net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc.h"
   6
   7 #include <stdint.h>
   8
   9 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h"
  10 #include "base/sha1.h"
  11 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  12 #include "base/time/time.h"
  13 #include "build/build_config.h"
  14 #include "net/base/net_errors.h"
  15 #include "net/base/net_util.h"
  16 #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
  17 #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
  18 #include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h"
  19 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_whitelist.h"
  20 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
  21 #include "net/cert/crl_set.h"
  22 #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
  23 #include "url/url_canon.h"
  24
  25 #if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_IOS)
  26 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_nss.h"
  27 #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
  28 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_openssl.h"
  29 #elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
  30 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_android.h"
  31 #elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
  32 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_mac.h"
  33 #elif defined(OS_WIN)
  34 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.h"
  35 #else
  36 #error Implement certificate verification.
  37 #endif
  38
  39 namespace net {
  40
  41 namespace {
  42
  43 // Constants used to build histogram names
  44 const char kLeafCert[] = "Leaf";
  45 const char kIntermediateCert[] = "Intermediate";
  46 const char kRootCert[] = "Root";
  47 // Matches the order of X509Certificate::PublicKeyType
  48 const char* const kCertTypeStrings[] = {
  49     "Unknown",
  50     "RSA",
  51     "DSA",
  52     "ECDSA",
  53     "DH",
  54     "ECDH"
  55 };
  56 // Histogram buckets for RSA/DSA/DH key sizes.
  57 const int kRsaDsaKeySizes[] = {512, 768, 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192,
  58                                16384};
  59 // Histogram buckets for ECDSA/ECDH key sizes. The list is based upon the FIPS
  60 // 186-4 approved curves.
  61 const int kEccKeySizes[] = {163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 384, 409, 521, 571};
  62
  63 const char* CertTypeToString(int cert_type) {
  64   if (cert_type < 0 ||
  65       static_cast<size_t>(cert_type) >= arraysize(kCertTypeStrings)) {
  66     return "Unsupported";
  67   }
  68   return kCertTypeStrings[cert_type];
  69 }
  70
  71 void RecordPublicKeyHistogram(const char* chain_position,
  72                               bool baseline_keysize_applies,
  73                               size_t size_bits,
  74                               X509Certificate::PublicKeyType cert_type) {
  75   std::string histogram_name =
  76       base::StringPrintf("CertificateType2.%s.%s.%s",
  77                          baseline_keysize_applies ? "BR" : "NonBR",
  78                          chain_position,
  79                          CertTypeToString(cert_type));
  80   // Do not use UMA_HISTOGRAM_... macros here, as it caches the Histogram
  81   // instance and thus only works if |histogram_name| is constant.
  82   base::HistogramBase* counter = NULL;
  83
  84   // Histogram buckets are contingent upon the underlying algorithm being used.
  85   if (cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDH ||
  86       cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDSA) {
  87     // Typical key sizes match SECP/FIPS 186-3 recommendations for prime and
  88     // binary curves - which range from 163 bits to 571 bits.
  89     counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet(
  90         histogram_name,
  91         base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kEccKeySizes,
  92                                                    arraysize(kEccKeySizes)),
  93         base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
  94   } else {
  95     // Key sizes < 1024 bits should cause errors, while key sizes > 16K are not
  96     // uniformly supported by the underlying cryptographic libraries.
  97     counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet(
  98         histogram_name,
  99         base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kRsaDsaKeySizes,
 100                                                    arraysize(kRsaDsaKeySizes)),
 101         base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
 102   }
 103   counter->Add(size_bits);
 104 }
 105
 106 // Returns true if |type| is |kPublicKeyTypeRSA| or |kPublicKeyTypeDSA|, and
 107 // if |size_bits| is < 1024. Note that this means there may be false
 108 // negatives: keys for other algorithms and which are weak will pass this
 109 // test.
 110 bool IsWeakKey(X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type, size_t size_bits) {
 111   switch (type) {
 112     case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeRSA:
 113     case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeDSA:
 114       return size_bits < 1024;
 115     default:
 116       return false;
 117   }
 118 }
 119
 120 // Returns true if |cert| contains a known-weak key. Additionally, histograms
 121 // the observed keys for future tightening of the definition of what
 122 // constitutes a weak key.
 123 bool ExaminePublicKeys(const scoped_refptr<X509Certificate>& cert,
 124                        bool should_histogram) {
 125   // The effective date of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements -
 126   // 2012-07-01 00:00:00 UTC.
 127   const base::Time kBaselineEffectiveDate =
 128       base::Time::FromInternalValue(INT64_C(12985574400000000));
 129   // The effective date of the key size requirements from Appendix A, v1.1.5
 130   // 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC.
