pk
))) != 0) {
1988 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%s%-" BC
"s: %d bits", prefix
, key_size_str
,
1989 (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&crt
->pk
));
1990 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
1993 * Optional extensions
1996 if (crt
->ext_types
& MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
) {
1997 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix
,
1998 crt
->ca_istrue
? "true" : "false");
1999 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
2001 if (crt
->max_pathlen
> 0) {
2002 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt
->max_pathlen
- 1);
2003 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
2007 if (crt
->ext_types
& MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
) {
2008 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix
);
2009 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
2011 if ((ret
= x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p
, &n
,
2012 &crt
->subject_alt_names
,
2017 if (crt
->ext_types
& MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE
) {
2018 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix
);
2019 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
2021 if ((ret
= x509_info_cert_type(&p
, &n
, crt
->ns_cert_type
)) != 0)
2025 if (crt
->ext_types
& MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE
) {
2026 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix
);
2027 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
2029 if ((ret
= x509_info_key_usage(&p
, &n
, crt
->key_usage
)) != 0)
2033 if (crt
->ext_types
& MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
) {
2034 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%sext key usage : ", prefix
);
2035 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
2037 if ((ret
= x509_info_ext_key_usage(&p
, &n
,
2038 &crt
->ext_key_usage
)) != 0)
2042 if (crt
->ext_types
& MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES
) {
2043 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix
);
2044 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
2046 if ((ret
= x509_info_cert_policies(&p
, &n
,
2047 &crt
->certificate_policies
)) != 0)
2051 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "\n");
2052 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
2054 return ((int)(size
- n
));
2057 struct x509_crt_verify_string
{
2062 static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings
[] = {
2063 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED
, "The certificate validity has expired" },
2064 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED
, "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" },
2065 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH
, "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN" },
2066 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED
, "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" },
2067 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED
, "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" },
2068 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED
, "The CRL is expired" },
2069 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING
, "Certificate was missing" },
2070 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY
, "Certificate verification was skipped" },
2071 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER
, "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)" },
2072 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE
, "The certificate validity starts in the future" },
2073 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE
, "The CRL is from the future" },
2074 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE
, "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" },
2075 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE
, "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" },
2076 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE
, "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension" },
2077 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD
, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash." },
2078 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK
, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." },
2079 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY
, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." },
2080 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD
, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash." },
2081 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK
, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." },
2082 { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY
, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." },
2086 int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf
, size_t size
, const char *prefix
,
2088 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
2089 const struct x509_crt_verify_string
*cur
;
2093 for (cur
= x509_crt_verify_strings
; cur
->string
!= NULL
; cur
++) {
2094 if ((flags
& cur
->code
) == 0)
2097 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "%s%s\n", prefix
, cur
->string
);
2098 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
2103 ret
= mbedtls_snprintf(p
, n
, "%sUnknown reason "
2104 "(this should not happen)\n", prefix
);
2105 MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF
;
2108 return ((int)(size
- n
));
2111 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
2112 int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
2113 unsigned int usage
) {
2114 unsigned int usage_must
, usage_may
;
2115 unsigned int may_mask
= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY
2116 | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY
;
2118 if ((crt
->ext_types
& MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE
) == 0)
2121 usage_must
= usage
& ~may_mask
;
2123 if (((crt
->key_usage
& ~may_mask
) & usage_must
) != usage_must
)
2124 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA
);
2126 usage_may
= usage
& may_mask
;
2128 if (((crt
->key_usage
& may_mask
) | usage_may
) != usage_may
)
2129 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA
);
2135 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE)
2136 int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
2137 const char *usage_oid
,
2139 const mbedtls_x509_sequence
*cur
;
2141 /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */
2142 if ((crt
->ext_types
& MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
) == 0)
2146 * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list
2148 for (cur
= &crt
->ext_key_usage
; cur
!= NULL
; cur
= cur
->next
) {
2149 const mbedtls_x509_buf
*cur_oid
= &cur
->buf
;
2151 if (cur_oid
->len
== usage_len
&&
2152 memcmp(cur_oid
->p
, usage_oid
, usage_len
) == 0) {
2156 if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
, cur_oid
) == 0)
2160 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA
);
2162 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */
2164 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
2166 * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise.
