Check USB device path access when prompting users to select a device.
[chromium-blink-merge.git] / crypto / hkdf.cc
blob82aae24679e45ab8ca9dd2acbc2b0a809a48f543
1 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
3 // found in the LICENSE file.
5 #include "crypto/hkdf.h"
7 #include "base/logging.h"
8 #include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
9 #include "crypto/hmac.h"
11 namespace crypto {
13 const size_t kSHA256HashLength = 32;
15 HKDF::HKDF(const base::StringPiece& secret,
16 const base::StringPiece& salt,
17 const base::StringPiece& info,
18 size_t key_bytes_to_generate,
19 size_t iv_bytes_to_generate,
20 size_t subkey_secret_bytes_to_generate) {
21 // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.2
22 base::StringPiece actual_salt = salt;
23 char zeros[kSHA256HashLength];
24 if (actual_salt.empty()) {
25 // If salt is not given, HashLength zeros are used.
26 memset(zeros, 0, sizeof(zeros));
27 actual_salt.set(zeros, sizeof(zeros));
30 // Perform the Extract step to transform the input key and
31 // salt into the pseudorandom key (PRK) used for Expand.
32 HMAC prk_hmac(HMAC::SHA256);
33 bool result = prk_hmac.Init(actual_salt);
34 DCHECK(result);
36 // |prk| is a pseudorandom key (of kSHA256HashLength octets).
37 uint8 prk[kSHA256HashLength];
38 DCHECK_EQ(sizeof(prk), prk_hmac.DigestLength());
39 result = prk_hmac.Sign(secret, prk, sizeof(prk));
40 DCHECK(result);
42 // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.3
43 // Perform the Expand phase to turn the pseudorandom key
44 // and info into the output keying material.
45 const size_t material_length = 2 * key_bytes_to_generate +
46 2 * iv_bytes_to_generate +
47 subkey_secret_bytes_to_generate;
48 const size_t n = (material_length + kSHA256HashLength-1) /
49 kSHA256HashLength;
50 DCHECK_LT(n, 256u);
52 output_.resize(n * kSHA256HashLength);
53 base::StringPiece previous;
55 scoped_ptr<char[]> buf(new char[kSHA256HashLength + info.size() + 1]);
56 uint8 digest[kSHA256HashLength];
58 HMAC hmac(HMAC::SHA256);
59 result = hmac.Init(prk, sizeof(prk));
60 DCHECK(result);
62 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
63 memcpy(buf.get(), previous.data(), previous.size());
64 size_t j = previous.size();
65 memcpy(buf.get() + j, info.data(), info.size());
66 j += info.size();
67 buf[j++] = static_cast<char>(i + 1);
69 result = hmac.Sign(base::StringPiece(buf.get(), j), digest, sizeof(digest));
70 DCHECK(result);
72 memcpy(&output_[i*sizeof(digest)], digest, sizeof(digest));
73 previous = base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<char*>(digest),
74 sizeof(digest));
77 size_t j = 0;
78 // On Windows, when the size of output_ is zero, dereference of 0'th element
79 // results in a crash. C++11 solves this problem by adding a data() getter
80 // method to std::vector.
81 if (key_bytes_to_generate) {
82 client_write_key_ = base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&output_[j]),
83 key_bytes_to_generate);
84 j += key_bytes_to_generate;
85 server_write_key_ = base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&output_[j]),
86 key_bytes_to_generate);
87 j += key_bytes_to_generate;
90 if (iv_bytes_to_generate) {
91 client_write_iv_ = base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&output_[j]),
92 iv_bytes_to_generate);
93 j += iv_bytes_to_generate;
94 server_write_iv_ = base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&output_[j]),
95 iv_bytes_to_generate);
96 j += iv_bytes_to_generate;
98 if (subkey_secret_bytes_to_generate) {
99 subkey_secret_ = base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&output_[j]),
100 subkey_secret_bytes_to_generate);
104 HKDF::~HKDF() {
107 } // namespace crypto