 131   const base::Time kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate =
 132       base::Time::FromInternalValue(INT64_C(13033008000000000));
 133
 134   size_t size_bits = 0;
 135   X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type = X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeUnknown;
 136   bool weak_key = false;
 137   bool baseline_keysize_applies =
 138       cert->valid_start() >= kBaselineEffectiveDate &&
 139       cert->valid_expiry() >= kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate;
 140
 141   X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(cert->os_cert_handle(), &size_bits, &type);
 142   if (should_histogram) {
 143     RecordPublicKeyHistogram(kLeafCert, baseline_keysize_applies, size_bits,
 144                              type);
 145   }
 146   if (IsWeakKey(type, size_bits))
 147     weak_key = true;
 148
 149   const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& intermediates =
 150       cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
 151   for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediates.size(); ++i) {
 152     X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(intermediates[i], &size_bits, &type);
 153     if (should_histogram) {
 154       RecordPublicKeyHistogram(
 155           (i < intermediates.size() - 1) ? kIntermediateCert : kRootCert,
 156           baseline_keysize_applies,
 157           size_bits,
 158           type);
 159     }
 160     if (!weak_key && IsWeakKey(type, size_bits))
 161       weak_key = true;
 162   }
 163
 164   return weak_key;
 165 }
 166
 167 }  // namespace
 168
 169 // static
 170 CertVerifyProc* CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault() {
 171 #if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_IOS)
 172   return new CertVerifyProcNSS();
 173 #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
 174   return new CertVerifyProcOpenSSL();
 175 #elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
 176   return new CertVerifyProcAndroid();
 177 #elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
 178   return new CertVerifyProcMac();
 179 #elif defined(OS_WIN)
 180   return new CertVerifyProcWin();
 181 #else
 182   return NULL;
 183 #endif
 184 }
 185
 186 CertVerifyProc::CertVerifyProc() {}
 187
 188 CertVerifyProc::~CertVerifyProc() {}
 189
 190 int CertVerifyProc::Verify(X509Certificate* cert,
 191                            const std::string& hostname,
 192                            const std::string& ocsp_response,
 193                            int flags,
 194                            CRLSet* crl_set,
 195                            const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
 196                            CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
 197   verify_result->Reset();
 198   verify_result->verified_cert = cert;
 199
 200   if (IsBlacklisted(cert)) {
 201     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
 202     return ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
 203   }
 204
 205   // We do online revocation checking for EV certificates that aren't covered
 206   // by a fresh CRLSet.
 207   // TODO(rsleevi): http://crbug.com/142974 - Allow preferences to fully
 208   // disable revocation checking.
 209   if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT)
 210     flags |= CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY;
 211
 212   int rv = VerifyInternal(cert, hostname, ocsp_response, flags, crl_set,
 213                           additional_trust_anchors, verify_result);
 214
 215   UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallback",
 216                         verify_result->common_name_fallback_used);
 217   if (!verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root) {
 218     UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallbackPrivateCA",
 219                           verify_result->common_name_fallback_used);
 220   }
 221
 222   // This check is done after VerifyInternal so that VerifyInternal can fill
 223   // in the list of public key hashes.
 224   if (IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(verify_result->public_key_hashes)) {
 225     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
 226     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 227   }
 228
 229   std::vector<std::string> dns_names, ip_addrs;
 230   cert->GetSubjectAltName(&dns_names, &ip_addrs);
 231   if (HasNameConstraintsViolation(verify_result->public_key_hashes,
 232                                   cert->subject().common_name,
 233                                   dns_names,
 234                                   ip_addrs)) {
 235     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
 236     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 237   }
 238
 239   if (IsNonWhitelistedCertificate(*verify_result->verified_cert,
 240                                   verify_result->public_key_hashes)) {
 241     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
 242     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 243   }
 244
 245   // Check for weak keys in the entire verified chain.
 246   bool weak_key = ExaminePublicKeys(verify_result->verified_cert,
 247                                     verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root);
 248
 249   if (weak_key) {
 250     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY;
 251     // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure,
 252     // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate
 253     // error.
 254     if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv))
 255       rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 256   }
 257
 258   // Treat certificates signed using broken signature algorithms as invalid.
 259   if (verify_result->has_md2 || verify_result->has_md4) {
 260     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
 261     rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 262   }
 263
 264   // Flag certificates using weak signature algorithms.
 265   if (verify_result->has_md5) {
 266     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
 267     // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure,
 268     // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate
 269     // error.
 270     if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv))
 271       rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 272   }
 273
 274   if (verify_result->has_sha1)
 275     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT;
 276
 277   // Flag certificates from publicly-trusted CAs that are issued to intranet
 278   // hosts. While the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (v1.1) permit
 279   // these to be issued until 1 November 2015, they represent a real risk for
 280   // the deployment of gTLDs and are being phased out ahead of the hard
 281   // deadline.
