content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  12 #include "base/debug/trace_event.h"
  13 #include "base/files/file_util.h"
  14 #include "base/hash.h"
  15 #include "base/path_service.h"
  16 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  17 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  19 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  20 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  21 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  22 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  23 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  24 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  25 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  26 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  27 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  28 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  29 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  30 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  31 #include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h"
  32
  33 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  34 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  35
  36 namespace content {
  37 namespace {
  38
  39 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  40 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  41 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  42 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  43 // of it, see:
  44 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  45 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  46   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  47   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  48   L"airfoilinject3.dll",          // Airfoil.
  49   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  50   L"assistant_x64.dll",           // Unknown.
  51   L"avcuf64.dll",                 // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
  52   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  53   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  54   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  55   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  56   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  57   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  58   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  59   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  60   L"esspd.dll",                   // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  61   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  62   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  63   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  64   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  65   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  66   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  67   L"icatcdll.dll",                // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  68   L"icdcnl.dll",                  // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  69   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  70   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  71   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  72   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  73   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  74   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  75   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  76   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  77   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  78   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  79   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  80   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  81   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  82   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  83   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  84   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  85   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  86   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  87   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  88   L"picrmi32.dll",                // PicRec.
  89   L"picrmi64.dll",                // PicRec.
  90   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  91   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  92   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  93   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  94   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
  95   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
  96   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
  97   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
  98   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
  99   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
 100   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
 101   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
 102   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
 103   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
 104   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
 105   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
 106   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
 107   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
 108   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 109   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 110   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 111   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 112   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 113   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 114 };
 115
 116 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 117 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 118 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 119 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 120                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 121                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 122   base::FilePath directory;
 123   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 124     return false;
 125
 126   if (sub_dir)
 127     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 128
 129   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 130   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 131                            directory.value().c_str());
 132   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 133     return false;
 134
 135   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 136   if (children)
 137     directory_str += L"*";
 138   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 139
 140   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 141                            directory_str.c_str());
 142   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 143     return false;
 144
 145   return true;
 146 }
 147
 148 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
 149 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
 150 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
 151                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 152                       sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 153   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 154   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 155                            key.c_str());
 156   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 157     return false;
 158
 159   key += L"\\*";
 160   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 161                            key.c_str());
 162   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 163     return false;
 164
 165   return true;
 166 }
 167
 168 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 169 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 170   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 171   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 172   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 173     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 174     return false;
 175   }
 176   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 177     return false;
 178   base::FilePath fname(path);
 179   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 180 }
 181
 182 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 183 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 184 // is also loaded in this process.
 185 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 186                         bool check_in_browser,
 187                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 188   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 189   if (!module) {
 190     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 191     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 192     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 193     std::wstring name(module_name);
 194     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 195     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 196     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 197     if (period <= 8)
 198       return;
 199     for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) {
 200       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0};
 201       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 202       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 203       if (check_in_browser) {
 204         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 205         if (!module)
 206           return;
 207         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 208         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 209         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 210           return;
 211       }
 212       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 213       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 214     }
 215   }
 216   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 217   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 218   return;
 219 }
 220
 221 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 222 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 223 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 224 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 225   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 226     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 227 }
 228
 229 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 230 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 231   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 232   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 233   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 234     HANDLE token;
 235     DWORD session_id_length;
 236     DWORD session_id = 0;
 237
 238     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 239     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 240         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 241     CloseHandle(token);
 242     if (session_id)
 243       s_session_id = session_id;
 244   }
 245
 246   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 247 }
 248
 249 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 250 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 251   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 252     return true;
 253
 254   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 255   // job.
 256   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 257     return true;
 258
 259   BOOL in_job = true;
 260   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 261   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 262     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 263   if (!in_job)
 264     return true;
 265
 266   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 267   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
 268   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 269                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 270                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 271     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 272     return true;
 273   }
 274   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 275     return true;
 276
 277   return false;
 278 }
 279
 280 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 281 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 282   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 283
 284   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 285   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 286   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 287                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 288                            L"Section");
 289   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 290     return false;
 291
 292   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 293   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 294   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 295   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 296                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 297                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 298   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 299     return false;
 300
 301   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 302   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 303   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 304   // system services.
 305   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 306                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 307                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 308   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 309     return false;
 310
 311   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 312   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 313   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 314                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 315                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 316   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 317     return false;
 318
 319   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 320 #ifndef NDEBUG
 321   base::FilePath app_dir;
 322   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 323     return false;
 324
 325   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 326   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 327                                                  long_path_buf,
 328                                                  MAX_PATH);
 329   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 330     return false;
 331
 332   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 333   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 334   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 335                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 336                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 337   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 338     return false;
 339 #endif  // NDEBUG
 340
 341   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 342   return true;
 343 }
 344
 345 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 346   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 347   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 348   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 349                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 350                            L"Event");
 351   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 352     return false;
 353
 354   // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
 355   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 356     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
 357   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 358     return false;
 359
 360   // Close the proxy settings on XP.
 361   if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003)
 362     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key",
 363                  L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \
 364                      L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings");
 365   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 366     return false;
 367
 368
 369   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 370   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 371     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 372     // token is restricted.
 373     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 374   }
 375
 376   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 377   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 378   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 379   policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
 380
 381   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) {
 382     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 383   }
 384
 385   return true;
 386 }
 387
 388 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 389 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 390 // command_line as needed.
