coreutils-acp/coreutils-pam.patch

   1 diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac coreutils-8.4/configure.ac
   2 --- coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac     2010-01-11 18:20:42.000000000 +0100
   3 +++ coreutils-8.4/configure.ac  2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
   4 @@ -126,6 +126,13 @@ if test "$gl_gcc_warnings" = yes; then
   5    AC_SUBST([GNULIB_WARN_CFLAGS])
   6  fi
   7
   8 +dnl Give the chance to enable PAM
   9 +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam, dnl
  10 +[  --enable-pam              Enable use of the PAM libraries],
  11 +[AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define if you want to use PAM])
  12 +LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc"
  13 +AC_SUBST(LIB_PAM)])
  14 +
  15  AC_FUNC_FORK
  16
  17  optional_bin_progs=
  18 diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi
  19 --- coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi       2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100
  20 +++ coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi    2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
  21 @@ -15081,8 +15081,11 @@ to certain shells, etc.).
  22  @findex syslog
  23  @command{su} can optionally be compiled to use @code{syslog} to report
  24  failed, and optionally successful, @command{su} attempts.  (If the system
  25 -supports @code{syslog}.)  However, GNU @command{su} does not check if the
  26 -user is a member of the @code{wheel} group; see below.
  27 +supports @code{syslog}.)
  28 +
  29 +This version of @command{su} has support for using PAM for
  30 +authentication.  You can edit @file{/etc/pam.d/su} to customize its
  31 +behaviour.
  32
  33  The program accepts the following options.  Also see @ref{Common options}.
  34
  35 @@ -15124,6 +15127,8 @@ environment variables except @env{TERM},
  36  @env{PATH} to a compiled-in default value.  Change to @var{user}'s home
  37  directory.  Prepend @samp{-} to the shell's name, intended to make it
  38  read its login startup file(s).
  39 +Additionaly @env{DISPLAY} and @env{XAUTHORITY} environment variables
  40 +are preserved as well for PAM functionality.
  41
  42  @item -m
  43  @itemx -p
  44 @@ -15163,33 +15168,6 @@ Exit status:
  45  the exit status of the subshell otherwise
  46  @end display
  47
  48 -@cindex wheel group, not supported
  49 -@cindex group wheel, not supported
  50 -@cindex fascism
  51 -@subsection Why GNU @command{su} does not support the @samp{wheel} group
  52 -
  53 -(This section is by Richard Stallman.)
  54 -
  55 -@cindex Twenex
  56 -@cindex MIT AI lab
  57 -Sometimes a few of the users try to hold total power over all the
  58 -rest.  For example, in 1984, a few users at the MIT AI lab decided to
  59 -seize power by changing the operator password on the Twenex system and
  60 -keeping it secret from everyone else.  (I was able to thwart this coup
  61 -and give power back to the users by patching the kernel, but I
  62 -wouldn't know how to do that in Unix.)
  63 -
  64 -However, occasionally the rulers do tell someone.  Under the usual
  65 -@command{su} mechanism, once someone learns the root password who
  66 -sympathizes with the ordinary users, he or she can tell the rest.  The
  67 -``wheel group'' feature would make this impossible, and thus cement the
  68 -power of the rulers.
  69 -
  70 -I'm on the side of the masses, not that of the rulers.  If you are
  71 -used to supporting the bosses and sysadmins in whatever they do, you
  72 -might find this idea strange at first.
  73 -
  74 -
  75  @node timeout invocation
  76  @section @command{timeout}: Run a command with a time limit
  77
  78 diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am
  79 --- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am  2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100
  80 +++ coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am       2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
  81 @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ factor_LDADD += $(LIB_GMP)
  82  uptime_LDADD += $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS)
  83
  84  # for crypt
  85 -su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT)
  86 +su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) @LIB_PAM@
  87
  88  # for various ACL functions
  89  copy_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
  90 diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c coreutils-8.4/src/su.c
  91 --- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c 2010-02-12 10:15:15.000000000 +0100
  92 +++ coreutils-8.4/src/su.c      2010-02-12 10:24:29.000000000 +0100
  93 @@ -37,6 +37,16 @@
  94     restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts.  RMS considers that to
  95     be fascist.