 282   if (verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && IsHostnameNonUnique(hostname)) {
 283     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME;
 284     // CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME will eventually become a hard error. For
 285     // now treat it as a warning and do not map it to an error return value.
 286   }
 287
 288   // Flag certificates using too long validity periods.
 289   if (verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && HasTooLongValidity(*cert)) {
 290     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG;
 291     if (rv == OK)
 292       rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 293   }
 294
 295   return rv;
 296 }
 297
 298 // static
 299 bool CertVerifyProc::IsBlacklisted(X509Certificate* cert) {
 300   static const unsigned kComodoSerialBytes = 16;
 301   static const uint8_t kComodoSerials[][kComodoSerialBytes] = {
 302     // Not a real certificate. For testing only.
 303     {0x07,0x7a,0x59,0xbc,0xd5,0x34,0x59,0x60,0x1c,0xa6,0x90,0x72,0x67,0xa6,0xdd,0x1c},
 304
 305     // The next nine certificates all expire on Fri Mar 14 23:59:59 2014.
 306     // Some serial numbers actually have a leading 0x00 byte required to
 307     // encode a positive integer in DER if the most significant bit is 0.
 308     // We omit the leading 0x00 bytes to make all serial numbers 16 bytes.
 309
 310     // Subject: CN=mail.google.com
 311     // subjectAltName dNSName: mail.google.com, www.mail.google.com
 312     {0x04,0x7e,0xcb,0xe9,0xfc,0xa5,0x5f,0x7b,0xd0,0x9e,0xae,0x36,0xe1,0x0c,0xae,0x1e},
 313     // Subject: CN=global trustee
 314     // subjectAltName dNSName: global trustee
 315     // Note: not a CA certificate.
 316     {0xd8,0xf3,0x5f,0x4e,0xb7,0x87,0x2b,0x2d,0xab,0x06,0x92,0xe3,0x15,0x38,0x2f,0xb0},
 317     // Subject: CN=login.live.com
 318     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.live.com, www.login.live.com
 319     {0xb0,0xb7,0x13,0x3e,0xd0,0x96,0xf9,0xb5,0x6f,0xae,0x91,0xc8,0x74,0xbd,0x3a,0xc0},
 320     // Subject: CN=addons.mozilla.org
 321     // subjectAltName dNSName: addons.mozilla.org, www.addons.mozilla.org
 322     {0x92,0x39,0xd5,0x34,0x8f,0x40,0xd1,0x69,0x5a,0x74,0x54,0x70,0xe1,0xf2,0x3f,0x43},
 323     // Subject: CN=login.skype.com
 324     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.skype.com, www.login.skype.com
 325     {0xe9,0x02,0x8b,0x95,0x78,0xe4,0x15,0xdc,0x1a,0x71,0x0a,0x2b,0x88,0x15,0x44,0x47},
 326     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 327     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com, www.login.yahoo.com
 328     {0xd7,0x55,0x8f,0xda,0xf5,0xf1,0x10,0x5b,0xb2,0x13,0x28,0x2b,0x70,0x77,0x29,0xa3},
 329     // Subject: CN=www.google.com
 330     // subjectAltName dNSName: www.google.com, google.com
 331     {0xf5,0xc8,0x6a,0xf3,0x61,0x62,0xf1,0x3a,0x64,0xf5,0x4f,0x6d,0xc9,0x58,0x7c,0x06},
 332     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 333     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com
 334     {0x39,0x2a,0x43,0x4f,0x0e,0x07,0xdf,0x1f,0x8a,0xa3,0x05,0xde,0x34,0xe0,0xc2,0x29},
 335     // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com
 336     // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com
 337     {0x3e,0x75,0xce,0xd4,0x6b,0x69,0x30,0x21,0x21,0x88,0x30,0xae,0x86,0xa8,0x2a,0x71},
 338   };
 339
 340   const std::string& serial_number = cert->serial_number();
 341   if (!serial_number.empty() && (serial_number[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
 342     // This is a negative serial number, which isn't technically allowed but
 343     // which probably happens. In order to avoid confusing a negative serial
 344     // number with a positive one once the leading zeros have been removed, we
 345     // disregard it.
 346     return false;
 347   }
 348
 349   base::StringPiece serial(serial_number);
 350   // Remove leading zeros.
 351   while (serial.size() > 1 && serial[0] == 0)
 352     serial.remove_prefix(1);
 353
 354   if (serial.size() == kComodoSerialBytes) {
 355     for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kComodoSerials); i++) {
 356       if (memcmp(kComodoSerials[i], serial.data(), kComodoSerialBytes) == 0) {
 357         UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.SSLCertBlacklisted", i,
 358                                   arraysize(kComodoSerials) + 1);
 359         return true;
 360       }
 361     }
 362   }
 363
 364   // CloudFlare revoked all certificates issued prior to April 2nd, 2014. Thus
 365   // all certificates where the CN ends with ".cloudflare.com" with a prior
 366   // issuance date are rejected.
