net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc.h"
   6
   7 #include "base/basictypes.h"
   8 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h"
   9 #include "base/sha1.h"
  10 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  11 #include "build/build_config.h"
  12 #include "net/base/net_errors.h"
  13 #include "net/base/net_util.h"
  14 #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
  15 #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
  16 #include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h"
  17 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
  18 #include "net/cert/crl_set.h"
  19 #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
  20 #include "url/url_canon.h"
  21
  22 #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS)
  23 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_nss.h"
  24 #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
  25 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_openssl.h"
  26 #elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
  27 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_android.h"
  28 #elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
  29 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_mac.h"
  30 #elif defined(OS_WIN)
  31 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.h"
  32 #else
  33 #error Implement certificate verification.
  34 #endif
  35
  36
  37 namespace net {
  38
  39 namespace {
  40
  41 // Constants used to build histogram names
  42 const char kLeafCert[] = "Leaf";
  43 const char kIntermediateCert[] = "Intermediate";
  44 const char kRootCert[] = "Root";
  45 // Matches the order of X509Certificate::PublicKeyType
  46 const char* const kCertTypeStrings[] = {
  47     "Unknown",
  48     "RSA",
  49     "DSA",
  50     "ECDSA",
  51     "DH",
  52     "ECDH"
  53 };
  54 // Histogram buckets for RSA/DSA/DH key sizes.
  55 const int kRsaDsaKeySizes[] = {512, 768, 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192,
  56                                16384};
  57 // Histogram buckets for ECDSA/ECDH key sizes. The list is based upon the FIPS
  58 // 186-4 approved curves.
  59 const int kEccKeySizes[] = {163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 384, 409, 521, 571};
  60
  61 const char* CertTypeToString(int cert_type) {
  62   if (cert_type < 0 ||
  63       static_cast<size_t>(cert_type) >= arraysize(kCertTypeStrings)) {
  64     return "Unsupported";
  65   }
  66   return kCertTypeStrings[cert_type];
  67 }
  68
  69 void RecordPublicKeyHistogram(const char* chain_position,
  70                               bool baseline_keysize_applies,
  71                               size_t size_bits,
  72                               X509Certificate::PublicKeyType cert_type) {
  73   std::string histogram_name =
  74       base::StringPrintf("CertificateType2.%s.%s.%s",
  75                          baseline_keysize_applies ? "BR" : "NonBR",
  76                          chain_position,
  77                          CertTypeToString(cert_type));
  78   // Do not use UMA_HISTOGRAM_... macros here, as it caches the Histogram
  79   // instance and thus only works if |histogram_name| is constant.
  80   base::HistogramBase* counter = NULL;
  81
  82   // Histogram buckets are contingent upon the underlying algorithm being used.
  83   if (cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDH ||
  84       cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDSA) {
  85     // Typical key sizes match SECP/FIPS 186-3 recommendations for prime and
  86     // binary curves - which range from 163 bits to 571 bits.
  87     counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet(
  88         histogram_name,
  89         base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kEccKeySizes,
  90                                                    arraysize(kEccKeySizes)),
  91         base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
  92   } else {
  93     // Key sizes < 1024 bits should cause errors, while key sizes > 16K are not
  94     // uniformly supported by the underlying cryptographic libraries.
  95     counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet(
  96         histogram_name,
  97         base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kRsaDsaKeySizes,
  98                                                    arraysize(kRsaDsaKeySizes)),
  99         base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
 100   }
 101   counter->Add(size_bits);
 102 }
 103
 104 // Returns true if |type| is |kPublicKeyTypeRSA| or |kPublicKeyTypeDSA|, and
 105 // if |size_bits| is < 1024. Note that this means there may be false
 106 // negatives: keys for other algorithms and which are weak will pass this
 107 // test.
