content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  12 #include "base/debug/trace_event.h"
  13 #include "base/files/file_util.h"
  14 #include "base/hash.h"
  15 #include "base/path_service.h"
  16 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  17 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  19 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  20 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  21 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  22 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  23 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  24 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  25 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  26 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  27 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  28 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  29 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  30 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  31 #include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h"
  32
  33 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  34 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  35
  36 namespace content {
  37 namespace {
  38
  39 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  40 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  41 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  42 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  43 // of it, see:
  44 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  45 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  46   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  47   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  48   L"airfoilinject3.dll",          // Airfoil.
  49   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  50   L"assistant_x64.dll",           // Unknown.
  51   L"avcuf64.dll",                 // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
  52   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  53   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  54   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  55   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  56   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  57   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  58   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  59   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  60   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  61   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  62   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  63   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  64   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  65   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  66   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  67   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  68   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  69   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  70   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  71   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  72   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  73   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  74   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  75   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  76   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  77   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  78   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  79   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  80   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  81   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  82   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  83   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  84   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  85   L"picrmi32.dll",                // PicRec.
  86   L"picrmi64.dll",                // PicRec.
  87   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  88   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  89   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  90   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  91   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
  92   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
  93   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
  94   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
  95   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
  96   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  97   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
  98   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
  99   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
 100   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
 101   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
 102   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
 103   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
 104   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
 105   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 106   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 107   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 108   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 109   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 110   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 111 };
 112
 113 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 114 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 115 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 116 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 117                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 118                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 119   base::FilePath directory;
 120   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 121     return false;
 122
 123   if (sub_dir)
 124     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 125
 126   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 127   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 128                            directory.value().c_str());
 129   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 130     return false;
 131
 132   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 133   if (children)
 134     directory_str += L"*";
 135   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 136
 137   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 138                            directory_str.c_str());
 139   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 140     return false;
 141
 142   return true;
 143 }
 144
 145 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
 146 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
 147 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
 148                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 149                       sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 150   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 151   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 152                            key.c_str());
 153   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 154     return false;
 155
 156   key += L"\\*";
 157   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 158                            key.c_str());
 159   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 160     return false;
 161
 162   return true;
 163 }
 164
 165 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 166 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 167   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 168   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 169   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 170     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 171     return false;
 172   }
 173   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 174     return false;
 175   base::FilePath fname(path);
 176   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 177 }
 178
 179 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 180 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 181 // is also loaded in this process.
 182 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 183                         bool check_in_browser,
 184                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 185   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 186   if (!module) {
 187     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 188     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 189     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 190     std::wstring name(module_name);
 191     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 192     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 193     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 194     if (period <= 8)
 195       return;
 196     for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) {
 197       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0};
 198       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 199       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 200       if (check_in_browser) {
 201         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 202         if (!module)
 203           return;
 204         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 205         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 206         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 207           return;
 208       }
 209       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 210       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 211     }
 212   }
 213   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 214   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 215   return;
 216 }
 217
 218 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 219 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 220 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 221 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 222   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 223     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 224 }
 225
 226 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 227 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 228   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 229   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 230   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 231     HANDLE token;
 232     DWORD session_id_length;
 233     DWORD session_id = 0;
 234
 235     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 236     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 237         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 238     CloseHandle(token);
 239     if (session_id)
 240       s_session_id = session_id;
 241   }
 242
 243   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 244 }
 245
 246 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 247 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 248   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 249     return true;
 250
 251   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 252   // job.
 253   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 254     return true;
 255
 256   BOOL in_job = true;
 257   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 258   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 259     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 260   if (!in_job)
 261     return true;
 262
 263   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 264   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
 265   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 266                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 267                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 268     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 269     return true;
 270   }
 271   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 272     return true;
 273
 274   return false;
 275 }
 276
 277 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 278 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 279   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 280
 281   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 282   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 283   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 284                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 285                            L"Section");
 286   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 287     return false;
 288
 289   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 290   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 291   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 292   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 293                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 294                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 295   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 296     return false;
 297
 298   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 299   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 300   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 301   // system services.
 302   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 303                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 304                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 305   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 306     return false;
 307
 308   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 309   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 310   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 311                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 312                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 313   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 314     return false;
 315
 316   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 317 #ifndef NDEBUG
 318   base::FilePath app_dir;
 319   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 320     return false;
 321
 322   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 323   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 324                                                  long_path_buf,
 325                                                  MAX_PATH);
 326   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 327     return false;
 328
 329   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 330   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 331   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 332                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 333                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 334   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 335     return false;
 336 #endif  // NDEBUG
 337
 338   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 339   return true;
 340 }
 341
 342 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 343   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 344   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 345   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 346                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 347                            L"Event");
 348   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 349     return false;
 350
 351   // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
 352   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 353     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
 354   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 355     return false;
 356
 357   // Close the proxy settings on XP.
 358   if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003)
 359     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key",
 360                  L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \
 361                      L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings");
 362   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 363     return false;
 364
 365
 366   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 367   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 368     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 369     // token is restricted.
 370     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 371   }
 372
 373   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 374   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 375   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 376   policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
 377
 378   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) {
 379     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 380   }
 381
 382   return true;
 383 }
 384
 385 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 386 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 387 // command_line as needed.