  96
  97 +#ifdef USE_PAM
  98 +
  99 +   Actually, with PAM, su has nothing to do with whether or not a
 100 +   wheel group is enforced by su.  RMS tries to restrict your access
 101 +   to a su which implements the wheel group, but PAM considers that
 102 +   to be fascist, and gives the user/sysadmin the opportunity to
 103 +   enforce a wheel group by proper editing of /etc/pam.conf
 104 +
 105 +#endif
 106 +
 107     Compile-time options:
 108     -DSYSLOG_SUCCESS    Log successful su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
 109     -DSYSLOG_FAILURE    Log failed su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
 110 @@ -53,6 +63,15 @@
 111  #include <pwd.h>
 112  #include <grp.h>
 113
 114 +#ifdef USE_PAM
 115 +# include <signal.h>
 116 +# include <sys/wait.h>
 117 +# include <sys/fsuid.h>
 118 +# include <unistd.h>
 119 +# include <security/pam_appl.h>
 120 +# include <security/pam_misc.h>
 121 +#endif /* USE_PAM */
 122 +
 123  #include "system.h"
 124  #include "getpass.h"
 125
 126 @@ -120,10 +139,17 @@
 127  /* The user to become if none is specified.  */
 128  #define DEFAULT_USER "root"
 129
 130 +#ifndef USE_PAM
 131  char *crypt (char const *key, char const *salt);
 132 +#endif
 133
 134 -static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t)
 135 +static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t,
 136 +       const struct passwd *)
 137 +#ifdef USE_PAM
 138 +       ;
 139 +#else
 140       ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN;
 141 +#endif
 142
 143  /* If true, pass the `-f' option to the subshell.  */
 144  static bool fast_startup;
 145 @@ -209,7 +235,26 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su
 146  }
 147  #endif
 148
 149 +#ifdef USE_PAM
 150 +static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
 151 +static int retval;
 152 +static struct pam_conv conv = {
 153 +  misc_conv,
 154 +  NULL
 155 +};
 156 +
 157 +#define PAM_BAIL_P if (retval) { \
 158 +  pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \
 159 +  return 0; \
 160 +}
 161 +#define PAM_BAIL_P_VOID if (retval) {          \
 162 +  pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);                  \
 163 +return;                                                \
 164 +}
 165 +#endif
 166 +
 167  /* Ask the user for a password.
 168 +   If PAM is in use, let PAM ask for the password if necessary.
 169     Return true if the user gives the correct password for entry PW,
 170     false if not.  Return true without asking for a password if run by UID 0
 171     or if PW has an empty password.  */
 172 @@ -217,6 +262,44 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su
 173  static bool
 174  correct_password (const struct passwd *pw)
 175  {
 176 +#ifdef USE_PAM
 177 +  struct passwd *caller;
 178 +  char *tty_name, *ttyn;
 179 +  retval = pam_start(PROGRAM_NAME, pw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
 180 +  PAM_BAIL_P;
 181 +
 182 +  if (getuid() != 0 && !isatty(0)) {
 183 +       fprintf(stderr, "standard in must be a tty\n");
 184 +       exit(1);
 185 +  }
 186 +
 187 +  caller = getpwuid(getuid());
 188 +  if(caller != NULL && caller->pw_name != NULL) {
 189 +         retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, caller->pw_name);
 190 +         PAM_BAIL_P;
 191 +  }
 192 +
 193 +  ttyn = ttyname(0);
 194 +  if (ttyn) {
 195 +    if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
 196 +       tty_name = ttyn+5;
 197 +    else
 198 +       tty_name = ttyn;
 199 +    retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name);
 200 +    PAM_BAIL_P;
 201 +  }
 202 +  retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
 203 +  PAM_BAIL_P;
 204 +  retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
 205 +  if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
 206 +    /* password has expired.  Offer option to change it. */
 207 +    retval = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
 208 +    PAM_BAIL_P;
 209 +  }
 210 +  PAM_BAIL_P;
 211 +  /* must be authenticated if this point was reached */
 212 +  return 1;
 213 +#else /* !USE_PAM */
 214    char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct;
 215  #if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP
 216    /* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems.  */
 217 @@ -241,6 +324,7 @@ correct_password (const struct passwd *p
 218    encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct);
 219    memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted));
 220    return STREQ (encrypted, correct);
 221 +#endif /* !USE_PAM */
 222  }
 223
 224  /* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being
 225 @@ -254,12 +338,18 @@ modify_environment (const struct passwd
 226        /* Leave TERM unchanged.  Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH.