2168 int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(const mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
, const mbedtls_x509_crl
*crl
) {
2169 const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry
*cur
= &crl
->entry
;
2171 while (cur
!= NULL
&& cur
->serial
.len
!= 0) {
2172 if (crt
->serial
.len
== cur
->serial
.len
&&
2173 memcmp(crt
->serial
.p
, cur
->serial
.p
, crt
->serial
.len
) == 0) {
2184 * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL.
2185 * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present.
2187 static int x509_crt_verifycrl(mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
, mbedtls_x509_crt
*ca
,
2188 mbedtls_x509_crl
*crl_list
,
2189 const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
*profile
) {
2191 unsigned char hash
[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE
];
2192 const mbedtls_md_info_t
*md_info
;
2197 while (crl_list
!= NULL
) {
2198 if (crl_list
->version
== 0 ||
2199 x509_name_cmp(&crl_list
->issuer
, &ca
->subject
) != 0) {
2200 crl_list
= crl_list
->next
;
2205 * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs
2207 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
2208 if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(ca
,
2209 MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN
) != 0) {
2210 flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED
;
2216 * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA
2218 if (x509_profile_check_md_alg(profile
, crl_list
->sig_md
) != 0)
2219 flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD
;
2221 if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile
, crl_list
->sig_pk
) != 0)
2222 flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK
;
2224 md_info
= mbedtls_md_info_from_type(crl_list
->sig_md
);
2225 if (mbedtls_md(md_info
, crl_list
->tbs
.p
, crl_list
->tbs
.len
, hash
) != 0) {
2226 /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
2227 flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED
;
2231 if (x509_profile_check_key(profile
, &ca
->pk
) != 0)
2232 flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY
;
2234 if (mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(crl_list
->sig_pk
, crl_list
->sig_opts
, &ca
->pk
,
2235 crl_list
->sig_md
, hash
, mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info
),
2236 crl_list
->sig
.p
, crl_list
->sig
.len
) != 0) {
2237 flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED
;
2242 * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out)
2244 if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&crl_list
->next_update
))
2245 flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED
;
2247 if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&crl_list
->this_update
))
2248 flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE
;
2251 * Check if certificate is revoked
2253 if (mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(crt
, crl_list
)) {
2254 flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED
;
2258 crl_list
= crl_list
->next
;
2263 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */
2266 * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent
2268 static int x509_crt_check_signature(const mbedtls_x509_crt
*child
,
2269 mbedtls_x509_crt
*parent
,
2270 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx
*rs_ctx
) {
2271 unsigned char hash
[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE
];
2273 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
2274 const mbedtls_md_info_t
*md_info
;
2275 md_info
= mbedtls_md_info_from_type(child
->sig_md
);
2276 hash_len
= mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info
);
2278 /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */
2279 if (mbedtls_md(md_info
, child
->tbs
.p
, child
->tbs
.len
, hash
) != 0)
2282 psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation
= PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT
;
2283 psa_algorithm_t hash_alg
= mbedtls_psa_translate_md(child
->sig_md
);
2285 if (psa_hash_setup(&hash_operation
, hash_alg
) != PSA_SUCCESS
)
2288 if (psa_hash_update(&hash_operation
, child
->tbs
.p
, child
->tbs
.len
)
2293 if (psa_hash_finish(&hash_operation
, hash
, sizeof(hash
), &hash_len
)
2297 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
2298 /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */
2299 if (! mbedtls_pk_can_do(&parent
->pk
, child
->sig_pk
))
2302 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
2303 if (rs_ctx
!= NULL
&& child
->sig_pk
== MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA
) {
2304 return (mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(&parent
->pk
,
2305 child
->sig_md
, hash
, hash_len
,
2306 child
->sig
.p
, child
->sig
.len
, &rs_ctx
->pk
));
2312 return (mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(child
->sig_pk
, child
->sig_opts
, &parent
->pk
,
2313 child
->sig_md
, hash
, hash_len
,
2314 child
->sig
.p
, child
->sig
.len
));
2318 * Check if 'parent' is a suitable parent (signing CA) for 'child'.
2319 * Return 0 if yes, -1 if not.
