content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  12 #include "base/files/file_util.h"
  13 #include "base/hash.h"
  14 #include "base/metrics/sparse_histogram.h"
  15 #include "base/path_service.h"
  16 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  17 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  19 #include "base/trace_event/trace_event.h"
  20 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  21 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  22 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  23 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  24 #include "content/common/content_switches_internal.h"
  25 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  26 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  27 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  28 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  29 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  30 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  31 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  32 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h"
  33 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  34 #include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h"
  35
  36 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  37 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  38
  39 namespace content {
  40 namespace {
  41
  42 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  43 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  44 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  45 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  46 // of it, see:
  47 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  48 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  49   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  50   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  51   L"airfoilinject3.dll",          // Airfoil.
  52   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  53   L"assistant_x64.dll",           // Unknown.
  54   L"avcuf64.dll",                 // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
  55   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  56   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  57   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  58   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  59   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  60   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  61   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  62   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  63   L"esspd.dll",                   // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  64   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  65   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  66   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  67   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  68   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  69   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  70   L"icatcdll.dll",                // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  71   L"icdcnl.dll",                  // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  72   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  73   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  74   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  75   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  76   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  77   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  78   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  79   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  80   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  81   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  82   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  83   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  84   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  85   L"pastali32.dll",               // PastaLeads.
  86   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  87   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  88   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  89   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  90   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  91   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  92   L"picrmi32.dll",                // PicRec.
  93   L"picrmi64.dll",                // PicRec.
  94   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  95   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  96   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  97   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  98   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
  99   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
 100   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
 101   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
 102   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
 103   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
 104   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
 105   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
 106   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
 107   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
 108   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
 109   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
 110   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
 111   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
 112   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 113   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 114   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 115   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 116   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 117   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 118 };
 119
 120 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 121 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 122 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 123 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 124                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 125                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 126   base::FilePath directory;
 127   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 128     return false;
 129
 130   if (sub_dir)
 131     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 132
 133   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 134   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 135                            directory.value().c_str());
 136   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 137     return false;
 138
 139   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 140   if (children)
 141     directory_str += L"*";
 142   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 143
 144   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 145                            directory_str.c_str());
 146   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 147     return false;
 148
 149   return true;
 150 }
 151
 152 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
 153 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
 154 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
 155                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 156                       sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 157   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 158   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 159                            key.c_str());
 160   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 161     return false;
 162
 163   key += L"\\*";
 164   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 165                            key.c_str());
 166   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 167     return false;
 168
 169   return true;
 170 }
 171
 172 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 173 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 174   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 175   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 176   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 177     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 178     return false;
 179   }
 180   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 181     return false;
 182   base::FilePath fname(path);
 183   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 184 }
 185
 186 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 187 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 188 // is also loaded in this process.
 189 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 190                         bool check_in_browser,
 191                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 192   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 193   if (!module) {
 194     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 195     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 196     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 197     std::wstring name(module_name);
 198     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 199     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 200     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 201     if (period <= 8)
 202       return;
 203     for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) {
 204       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0};
 205       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 206       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 207       if (check_in_browser) {
 208         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 209         if (!module)
 210           return;
 211         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 212         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 213         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 214           return;
 215       }
 216       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 217       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 218     }
 219   }
 220   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 221   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 222   return;
 223 }
 224
 225 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 226 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 227 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 228 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 229   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 230     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 231 }
 232
 233 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 234 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 235   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 236   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 237   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 238     HANDLE token;
 239     DWORD session_id_length;
 240     DWORD session_id = 0;
 241
 242     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 243     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 244         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 245     CloseHandle(token);
 246     if (session_id)
 247       s_session_id = session_id;
 248   }
 249
 250   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 251 }
 252
 253 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 254 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 255   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 256     return true;
 257
 258   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 259   // job.
