content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  12 #include "base/debug/trace_event.h"
  13 #include "base/file_util.h"
  14 #include "base/hash.h"
  15 #include "base/metrics/field_trial.h"
  16 #include "base/path_service.h"
  17 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  19 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  20 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  21 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  22 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  23 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  24 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  25 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  26 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  27 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  28 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  29 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  30 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  31 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  32 #include "ui/gfx/win/dpi.h"
  33
  34 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  35 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  36
  37 namespace content {
  38 namespace {
  39
  40 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  41 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  42 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  43 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  44 // of it, see:
  45 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  46 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  47   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  48   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  49   L"airfoilinject3.dll",          // Airfoil.
  50   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  51   L"assistant_x64.dll",           // Unknown.
  52   L"avcuf64.dll",                 // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
  53   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  54   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  55   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  56   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  57   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  58   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  59   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  60   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  61   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  62   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  63   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  64   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  65   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  66   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  67   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  68   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  69   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  70   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  71   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  72   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  73   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  74   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  75   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  76   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  77   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  78   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  79   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  80   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  81   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  82   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  83   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  84   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  85   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  86   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  87   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  88   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  89   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  90   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
  91   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
  92   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
  93   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
  94   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
  95   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  96   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
  97   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
  98   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
  99   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
 100   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
 101   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
 102   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
 103   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
 104   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 105   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 106   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 107   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 108   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 109   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 110 };
 111
 112 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 113 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 114 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 115 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 116                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 117                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 118   base::FilePath directory;
 119   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 120     return false;
 121
 122   if (sub_dir)
 123     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 124
 125   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 126   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 127                            directory.value().c_str());
 128   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 129     return false;
 130
 131   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 132   if (children)
 133     directory_str += L"*";
 134   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 135
 136   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 137                            directory_str.c_str());
 138   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 139     return false;
 140
 141   return true;
 142 }
 143
 144 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
 145 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
 146 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
 147                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 148                       sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 149   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 150   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 151                            key.c_str());
 152   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 153     return false;
 154
 155   key += L"\\*";
 156   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 157                            key.c_str());
 158   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 159     return false;
 160
 161   return true;
 162 }
 163
 164 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 165 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 166   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 167   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 168   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 169     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 170     return false;
 171   }
 172   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 173     return false;
 174   base::FilePath fname(path);
 175   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 176 }
 177
 178 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 179 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 180 // is also loaded in this process.
 181 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 182                         bool check_in_browser,
 183                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 184   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 185   if (!module) {
 186     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 187     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 188     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 189     std::wstring name(module_name);
 190     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 191     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 192     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 193     if (period <= 8)
 194       return;
 195     for (int ix = 0; ix < 3; ++ix) {
 196       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ('1' + ix), 0};
 197       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 198       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 199       if (check_in_browser) {
 200         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 201         if (!module)
 202           return;
 203         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 204         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 205         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 206           return;
 207       }
 208       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 209       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 210     }
 211   }
 212   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 213   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 214   return;
 215 }
 216
 217 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 218 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 219 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 220 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 221   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 222     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 223 }
 224
 225 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 226 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 227   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 228   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 229   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 230     HANDLE token;
 231     DWORD session_id_length;
 232     DWORD session_id = 0;
 233
 234     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 235     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 236         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 237     CloseHandle(token);
 238     if (session_id)
 239       s_session_id = session_id;
 240   }
 241
 242   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 243 }
 244
 245 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 246 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 247   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 248     return true;
 249
 250   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 251   // job.
 252   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 253     return true;
 254
 255   BOOL in_job = true;
 256   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 257   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 258     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 259   if (!in_job)
 260     return true;
 261
 262   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 263   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
 264   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 265                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 266                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 267     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 268     return true;
 269   }
 270   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 271     return true;
 272
 273   return false;
 274 }
 275
 276 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 277 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 278   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 279
 280   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 281   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 282   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 283                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 284                            L"Section");
 285   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 286     return false;
 287
 288   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 289   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 290   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 291   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 292                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 293                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 294   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 295     return false;
 296
 297   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 298   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 299   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 300   // system services.