 108 bool IsWeakKey(X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type, size_t size_bits) {
 109   switch (type) {
 110     case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeRSA:
 111     case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeDSA:
 112       return size_bits < 1024;
 113     default:
 114       return false;
 115   }
 116 }
 117
 118 // Returns true if |cert| contains a known-weak key. Additionally, histograms
 119 // the observed keys for future tightening of the definition of what
 120 // constitutes a weak key.
 121 bool ExaminePublicKeys(const scoped_refptr<X509Certificate>& cert,
 122                        bool should_histogram) {
 123   // The effective date of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements -
 124   // 2012-07-01 00:00:00 UTC.
 125   const base::Time kBaselineEffectiveDate =
 126       base::Time::FromInternalValue(GG_INT64_C(12985574400000000));
 127   // The effective date of the key size requirements from Appendix A, v1.1.5
 128   // 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC.
 129   const base::Time kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate =
 130       base::Time::FromInternalValue(GG_INT64_C(13033008000000000));
 131
 132   size_t size_bits = 0;
 133   X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type = X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeUnknown;
 134   bool weak_key = false;
 135   bool baseline_keysize_applies =
 136       cert->valid_start() >= kBaselineEffectiveDate &&
 137       cert->valid_expiry() >= kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate;
 138
 139   X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(cert->os_cert_handle(), &size_bits, &type);
 140   if (should_histogram) {
 141     RecordPublicKeyHistogram(kLeafCert, baseline_keysize_applies, size_bits,
 142                              type);
 143   }
 144   if (IsWeakKey(type, size_bits))
 145     weak_key = true;
 146
 147   const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& intermediates =
 148       cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
 149   for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediates.size(); ++i) {
 150     X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(intermediates[i], &size_bits, &type);
 151     if (should_histogram) {
 152       RecordPublicKeyHistogram(
 153           (i < intermediates.size() - 1) ? kIntermediateCert : kRootCert,
 154           baseline_keysize_applies,
 155           size_bits,
 156           type);
 157     }
 158     if (!weak_key && IsWeakKey(type, size_bits))
 159       weak_key = true;
 160   }
 161
 162   return weak_key;
 163 }
 164
 165 }  // namespace
 166
 167 // static
 168 CertVerifyProc* CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault() {
 169 #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS)
 170   return new CertVerifyProcNSS();
 171 #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
 172   return new CertVerifyProcOpenSSL();
 173 #elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
 174   return new CertVerifyProcAndroid();
 175 #elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
 176   return new CertVerifyProcMac();
 177 #elif defined(OS_WIN)
 178   return new CertVerifyProcWin();
 179 #else
 180   return NULL;
 181 #endif
 182 }
 183
 184 CertVerifyProc::CertVerifyProc() {}
 185
 186 CertVerifyProc::~CertVerifyProc() {}
 187
 188 int CertVerifyProc::Verify(X509Certificate* cert,
 189                            const std::string& hostname,
 190                            int flags,
 191                            CRLSet* crl_set,
 192                            const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
 193                            CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
 194   verify_result->Reset();
 195   verify_result->verified_cert = cert;
 196
 197   if (IsBlacklisted(cert)) {
 198     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
 199     return ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
 200   }
 201
 202   // We do online revocation checking for EV certificates that aren't covered
 203   // by a fresh CRLSet.
 204   // TODO(rsleevi): http://crbug.com/142974 - Allow preferences to fully
 205   // disable revocation checking.
 206   if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT)
 207     flags |= CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY;
 208
 209   int rv = VerifyInternal(cert, hostname, flags, crl_set,
 210                           additional_trust_anchors, verify_result);
 211
 212   UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallback",
 213                         verify_result->common_name_fallback_used);
 214   if (!verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root) {
 215     UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallbackPrivateCA",
 216                           verify_result->common_name_fallback_used);
 217   }
 218
 219   // This check is done after VerifyInternal so that VerifyInternal can fill
 220   // in the list of public key hashes.