2321 * top means parent is a locally-trusted certificate
2323 static int x509_crt_check_parent(const mbedtls_x509_crt
*child
,
2324 const mbedtls_x509_crt
*parent
,
2328 /* Parent must be the issuer */
2329 if (x509_name_cmp(&child
->issuer
, &parent
->subject
) != 0)
2332 /* Parent must have the basicConstraints CA bit set as a general rule */
2335 /* Exception: v1/v2 certificates that are locally trusted. */
2336 if (top
&& parent
->version
< 3)
2339 if (need_ca_bit
&& ! parent
->ca_istrue
)
2342 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
2344 mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(parent
, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
) != 0) {
2353 * Find a suitable parent for child in candidates, or return NULL.
2355 * Here suitable is defined as:
2356 * 1. subject name matches child's issuer
2357 * 2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs
2358 * 3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct
2359 * (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported)
2360 * 4. pathlen constraints are satisfied
2362 * If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first
2363 * such. Otherwise, return the first suitable candidate (or NULL if there is
2366 * The rationale for this rule is that someone could have a list of trusted
2367 * roots with two versions on the same root with different validity periods.
2368 * (At least one user reported having such a list and wanted it to just work.)
2369 * The reason we don't just require time-validity is that generally there is
2370 * only one version, and if it's expired we want the flags to state that
2371 * rather than NOT_TRUSTED, as would be the case if we required it here.
2373 * The rationale for rule 3 (signature for trusted roots) is that users might
2374 * have two versions of the same CA with different keys in their list, and the
2375 * way we select the correct one is by checking the signature (as we don't
2376 * rely on key identifier extensions). (This is one way users might choose to
2377 * handle key rollover, another relies on self-issued certs, see [SIRO].)
2380 * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent
2381 * - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents
2382 * - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL)
2383 * - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
2384 * - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top
2385 * of the chain, 0 otherwise
2386 * - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far
2387 * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far
2388 * (will never be greater than path_cnt)
2389 * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
2393 * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
2395 static int x509_crt_find_parent_in(
2396 mbedtls_x509_crt
*child
,
2397 mbedtls_x509_crt
*candidates
,
2398 mbedtls_x509_crt
**r_parent
,
2399 int *r_signature_is_good
,
2403 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx
*rs_ctx
) {
2404 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
2405 mbedtls_x509_crt
*parent
, *fallback_parent
;
2406 int signature_is_good
= 0, fallback_signature_is_good
;
2408 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
2409 /* did we have something in progress? */
2410 if (rs_ctx
!= NULL
&& rs_ctx
->parent
!= NULL
) {
2411 /* restore saved state */
2412 parent
= rs_ctx
->parent
;
2413 fallback_parent
= rs_ctx
->fallback_parent
;
2414 fallback_signature_is_good
= rs_ctx
->fallback_signature_is_good
;
2416 /* clear saved state */
2417 rs_ctx
->parent
= NULL
;
2418 rs_ctx
->fallback_parent
= NULL
;
2419 rs_ctx
->fallback_signature_is_good
= 0;
2421 /* resume where we left */
2422 goto check_signature
;
2426 fallback_parent
= NULL
;
2427 fallback_signature_is_good
= 0;
2429 for (parent
= candidates
; parent
!= NULL
; parent
= parent
->next
) {
2430 /* basic parenting skills (name, CA bit, key usage) */
2431 if (x509_crt_check_parent(child
, parent
, top
) != 0)
2434 /* +1 because stored max_pathlen is 1 higher that the actual value */
2435 if (parent
->max_pathlen
> 0 &&
2436 (size_t) parent
->max_pathlen
< 1 + path_cnt
- self_cnt
) {
2441 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
2444 ret
= x509_crt_check_signature(child
, parent
, rs_ctx
);
2446 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
2447 if (rs_ctx
!= NULL
&& ret
== MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS
) {
2449 rs_ctx
->parent
= parent
;
2450 rs_ctx
->fallback_parent
= fallback_parent
;
2451 rs_ctx
->fallback_signature_is_good
= fallback_signature_is_good
;
2459 signature_is_good
= ret
== 0;
2460 if (top
&& ! signature_is_good
)
2463 /* optional time check */
2464 if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&parent
->valid_to
) ||
2465 mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&parent
->valid_from
)) {
2466 if (fallback_parent
== NULL
) {
2467 fallback_parent
= parent
;
2468 fallback_signature_is_good
= signature_is_good
;
2475 *r_signature_is_good
= signature_is_good
;
2480 if (parent
== NULL
) {
2481 *r_parent
= fallback_parent
;
2482 *r_signature_is_good
= fallback_signature_is_good
;
2489 * Find a parent in trusted CAs or the provided chain, or return NULL.
