content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/debugger.h"
  12 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  13 #include "base/debug/trace_event.h"
  14 #include "base/file_util.h"
  15 #include "base/hash.h"
  16 #include "base/path_service.h"
  17 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  19 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  20 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  21 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  22 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  23 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  24 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  25 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  26 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  27 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  28 #include "ipc/ipc_switches.h"
  29 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  30 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  31 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  32 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  33
  34 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  35 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  36
  37 namespace content {
  38 namespace {
  39
  40 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  41 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  42 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  43 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  44 // of it, see:
  45 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  46 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  47   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  48   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  49   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  50   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  51   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  52   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  53   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  54   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  55   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  56   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  57   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  58   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  59   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  60   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  61   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  62   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  63   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  64   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  65   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  66   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  67   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  68   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  69   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  70   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  71   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  72   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  73   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  74   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  75   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  76   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  77   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  78   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  79   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  80   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  81   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  82   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  83   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  84   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  85   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  86   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  87   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
  88   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
  89   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
  90   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
  91   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
  92   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  93   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
  94   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
  95   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
  96   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
  97   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
  98   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
  99   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
 100   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
 101   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 102   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 103   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 104   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 105   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 106   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 107 };
 108
 109 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 110 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 111 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 112 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 113                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 114                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 115   base::FilePath directory;
 116   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 117     return false;
 118
 119   if (sub_dir)
 120     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 121
 122   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 123   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 124                            directory.value().c_str());
 125   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 126     return false;
 127
 128   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 129   if (children)
 130     directory_str += L"*";
 131   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 132
 133   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 134                            directory_str.c_str());
 135   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 136     return false;
 137
 138   return true;
 139 }
 140
 141 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
 142 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
 143 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
 144                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 145                       sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 146   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 147   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 148                            key.c_str());
 149   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 150     return false;
 151
 152   key += L"\\*";
 153   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 154                            key.c_str());
 155   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 156     return false;
 157
 158   return true;
 159 }
 160
 161 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 162 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 163   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 164   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 165   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 166     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 167     return false;
 168   }
 169   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 170     return false;
 171   base::FilePath fname(path);
 172   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 173 }
 174
 175 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 176 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 177 // is also loaded in this process.
 178 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 179                         bool check_in_browser,
 180                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 181   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 182   if (!module) {
 183     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 184     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 185     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 186     std::wstring name(module_name);
 187     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 188     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 189     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 190     if (period <= 8)
 191       return;
 192     for (int ix = 0; ix < 3; ++ix) {
 193       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ('1' + ix), 0};
 194       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 195       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 196       if (check_in_browser) {
 197         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 198         if (!module)
 199           return;
 200         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 201         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 202         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 203           return;
 204       }
 205       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 206       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 207     }
 208   }
 209   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 210   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 211   return;
 212 }
 213
 214 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 215 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 216 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 217 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 218   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 219     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 220 }
 221
 222 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 223 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 224   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 225   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 226   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 227     HANDLE token;
 228     DWORD session_id_length;
 229     DWORD session_id = 0;
 230
 231     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 232     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 233         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 234     CloseHandle(token);
 235     if (session_id)
 236       s_session_id = session_id;
 237   }
 238
 239   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 240 }
 241
 242 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 243 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 244   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 245     return true;
 246
 247   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 248   // job.
 249   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 250     return true;
 251
 252   BOOL in_job = true;
 253   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 254   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 255     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 256   if (!in_job)
 257     return true;
 258
 259   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 260   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
 261   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 262                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 263                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 264     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 265     return true;
 266   }
 267   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 268     return true;
 269
 270   return false;
 271 }
 272
 273 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 274 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 275   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 276
 277   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 278   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 279   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 280                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 281                            L"Section");
 282   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 283     return false;
 284
 285   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 286   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 287   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 288   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 289                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 290                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 291   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 292     return false;
 293
 294   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 295   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 296   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 297   // system services.
 298   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 299                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 300                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 301   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 302     return false;
 303
 304   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 305   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 306   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 307                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 308                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 309   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 310     return false;
 311
 312   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 313 #ifndef NDEBUG
 314   base::FilePath app_dir;
 315   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 316     return false;
 317
 318   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 319   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 320                                                  long_path_buf,
 321                                                  MAX_PATH);
 322   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 323     return false;
 324
 325   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 326   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 327   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 328                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 329                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 330   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 331     return false;
 332 #endif  // NDEBUG
 333
 334   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 335
 336   return true;
 337 }
 338
 339 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 340   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 341   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 342   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 343                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 344                            L"Event");
 345   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 346     return false;
 347
 348   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 349   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 350     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 351     // token is restricted.
 352     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 353   }
 354
 355   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 356   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 357   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 358
 359   bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
 360                         switches::kDisableAltWinstation);
 361
 362   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) {
 363     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 364   }
 365
 366   return true;
 367 }
 368
 369 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 370 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 371 // command_line as needed. is_in_sandbox must be true if the child process will
 372 // be in a sandbox.
 373 //
 374 // Returns true if the caller should "help" the child process by calling the JIT
 375 // debugger on it. It may only happen if is_in_sandbox is true.
 376 bool ProcessDebugFlags(CommandLine* command_line, bool is_in_sandbox) {
 377   bool should_help_child = false;
 378   const CommandLine& current_cmd_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 379   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 380   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDebugChildren)) {
 381     // Look to pass-on the kDebugOnStart flag.