 227           Unset all other environment variables.  */
 228        char const *term = getenv ("TERM");
 229 +      char const *display = getenv ("DISPLAY");
 230 +      char const *xauthority = getenv ("XAUTHORITY");
 231        if (term)
 232          term = xstrdup (term);
 233        environ = xmalloc ((6 + !!term) * sizeof (char *));
 234        environ[0] = NULL;
 235        if (term)
 236          xsetenv ("TERM", term);
 237 +      if (display)
 238 +        xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display);
 239 +      if (xauthority)
 240 +        xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority);
 241        xsetenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir);
 242        xsetenv ("SHELL", shell);
 243        xsetenv ("USER", pw->pw_name);
 244 @@ -292,8 +382,13 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
 245  {
 246  #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
 247    errno = 0;
 248 -  if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
 249 +  if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
 250 +#ifdef USE_PAM
 251 +    pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
 252 +    pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
 253 +#endif
 254      error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set groups"));
 255 +  }
 256    endgrent ();
 257  #endif
 258    if (setgid (pw->pw_gid))
 259 @@ -302,6 +397,31 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
 260      error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set user id"));
 261  }
 262
 263 +#ifdef USE_PAM
 264 +static int caught=0;
 265 +/* Signal handler for parent process later */
 266 +static void su_catch_sig(int sig)
 267 +{
 268 +  ++caught;
 269 +}
 270 +
 271 +int
 272 +pam_copyenv (pam_handle_t *pamh)
 273 +{
 274 +  char **env;
 275 +
 276 +  env = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
 277 +  if(env) {
 278 +    while(*env) {
 279 +       if (putenv (*env))
 280 +         xalloc_die ();
 281 +       env++;
 282 +    }
 283 +  }
 284 +  return(0);
 285 +}
 286 +#endif
 287 +
 288  /* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty.
