content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  12 #include "base/debug/trace_event.h"
  13 #include "base/file_util.h"
  14 #include "base/hash.h"
  15 #include "base/metrics/field_trial.h"
  16 #include "base/path_service.h"
  17 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  19 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  20 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  21 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  22 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  23 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  24 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  25 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  26 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  27 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  28 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  29 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  30 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  31 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  32 #include "ui/gfx/win/dpi.h"
  33
  34 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  35 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  36
  37 namespace content {
  38 namespace {
  39
  40 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  41 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  42 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  43 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  44 // of it, see:
  45 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  46 // If the size of this list exceeds 64, change kTroublesomeDllsMaxCount.
  47 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  48   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  49   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  50   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  51   L"assistant_x64.dll",           // Unknown.
  52   L"avcuf64.dll",                 // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
  53   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  54   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  55   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  56   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  57   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  58   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  59   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  60   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  61   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  62   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  63   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  64   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  65   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  66   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  67   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  68   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  69   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  70   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  71   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  72   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  73   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  74   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  75   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  76   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  77   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  78   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  79   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  80   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  81   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  82   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  83   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  84   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  85   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  86   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  87   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  88   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  89   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  90   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
  91   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
  92   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
  93   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
  94   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
  95   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  96   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
  97   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
  98   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
  99   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
 100   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
 101   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
 102   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
 103   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
 104   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 105   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 106   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 107   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 108   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 109   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 110 };
 111
 112 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 113 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 114 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 115 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 116                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 117                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 118   base::FilePath directory;
 119   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 120     return false;
 121
 122   if (sub_dir)
 123     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 124
 125   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 126   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 127                            directory.value().c_str());
 128   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 129     return false;
 130
 131   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 132   if (children)
 133     directory_str += L"*";
 134   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 135
 136   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 137                            directory_str.c_str());
 138   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 139     return false;
 140
 141   return true;
 142 }
 143
 144 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
 145 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
 146 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
 147                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 148                       sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 149   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 150   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 151                            key.c_str());
 152   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 153     return false;
 154
 155   key += L"\\*";
 156   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 157                            key.c_str());
 158   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 159     return false;
 160
 161   return true;
 162 }
 163
 164 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 165 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 166   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 167   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 168   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 169     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 170     return false;
 171   }
 172   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 173     return false;
 174   base::FilePath fname(path);
 175   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 176 }
 177
 178 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 179 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 180 // is also loaded in this process.
 181 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 182                         bool check_in_browser,
 183                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 184   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 185   if (!module) {
 186     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 187     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 188     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 189     std::wstring name(module_name);
 190     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 191     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 192     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 193     if (period <= 8)
 194       return;
 195     for (int ix = 0; ix < 3; ++ix) {
 196       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ('1' + ix), 0};
 197       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 198       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 199       if (check_in_browser) {
 200         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 201         if (!module)
 202           return;
 203         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 204         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 205         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 206           return;
 207       }
 208       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 209       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 210     }
 211   }
 212   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 213   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 214   return;
 215 }
 216
 217 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 218 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 219 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 220 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 221   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 222     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 223 }
 224
 225 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 226 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 227   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 228   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 229   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 230     HANDLE token;
 231     DWORD session_id_length;
 232     DWORD session_id = 0;
 233
 234     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 235     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 236         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 237     CloseHandle(token);
 238     if (session_id)
 239       s_session_id = session_id;
 240   }
 241
 242   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 243 }
 244
 245 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 246 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 247   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 248     return true;
 249
 250   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 251   // job.
 252   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 253     return true;
 254
 255   BOOL in_job = true;
 256   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 257   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 258     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 259   if (!in_job)
 260     return true;
 261
 262   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 263   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
 264   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 265                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 266                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 267     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 268     return true;
 269   }
 270   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 271     return true;
 272
 273   return false;
 274 }
 275
 276 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 277 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 278   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 279
 280   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 281   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 282   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 283                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 284                            L"Section");
 285   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 286     return false;
 287
 288   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 289   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 290   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 291   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 292                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 293                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 294   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 295     return false;
 296
 297   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 298   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 299   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 300   // system services.
 301   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 302                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 303                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 304   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 305     return false;
 306
 307   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 308   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 309   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 310                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 311                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 312   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 313     return false;
 314
 315   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 316 #ifndef NDEBUG
 317   base::FilePath app_dir;
 318   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 319     return false;
 320
 321   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 322   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 323                                                  long_path_buf,
 324                                                  MAX_PATH);
 325   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 326     return false;
 327
 328   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 329   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 330   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 331                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 332                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 333   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 334     return false;
 335 #endif  // NDEBUG
 336
 337   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 338   return true;
 339 }
 340
 341 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 342   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 343   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 344   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 345                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 346                            L"Event");
 347   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 348     return false;
 349
 350   // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
 351   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 352     policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
 353
 354   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 355   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 356     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 357     // token is restricted.
 358     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 359   }
 360
 361   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 362   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 363   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 364   policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
 365
 366   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) {
 367     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 368   }
 369
 370   return true;
 371 }
 372
 373 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 374 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 375 // command_line as needed.
 376 void ProcessDebugFlags(CommandLine* command_line) {
 377   const CommandLine& current_cmd_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 378   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 379   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 380     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 381     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 382         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 383     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 384       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 385     }
 386     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 387   }
 388 }
 389
 390 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 391 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 392 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 393 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 394
 395 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 396                                                   HANDLE source_handle,
 397                                                   HANDLE target_process_handle,
 398                                                   LPHANDLE target_handle,
 399                                                   DWORD desired_access,
 400                                                   BOOL inherit_handle,
 401                                                   DWORD options);
 402
 403 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
 404
 405 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 406
 407 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 408     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 409     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 410     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 411
 412 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 413   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 414   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 415   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 416       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 417   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 418   NTSTATUS error;
 419   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 420   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 421   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 422
 423   // Get the object basic information.
 424   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 425   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 426   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 427                         &size);
 428   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 429
 430   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 431       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 432
 433   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 434     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask = ~(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION |
 435                                          SYNCHRONIZE);
 436     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 437         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 438   }
 439 }
 440
 441 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 442                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 443                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 444                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 445                                  DWORD desired_access,
 446                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 447                                  DWORD options) {
 448   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 449   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 450                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 451                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 452     return FALSE;
 453
 454   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 455   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 456       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 457     return TRUE;
 458
 459   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 460   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 461   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 462     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 463     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 464       HANDLE temp_handle;
 465       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 466                                         target_process_handle,
 467                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 468                                         &temp_handle,
 469                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 470                                         FALSE, 0));
 471       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 472       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process, NULL, &is_in_job));
 473     }
 474   }
 475
 476   if (is_in_job) {
 477     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 478     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 479
 480     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 481     HANDLE temp_handle;
 482     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 483                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 484                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 485     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 486
 487     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 488     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle);
 489   }
 490
 491   return TRUE;
 492 }
 493 #endif
 494
 495 }  // namespace
 496
 497 void SetJobLevel(const CommandLine& cmd_line,
 498                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 499                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 500                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 501   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) {
 502 #ifdef _WIN64
 503     policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
 504 #endif
 505     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 506   } else {
 507     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 508   }
 509 }
 510
 511 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 512 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 513 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 514   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 515   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 516       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 517   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 518 }
 519
 520 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 521   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 522   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 523   DCHECK(broker_services);
 524   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 525   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 526   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 527
 528   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 529 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 530   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 531   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 532   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 533   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 534   // original function.
 535   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 536       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 537     HMODULE module = NULL;
 538     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 539     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 540                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 541                               &module));
 542     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 543     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 544       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 545       result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 546           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 547           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 548       CHECK(result == 0);
 549       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
 550           reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
 551               g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
 552     }
 553   }
 554 #endif
 555
 556   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 557 }
 558
 559 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 560   DCHECK(target_services);
 561   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 562   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 563   g_target_services = target_services;
 564   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 565 }
 566
 567 bool ShouldUseDirectWrite() {
 568   // If the flag is currently on, and we're on Win7 or above, we enable
 569   // DirectWrite. Skia does not require the additions to DirectWrite in QFE
 570   // 2670838, but a simple 'better than XP' check is not enough.
 571   if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 572     return false;
 573
 574   base::win::OSInfo::VersionNumber os_version =
 575       base::win::OSInfo::GetInstance()->version_number();
 576   if ((os_version.major == 6) && (os_version.minor == 1)) {
 577     // We can't use DirectWrite for pre-release versions of Windows 7.
 578     if (os_version.build < 7600)
 579       return false;
 580   }
 581
 582   // If forced off, don't use it.
 583   const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 584   if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDirectWrite))
 585     return false;
 586
 587 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 588   // Can't use GDI on HiDPI.
 589   if (gfx::GetDPIScale() > 1.0f)
 590     return true;
 591 #endif
 592
 593   // Otherwise, check the field trial.
 594   const std::string group_name =
 595       base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName("DirectWrite");
 596   return group_name != "Disabled";
 597 }
 598
 599 base::ProcessHandle StartSandboxedProcess(
 600     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 601     CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 602   const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 603   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 604
 605   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 606
 607   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 608   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 609       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 610     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 611   }
 612
 613   ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
 614
 615   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 616   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 617   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 618   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 619
 620   if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
 621       browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 622       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 623     base::ProcessHandle process = 0;
 624     base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &process);
 625     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process);
 626     return process;
 627   }
 628
 629   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 630
 631   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 632                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 633                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 634                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 635                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 636
 637  if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8 &&
 638      type_str == switches::kRendererProcess &&
 639      browser_command_line.HasSwitch(
 640         switches::kEnableWin32kRendererLockDown)) {
 641     if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
 642                         sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
 643                         NULL) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 644       return 0;
 645     }
 646     mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
 647   }
 648
 649   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 650     return 0;
 651
 652   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 653                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 654
 655   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 656     return 0;
 657
 658   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 659
 660   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 661   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 662   if (delegate)
 663     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 664
 665   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 666     return 0;
 667
 668   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
 669     if (ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
 670       AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
 671                   NULL,
 672                   true,
 673                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 674                   policy);
 675     }
 676   } else {
 677     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 678     // this subprocess. See
 679     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 680     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 681   }
 682
 683   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 684   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 685     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 686                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 687                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 688     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 689       return 0;
 690
 691     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 692     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 693                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 694                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 695     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 696       return 0;
 697   }
 698
 699   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 700     NOTREACHED();
 701     return 0;
 702   }
 703
 704   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 705     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 706     // have no effect.
 707     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 708     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 709   }
 710
 711   if (delegate) {
 712     bool success = true;
 713     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 714     if (!success)
 715       return 0;
 716   }
 717
 718   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 719
 720   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 721   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 722                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 723                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 724                policy, &temp_process_info);
 725   policy->Release();
 726   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 727
 728   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 729
 730   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 731     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 732       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 733     else
 734       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 735     return 0;
 736   }
 737
 738   if (delegate)
 739     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 740
 741   ResumeThread(target.thread_handle());
 742   return target.TakeProcessHandle();
 743 }
 744
 745 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 746                            DWORD target_process_id,
 747                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 748                            DWORD desired_access,
 749                            DWORD options) {
 750   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 751   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 752     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 753                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 754                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 755
 756   }
 757
 758   // Try the broker next
 759   if (g_target_services &&
 760       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 761                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 762                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 763     return true;
 764   }
 765
 766   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 767   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 768   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 769                                     target_process_id));
 770   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 771     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 772                                 target_process, target_handle,
 773                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 774   }
 775
 776   return false;
 777 }
 778
 779 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 780   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 781 }
 782
 783 }  // namespace content