 221   if (IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(verify_result->public_key_hashes)) {
 222     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
 223     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 224   }
 225
 226   std::vector<std::string> dns_names, ip_addrs;
 227   cert->GetSubjectAltName(&dns_names, &ip_addrs);
 228   if (HasNameConstraintsViolation(verify_result->public_key_hashes,
 229                                   cert->subject().common_name,
 230                                   dns_names,
 231                                   ip_addrs)) {
 232     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
 233     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 234   }
 235
 236   // Check for weak keys in the entire verified chain.
 237   bool weak_key = ExaminePublicKeys(verify_result->verified_cert,
 238                                     verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root);
 239
 240   if (weak_key) {
 241     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY;
 242     // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure,
 243     // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate
 244     // error.
 245     if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv))
 246       rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 247   }
 248
 249   // Treat certificates signed using broken signature algorithms as invalid.
 250   if (verify_result->has_md2 || verify_result->has_md4) {
 251     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
 252     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 253   }
 254
 255   // Flag certificates using weak signature algorithms.
 256   if (verify_result->has_md5) {
 257     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
 258     // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure,
 259     // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate
 260     // error.
 261     if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv))
 262       rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 263   }
 264
 265   // Flag certificates from publicly-trusted CAs that are issued to intranet
 266   // hosts. While the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (v1.1) permit
 267   // these to be issued until 1 November 2015, they represent a real risk for
 268   // the deployment of gTLDs and are being phased out ahead of the hard
 269   // deadline.
 270   if (verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && IsHostnameNonUnique(hostname)) {
 271     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME;
 272     // CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME will eventually become a hard error. For
 273     // now treat it as a warning and do not map it to an error return value.
 274   }
 275
 276   return rv;
 277 }
 278
 279 // static
 280 bool CertVerifyProc::IsBlacklisted(X509Certificate* cert) {
 281   static const unsigned kComodoSerialBytes = 16;
 282   static const uint8 kComodoSerials[][kComodoSerialBytes] = {
 283     // Not a real certificate. For testing only.
 284     {0x07,0x7a,0x59,0xbc,0xd5,0x34,0x59,0x60,0x1c,0xa6,0x90,0x72,0x67,0xa6,0xdd,0x1c},
 285
 286     // The next nine certificates all expire on Fri Mar 14 23:59:59 2014.
 287     // Some serial numbers actually have a leading 0x00 byte required to
 288     // encode a positive integer in DER if the most significant bit is 0.
 289     // We omit the leading 0x00 bytes to make all serial numbers 16 bytes.
 290
 291     // Subject: CN=mail.google.com
 292     // subjectAltName dNSName: mail.google.com, www.mail.google.com
 293     {0x04,0x7e,0xcb,0xe9,0xfc,0xa5,0x5f,0x7b,0xd0,0x9e,0xae,0x36,0xe1,0x0c,0xae,0x1e},
 294     // Subject: CN=global trustee
 295     // subjectAltName dNSName: global trustee
 296     // Note: not a CA certificate.