2491 * Searches in trusted CAs first, and return the first suitable parent found
2492 * (see find_parent_in() for definition of suitable).
2495 * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed
2496 * by a chain of possible intermediates
2497 * - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates
2498 * - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL)
2499 * - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0
2500 * - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
2501 * - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child)
2502 * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far
2503 * (will always be no greater than path_cnt)
2504 * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
2508 * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
2510 static int x509_crt_find_parent(
2511 mbedtls_x509_crt
*child
,
2512 mbedtls_x509_crt
*trust_ca
,
2513 mbedtls_x509_crt
**parent
,
2514 int *parent_is_trusted
,
2515 int *signature_is_good
,
2518 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx
*rs_ctx
) {
2519 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
2520 mbedtls_x509_crt
*search_list
;
2522 *parent_is_trusted
= 1;
2524 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
2525 /* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */
2526 if (rs_ctx
!= NULL
&& rs_ctx
->parent_is_trusted
!= -1) {
2527 *parent_is_trusted
= rs_ctx
->parent_is_trusted
;
2528 rs_ctx
->parent_is_trusted
= -1;
2533 search_list
= *parent_is_trusted
? trust_ca
: child
->next
;
2535 ret
= x509_crt_find_parent_in(child
, search_list
,
2536 parent
, signature_is_good
,
2538 path_cnt
, self_cnt
, rs_ctx
);
2540 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
2541 if (rs_ctx
!= NULL
&& ret
== MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS
) {
2543 rs_ctx
->parent_is_trusted
= *parent_is_trusted
;
2550 /* stop here if found or already in second iteration */
2551 if (*parent
!= NULL
|| *parent_is_trusted
== 0)
2554 /* prepare second iteration */
2555 *parent_is_trusted
= 0;
2558 /* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */
2559 if (*parent
== NULL
) {
2560 *parent_is_trusted
= 0;
2561 *signature_is_good
= 0;
2568 * Check if an end-entity certificate is locally trusted
2570 * Currently we require such certificates to be self-signed (actually only
2571 * check for self-issued as self-signatures are not checked)
2573 static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
2574 mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
2575 mbedtls_x509_crt
*trust_ca
) {
2576 mbedtls_x509_crt
*cur
;
2578 /* must be self-issued */
2579 if (x509_name_cmp(&crt
->issuer
, &crt
->subject
) != 0)
2582 /* look for an exact match with trusted cert */
2583 for (cur
= trust_ca
; cur
!= NULL
; cur
= cur
->next
) {
2584 if (crt
->raw
.len
== cur
->raw
.len
&&
2585 memcmp(crt
->raw
.p
, cur
->raw
.p
, crt
->raw
.len
) == 0) {
2595 * Build and verify a certificate chain
2597 * Given a peer-provided list of certificates EE, C1, ..., Cn and
2598 * a list of trusted certs R1, ... Rp, try to build and verify a chain
2599 * EE, Ci1, ... Ciq [, Rj]
2600 * such that every cert in the chain is a child of the next one,
2601 * jumping to a trusted root as early as possible.
2603 * Verify that chain and return it with flags for all issues found.
2606 * - EE == Rj -> return a one-element list containing it
2607 * - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root
2608 * -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq
2610 * Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least:
2612 * - EE -> trusted root
2613 * - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root
2614 * - if relevant: EE untrusted
2615 * - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted
2616 * with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root).
2617 * For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is
2618 * enough (but length 1 is not in general).
2621 * - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn
2622 * - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp
2623 * - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile()
2624 * - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain
2625 * Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise!
2626 * Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume.