 301   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 302                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 303                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 304   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 305     return false;
 306
 307   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 308   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 309   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 310                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 311                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 312   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 313     return false;
 314
 315   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 316 #ifndef NDEBUG
 317   base::FilePath app_dir;
 318   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 319     return false;
 320
 321   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 322   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 323                                                  long_path_buf,
 324                                                  MAX_PATH);
 325   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 326     return false;
 327
 328   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 329   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 330   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 331                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 332                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 333   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 334     return false;
 335 #endif  // NDEBUG
 336
 337   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 338   return true;
 339 }
 340
 341 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 342   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 343   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 344   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 345                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 346                            L"Event");
 347   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 348     return false;
 349
 350   // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
 351   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 352     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
 353   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 354     return false;
 355
 356   // Close the proxy settings on XP.
 357   if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003)
 358     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key",
 359                  L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \
 360                      L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings");
 361   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 362     return false;
 363
 364
 365   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 366   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 367     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 368     // token is restricted.
 369     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 370   }
 371
 372   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 373   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 374   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 375   policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
 376
 377   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) {
 378     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 379   }
 380
 381   return true;
 382 }
 383
 384 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 385 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 386 // command_line as needed.
 387 void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
 388   const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line =
 389       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 390   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 391   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 392     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 393     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 394         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 395     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 396       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 397     }
 398     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 399   }
 400 }
 401
 402 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 403 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 404 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 405 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 406
 407 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 408                                                   HANDLE source_handle,
 409                                                   HANDLE target_process_handle,
 410                                                   LPHANDLE target_handle,
 411                                                   DWORD desired_access,
 412                                                   BOOL inherit_handle,
 413                                                   DWORD options);
 414
 415 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
 416
 417 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 418
 419 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 420     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 421     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 422     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 423
 424 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 425   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 426   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 427   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 428       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 429   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 430   NTSTATUS error;
 431   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 432   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 433   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 434
 435   // Get the object basic information.
 436   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 437   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 438   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 439                         &size);
 440   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 441
 442   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 443       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 444
 445   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 446     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask =
 447         ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
 448     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 449         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 450   }
 451 }
 452
 453 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 454                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 455                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 456                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 457                                  DWORD desired_access,
 458                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 459                                  DWORD options) {
 460   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 461   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 462                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 463                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 464     return FALSE;
 465
 466   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 467   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 468       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 469     return TRUE;
 470
 471   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 472   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 473   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 474     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 475     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 476       HANDLE temp_handle;
 477       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 478                                         target_process_handle,
 479                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 480                                         &temp_handle,
 481                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 482                                         FALSE, 0));
 483       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 484       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process, NULL, &is_in_job));
 485     }
 486   }
 487
 488   if (is_in_job) {
 489     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 490     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 491
 492     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 493     HANDLE temp_handle;
 494     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 495                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 496                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 497     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 498
 499     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 500     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle);
 501   }
 502
 503   return TRUE;
 504 }
 505 #endif
 506
 507 }  // namespace
 508
 509 void SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
 510                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 511                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 512                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 513   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) {
 514 #ifdef _WIN64
 515     policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
 516 #endif
 517     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 518   } else {
 519     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 520   }
 521 }
 522
 523 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 524 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 525 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 526   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 527   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 528       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 529   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 530 }
 531
 532 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 533   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 534   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 535   DCHECK(broker_services);
 536   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 537   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 538   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 539
 540   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 541 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 542   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 543   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 544   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 545   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 546   // original function.