 297     {0xd8,0xf3,0x5f,0x4e,0xb7,0x87,0x2b,0x2d,0xab,0x06,0x92,0xe3,0x15,0x38,0x2f,0xb0},
 298     // Subject: CN=login.live.com
 299     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.live.com, www.login.live.com
 300     {0xb0,0xb7,0x13,0x3e,0xd0,0x96,0xf9,0xb5,0x6f,0xae,0x91,0xc8,0x74,0xbd,0x3a,0xc0},
 301     // Subject: CN=addons.mozilla.org
 302     // subjectAltName dNSName: addons.mozilla.org, www.addons.mozilla.org
 303     {0x92,0x39,0xd5,0x34,0x8f,0x40,0xd1,0x69,0x5a,0x74,0x54,0x70,0xe1,0xf2,0x3f,0x43},
 304     // Subject: CN=login.skype.com
 305     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.skype.com, www.login.skype.com
 306     {0xe9,0x02,0x8b,0x95,0x78,0xe4,0x15,0xdc,0x1a,0x71,0x0a,0x2b,0x88,0x15,0x44,0x47},
 307     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 308     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com, www.login.yahoo.com
 309     {0xd7,0x55,0x8f,0xda,0xf5,0xf1,0x10,0x5b,0xb2,0x13,0x28,0x2b,0x70,0x77,0x29,0xa3},
 310     // Subject: CN=www.google.com
 311     // subjectAltName dNSName: www.google.com, google.com
 312     {0xf5,0xc8,0x6a,0xf3,0x61,0x62,0xf1,0x3a,0x64,0xf5,0x4f,0x6d,0xc9,0x58,0x7c,0x06},
 313     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 314     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com
 315     {0x39,0x2a,0x43,0x4f,0x0e,0x07,0xdf,0x1f,0x8a,0xa3,0x05,0xde,0x34,0xe0,0xc2,0x29},
 316     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 317     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com
 318     {0x3e,0x75,0xce,0xd4,0x6b,0x69,0x30,0x21,0x21,0x88,0x30,0xae,0x86,0xa8,0x2a,0x71},
 319   };
 320
 321   const std::string& serial_number = cert->serial_number();
 322   if (!serial_number.empty() && (serial_number[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
 323     // This is a negative serial number, which isn't technically allowed but
 324     // which probably happens. In order to avoid confusing a negative serial
 325     // number with a positive one once the leading zeros have been removed, we
 326     // disregard it.
 327     return false;
 328   }
 329
 330   base::StringPiece serial(serial_number);
 331   // Remove leading zeros.
 332   while (serial.size() > 1 && serial[0] == 0)
 333     serial.remove_prefix(1);
 334
 335   if (serial.size() == kComodoSerialBytes) {
 336     for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kComodoSerials); i++) {
 337       if (memcmp(kComodoSerials[i], serial.data(), kComodoSerialBytes) == 0) {
 338         UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.SSLCertBlacklisted", i,
 339                                   arraysize(kComodoSerials) + 1);
 340         return true;
 341       }
 342     }
 343   }
 344
 345   // CloudFlare revoked all certificates issued prior to April 2nd, 2014. Thus
 346   // all certificates where the CN ends with ".cloudflare.com" with a prior
 347   // issuance date are rejected.
 348   //
 349   // The old certs had a lifetime of five years, so this can be removed April
 350   // 2nd, 2019.
 351   const std::string& cn = cert->subject().common_name;
 352   static const char kCloudFlareCNSuffix[] = ".cloudflare.com";
 353   // kCloudFlareEpoch is the base::Time internal value for midnight at the
 354   // beginning of April 2nd, 2014, UTC.
 355   static const int64 kCloudFlareEpoch = INT64_C(13040870400000000);
 356   if (cn.size() > arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1 &&
 357       cn.compare(cn.size() - (arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1),
 358                  arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1,
 359                  kCloudFlareCNSuffix) == 0 &&
 360       cert->valid_start() < base::Time::FromInternalValue(kCloudFlareEpoch)) {
 361     return true;
 362   }
 363
 364   return false;
 365 }
 366
 367 // static
 368 // NOTE: This implementation assumes and enforces that the hashes are SHA1.