2627 * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
2630 * - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined
2631 * - 0 is the chain was successfully built and examined,
2632 * even if it was found to be invalid
2634 static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
2635 mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
2636 mbedtls_x509_crt
*trust_ca
,
2637 mbedtls_x509_crl
*ca_crl
,
2638 mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb
,
2640 const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
*profile
,
2641 mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain
*ver_chain
,
2642 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx
*rs_ctx
) {
2643 /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can
2644 * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */
2645 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
2647 mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item
*cur
;
2648 mbedtls_x509_crt
*child
;
2649 mbedtls_x509_crt
*parent
;
2650 int parent_is_trusted
;
2651 int child_is_trusted
;
2652 int signature_is_good
;
2654 mbedtls_x509_crt
*cur_trust_ca
= NULL
;
2656 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
2657 /* resume if we had an operation in progress */
2658 if (rs_ctx
!= NULL
&& rs_ctx
->in_progress
== x509_crt_rs_find_parent
) {
2659 /* restore saved state */
2660 *ver_chain
= rs_ctx
->ver_chain
; /* struct copy */
2661 self_cnt
= rs_ctx
->self_cnt
;
2663 /* restore derived state */
2664 cur
= &ver_chain
->items
[ver_chain
->len
- 1];
2666 flags
= &cur
->flags
;
2670 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
2674 parent_is_trusted
= 0;
2675 child_is_trusted
= 0;
2678 /* Add certificate to the verification chain */
2679 cur
= &ver_chain
->items
[ver_chain
->len
];
2683 flags
= &cur
->flags
;
2685 /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */
2686 if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&child
->valid_to
))
2687 *flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED
;
2689 if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&child
->valid_from
))
2690 *flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE
;
2692 /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */
2693 if (child_is_trusted
)
2696 /* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */
2697 if (x509_profile_check_md_alg(profile
, child
->sig_md
) != 0)
2698 *flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD
;
2700 if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile
, child
->sig_pk
) != 0)
2701 *flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK
;
2703 /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */
2704 if (ver_chain
->len
== 1 &&
2705 x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(child
, trust_ca
) == 0) {
2709 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
2713 /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback,
2714 * or use statically provided list. */
2715 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
2716 if (f_ca_cb
!= NULL
) {
2717 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ver_chain
->trust_ca_cb_result
);
2718 mbedtls_free(ver_chain
->trust_ca_cb_result
);
2719 ver_chain
->trust_ca_cb_result
= NULL
;
2721 ret
= f_ca_cb(p_ca_cb
, child
, &ver_chain
->trust_ca_cb_result
);
2723 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR
);
2725 cur_trust_ca
= ver_chain
->trust_ca_cb_result
;
2727 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
2731 cur_trust_ca
= trust_ca
;
2734 /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */
2735 ret
= x509_crt_find_parent(child
, cur_trust_ca
, &parent
,
2736 &parent_is_trusted
, &signature_is_good
,
2737 ver_chain
->len
- 1, self_cnt
, rs_ctx
);
2739 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
2740 if (rs_ctx
!= NULL
&& ret
== MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS
) {
2742 rs_ctx
->in_progress
= x509_crt_rs_find_parent
;
2743 rs_ctx
->self_cnt
= self_cnt
;
2744 rs_ctx
->ver_chain
= *ver_chain
; /* struct copy */
2752 /* No parent? We're done here */
2753 if (parent
== NULL
) {
2754 *flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED
;
2758 /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs.
2759 * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO],
2760 * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */
2761 if (ver_chain
->len
!= 1 &&
2762 x509_name_cmp(&child
->issuer
, &child
->subject
) == 0) {
2766 /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA,
2767 * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */
2768 if (! parent_is_trusted
&&
2769 ver_chain
->len
> MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA
) {
2770 /* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */
2771 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR
);
2774 /* signature was checked while searching parent */
2775 if (! signature_is_good
)
2776 *flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED
;
2778 /* check size of signing key */
2779 if (x509_profile_check_key(profile
, &parent
->pk
) != 0)
2780 *flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY
;
2782 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
2783 /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
2784 *flags
|= x509_crt_verifycrl(child
, parent
, ca_crl
, profile
);
2789 /* prepare for next iteration */
2792 child_is_trusted
= parent_is_trusted
;
2793 signature_is_good
= 0;
2798 * Check for CN match
2800 static int x509_crt_check_cn(const mbedtls_x509_buf
*name
,
2801 const char *cn
, size_t cn_len
) {
2802 /* try exact match */
2803 if (name
->len
== cn_len
&&
2804 x509_memcasecmp(cn
, name
->p
, cn_len
) == 0) {
2808 /* try wildcard match */
2809 if (x509_check_wildcard(cn
, name
) == 0) {
2817 * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6
2819 static int x509_crt_check_san(const mbedtls_x509_buf
*name
,
2820 const char *cn
, size_t cn_len
) {
2821 const unsigned char san_type
= (unsigned char) name
->tag
&
2822 MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK
;
2825 if (san_type
== MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME
)
2826 return (x509_crt_check_cn(name
, cn
, cn_len
));
2828 /* (We may handle other types here later.) */
2830 /* Unrecognized type */
2835 * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL!