 289     If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option.
 290     Pass ADDITIONAL_ARGS to the shell as more arguments; there
 291 @@ -309,17 +429,49 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
 292
 293  static void
 294  run_shell (char const *shell, char const *command, char **additional_args,
 295 -           size_t n_additional_args)
 296 +           size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw)
 297  {
 298    size_t n_args = 1 + fast_startup + 2 * !!command + n_additional_args + 1;
 299    char const **args = xnmalloc (n_args, sizeof *args);
 300    size_t argno = 1;
 301 +#ifdef USE_PAM
 302 +  int child;
 303 +  sigset_t ourset;
 304 +  int status;
 305 +
 306 +  retval = pam_open_session(pamh,0);
 307 +  if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
 308 +    fprintf (stderr, "could not open session\n");
 309 +    exit (1);
 310 +  }
 311 +
 312 +/* do this at the last possible moment, because environment variables may
 313 +   be passed even in the session phase
 314 +*/
 315 +  if(pam_copyenv(pamh) != PAM_SUCCESS)
 316 +     fprintf (stderr, "error copying PAM environment\n");
 317 +
 318 +  /* Credentials should be set in the parent */
 319 +  if (pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
 320 +    pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
 321 +    fprintf(stderr, "could not set PAM credentials\n");
 322 +    exit(1);
 323 +  }
 324 +
 325 +  child = fork();
 326 +  if (child == 0) {  /* child shell */
 327 +  change_identity (pw);
 328 +  pam_end(pamh, 0);
 329 +#endif
 330
 331    if (simulate_login)
 332      {
 333        char *arg0;
 334        char *shell_basename;
 335
 336 +      if(chdir(pw->pw_dir))
 337 +             error(0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
 338 +
 339        shell_basename = last_component (shell);
 340        arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (shell_basename) + 2);
 341        arg0[0] = '-';
 342 @@ -344,6 +496,67 @@ run_shell (char const *shell, char const
 343      error (0, errno, "%s", shell);
 344      exit (exit_status);
 345    }
 346 +#ifdef USE_PAM
 347 +  } else if (child == -1) {
 348 +      fprintf(stderr, "can not fork user shell: %s", strerror(errno));
 349 +      pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
 350 +      pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
 351 +      pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
 352 +      exit(1);
 353 +  }
 354 +  /* parent only */
 355 +  sigfillset(&ourset);
 356 +  if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) {
 357 +    fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME);
 358 +    caught = 1;
 359 +  }
 360 +  if (!caught) {
 361 +    struct sigaction action;
 362 +    action.sa_handler = su_catch_sig;
 363 +    sigemptyset(&action.sa_mask);
 364 +    action.sa_flags = 0;
 365 +    sigemptyset(&ourset);
 366 +    if (sigaddset(&ourset, SIGTERM)
 367 +        || sigaddset(&ourset, SIGALRM)
 368 +        || sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL)
 369 +        || sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) {
 370 +      fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal masking malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME);
 371 +      caught = 1;
 372 +    }
 373 +  }
 374 +  if (!caught) {
 375 +    do {
 376 +      int pid;
 377 +
 378 +      pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WUNTRACED);
 379 +
 380 +      if (((pid_t)-1 != pid) && (0 != WIFSTOPPED (status))) {
 381 +          kill(getpid(), WSTOPSIG(status));
 382 +          /* once we get here, we must have resumed */
 383 +          kill(pid, SIGCONT);
 384 +      }
 385 +    } while (0 != WIFSTOPPED(status));
 386 +  }
 387 +
 388 +  if (caught) {
 389 +    fprintf(stderr, "\nSession terminated, killing shell...");
 390 +    kill (child, SIGTERM);
 391 +  }
 392 +  /* Not checking retval on this because we need to call close session */
 393 +  pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
 394 +  retval = pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
 395 +  PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
 396 +  retval = pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
 397 +  PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
 398 +  if (caught) {
 399 +    sleep(2);
 400 +    kill(child, SIGKILL);
 401 +    fprintf(stderr, " ...killed.\n");
 402 +    exit(-1);
 403 +  }
 404 +  exit ((0 != WIFEXITED (status)) ? WEXITSTATUS (status)
 405 +                                  : WTERMSIG (status) + 128);
 406 +#endif /* USE_PAM */
 407  }
 408
 409  /* Return true if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by
 410 @@ -511,9 +724,9 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
 411    shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell);
 412    modify_environment (pw, shell);
 413
 414 +#ifndef USE_PAM
 415    change_identity (pw);
 416 -  if (simulate_login && chdir (pw->pw_dir) != 0)
 417 -    error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
 418 +#endif
 419
 420    /* error() flushes stderr, but does not check for write failure.
 421       Normally, we would catch this via our atexit() hook of
 422 @@ -523,5 +736,5 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
 423    if (ferror (stderr))
 424      exit (EXIT_CANCELED);
 425
 426 -  run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind));
 427 +  run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind), pw);
 428  }