 369 bool CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(
 370     const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes) {
 371   static const unsigned kNumHashes = 17;
 372   static const uint8 kHashes[kNumHashes][base::kSHA1Length] = {
 373     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Root CA
 374     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net x2 and self-signed
 375     {0x41, 0x0f, 0x36, 0x36, 0x32, 0x58, 0xf3, 0x0b, 0x34, 0x7d,
 376      0x12, 0xce, 0x48, 0x63, 0xe4, 0x33, 0x43, 0x78, 0x06, 0xa8},
 377     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Cyber CA
 378     // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root
 379     {0xc4, 0xf9, 0x66, 0x37, 0x16, 0xcd, 0x5e, 0x71, 0xd6, 0x95,
 380      0x0b, 0x5f, 0x33, 0xce, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x95, 0xb4, 0x35, 0xd1},
 381     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Services 1024 CA
 382     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net
 383     {0xe2, 0x3b, 0x8d, 0x10, 0x5f, 0x87, 0x71, 0x0a, 0x68, 0xd9,
 384      0x24, 0x80, 0x50, 0xeb, 0xef, 0xc6, 0x27, 0xbe, 0x4c, 0xa6},
 385     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2
 386     // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Organisatie CA - G2
 387     {0x7b, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x39, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x2b, 0x45, 0x6e,
 388      0x9f, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x1d, 0xe6, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x49, 0x45, 0xdb},
 389     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Overheid en Bedrijven
 390     // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Overheid CA
 391     {0xe8, 0xf9, 0x12, 0x00, 0xc6, 0x5c, 0xee, 0x16, 0xe0, 0x39,
 392      0xb9, 0xf8, 0x83, 0x84, 0x16, 0x61, 0x63, 0x5f, 0x81, 0xc5},
 393     // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd.
 394     // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root
 395     // Expires: Jul 17 15:16:54 2012 GMT
 396     {0x01, 0x29, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xae, 0x8d, 0x24, 0x96,
 397      0xd1, 0xc3, 0xe1, 0x97, 0x23, 0x91, 0x90, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x52},
 398     // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd.
 399     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048)
 400     // Expires: Jul 16 17:53:37 2015 GMT
 401     {0xd3, 0x3c, 0x5b, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0xb3, 0xbe, 0x9a,
 402      0xd6, 0x95, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0xcc, 0x25, 0x28, 0x03, 0x29, 0x81},
 403     // Issuer: CN=Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2
 404     // Covers two certificates, the latter of which expires Apr 15 21:09:30
 405     // 2021 GMT.
 406     {0xe1, 0x2d, 0x89, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x22, 0x76, 0xf8, 0x30, 0xe6,
 407      0xce, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x41, 0xa9, 0x32},
 408     // Cyberoam CA certificate. Private key leaked, but this certificate would
 409     // only have been installed by Cyberoam customers. The certificate expires
 410     // in 2036, but we can probably remove in a couple of years (2014).
 411     {0xd9, 0xf5, 0xc6, 0xce, 0x57, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xcc, 0x7e,
 412      0xd1, 0x72, 0xbd, 0x53, 0xe0, 0xd3, 0x07, 0x83, 0x4b, 0xd1},
 413     // Win32/Sirefef.gen!C generates fake certificates with this public key.
 414     {0xa4, 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x9e, 0x1d, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0xc3,
 415      0x31, 0xcf, 0x64, 0xfc, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0x51, 0xfb, 0xa4},
 416     // ANSSI certificate under which a MITM proxy was mistakenly operated.
 417     // Expires: Jul 18 10:05:28 2014 GMT
 418     {0x3e, 0xcf, 0x4b, 0xbb, 0xe4, 0x60, 0x96, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xbb,
 419      0x53, 0x9b, 0xb9, 0x13, 0xd7, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0xef, 0x31, 0xbf},
 420     // Three retired intermediate certificates from Symantec. No compromise;
 421     // just for robustness. All expire May 17 23:59:59 2018.
 422     // See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=966060
 423     {0x68, 0x5e, 0xec, 0x0a, 0x39, 0xf6, 0x68, 0xae, 0x8f, 0xd8,
 424      0x96, 0x4f, 0x98, 0x74, 0x76, 0xb4, 0x50, 0x4f, 0xd2, 0xbe},
 425     {0x0e, 0x50, 0x2d, 0x4d, 0xd1, 0xe1, 0x60, 0x36, 0x8a, 0x31,
 426      0xf0, 0x6a, 0x81, 0x04, 0x31, 0xba, 0x6f, 0x72, 0xc0, 0x41},
 427     {0x93, 0xd1, 0x53, 0x22, 0x29, 0xcc, 0x2a, 0xbd, 0x21, 0xdf,
 428      0xf5, 0x97, 0xee, 0x32, 0x0f, 0xe4, 0x24, 0x6f, 0x3d, 0x0c},
 429     // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, OU=NICCA, CN=NIC Certifying
 430     // Authority. Issued by C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2007.