 547   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 548       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 549     HMODULE module = NULL;
 550     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 551     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 552                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 553                               &module));
 554     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 555     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 556       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 557       result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 558           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 559           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 560       CHECK(result == 0);
 561       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
 562           reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
 563               g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
 564     }
 565   }
 566 #endif
 567
 568   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 569 }
 570
 571 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 572   DCHECK(target_services);
 573   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 574   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 575   g_target_services = target_services;
 576   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 577 }
 578
 579 bool ShouldUseDirectWrite() {
 580   // If the flag is currently on, and we're on Win7 or above, we enable
 581   // DirectWrite. Skia does not require the additions to DirectWrite in QFE
 582   // 2670838, but a simple 'better than XP' check is not enough.
 583   if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 584     return false;
 585
 586   base::win::OSInfo::VersionNumber os_version =
 587       base::win::OSInfo::GetInstance()->version_number();
 588   if ((os_version.major == 6) && (os_version.minor == 1)) {
 589     // We can't use DirectWrite for pre-release versions of Windows 7.
 590     if (os_version.build < 7600)
 591       return false;
 592   }
 593
 594   // If forced off, don't use it.
 595   const base::CommandLine& command_line =
 596       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 597   if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDirectWrite))
 598     return false;
 599
 600 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 601   // Can't use GDI on HiDPI.
 602   if (gfx::GetDPIScale() > 1.0f)
 603     return true;
 604 #endif
 605
 606   // Otherwise, check the field trial.
 607   const std::string group_name =
 608       base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName("DirectWrite");
 609   return group_name != "Disabled";
 610 }
 611
 612 base::ProcessHandle StartSandboxedProcess(
 613     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 614     base::CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 615   const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
 616       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 617   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 618
 619   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 620
 621   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 622   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 623       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 624     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 625   }
 626
 627   ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
 628
 629   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 630   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 631   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 632   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 633
 634   if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
 635       browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 636       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 637     base::ProcessHandle process = 0;
 638     base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &process);
 639     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process);
 640     return process;
 641   }
 642
 643   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 644
 645   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 646                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 647                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 648                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 649                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 650
 651  if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8 &&
 652      type_str == switches::kRendererProcess &&
 653      browser_command_line.HasSwitch(
 654         switches::kEnableWin32kRendererLockDown)) {
 655     if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
 656                         sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
 657                         NULL) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 658       return 0;
 659     }
 660     mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
 661   }
 662
 663   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 664     return 0;
 665
 666   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 667                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 668
 669   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 670     return 0;
 671
 672   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 673
 674   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 675   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 676   if (delegate)
 677     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 678
 679   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 680     return 0;
 681
 682   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
 683     if (ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
 684       AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
 685                   NULL,
 686                   true,
 687                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 688                   policy);
 689     }
 690   } else {
 691     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 692     // this subprocess. See
 693     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 694     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 695   }
 696
 697   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 698   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 699     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 700                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 701                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 702     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 703       return 0;
 704
 705     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 706     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 707                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 708                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 709     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 710       return 0;
 711   }
 712
 713   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 714     NOTREACHED();
 715     return 0;
 716   }
 717
 718   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 719     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 720     // have no effect.
 721     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 722     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 723   }
 724
 725   if (delegate) {
 726     bool success = true;
 727     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 728     if (!success)
 729       return 0;
 730   }
 731
 732   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 733
 734   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 735   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 736                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 737                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 738                policy, &temp_process_info);
 739   policy->Release();
 740   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 741
 742   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 743
 744   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 745     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 746       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 747     else
 748       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 749     return 0;
 750   }
 751
 752   if (delegate)
 753     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 754
 755   ResumeThread(target.thread_handle());
 756   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 757   return target.TakeProcessHandle();
 758 }
 759
 760 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 761                            DWORD target_process_id,
 762                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 763                            DWORD desired_access,
 764                            DWORD options) {
 765   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 766   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 767     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 768                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 769                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 770
 771   }
 772
 773   // Try the broker next
 774   if (g_target_services &&
 775       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 776                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 777                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 778     return true;
 779   }
 780
 781   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 782   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 783   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 784                                     target_process_id));
 785   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 786     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 787                                 target_process, target_handle,
 788                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 789   }
 790
 791   return false;
 792 }
 793
 794 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 795   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 796 }
 797
 798 }  // namespace content