 382     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 383         switches::kDebugChildren);
 384     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 385       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDebugOnStart);
 386       should_help_child = true;
 387     }
 388     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kDebugChildren, value);
 389   } else if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 390     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 391     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 392         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 393     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 394       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 395     }
 396     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 397   }
 398   return should_help_child;
 399 }
 400
 401 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 402 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 403 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 404 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 405
 406 BOOL (WINAPI *g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 407                                            HANDLE source_handle,
 408                                            HANDLE target_process_handle,
 409                                            LPHANDLE target_handle,
 410                                            DWORD desired_access,
 411                                            BOOL inherit_handle,
 412                                            DWORD options);
 413
 414 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 415
 416 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 417     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 418     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 419     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 420
 421 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 422   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 423   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 424   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 425       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 426   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 427   NTSTATUS error;
 428   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 429   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 430   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 431
 432   // Get the object basic information.
 433   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 434   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 435   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 436                         &size);
 437   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 438
 439   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 440       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 441
 442   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 443     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask = ~(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION |
 444                                          SYNCHRONIZE);
 445     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 446         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 447   }
 448 }
 449
 450 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 451                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 452                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 453                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 454                                  DWORD desired_access,
 455                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 456                                  DWORD options) {
 457   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 458   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 459                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 460                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 461     return FALSE;
 462
 463   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 464   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 465       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 466     return TRUE;
 467
 468   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 469   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 470   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 471     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 472     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 473       HANDLE temp_handle;
 474       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 475                                         target_process_handle,
 476                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 477                                         &temp_handle,
 478                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 479                                         FALSE, 0));
 480       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 481       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process, NULL, &is_in_job));
 482     }
 483   }
 484
 485   if (is_in_job) {
 486     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 487     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 488
 489     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 490     HANDLE temp_handle;
 491     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 492                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 493                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 494     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 495
 496     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 497     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle);
 498   }
 499
 500   return TRUE;
 501 }
 502 #endif
 503
 504 }  // namespace
 505
 506 void SetJobLevel(const CommandLine& cmd_line,
 507                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 508                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 509                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 510   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line))
 511     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 512   else
 513     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 514 }
 515
 516 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 517 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 518 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 519   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 520   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 521       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 522   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 523 }
 524
 525 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 526   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 527   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 528   DCHECK(broker_services);
 529   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 530   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 531   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 532
 533   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 534 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 535   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 536   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 537   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 538   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 539   // original function.
 540   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 541       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 542     HMODULE module = NULL;
 543     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 544     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 545                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 546                               &module));
 547     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 548     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 549       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 550       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle = ::DuplicateHandle;
 551       g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 552           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 553           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 554     }
 555   }
 556 #endif
 557
 558   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 559 }
 560
 561 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 562   DCHECK(target_services);
 563   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 564   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 565   g_target_services = target_services;
 566   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 567 }
 568
 569 base::ProcessHandle StartSandboxedProcess(
 570     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 571     CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 572   const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 573   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 574
 575   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 576
 577   bool in_sandbox = true;
 578   if (delegate)
 579     delegate->ShouldSandbox(&in_sandbox);
 580
 581   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 582       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 583     // The user or the caller has explicity opted-out from all sandboxing.
 584     in_sandbox = false;
 585   }
 586
 587
 588   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 589   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 590       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 591     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 592   }
 593
 594   bool child_needs_help = ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line, in_sandbox);
 595
 596   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 597   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 598   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 599   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 600
 601   if (!in_sandbox) {
 602     base::ProcessHandle process = 0;
 603     base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &process);
 604     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process);
 605     return process;
 606   }
 607
 608   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 609
 610   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 611                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 612                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 613                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 614                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 615
 616   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 617     return 0;
 618
 619   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 620                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 621
 622   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 623     return 0;
 624
 625   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 626
 627   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 628   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 629   if (delegate)
 630     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 631
 632   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 633     return 0;
 634
 635   if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) {
 636     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 637     // this subprocess. See
 638     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 639     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 640   }
 641
 642   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 643   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 644     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 645                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 646                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 647     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 648       return 0;
 649
 650     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 651     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 652                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 653                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 654     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 655       return 0;
 656   }
 657
 658   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 659     NOTREACHED();
 660     return 0;
 661   }
 662
 663   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 664     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 665     // have no effect.
 666     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 667     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 668   }
 669
 670   if (delegate) {
 671     bool success = true;
 672     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 673     if (!success)
 674       return 0;
 675   }
 676
 677   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 678
 679   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 680   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 681                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 682                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 683                policy, &temp_process_info);
 684   policy->Release();
 685   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 686
 687   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 688
 689   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 690     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 691       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 692     else
 693       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 694     return 0;
 695   }
 696
 697   if (delegate)
 698     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 699
 700   ResumeThread(target.thread_handle());
 701
 702   // Help the process a little. It can't start the debugger by itself if
 703   // the process is in a sandbox.
 704   if (child_needs_help)
 705     base::debug::SpawnDebuggerOnProcess(target.process_id());
 706
 707   return target.TakeProcessHandle();
 708 }
 709
 710 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 711                            DWORD target_process_id,
 712                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 713                            DWORD desired_access,
 714                            DWORD options) {
 715   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 716   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 717     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 718                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 719                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 720
 721   }
 722
 723   // Try the broker next
 724   if (g_target_services &&
 725       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 726                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 727                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 728     return true;
 729   }
 730
 731   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 732   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 733   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 734                                     target_process_id));
 735   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 736     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 737                                 target_process, target_handle,
 738                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 739   }
 740
 741   return false;
 742 }
 743
 744 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 745   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 746 }
 747
 748 }  // namespace content