 431     // Expires July 4th, 2015.
 432     {0xf5, 0x71, 0x79, 0xfa, 0xea, 0x10, 0xc5, 0x43, 0x8c, 0xb0,
 433      0xc6, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x7b, 0x6e, 0x0d, 0xb2, 0xff, 0x54},
 434     // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, CN=NIC CA 2011. Issued by
 435     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2011.
 436     // Expires March 11th 2016.
 437     {0x07, 0x7a, 0xc7, 0xde, 0x8d, 0xa5, 0x58, 0x64, 0x3a, 0x06,
 438      0xc5, 0x36, 0x9e, 0x55, 0x4f, 0xae, 0xb3, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0x66},
 439     // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, CN=NIC CA 2014. Issued by
 440     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2014.
 441     // Expires: March 5th, 2024.
 442     {0xe5, 0x8e, 0x31, 0x5b, 0xaa, 0xee, 0xaa, 0xc6, 0xe7, 0x2e,
 443      0xc9, 0x57, 0x36, 0x70, 0xca, 0x2f, 0x25, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x47},
 444   };
 445
 446   for (unsigned i = 0; i < kNumHashes; i++) {
 447     for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin();
 448          j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) {
 449       if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 &&
 450           memcmp(j->data(), kHashes[i], base::kSHA1Length) == 0) {
 451         return true;
 452       }
 453     }
 454   }
 455
 456   return false;
 457 }
 458
 459 static const size_t kMaxDomainLength = 18;
 460
 461 // CheckNameConstraints verifies that every name in |dns_names| is in one of
 462 // the domains specified by |domains|. The |domains| array is terminated by an
 463 // empty string.
 464 static bool CheckNameConstraints(const std::vector<std::string>& dns_names,
 465                                  const char domains[][kMaxDomainLength]) {
 466   for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator i = dns_names.begin();
 467        i != dns_names.end(); ++i) {
 468     bool ok = false;
 469     url::CanonHostInfo host_info;
 470     const std::string dns_name = CanonicalizeHost(*i, &host_info);
 471     if (host_info.IsIPAddress())
 472       continue;
 473
 474     const size_t registry_len = registry_controlled_domains::GetRegistryLength(
 475         dns_name,
 476         registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
 477         registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
 478     // If the name is not in a known TLD, ignore it. This permits internal
 479     // names.
 480     if (registry_len == 0)
 481       continue;
 482
 483     for (size_t j = 0; domains[j][0]; ++j) {
 484       const size_t domain_length = strlen(domains[j]);
 485       // The DNS name must have "." + domains[j] as a suffix.
 486       if (i->size() <= (1 /* period before domain */ + domain_length))
 487         continue;
 488
 489       const char* suffix = &dns_name[i->size() - domain_length - 1];
 490       if (suffix[0] != '.')
 491         continue;
 492       if (memcmp(&suffix[1], domains[j], domain_length) != 0)
 493         continue;
 494       ok = true;
 495       break;
 496     }
 497
 498     if (!ok)
 499       return false;
 500   }
 501
 502   return true;
 503 }
 504
 505 // PublicKeyDomainLimitation contains a SHA1, SPKI hash and a pointer to an
 506 // array of fixed-length strings that contain the domains that the SPKI is
 507 // allowed to issue for.
