1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
3 // found in the LICENSE file.
5 #include "content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.h"
9 #include <sys/socket.h>
12 #include <sys/types.h>
13 #include <sys/types.h>
15 #include "base/basictypes.h"
16 #include "base/command_line.h"
17 #include "base/logging.h"
18 #include "build/build_config.h"
19 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
20 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf_policy.h"
22 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
24 #include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
25 #include "content/common/sandbox_linux/bpf_cros_arm_gpu_policy_linux.h"
26 #include "content/common/sandbox_linux/bpf_gpu_policy_linux.h"
27 #include "content/common/sandbox_linux/bpf_ppapi_policy_linux.h"
28 #include "content/common/sandbox_linux/bpf_renderer_policy_linux.h"
29 #include "content/common/sandbox_linux/bpf_utility_policy_linux.h"
30 #include "content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_bpf_base_policy_linux.h"
31 #include "content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_linux.h"
32 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.h"
33 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h"
34 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h"
35 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h"
36 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
37 #include "sandbox/linux/services/linux_syscalls.h"
39 using sandbox::BaselinePolicy
;
40 using sandbox::SandboxBPF
;
41 using sandbox::SyscallSets
;
42 using sandbox::bpf_dsl::Allow
;
43 using sandbox::bpf_dsl::ResultExpr
;
47 // Make sure that seccomp-bpf does not get disabled by mistake. Also make sure
48 // that we think twice about this when adding a new architecture.
49 #if !defined(ARCH_CPU_ARM64)
50 #error "Seccomp-bpf disabled on supported architecture!"
51 #endif // !defined(ARCH_CPU_ARM64)
57 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
60 void StartSandboxWithPolicy(sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy
* policy
);
62 inline bool IsChromeOS() {
63 #if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
70 inline bool IsArchitectureArm() {
78 class BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy
: public SandboxBPFBasePolicy
{
80 BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy() {}
81 virtual ~BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy() {}
83 virtual ResultExpr
EvaluateSyscall(int system_call_number
) const OVERRIDE
;
86 DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy
);
89 ResultExpr
BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(int sysno
) const {
90 if (SyscallSets::IsDebug(sysno
) || SyscallSets::IsNuma(sysno
))
91 return sandbox::CrashSIGSYS();
96 class AllowAllPolicy
: public SandboxBPFBasePolicy
{
99 virtual ~AllowAllPolicy() {}
101 virtual ResultExpr
EvaluateSyscall(int system_call_number
) const OVERRIDE
;
104 DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(AllowAllPolicy
);
107 // Allow all syscalls.
108 // This will still deny x32 or IA32 calls in 64 bits mode or
109 // 64 bits system calls in compatibility mode.
110 ResultExpr
AllowAllPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(int sysno
) const {
114 // If a BPF policy is engaged for |process_type|, run a few sanity checks.
115 void RunSandboxSanityChecks(const std::string
& process_type
) {
116 if (process_type
== switches::kRendererProcess
||
117 process_type
== switches::kGpuProcess
||
118 process_type
== switches::kPpapiPluginProcess
) {
122 // Without the sandbox, this would EBADF.
123 syscall_ret
= fchmod(-1, 07777);
124 CHECK_EQ(-1, syscall_ret
);
125 CHECK_EQ(EPERM
, errno
);
127 // Run most of the sanity checks only in DEBUG mode to avoid a perf.
130 // open() must be restricted.
131 syscall_ret
= open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY
);
132 CHECK_EQ(-1, syscall_ret
);
133 CHECK_EQ(SandboxBPFBasePolicy::GetFSDeniedErrno(), errno
);
135 // We should never allow the creation of netlink sockets.
136 syscall_ret
= socket(AF_NETLINK
, SOCK_DGRAM
, 0);
137 CHECK_EQ(-1, syscall_ret
);
138 CHECK_EQ(EPERM
, errno
);
139 #endif // !defined(NDEBUG)
144 // This function takes ownership of |policy|.
145 void StartSandboxWithPolicy(sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy
* policy
) {
146 // Starting the sandbox is a one-way operation. The kernel doesn't allow
147 // us to unload a sandbox policy after it has been started. Nonetheless,
148 // in order to make the use of the "Sandbox" object easier, we allow for
149 // the object to be destroyed after the sandbox has been started. Note that
150 // doing so does not stop the sandbox.
152 sandbox
.SetSandboxPolicy(policy
);
153 CHECK(sandbox
.StartSandbox(SandboxBPF::PROCESS_SINGLE_THREADED
));
156 // nacl_helper needs to be tiny and includes only part of content/
157 // in its dependencies. Make sure to not link things that are not needed.