 260   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 261     return true;
 262
 263   BOOL in_job = true;
 264   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 265   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 266     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 267   if (!in_job)
 268     return true;
 269
 270   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 271   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
 272   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 273                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 274                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 275     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 276     return true;
 277   }
 278   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 279     return true;
 280
 281   return false;
 282 }
 283
 284 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 285 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 286   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 287
 288   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 289   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 290   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 291                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 292                            L"Section");
 293   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 294     return false;
 295
 296   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 297   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 298   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 299   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 300                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 301                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 302   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 303     return false;
 304
 305   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 306   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 307   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 308   // system services.
 309   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 310                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 311                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 312   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 313     return false;
 314
 315   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 316   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 317   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 318                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 319                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 320   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 321     return false;
 322
 323   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 324 #ifndef NDEBUG
 325   base::FilePath app_dir;
 326   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 327     return false;
 328
 329   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 330   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 331                                                  long_path_buf,
 332                                                  MAX_PATH);
 333   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 334     return false;
 335
 336   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 337   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 338   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 339                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 340                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 341   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 342     return false;
 343 #endif  // NDEBUG
 344
 345   // Add the policy for read-only PDB file access for AddressSanitizer.
 346 #if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
 347   base::FilePath exe;
 348   if (!PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &exe))
 349     return false;
 350   base::FilePath pdb_path = exe.DirName().Append(L"*.pdb");
 351   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 352                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 353                            pdb_path.value().c_str());
 354   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 355     return false;
 356 #endif
 357
 358   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 359   return true;
 360 }
 361
 362 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 363   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 364   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 365   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 366                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 367                            L"Event");
 368   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 369     return false;
 370
 371   // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
 372   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 373     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
 374   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 375     return false;
 376
 377   // Close the proxy settings on XP.
 378   if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003)
 379     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key",
 380                  L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \
 381                      L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings");
 382   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 383     return false;
 384
 385
 386   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 387   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 388     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 389     // token is restricted.
 390     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 391   }
 392
 393   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 394   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 395   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 396   policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
 397
 398   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) {
 399     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 400   }
 401
 402   return true;
 403 }
 404
 405 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 406 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 407 // command_line as needed.
 408 void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
 409   const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line =
 410       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 411   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 412   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 413     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 414     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 415         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 416     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 417       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 418     }
 419     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 420   }
 421 }
 422
 423 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 424 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 425 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 426 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 427
 428 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 429                                                   HANDLE source_handle,
 430                                                   HANDLE target_process_handle,
 431                                                   LPHANDLE target_handle,
 432                                                   DWORD desired_access,
 433                                                   BOOL inherit_handle,
 434                                                   DWORD options);
 435
 436 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
 437
 438 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 439
 440 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 441     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 442     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 443     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 444
 445 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 446   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 447   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 448   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 449       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 450   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 451   NTSTATUS error;
 452   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 453   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 454   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 455
 456   // Get the object basic information.
 457   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 458   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 459   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 460                         &size);
 461   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 462
 463   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 464       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 465
 466   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 467     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask =
 468         ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
 469     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 470         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 471   }
 472 }
 473
 474 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 475                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 476                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 477                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 478                                  DWORD desired_access,
 479                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 480                                  DWORD options) {
 481   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 482   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 483                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 484                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 485     return FALSE;
 486
 487   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 488   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 489       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 490     return TRUE;
 491
 492   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 493   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 494   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 495     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 496     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 497       HANDLE temp_handle;
 498       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 499                                         target_process_handle,
 500                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 501                                         &temp_handle,
 502                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 503                                         FALSE, 0));
 504       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 505       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 506     }
 507   }
 508
 509   if (is_in_job) {
 510     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 511     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 512
 513     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 514     HANDLE temp_handle;
 515     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 516                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 517                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 518     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 519
 520     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 521     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get());
 522   }
 523
 524   return TRUE;
 525 }
 526 #endif
 527
 528 }  // namespace
 529
 530 void SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
 531                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 532                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 533                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 534   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) {
 535 #ifdef _WIN64
 536     policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
 537 #endif
 538     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 539   } else {
 540     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 541   }
 542 }
 543
 544 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 545 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 546 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 547   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 548   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 549       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 550   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 551 }
 552
 553 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 554   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 555   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 556   DCHECK(broker_services);
 557   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 558   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 559   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 560
 561   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 562 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 563   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 564   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 565   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 566   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 567   // original function.