2837 static void x509_crt_verify_name(const mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
2840 const mbedtls_x509_name
*name
;
2841 const mbedtls_x509_sequence
*cur
;
2842 size_t cn_len
= strlen(cn
);
2844 if (crt
->ext_types
& MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
) {
2845 for (cur
= &crt
->subject_alt_names
; cur
!= NULL
; cur
= cur
->next
) {
2846 if (x509_crt_check_san(&cur
->buf
, cn
, cn_len
) == 0)
2851 *flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH
;
2853 for (name
= &crt
->subject
; name
!= NULL
; name
= name
->next
) {
2854 if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN
, &name
->oid
) == 0 &&
2855 x509_crt_check_cn(&name
->val
, cn
, cn_len
) == 0) {
2861 *flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH
;
2866 * Merge the flags for all certs in the chain, after calling callback
2868 static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(
2870 const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain
*ver_chain
,
2871 int (*f_vrfy
)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt
*, int, uint32_t *),
2873 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
2876 const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item
*cur
;
2878 for (i
= ver_chain
->len
; i
!= 0; --i
) {
2879 cur
= &ver_chain
->items
[i
- 1];
2880 cur_flags
= cur
->flags
;
2883 if ((ret
= f_vrfy(p_vrfy
, cur
->crt
, (int) i
- 1, &cur_flags
)) != 0)
2886 *flags
|= cur_flags
;
2893 * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version
2896 * - checks the requested CN (if any)
2897 * - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key,
2898 * as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently
2899 * - builds and verifies the chain
2900 * - then calls the callback and merges the flags
2902 * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb`
2903 * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the
2904 * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will
2905 * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list
2906 * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list
2909 static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
2910 mbedtls_x509_crt
*trust_ca
,
2911 mbedtls_x509_crl
*ca_crl
,
2912 mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb
,
2914 const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
*profile
,
2915 const char *cn
, uint32_t *flags
,
2916 int (*f_vrfy
)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt
*, int, uint32_t *),
2918 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx
*rs_ctx
) {
2919 int ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
;
2920 mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type
;
2921 mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain
;
2926 x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(&ver_chain
);
2928 if (profile
== NULL
) {
2929 ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA
;
2933 /* check name if requested */
2935 x509_crt_verify_name(crt
, cn
, &ee_flags
);
2937 /* Check the type and size of the key */
2938 pk_type
= mbedtls_pk_get_type(&crt
->pk
);
2940 if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile
, pk_type
) != 0)
2941 ee_flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK
;
2943 if (x509_profile_check_key(profile
, &crt
->pk
) != 0)
2944 ee_flags
|= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY
;
2946 /* Check the chain */
2947 ret
= x509_crt_verify_chain(crt
, trust_ca
, ca_crl
,
2948 f_ca_cb
, p_ca_cb
, profile
,
2949 &ver_chain
, rs_ctx
);
2954 /* Merge end-entity flags */
2955 ver_chain
.items
[0].flags
|= ee_flags
;
2957 /* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */
2958 ret
= x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(flags
, &ver_chain
, f_vrfy
, p_vrfy
);
2962 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
2963 mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ver_chain
.trust_ca_cb_result
);
2964 mbedtls_free(ver_chain
.trust_ca_cb_result
);
2965 ver_chain
.trust_ca_cb_result
= NULL
;
2966 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
2968 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
2969 if (rs_ctx
!= NULL
&& ret
!= MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS
)
2970 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(rs_ctx
);
2973 /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by
2974 * the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the
2975 * callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */
2976 if (ret
== MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED
)
2977 ret
= MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR
;
2980 *flags
= (uint32_t) -1;
2985 return (MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED
);
2992 * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable)
2994 int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
2995 mbedtls_x509_crt
*trust_ca
,
2996 mbedtls_x509_crl
*ca_crl
,
2997 const char *cn
, uint32_t *flags
,
2998 int (*f_vrfy
)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt
*, int, uint32_t *),
3000 return (x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt
, trust_ca
, ca_crl
,