158 #if !defined(IN_NACL_HELPER)
159 scoped_ptr
<SandboxBPFBasePolicy
> GetGpuProcessSandbox() {
160 const base::CommandLine
& command_line
=
161 *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
162 bool allow_sysv_shm
= false;
163 if (command_line
.HasSwitch(switches::kGpuSandboxAllowSysVShm
)) {
164 DCHECK(IsArchitectureArm());
165 allow_sysv_shm
= true;
168 if (IsChromeOS() && IsArchitectureArm()) {
169 return scoped_ptr
<SandboxBPFBasePolicy
>(
170 new CrosArmGpuProcessPolicy(allow_sysv_shm
));
172 return scoped_ptr
<SandboxBPFBasePolicy
>(new GpuProcessPolicy
);
176 // Initialize the seccomp-bpf sandbox.
177 bool StartBPFSandbox(const base::CommandLine
& command_line
,
178 const std::string
& process_type
) {
179 scoped_ptr
<SandboxBPFBasePolicy
> policy
;
181 if (process_type
== switches::kGpuProcess
) {
182 policy
.reset(GetGpuProcessSandbox().release());
183 } else if (process_type
== switches::kRendererProcess
) {
184 policy
.reset(new RendererProcessPolicy
);
185 } else if (process_type
== switches::kPpapiPluginProcess
) {
186 policy
.reset(new PpapiProcessPolicy
);
187 } else if (process_type
== switches::kUtilityProcess
) {
188 policy
.reset(new UtilityProcessPolicy
);
191 policy
.reset(new AllowAllPolicy
);
194 CHECK(policy
->PreSandboxHook());
195 StartSandboxWithPolicy(policy
.release());
197 RunSandboxSanityChecks(process_type
);
200 #else // defined(IN_NACL_HELPER)
201 bool StartBPFSandbox(const base::CommandLine
& command_line
,
202 const std::string
& process_type
) {
204 // Avoid -Wunused-function with no-op code.
205 ignore_result(IsChromeOS
);
206 ignore_result(IsArchitectureArm
);
207 ignore_result(RunSandboxSanityChecks
);
210 #endif // !defined(IN_NACL_HELPER)
214 #endif // USE_SECCOMP_BPF
216 // Is seccomp BPF globally enabled?
217 bool SandboxSeccompBPF::IsSeccompBPFDesired() {
218 const base::CommandLine
& command_line
=
219 *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
220 if (!command_line
.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox
) &&
221 !command_line
.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSeccompFilterSandbox
)) {
228 bool SandboxSeccompBPF::ShouldEnableSeccompBPF(
229 const std::string
& process_type
) {
230 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
231 const base::CommandLine
& command_line
=
232 *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
233 if (process_type
== switches::kGpuProcess
)
234 return !command_line
.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox
);
237 #endif // USE_SECCOMP_BPF
241 bool SandboxSeccompBPF::SupportsSandbox() {
242 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
243 // TODO(jln): pass the saved proc_fd_ from the LinuxSandbox singleton
245 SandboxBPF::SandboxStatus bpf_sandbox_status
=
246 SandboxBPF::SupportsSeccompSandbox(-1);
247 // Kernel support is what we are interested in here. Other status
248 // such as STATUS_UNAVAILABLE (has threads) still indicate kernel support.
249 // We make this a negative check, since if there is a bug, we would rather
250 // "fail closed" (expect a sandbox to be available and try to start it).
251 if (bpf_sandbox_status
!= SandboxBPF::STATUS_UNSUPPORTED
) {
258 bool SandboxSeccompBPF::StartSandbox(const std::string
& process_type
) {
259 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
260 const base::CommandLine
& command_line
=
261 *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
263 if (IsSeccompBPFDesired() && // Global switches policy.
264 ShouldEnableSeccompBPF(process_type
) && // Process-specific policy.
266 // If the kernel supports the sandbox, and if the command line says we
267 // should enable it, enable it or die.
268 bool started_sandbox
= StartBPFSandbox(command_line
, process_type
);
269 CHECK(started_sandbox
);
276 bool SandboxSeccompBPF::StartSandboxWithExternalPolicy(
277 scoped_ptr
<sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy
> policy
) {
278 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
279 if (IsSeccompBPFDesired() && SupportsSandbox()) {
281 StartSandboxWithPolicy(policy
.release());
284 #endif // defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
288 scoped_ptr
<sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy
>
289 SandboxSeccompBPF::GetBaselinePolicy() {
290 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
291 return scoped_ptr
<sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy
>(new BaselinePolicy
);
293 return scoped_ptr
<sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy
>();
294 #endif // defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
297 } // namespace content