 388 void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
 389   const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line =
 390       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 391   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 392   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 393     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 394     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 395         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 396     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 397       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 398     }
 399     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 400   }
 401 }
 402
 403 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 404 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 405 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 406 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 407
 408 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 409                                                   HANDLE source_handle,
 410                                                   HANDLE target_process_handle,
 411                                                   LPHANDLE target_handle,
 412                                                   DWORD desired_access,
 413                                                   BOOL inherit_handle,
 414                                                   DWORD options);
 415
 416 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
 417
 418 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 419
 420 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 421     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 422     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 423     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 424
 425 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 426   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 427   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 428   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 429       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 430   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 431   NTSTATUS error;
 432   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 433   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 434   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 435
 436   // Get the object basic information.
 437   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 438   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 439   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 440                         &size);
 441   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 442
 443   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 444       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 445
 446   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 447     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask =
 448         ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
 449     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 450         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 451   }
 452 }
 453
 454 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 455                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 456                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 457                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 458                                  DWORD desired_access,
 459                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 460                                  DWORD options) {
 461   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 462   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 463                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 464                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 465     return FALSE;
 466
 467   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 468   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 469       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 470     return TRUE;
 471
 472   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 473   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 474   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 475     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 476     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 477       HANDLE temp_handle;
 478       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 479                                         target_process_handle,
 480                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 481                                         &temp_handle,
 482                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 483                                         FALSE, 0));
 484       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 485       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 486     }
 487   }
 488
 489   if (is_in_job) {
 490     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 491     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 492
 493     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 494     HANDLE temp_handle;
 495     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 496                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 497                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 498     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 499
 500     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 501     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get());
 502   }
 503
 504   return TRUE;
 505 }
 506 #endif
 507
 508 }  // namespace
 509
 510 void SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
 511                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 512                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 513                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 514   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) {
 515 #ifdef _WIN64
 516     policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
 517 #endif
 518     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 519   } else {
 520     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 521   }
 522 }
 523
 524 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 525 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 526 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 527   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 528   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 529       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 530   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 531 }
 532
 533 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 534   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 535   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 536   DCHECK(broker_services);
 537   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 538   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 539   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 540
 541   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 542 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 543   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 544   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 545   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 546   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 547   // original function.
 548   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 549       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 550     HMODULE module = NULL;
 551     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 552     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 553                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 554                               &module));
 555     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 556     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 557       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 558       result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 559           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 560           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 561       CHECK(result == 0);
 562       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
 563           reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
 564               g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
 565     }
 566   }
 567 #endif
 568
 569   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 570 }
 571
 572 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 573   DCHECK(target_services);
 574   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 575   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 576   g_target_services = target_services;
 577   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 578 }
 579
 580 base::Process StartSandboxedProcess(
 581     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 582     base::CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 583   const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
 584       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 585   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 586
 587   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 588
 589   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 590   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 591       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 592     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 593   }
 594
 595   ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
 596
 597   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 598   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 599   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 600   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 601
 602   if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
 603       browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 604       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 605     base::ProcessHandle handle = 0;
 606     base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &handle);
 607     // TODO(rvargas) crbug.com/417532: Don't share a raw handle.
 608     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(handle);
 609     return base::Process(handle);
 610   }
 611
 612   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 613
 614   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 615                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 616                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 617                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 618                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 619
 620  if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8 &&
 621      type_str == switches::kRendererProcess &&
 622      browser_command_line.HasSwitch(
 623         switches::kEnableWin32kRendererLockDown)) {
 624     if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
 625                         sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
 626                         NULL) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 627       return base::Process();
 628     }
 629     mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
 630   }
 631
 632   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 633     return base::Process();
 634
 635   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 636                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 637
 638   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 639     return base::Process();
 640
 641   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 642
 643   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 644   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 645   if (delegate)
 646     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 647
 648   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 649     return base::Process();
 650
 651   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
 652 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 653     if (gfx::win::ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
 654       AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
 655                   NULL,
 656                   true,
 657                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 658                   policy);
 659     }
 660 #endif
 661   } else {
 662     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 663     // this subprocess. See
 664     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 665     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 666   }
 667
 668   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 669   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 670     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 671                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 672                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 673     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 674       return base::Process();
 675
 676     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 677     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 678                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 679                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 680     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 681       return base::Process();
 682   }
 683
 684   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 685     NOTREACHED();
 686     return base::Process();
 687   }
 688
 689   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 690     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 691     // have no effect.
 692     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 693     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 694   }
 695
 696   if (delegate) {
 697     bool success = true;
 698     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 699     if (!success)
 700       return base::Process();
 701   }
 702
 703   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 704
 705   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 706   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 707                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 708                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 709                policy, &temp_process_info);
 710   policy->Release();
 711   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 712
 713   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 714
 715   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 716     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 717       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 718     else
 719       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 720     return base::Process();
 721   }
 722
 723   if (delegate)
 724     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 725
 726   CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != -1);
 727   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 728   return base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle());
 729 }
 730
 731 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 732                            DWORD target_process_id,
 733                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 734                            DWORD desired_access,
 735                            DWORD options) {
 736   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 737   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 738     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 739                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 740                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 741
 742   }
 743
 744   // Try the broker next
 745   if (g_target_services &&
 746       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 747                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 748                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 749     return true;
 750   }
 751
 752   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 753   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 754   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 755                                     target_process_id));
 756   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 757     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 758                                 target_process.Get(), target_handle,
 759                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 760   }
 761
 762   return false;
 763 }
 764
 765 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 766   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 767 }
 768
 769 }  // namespace content