 391 void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
 392   const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line =
 393       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 394   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 395   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 396     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 397     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 398         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 399     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 400       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 401     }
 402     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 403   }
 404 }
 405
 406 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 407 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 408 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 409 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 410
 411 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 412                                                   HANDLE source_handle,
 413                                                   HANDLE target_process_handle,
 414                                                   LPHANDLE target_handle,
 415                                                   DWORD desired_access,
 416                                                   BOOL inherit_handle,
 417                                                   DWORD options);
 418
 419 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
 420
 421 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 422
 423 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 424     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 425     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 426     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 427
 428 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 429   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 430   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 431   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 432       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 433   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 434   NTSTATUS error;
 435   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 436   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 437   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 438
 439   // Get the object basic information.
 440   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 441   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 442   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 443                         &size);
 444   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 445
 446   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 447       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 448
 449   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 450     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask =
 451         ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
 452     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 453         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 454   }
 455 }
 456
 457 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 458                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 459                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 460                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 461                                  DWORD desired_access,
 462                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 463                                  DWORD options) {
 464   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 465   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 466                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 467                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 468     return FALSE;
 469
 470   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 471   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 472       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 473     return TRUE;
 474
 475   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 476   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 477   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 478     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 479     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 480       HANDLE temp_handle;
 481       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 482                                         target_process_handle,
 483                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 484                                         &temp_handle,
 485                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 486                                         FALSE, 0));
 487       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 488       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 489     }
 490   }
 491
 492   if (is_in_job) {
 493     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 494     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 495
 496     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 497     HANDLE temp_handle;
 498     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 499                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 500                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 501     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 502
 503     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 504     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get());
 505   }
 506
 507   return TRUE;
 508 }
 509 #endif
 510
 511 }  // namespace
 512
 513 void SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
 514                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 515                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 516                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 517   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) {
 518 #ifdef _WIN64
 519     policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
 520 #endif
 521     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 522   } else {
 523     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 524   }
 525 }
 526
 527 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 528 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 529 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 530   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 531   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 532       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 533   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 534 }
 535
 536 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 537   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 538   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 539   DCHECK(broker_services);
 540   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 541   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 542   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 543
 544   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 545 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 546   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 547   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 548   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 549   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 550   // original function.
 551   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 552       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 553     HMODULE module = NULL;
 554     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 555     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 556                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 557                               &module));
 558     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 559     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 560       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 561       result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 562           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 563           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 564       CHECK(result == 0);
 565       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
 566           reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
 567               g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
 568     }
 569   }
 570 #endif
 571
 572   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 573 }
 574
 575 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 576   DCHECK(target_services);
 577   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 578   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 579   g_target_services = target_services;
 580   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 581 }
 582
 583 base::Process StartSandboxedProcess(
 584     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 585     base::CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 586   const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
 587       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 588   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 589
 590   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 591
 592   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 593   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 594       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 595     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 596   }
 597
 598   ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
 599
 600   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 601   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 602   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 603   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 604
 605   if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
 606       browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 607       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 608     base::ProcessHandle handle = 0;
 609     base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &handle);
 610     // TODO(rvargas) crbug.com/417532: Don't share a raw handle.
 611     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(handle);
 612     return base::Process(handle);
 613   }
 614
 615   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 616
 617   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 618                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 619                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 620                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 621                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 622
 623  if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8 &&
 624      type_str == switches::kRendererProcess &&
 625      browser_command_line.HasSwitch(
 626         switches::kEnableWin32kRendererLockDown)) {
 627     if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
 628                         sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
 629                         NULL) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 630       return base::Process();
 631     }
 632     mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
 633   }
 634
 635   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 636     return base::Process();
 637
 638   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 639                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 640
 641   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 642     return base::Process();
 643
 644   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 645
 646   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 647   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 648   if (delegate)
 649     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 650
 651   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 652     return base::Process();
 653
 654   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
 655 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 656     if (gfx::win::ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
 657       AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
 658                   NULL,
 659                   true,
 660                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 661                   policy);
 662     }
 663 #endif
 664   } else {
 665     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 666     // this subprocess. See
 667     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 668     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 669   }
 670
 671   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 672   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 673     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 674                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 675                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 676     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 677       return base::Process();
 678
 679     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 680     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 681                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 682                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 683     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 684       return base::Process();
 685   }
 686
 687   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 688     NOTREACHED();
 689     return base::Process();
 690   }
 691
 692   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 693     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 694     // have no effect.
 695     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 696     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 697   }
 698
 699   if (delegate) {
 700     bool success = true;
 701     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 702     if (!success)
 703       return base::Process();
 704   }
 705
 706   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 707
 708   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 709   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 710                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 711                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 712                policy, &temp_process_info);
 713   policy->Release();
 714   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 715
 716   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 717
 718   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 719     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 720       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 721     else
 722       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 723     return base::Process();
 724   }
 725
 726   if (delegate)
 727     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 728
 729   CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != -1);
 730   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 731   return base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle());
 732 }
 733
 734 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 735                            DWORD target_process_id,
 736                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 737                            DWORD desired_access,
 738                            DWORD options) {
 739   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 740   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 741     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 742                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 743                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 744
 745   }
 746
 747   // Try the broker next
 748   if (g_target_services &&
 749       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 750                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 751                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 752     return true;
 753   }
 754
 755   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 756   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 757   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 758                                     target_process_id));
 759   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 760     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 761                                 target_process.Get(), target_handle,
 762                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 763   }
 764
 765   return false;
 766 }
 767
 768 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 769   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 770 }
 771
 772 }  // namespace content