 508 struct PublicKeyDomainLimitation {
 509   uint8 public_key[base::kSHA1Length];
 510   const char (*domains)[kMaxDomainLength];
 511 };
 512
 513 // static
 514 bool CertVerifyProc::HasNameConstraintsViolation(
 515     const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes,
 516     const std::string& common_name,
 517     const std::vector<std::string>& dns_names,
 518     const std::vector<std::string>& ip_addrs) {
 519   static const char kDomainsANSSI[][kMaxDomainLength] = {
 520     "fr",  // France
 521     "gp",  // Guadeloupe
 522     "gf",  // Guyane
 523     "mq",  // Martinique
 524     "re",  // Réunion
 525     "yt",  // Mayotte
 526     "pm",  // Saint-Pierre et Miquelon
 527     "bl",  // Saint Barthélemy
 528     "mf",  // Saint Martin
 529     "wf",  // Wallis et Futuna
 530     "pf",  // Polynésie française
 531     "nc",  // Nouvelle Calédonie
 532     "tf",  // Terres australes et antarctiques françaises
 533     "",
 534   };
 535
 536   static const char kDomainsIndiaCCA[][kMaxDomainLength] = {
 537     "gov.in",
 538     "nic.in",
 539     "ac.in",
 540     "rbi.org.in",
 541     "bankofindia.co.in",
 542     "ncode.in",
 543     "tcs.co.in",
 544     "",
 545   };
 546
 547   static const char kDomainsTest[][kMaxDomainLength] = {
 548     "example.com",
 549     "",
 550   };
 551
 552   static const PublicKeyDomainLimitation kLimits[] = {
 553     // C=FR, ST=France, L=Paris, O=PM/SGDN, OU=DCSSI,
 554     // CN=IGC/A/emailAddress=igca@sgdn.pm.gouv.fr
 555     {
 556       {0x79, 0x23, 0xd5, 0x8d, 0x0f, 0xe0, 0x3c, 0xe6, 0xab, 0xad,
 557        0xae, 0x27, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x14, 0xd1, 0xa8, 0x73},
 558       kDomainsANSSI,
 559     },
 560     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2007
 561     // Expires: July 4th 2015.
 562     {
 563       {0xfe, 0xe3, 0x95, 0x21, 0x2d, 0x5f, 0xea, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0xdc,
 564        0xcf, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0xc0, 0x58, 0x27, 0xd8, 0xb8, 0xe4},
 565       kDomainsIndiaCCA,
 566     },
 567     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2011
 568     // Expires: March 11 2016.
 569     {
 570       {0xf1, 0x42, 0xf6, 0xa2, 0x7d, 0x29, 0x3e, 0xa8, 0xf9, 0x64,
 571        0x52, 0x56, 0xed, 0x07, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xf2, 0xdb, 0x1c, 0xdf},
 572       kDomainsIndiaCCA,
 573     },
 574     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2014
 575     // Expires: March 5 2024.
 576     {
 577       {0x36, 0x8c, 0x4a, 0x1e, 0x2d, 0xb7, 0x81, 0xe8, 0x6b, 0xed,
 578        0x5a, 0x0a, 0x42, 0xb8, 0xc5, 0xcf, 0x6d, 0xb3, 0x57, 0xe1},
 579       kDomainsIndiaCCA,
 580     },
 581     // Not a real certificate - just for testing. This is the SPKI hash of
 582     // the keys used in net/data/ssl/certificates/name_constraint_*.crt.
 583     {
 584       {0x15, 0x45, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0x58, 0x6b, 0x47, 0xcf, 0xc1, 0x44,
 585        0xa2, 0xc9, 0xaa, 0xab, 0x98, 0x3d, 0x21, 0xcc, 0x42, 0xde},
 586       kDomainsTest,
 587     },
 588   };
 589
 590   for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kLimits); ++i) {
 591     for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin();
 592          j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) {
 593       if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 &&
 594           memcmp(j->data(), kLimits[i].public_key, base::kSHA1Length) == 0) {
 595         if (dns_names.empty() && ip_addrs.empty()) {
 596           std::vector<std::string> dns_names;
 597           dns_names.push_back(common_name);
 598           if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].domains))
 599             return true;
 600         } else {
 601           if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].domains))
 602             return true;
 603         }
 604       }
 605     }
 606   }
 607
 608   return false;
 609 }
 610
 611 }  // namespace net