3002 &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default
,
3004 f_vrfy
, p_vrfy
, NULL
));
3008 * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable)
3010 int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
3011 mbedtls_x509_crt
*trust_ca
,
3012 mbedtls_x509_crl
*ca_crl
,
3013 const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
*profile
,
3014 const char *cn
, uint32_t *flags
,
3015 int (*f_vrfy
)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt
*, int, uint32_t *),
3017 return (x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt
, trust_ca
, ca_crl
,
3020 f_vrfy
, p_vrfy
, NULL
));
3023 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
3025 * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, CA callback,
3028 int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
3029 mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb
,
3031 const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
*profile
,
3032 const char *cn
, uint32_t *flags
,
3033 int (*f_vrfy
)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt
*, int, uint32_t *),
3035 return (x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt
, NULL
, NULL
,
3038 f_vrfy
, p_vrfy
, NULL
));
3040 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
3042 int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
,
3043 mbedtls_x509_crt
*trust_ca
,
3044 mbedtls_x509_crl
*ca_crl
,
3045 const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
*profile
,
3046 const char *cn
, uint32_t *flags
,
3047 int (*f_vrfy
)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt
*, int, uint32_t *),
3049 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx
*rs_ctx
) {
3050 return (x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt
, trust_ca
, ca_crl
,
3053 f_vrfy
, p_vrfy
, rs_ctx
));
3058 * Initialize a certificate chain
3060 void mbedtls_x509_crt_init(mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
) {
3061 memset(crt
, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt
));
3065 * Unallocate all certificate data
3067 void mbedtls_x509_crt_free(mbedtls_x509_crt
*crt
) {
3068 mbedtls_x509_crt
*cert_cur
= crt
;
3069 mbedtls_x509_crt
*cert_prv
;
3070 mbedtls_x509_name
*name_cur
;
3071 mbedtls_x509_name
*name_prv
;
3072 mbedtls_x509_sequence
*seq_cur
;
3073 mbedtls_x509_sequence
*seq_prv
;
3079 mbedtls_pk_free(&cert_cur
->pk
);
3081 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
3082 mbedtls_free(cert_cur
->sig_opts
);
3085 name_cur
= cert_cur
->issuer
.next
;
3086 while (name_cur
!= NULL
) {
3087 name_prv
= name_cur
;
3088 name_cur
= name_cur
->next
;
3089 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(name_prv
, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name
));
3090 mbedtls_free(name_prv
);
3093 name_cur
= cert_cur
->subject
.next
;
3094 while (name_cur
!= NULL
) {
3095 name_prv
= name_cur
;
3096 name_cur
= name_cur
->next
;
3097 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(name_prv
, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name
));
3098 mbedtls_free(name_prv
);
3101 seq_cur
= cert_cur
->ext_key_usage
.next
;
3102 while (seq_cur
!= NULL
) {
3104 seq_cur
= seq_cur
->next
;
3105 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv
,
3106 sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence
));
3107 mbedtls_free(seq_prv
);
3110 seq_cur
= cert_cur
->subject_alt_names
.next
;
3111 while (seq_cur
!= NULL
) {
3113 seq_cur
= seq_cur
->next
;
3114 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv
,
3115 sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence
));
3116 mbedtls_free(seq_prv
);
3119 seq_cur
= cert_cur
->certificate_policies
.next
;
3120 while (seq_cur
!= NULL
) {
3122 seq_cur
= seq_cur
->next
;
3123 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv
,
3124 sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence
));
3125 mbedtls_free(seq_prv
);
3128 if (cert_cur
->raw
.p
!= NULL
&& cert_cur
->own_buffer
) {
3129 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cert_cur
->raw
.p
, cert_cur
->raw
.len
);
3130 mbedtls_free(cert_cur
->raw
.p
);
3133 cert_cur
= cert_cur
->next
;
3134 } while (cert_cur
!= NULL
);
3138 cert_prv
= cert_cur
;
3139 cert_cur
= cert_cur
->next
;
3141 mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cert_prv
, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt
));
3142 if (cert_prv
!= crt
)
3143 mbedtls_free(cert_prv
);
3144 } while (cert_cur
!= NULL
);
3147 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
3149 * Initialize a restart context
3151 void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx
*ctx
) {
3152 mbedtls_pk_restart_init(&ctx
->pk
);
3155 ctx
->fallback_parent
= NULL
;
3156 ctx
->fallback_signature_is_good
= 0;
3158 ctx
->parent_is_trusted
= -1;
3160 ctx
->in_progress
= x509_crt_rs_none
;
3162 x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(&ctx
->ver_chain
);
3166 * Free the components of a restart context
3168 void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx
*ctx
) {
3172 mbedtls_pk_restart_free(&ctx
->pk
);
3173 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(ctx
);
3175 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
3177 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */