net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc.h"
   6
   7 #include <stdint.h>
   8
   9 #include "base/basictypes.h"
  10 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h"
  11 #include "base/sha1.h"
  12 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  13 #include "base/time/time.h"
  14 #include "build/build_config.h"
  15 #include "net/base/net_errors.h"
  16 #include "net/base/net_util.h"
  17 #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
  18 #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
  19 #include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h"
  20 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
  21 #include "net/cert/crl_set.h"
  22 #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
  23 #include "url/url_canon.h"
  24
  25 #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS)
  26 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_nss.h"
  27 #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
  28 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_openssl.h"
  29 #elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
  30 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_android.h"
  31 #elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
  32 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_mac.h"
  33 #elif defined(OS_WIN)
  34 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.h"
  35 #else
  36 #error Implement certificate verification.
  37 #endif
  38
  39 namespace net {
  40
  41 namespace {
  42
  43 // Constants used to build histogram names
  44 const char kLeafCert[] = "Leaf";
  45 const char kIntermediateCert[] = "Intermediate";
  46 const char kRootCert[] = "Root";
  47 // Matches the order of X509Certificate::PublicKeyType
  48 const char* const kCertTypeStrings[] = {
  49     "Unknown",
  50     "RSA",
  51     "DSA",
  52     "ECDSA",
  53     "DH",
  54     "ECDH"
  55 };
  56 // Histogram buckets for RSA/DSA/DH key sizes.
  57 const int kRsaDsaKeySizes[] = {512, 768, 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192,
  58                                16384};
  59 // Histogram buckets for ECDSA/ECDH key sizes. The list is based upon the FIPS
  60 // 186-4 approved curves.
  61 const int kEccKeySizes[] = {163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 384, 409, 521, 571};
  62
  63 const char* CertTypeToString(int cert_type) {
  64   if (cert_type < 0 ||
  65       static_cast<size_t>(cert_type) >= arraysize(kCertTypeStrings)) {
  66     return "Unsupported";
  67   }
  68   return kCertTypeStrings[cert_type];
  69 }
  70
  71 void RecordPublicKeyHistogram(const char* chain_position,
  72                               bool baseline_keysize_applies,
  73                               size_t size_bits,
  74                               X509Certificate::PublicKeyType cert_type) {
  75   std::string histogram_name =
  76       base::StringPrintf("CertificateType2.%s.%s.%s",
  77                          baseline_keysize_applies ? "BR" : "NonBR",
  78                          chain_position,
  79                          CertTypeToString(cert_type));
  80   // Do not use UMA_HISTOGRAM_... macros here, as it caches the Histogram
  81   // instance and thus only works if |histogram_name| is constant.
  82   base::HistogramBase* counter = NULL;
  83
  84   // Histogram buckets are contingent upon the underlying algorithm being used.
  85   if (cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDH ||
  86       cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDSA) {
  87     // Typical key sizes match SECP/FIPS 186-3 recommendations for prime and
  88     // binary curves - which range from 163 bits to 571 bits.
  89     counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet(
  90         histogram_name,
  91         base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kEccKeySizes,
  92                                                    arraysize(kEccKeySizes)),
  93         base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
  94   } else {
  95     // Key sizes < 1024 bits should cause errors, while key sizes > 16K are not
  96     // uniformly supported by the underlying cryptographic libraries.
  97     counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet(
  98         histogram_name,
  99         base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kRsaDsaKeySizes,
 100                                                    arraysize(kRsaDsaKeySizes)),
 101         base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
 102   }
 103   counter->Add(size_bits);
 104 }
 105
 106 // Returns true if |type| is |kPublicKeyTypeRSA| or |kPublicKeyTypeDSA|, and
 107 // if |size_bits| is < 1024. Note that this means there may be false
 108 // negatives: keys for other algorithms and which are weak will pass this
 109 // test.
 110 bool IsWeakKey(X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type, size_t size_bits) {
 111   switch (type) {
 112     case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeRSA:
 113     case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeDSA:
 114       return size_bits < 1024;
 115     default:
 116       return false;
 117   }
 118 }
 119
 120 // Returns true if |cert| contains a known-weak key. Additionally, histograms
 121 // the observed keys for future tightening of the definition of what
 122 // constitutes a weak key.
 123 bool ExaminePublicKeys(const scoped_refptr<X509Certificate>& cert,
 124                        bool should_histogram) {
 125   // The effective date of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements -
 126   // 2012-07-01 00:00:00 UTC.
 127   const base::Time kBaselineEffectiveDate =
 128       base::Time::FromInternalValue(GG_INT64_C(12985574400000000));
 129   // The effective date of the key size requirements from Appendix A, v1.1.5
 130   // 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC.
 131   const base::Time kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate =
 132       base::Time::FromInternalValue(GG_INT64_C(13033008000000000));
 133
 134   size_t size_bits = 0;
 135   X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type = X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeUnknown;
 136   bool weak_key = false;
 137   bool baseline_keysize_applies =
 138       cert->valid_start() >= kBaselineEffectiveDate &&
 139       cert->valid_expiry() >= kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate;
 140
 141   X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(cert->os_cert_handle(), &size_bits, &type);
 142   if (should_histogram) {
 143     RecordPublicKeyHistogram(kLeafCert, baseline_keysize_applies, size_bits,
 144                              type);
 145   }
 146   if (IsWeakKey(type, size_bits))
 147     weak_key = true;
 148
 149   const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& intermediates =
 150       cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
 151   for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediates.size(); ++i) {
 152     X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(intermediates[i], &size_bits, &type);
 153     if (should_histogram) {
 154       RecordPublicKeyHistogram(
 155           (i < intermediates.size() - 1) ? kIntermediateCert : kRootCert,
 156           baseline_keysize_applies,
 157           size_bits,
 158           type);
 159     }
 160     if (!weak_key && IsWeakKey(type, size_bits))
 161       weak_key = true;
 162   }
 163
 164   return weak_key;
 165 }
 166
 167 }  // namespace
 168
 169 // static
 170 CertVerifyProc* CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault() {
 171 #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS)
 172   return new CertVerifyProcNSS();
 173 #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
 174   return new CertVerifyProcOpenSSL();
 175 #elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
 176   return new CertVerifyProcAndroid();
 177 #elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
 178   return new CertVerifyProcMac();
 179 #elif defined(OS_WIN)
 180   return new CertVerifyProcWin();
 181 #else
 182   return NULL;
 183 #endif
 184 }
 185
 186 CertVerifyProc::CertVerifyProc() {}
 187
 188 CertVerifyProc::~CertVerifyProc() {}
 189
 190 int CertVerifyProc::Verify(X509Certificate* cert,
 191                            const std::string& hostname,
 192                            int flags,
 193                            CRLSet* crl_set,
 194                            const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
 195                            CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
 196   verify_result->Reset();
 197   verify_result->verified_cert = cert;
 198
 199   if (IsBlacklisted(cert)) {
 200     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
 201     return ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
 202   }
 203
 204   // We do online revocation checking for EV certificates that aren't covered
 205   // by a fresh CRLSet.
 206   // TODO(rsleevi): http://crbug.com/142974 - Allow preferences to fully
 207   // disable revocation checking.
 208   if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT)
 209     flags |= CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY;
 210
 211   int rv = VerifyInternal(cert, hostname, flags, crl_set,
 212                           additional_trust_anchors, verify_result);
 213
 214   UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallback",
 215                         verify_result->common_name_fallback_used);
 216   if (!verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root) {
 217     UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallbackPrivateCA",
 218                           verify_result->common_name_fallback_used);
 219   }
 220
 221   // This check is done after VerifyInternal so that VerifyInternal can fill
 222   // in the list of public key hashes.
 223   if (IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(verify_result->public_key_hashes)) {
 224     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
 225     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 226   }
 227
 228   std::vector<std::string> dns_names, ip_addrs;
 229   cert->GetSubjectAltName(&dns_names, &ip_addrs);
 230   if (HasNameConstraintsViolation(verify_result->public_key_hashes,
 231                                   cert->subject().common_name,
 232                                   dns_names,
 233                                   ip_addrs)) {
 234     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
 235     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 236   }
 237
 238   // Check for weak keys in the entire verified chain.
 239   bool weak_key = ExaminePublicKeys(verify_result->verified_cert,
 240                                     verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root);
 241
 242   if (weak_key) {
 243     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY;
 244     // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure,
 245     // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate
 246     // error.
 247     if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv))
 248       rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 249   }
 250
 251   // Treat certificates signed using broken signature algorithms as invalid.
 252   if (verify_result->has_md2 || verify_result->has_md4) {
 253     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
 254     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 255   }
 256
 257   // Flag certificates using weak signature algorithms.
 258   if (verify_result->has_md5) {
 259     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
 260     // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure,
 261     // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate
 262     // error.
 263     if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv))
 264       rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 265   }
 266
 267   if (verify_result->has_sha1)
 268     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT;
 269
 270   // Flag certificates from publicly-trusted CAs that are issued to intranet
 271   // hosts. While the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (v1.1) permit
 272   // these to be issued until 1 November 2015, they represent a real risk for
 273   // the deployment of gTLDs and are being phased out ahead of the hard
 274   // deadline.
 275   if (verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && IsHostnameNonUnique(hostname)) {
 276     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME;
 277     // CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME will eventually become a hard error. For
 278     // now treat it as a warning and do not map it to an error return value.
 279   }
 280
 281   // Flag certificates using too long validity periods.
 282   if (verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && HasTooLongValidity(*cert)) {
 283     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG;
 284     if (rv == OK)
 285       rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 286   }
 287
 288   return rv;
 289 }
 290
 291 // static
 292 bool CertVerifyProc::IsBlacklisted(X509Certificate* cert) {
 293   static const unsigned kComodoSerialBytes = 16;
 294   static const uint8 kComodoSerials[][kComodoSerialBytes] = {
 295     // Not a real certificate. For testing only.
 296     {0x07,0x7a,0x59,0xbc,0xd5,0x34,0x59,0x60,0x1c,0xa6,0x90,0x72,0x67,0xa6,0xdd,0x1c},
 297
 298     // The next nine certificates all expire on Fri Mar 14 23:59:59 2014.
 299     // Some serial numbers actually have a leading 0x00 byte required to
 300     // encode a positive integer in DER if the most significant bit is 0.
 301     // We omit the leading 0x00 bytes to make all serial numbers 16 bytes.
 302
 303     // Subject: CN=mail.google.com
 304     // subjectAltName dNSName: mail.google.com, www.mail.google.com
 305     {0x04,0x7e,0xcb,0xe9,0xfc,0xa5,0x5f,0x7b,0xd0,0x9e,0xae,0x36,0xe1,0x0c,0xae,0x1e},
 306     // Subject: CN=global trustee
 307     // subjectAltName dNSName: global trustee
 308     // Note: not a CA certificate.
 309     {0xd8,0xf3,0x5f,0x4e,0xb7,0x87,0x2b,0x2d,0xab,0x06,0x92,0xe3,0x15,0x38,0x2f,0xb0},
 310     // Subject: CN=login.live.com
 311     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.live.com, www.login.live.com
 312     {0xb0,0xb7,0x13,0x3e,0xd0,0x96,0xf9,0xb5,0x6f,0xae,0x91,0xc8,0x74,0xbd,0x3a,0xc0},
 313     // Subject: CN=addons.mozilla.org
 314     // subjectAltName dNSName: addons.mozilla.org, www.addons.mozilla.org
 315     {0x92,0x39,0xd5,0x34,0x8f,0x40,0xd1,0x69,0x5a,0x74,0x54,0x70,0xe1,0xf2,0x3f,0x43},
 316     // Subject: CN=login.skype.com
 317     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.skype.com, www.login.skype.com
 318     {0xe9,0x02,0x8b,0x95,0x78,0xe4,0x15,0xdc,0x1a,0x71,0x0a,0x2b,0x88,0x15,0x44,0x47},
 319     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 320     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com, www.login.yahoo.com
 321     {0xd7,0x55,0x8f,0xda,0xf5,0xf1,0x10,0x5b,0xb2,0x13,0x28,0x2b,0x70,0x77,0x29,0xa3},
 322     // Subject: CN=www.google.com
 323     // subjectAltName dNSName: www.google.com, google.com
 324     {0xf5,0xc8,0x6a,0xf3,0x61,0x62,0xf1,0x3a,0x64,0xf5,0x4f,0x6d,0xc9,0x58,0x7c,0x06},
 325     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 326     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com
 327     {0x39,0x2a,0x43,0x4f,0x0e,0x07,0xdf,0x1f,0x8a,0xa3,0x05,0xde,0x34,0xe0,0xc2,0x29},
 328     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 329     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com
 330     {0x3e,0x75,0xce,0xd4,0x6b,0x69,0x30,0x21,0x21,0x88,0x30,0xae,0x86,0xa8,0x2a,0x71},
 331   };
 332
 333   const std::string& serial_number = cert->serial_number();
 334   if (!serial_number.empty() && (serial_number[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
 335     // This is a negative serial number, which isn't technically allowed but
 336     // which probably happens. In order to avoid confusing a negative serial
 337     // number with a positive one once the leading zeros have been removed, we
 338     // disregard it.
 339     return false;
 340   }
 341
 342   base::StringPiece serial(serial_number);
 343   // Remove leading zeros.
 344   while (serial.size() > 1 && serial[0] == 0)
 345     serial.remove_prefix(1);
 346
 347   if (serial.size() == kComodoSerialBytes) {
 348     for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kComodoSerials); i++) {
 349       if (memcmp(kComodoSerials[i], serial.data(), kComodoSerialBytes) == 0) {
 350         UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.SSLCertBlacklisted", i,
 351                                   arraysize(kComodoSerials) + 1);
 352         return true;
 353       }
 354     }
 355   }
 356
 357   // CloudFlare revoked all certificates issued prior to April 2nd, 2014. Thus
 358   // all certificates where the CN ends with ".cloudflare.com" with a prior
 359   // issuance date are rejected.
 360   //
 361   // The old certs had a lifetime of five years, so this can be removed April
 362   // 2nd, 2019.
 363   const std::string& cn = cert->subject().common_name;
 364   static const char kCloudFlareCNSuffix[] = ".cloudflare.com";
 365   // kCloudFlareEpoch is the base::Time internal value for midnight at the
 366   // beginning of April 2nd, 2014, UTC.
 367   static const int64 kCloudFlareEpoch = INT64_C(13040870400000000);
 368   if (cn.size() > arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1 &&
 369       cn.compare(cn.size() - (arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1),
 370                  arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1,
 371                  kCloudFlareCNSuffix) == 0 &&
 372       cert->valid_start() < base::Time::FromInternalValue(kCloudFlareEpoch)) {
 373     return true;
 374   }
 375
 376   return false;
 377 }
 378
 379 // static
 380 // NOTE: This implementation assumes and enforces that the hashes are SHA1.
 381 bool CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(
 382     const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes) {
 383   static const unsigned kNumHashes = 17;
 384   static const uint8 kHashes[kNumHashes][base::kSHA1Length] = {
 385     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Root CA
 386     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net x2 and self-signed
 387     {0x41, 0x0f, 0x36, 0x36, 0x32, 0x58, 0xf3, 0x0b, 0x34, 0x7d,
 388      0x12, 0xce, 0x48, 0x63, 0xe4, 0x33, 0x43, 0x78, 0x06, 0xa8},
 389     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Cyber CA
 390     // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root
 391     {0xc4, 0xf9, 0x66, 0x37, 0x16, 0xcd, 0x5e, 0x71, 0xd6, 0x95,
 392      0x0b, 0x5f, 0x33, 0xce, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x95, 0xb4, 0x35, 0xd1},
 393     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Services 1024 CA
 394     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net
 395     {0xe2, 0x3b, 0x8d, 0x10, 0x5f, 0x87, 0x71, 0x0a, 0x68, 0xd9,
 396      0x24, 0x80, 0x50, 0xeb, 0xef, 0xc6, 0x27, 0xbe, 0x4c, 0xa6},
 397     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2
 398     // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Organisatie CA - G2
 399     {0x7b, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x39, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x2b, 0x45, 0x6e,
 400      0x9f, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x1d, 0xe6, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x49, 0x45, 0xdb},
 401     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Overheid en Bedrijven
 402     // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Overheid CA
 403     {0xe8, 0xf9, 0x12, 0x00, 0xc6, 0x5c, 0xee, 0x16, 0xe0, 0x39,
 404      0xb9, 0xf8, 0x83, 0x84, 0x16, 0x61, 0x63, 0x5f, 0x81, 0xc5},
 405     // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd.
 406     // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root
 407     // Expires: Jul 17 15:16:54 2012 GMT
 408     {0x01, 0x29, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xae, 0x8d, 0x24, 0x96,
 409      0xd1, 0xc3, 0xe1, 0x97, 0x23, 0x91, 0x90, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x52},
 410     // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd.
 411     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048)
 412     // Expires: Jul 16 17:53:37 2015 GMT
 413     {0xd3, 0x3c, 0x5b, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0xb3, 0xbe, 0x9a,
 414      0xd6, 0x95, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0xcc, 0x25, 0x28, 0x03, 0x29, 0x81},
 415     // Issuer: CN=Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2
 416     // Covers two certificates, the latter of which expires Apr 15 21:09:30
 417     // 2021 GMT.
 418     {0xe1, 0x2d, 0x89, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x22, 0x76, 0xf8, 0x30, 0xe6,
 419      0xce, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x41, 0xa9, 0x32},
 420     // Cyberoam CA certificate. Private key leaked, but this certificate would
 421     // only have been installed by Cyberoam customers. The certificate expires
 422     // in 2036, but we can probably remove in a couple of years (2014).
 423     {0xd9, 0xf5, 0xc6, 0xce, 0x57, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xcc, 0x7e,
 424      0xd1, 0x72, 0xbd, 0x53, 0xe0, 0xd3, 0x07, 0x83, 0x4b, 0xd1},
 425     // Win32/Sirefef.gen!C generates fake certificates with this public key.
 426     {0xa4, 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x9e, 0x1d, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0xc3,
 427      0x31, 0xcf, 0x64, 0xfc, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0x51, 0xfb, 0xa4},
 428     // Three retired intermediate certificates from Symantec. No compromise;
 429     // just for robustness. All expire May 17 23:59:59 2018.
 430     // See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=966060
 431     {0x68, 0x5e, 0xec, 0x0a, 0x39, 0xf6, 0x68, 0xae, 0x8f, 0xd8,
 432      0x96, 0x4f, 0x98, 0x74, 0x76, 0xb4, 0x50, 0x4f, 0xd2, 0xbe},
 433     {0x0e, 0x50, 0x2d, 0x4d, 0xd1, 0xe1, 0x60, 0x36, 0x8a, 0x31,
 434      0xf0, 0x6a, 0x81, 0x04, 0x31, 0xba, 0x6f, 0x72, 0xc0, 0x41},
 435     {0x93, 0xd1, 0x53, 0x22, 0x29, 0xcc, 0x2a, 0xbd, 0x21, 0xdf,
 436      0xf5, 0x97, 0xee, 0x32, 0x0f, 0xe4, 0x24, 0x6f, 0x3d, 0x0c},
 437     // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, OU=NICCA, CN=NIC Certifying
 438     // Authority. Issued by C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2007.
 439     // Expires July 4th, 2015.
 440     {0xf5, 0x71, 0x79, 0xfa, 0xea, 0x10, 0xc5, 0x43, 0x8c, 0xb0,
 441      0xc6, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x7b, 0x6e, 0x0d, 0xb2, 0xff, 0x54},
 442     // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, CN=NIC CA 2011. Issued by
 443     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2011.
 444     // Expires March 11th 2016.
 445     {0x07, 0x7a, 0xc7, 0xde, 0x8d, 0xa5, 0x58, 0x64, 0x3a, 0x06,
 446      0xc5, 0x36, 0x9e, 0x55, 0x4f, 0xae, 0xb3, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0x66},
 447     // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, CN=NIC CA 2014. Issued by
 448     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2014.
 449     // Expires: March 5th, 2024.
 450     {0xe5, 0x8e, 0x31, 0x5b, 0xaa, 0xee, 0xaa, 0xc6, 0xe7, 0x2e,
 451      0xc9, 0x57, 0x36, 0x70, 0xca, 0x2f, 0x25, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x47},
 452     // C=DE, O=Fraunhofer, OU=Fraunhofer Corporate PKI,
 453     // CN=Fraunhofer Service CA 2007.
 454     // Expires: Jun 30 2019.
 455     // No compromise, just for robustness. See
 456     // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1076940
 457     {0x38, 0x4d, 0x0c, 0x1d, 0xc4, 0x77, 0xa7, 0xb3, 0xf8, 0x67,
 458      0x86, 0xd0, 0x18, 0x51, 0x9f, 0x58, 0x9f, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0x25},
 459   };
 460
 461   for (unsigned i = 0; i < kNumHashes; i++) {
 462     for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin();
 463          j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) {
 464       if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 &&
 465           memcmp(j->data(), kHashes[i], base::kSHA1Length) == 0) {
 466         return true;
 467       }
 468     }
 469   }
 470
 471   return false;
 472 }
 473
 474 static const size_t kMaxDomainLength = 18;
 475
 476 // CheckNameConstraints verifies that every name in |dns_names| is in one of
 477 // the domains specified by |domains|. The |domains| array is terminated by an
 478 // empty string.
 479 static bool CheckNameConstraints(const std::vector<std::string>& dns_names,
 480                                  const char domains[][kMaxDomainLength]) {
 481   for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator i = dns_names.begin();
 482        i != dns_names.end(); ++i) {
 483     bool ok = false;
 484     url::CanonHostInfo host_info;
 485     const std::string dns_name = CanonicalizeHost(*i, &host_info);
 486     if (host_info.IsIPAddress())
 487       continue;
 488
 489     const size_t registry_len = registry_controlled_domains::GetRegistryLength(
 490         dns_name,
 491         registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
 492         registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
 493     // If the name is not in a known TLD, ignore it. This permits internal
 494     // names.
 495     if (registry_len == 0)
 496       continue;
 497
 498     for (size_t j = 0; domains[j][0]; ++j) {
 499       const size_t domain_length = strlen(domains[j]);
 500       // The DNS name must have "." + domains[j] as a suffix.
 501       if (i->size() <= (1 /* period before domain */ + domain_length))
 502         continue;
 503
 504       const char* suffix = &dns_name[i->size() - domain_length - 1];
 505       if (suffix[0] != '.')
 506         continue;
 507       if (memcmp(&suffix[1], domains[j], domain_length) != 0)
 508         continue;
 509       ok = true;
 510       break;
 511     }
 512
 513     if (!ok)
 514       return false;
 515   }
 516
 517   return true;
 518 }
 519
 520 // PublicKeyDomainLimitation contains a SHA1, SPKI hash and a pointer to an
 521 // array of fixed-length strings that contain the domains that the SPKI is
 522 // allowed to issue for.
 523 struct PublicKeyDomainLimitation {
 524   uint8 public_key[base::kSHA1Length];
 525   const char (*domains)[kMaxDomainLength];
 526 };
 527
 528 // static
 529 bool CertVerifyProc::HasNameConstraintsViolation(
 530     const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes,
 531     const std::string& common_name,
 532     const std::vector<std::string>& dns_names,
 533     const std::vector<std::string>& ip_addrs) {
 534   static const char kDomainsANSSI[][kMaxDomainLength] = {
 535     "fr",  // France
 536     "gp",  // Guadeloupe
 537     "gf",  // Guyane
 538     "mq",  // Martinique
 539     "re",  // Réunion
 540     "yt",  // Mayotte
 541     "pm",  // Saint-Pierre et Miquelon
 542     "bl",  // Saint Barthélemy
 543     "mf",  // Saint Martin
 544     "wf",  // Wallis et Futuna
 545     "pf",  // Polynésie française
 546     "nc",  // Nouvelle Calédonie
 547     "tf",  // Terres australes et antarctiques françaises
 548     "",
 549   };
 550
 551   static const char kDomainsIndiaCCA[][kMaxDomainLength] = {
 552     "gov.in",
 553     "nic.in",
 554     "ac.in",
 555     "rbi.org.in",
 556     "bankofindia.co.in",
 557     "ncode.in",
 558     "tcs.co.in",
 559     "",
 560   };
 561
 562   static const char kDomainsTest[][kMaxDomainLength] = {
 563     "example.com",
 564     "",
 565   };
 566
 567   static const PublicKeyDomainLimitation kLimits[] = {
 568     // C=FR, ST=France, L=Paris, O=PM/SGDN, OU=DCSSI,
 569     // CN=IGC/A/emailAddress=igca@sgdn.pm.gouv.fr
 570     {
 571       {0x79, 0x23, 0xd5, 0x8d, 0x0f, 0xe0, 0x3c, 0xe6, 0xab, 0xad,
 572        0xae, 0x27, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x14, 0xd1, 0xa8, 0x73},
 573       kDomainsANSSI,
 574     },
 575     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2007
 576     // Expires: July 4th 2015.
 577     {
 578       {0xfe, 0xe3, 0x95, 0x21, 0x2d, 0x5f, 0xea, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0xdc,
 579        0xcf, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0xc0, 0x58, 0x27, 0xd8, 0xb8, 0xe4},
 580       kDomainsIndiaCCA,
 581     },
 582     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2011
 583     // Expires: March 11 2016.
 584     {
 585       {0xf1, 0x42, 0xf6, 0xa2, 0x7d, 0x29, 0x3e, 0xa8, 0xf9, 0x64,
 586        0x52, 0x56, 0xed, 0x07, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xf2, 0xdb, 0x1c, 0xdf},
 587       kDomainsIndiaCCA,
 588     },
 589     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2014
 590     // Expires: March 5 2024.
 591     {
 592       {0x36, 0x8c, 0x4a, 0x1e, 0x2d, 0xb7, 0x81, 0xe8, 0x6b, 0xed,
 593        0x5a, 0x0a, 0x42, 0xb8, 0xc5, 0xcf, 0x6d, 0xb3, 0x57, 0xe1},
 594       kDomainsIndiaCCA,
 595     },
 596     // Not a real certificate - just for testing. This is the SPKI hash of
 597     // the keys used in net/data/ssl/certificates/name_constraint_*.crt.
 598     {
 599       {0x61, 0xec, 0x82, 0x8b, 0xdb, 0x5c, 0x78, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xcc,
 600        0x4f, 0x0f, 0x14, 0xbb, 0x85, 0x31, 0x93, 0x9f, 0xf7, 0x3d},
 601       kDomainsTest,
 602     },
 603   };
 604
 605   for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kLimits); ++i) {
 606     for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin();
 607          j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) {
 608       if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 &&
 609           memcmp(j->data(), kLimits[i].public_key, base::kSHA1Length) == 0) {
 610         if (dns_names.empty() && ip_addrs.empty()) {
 611           std::vector<std::string> dns_names;
 612           dns_names.push_back(common_name);
 613           if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].domains))
 614             return true;
 615         } else {
 616           if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].domains))
 617             return true;
 618         }
 619       }
 620     }
 621   }
 622
 623   return false;
 624 }
 625
 626 // static
 627 bool CertVerifyProc::HasTooLongValidity(const X509Certificate& cert) {
 628   const base::Time& start = cert.valid_start();
 629   const base::Time& expiry = cert.valid_expiry();
 630   if (start.is_max() || start.is_null() || expiry.is_max() ||
 631       expiry.is_null() || start > expiry) {
 632     return true;
 633   }
 634
 635   base::Time::Exploded exploded_start;
 636   base::Time::Exploded exploded_expiry;
 637   cert.valid_start().UTCExplode(&exploded_start);
 638   cert.valid_expiry().UTCExplode(&exploded_expiry);
 639
 640   if (exploded_expiry.year - exploded_start.year > 10)
 641     return true;
 642
 643   int month_diff = (exploded_expiry.year - exploded_start.year) * 12 +
 644                    (exploded_expiry.month - exploded_start.month);
 645
 646   // Add any remainder as a full month.
 647   if (exploded_expiry.day_of_month > exploded_start.day_of_month)
 648     ++month_diff;
 649
 650   static const base::Time time_2012_07_01 =
 651       base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2012, 7, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0});
 652   static const base::Time time_2015_04_01 =
 653       base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 4, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0});
 654   static const base::Time time_2019_07_01 =
 655       base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2019, 7, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0});
 656
 657   // For certificates issued before the BRs took effect.
 658   if (start < time_2012_07_01 && (month_diff > 120 || expiry > time_2019_07_01))
 659     return true;
 660
 661   // For certificates issued after 1 July 2012: 60 months.
 662   if (start >= time_2012_07_01 && month_diff > 60)
 663     return true;
 664
 665   // For certificates issued after 1 April 2015: 39 months.
 666   if (start >= time_2015_04_01 && month_diff > 39)
 667     return true;
 668
 669   return false;
 670 }
 671
 672 }  // namespace net