 568   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 569       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 570     HMODULE module = NULL;
 571     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 572     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 573                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 574                               &module));
 575     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 576     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 577       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 578       result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 579           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 580           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 581       CHECK(result == 0);
 582       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
 583           reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
 584               g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
 585     }
 586   }
 587 #endif
 588
 589   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 590 }
 591
 592 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 593   DCHECK(target_services);
 594   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 595   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 596   g_target_services = target_services;
 597   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 598 }
 599
 600 base::Process StartSandboxedProcess(
 601     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 602     base::CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 603   const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
 604       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 605   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 606
 607   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 608
 609   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 610   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 611       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 612     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 613   }
 614
 615   ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
 616
 617   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 618   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 619   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 620   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 621
 622   if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
 623       browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 624       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 625     base::Process process =
 626         base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions());
 627     // TODO(rvargas) crbug.com/417532: Don't share a raw handle.
 628     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process.Handle());
 629     return process.Pass();
 630   }
 631
 632   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 633
 634   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 635                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 636                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 637                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 638                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 639
 640 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 641   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess &&
 642       IsWin32kRendererLockdownEnabled()) {
 643     if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
 644                         sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
 645                         NULL) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 646       return base::Process();
 647     }
 648     mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
 649   }
 650 #endif
 651
 652   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 653     return base::Process();
 654
 655   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 656                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 657
 658   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 659     return base::Process();
 660
 661   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 662
 663   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 664   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 665   if (delegate)
 666     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 667
 668   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 669     return base::Process();
 670
 671   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
 672 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 673     if (gfx::win::ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
 674       AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
 675                   NULL,
 676                   true,
 677                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 678                   policy);
 679     }
 680 #endif
 681   } else {
 682     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 683     // this subprocess. See
 684     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 685     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 686   }
 687
 688   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 689   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 690     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 691                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 692                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 693     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 694       return base::Process();
 695
 696     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 697     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 698                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 699                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 700     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 701       return base::Process();
 702   }
 703
 704   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 705     NOTREACHED();
 706     return base::Process();
 707   }
 708
 709   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 710     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 711     // have no effect.
 712     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 713     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 714   }
 715
 716   if (delegate) {
 717     bool success = true;
 718     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 719     if (!success)
 720       return base::Process();
 721   }
 722
 723   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 724
 725   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 726   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 727                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 728                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 729                policy, &temp_process_info);
 730   DWORD last_error = ::GetLastError();
 731   policy->Release();
 732   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 733
 734   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 735
 736   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 737     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 738       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 739     else if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_PROCESS) {
 740       // TODO(shrikant): Remove this special case handling after determining
 741       // cause for lowbox/createprocess errors.
 742       sandbox::PolicyBase* policy_base =
 743           static_cast<sandbox::PolicyBase*>(policy);
 744       UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY(policy_base->GetLowBoxSid() ?
 745                                       "Process.Sandbox.Lowbox.Launch.Error" :
 746                                       "Process.Sandbox.Launch.Error",
 747                                   last_error);
 748     } else
 749       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 750     return base::Process();
 751   }
 752
 753   if (delegate)
 754     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 755
 756   CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != -1);
 757   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 758   return base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle());
 759 }
 760
 761 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 762                            DWORD target_process_id,
 763                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 764                            DWORD desired_access,
 765                            DWORD options) {
 766   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 767   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 768     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 769                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 770                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 771
 772   }
 773
 774   // Try the broker next
 775   if (g_target_services &&
 776       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 777                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 778                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 779     return true;
 780   }
 781
 782   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 783   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 784   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 785                                     target_process_id));
 786   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 787     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 788                                 target_process.Get(), target_handle,
 789                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 790   }
 791
 792   return false;
 793 }
 794
 795 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 796   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 797 }
 798
 799 }  // namespace content