 367   //
 368   // The old certs had a lifetime of five years, so this can be removed April
 369   // 2nd, 2019.
 370   const std::string& cn = cert->subject().common_name;
 371   static const char kCloudFlareCNSuffix[] = ".cloudflare.com";
 372   // kCloudFlareEpoch is the base::Time internal value for midnight at the
 373   // beginning of April 2nd, 2014, UTC.
 374   static const int64_t kCloudFlareEpoch = INT64_C(13040870400000000);
 375   if (cn.size() > arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1 &&
 376       cn.compare(cn.size() - (arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1),
 377                  arraysize(kCloudFlareCNSuffix) - 1,
 378                  kCloudFlareCNSuffix) == 0 &&
 379       cert->valid_start() < base::Time::FromInternalValue(kCloudFlareEpoch)) {
 380     return true;
 381   }
 382
 383   return false;
 384 }
 385
 386 // static
 387 // NOTE: This implementation assumes and enforces that the hashes are SHA1.
 388 bool CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(
 389     const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes) {
 390   static const unsigned kNumHashes = 17;
 391   static const uint8_t kHashes[kNumHashes][base::kSHA1Length] = {
 392     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Root CA
 393     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net x2 and self-signed
 394     {0x41, 0x0f, 0x36, 0x36, 0x32, 0x58, 0xf3, 0x0b, 0x34, 0x7d,
 395      0x12, 0xce, 0x48, 0x63, 0xe4, 0x33, 0x43, 0x78, 0x06, 0xa8},
 396     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Cyber CA
 397     // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root
 398     {0xc4, 0xf9, 0x66, 0x37, 0x16, 0xcd, 0x5e, 0x71, 0xd6, 0x95,
 399      0x0b, 0x5f, 0x33, 0xce, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x95, 0xb4, 0x35, 0xd1},
 400     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Services 1024 CA
 401     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net
 402     {0xe2, 0x3b, 0x8d, 0x10, 0x5f, 0x87, 0x71, 0x0a, 0x68, 0xd9,
 403      0x24, 0x80, 0x50, 0xeb, 0xef, 0xc6, 0x27, 0xbe, 0x4c, 0xa6},
 404     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2
 405     // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Organisatie CA - G2
 406     {0x7b, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x39, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x2b, 0x45, 0x6e,
 407      0x9f, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x1d, 0xe6, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x49, 0x45, 0xdb},
 408     // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Overheid en Bedrijven
 409     // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Overheid CA
 410     {0xe8, 0xf9, 0x12, 0x00, 0xc6, 0x5c, 0xee, 0x16, 0xe0, 0x39,
 411      0xb9, 0xf8, 0x83, 0x84, 0x16, 0x61, 0x63, 0x5f, 0x81, 0xc5},
 412     // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd.
 413     // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root
 414     // Expires: Jul 17 15:16:54 2012 GMT
 415     {0x01, 0x29, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xae, 0x8d, 0x24, 0x96,
 416      0xd1, 0xc3, 0xe1, 0x97, 0x23, 0x91, 0x90, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x52},
 417     // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd.
 418     // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048)
 419     // Expires: Jul 16 17:53:37 2015 GMT
 420     {0xd3, 0x3c, 0x5b, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0xb3, 0xbe, 0x9a,
 421      0xd6, 0x95, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0xcc, 0x25, 0x28, 0x03, 0x29, 0x81},
 422     // Issuer: CN=Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2
 423     // Covers two certificates, the latter of which expires Apr 15 21:09:30
 424     // 2021 GMT.
 425     {0xe1, 0x2d, 0x89, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x22, 0x76, 0xf8, 0x30, 0xe6,
 426      0xce, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x41, 0xa9, 0x32},
 427     // Cyberoam CA certificate. Private key leaked, but this certificate would
 428     // only have been installed by Cyberoam customers. The certificate expires
 429     // in 2036, but we can probably remove in a couple of years (2014).
 430     {0xd9, 0xf5, 0xc6, 0xce, 0x57, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xcc, 0x7e,
 431      0xd1, 0x72, 0xbd, 0x53, 0xe0, 0xd3, 0x07, 0x83, 0x4b, 0xd1},
 432     // Win32/Sirefef.gen!C generates fake certificates with this public key.
 433     {0xa4, 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x9e, 0x1d, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0xc3,
 434      0x31, 0xcf, 0x64, 0xfc, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0x51, 0xfb, 0xa4},
 435     // Three retired intermediate certificates from Symantec. No compromise;
 436     // just for robustness. All expire May 17 23:59:59 2018.
 437     // See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=966060
 438     {0x68, 0x5e, 0xec, 0x0a, 0x39, 0xf6, 0x68, 0xae, 0x8f, 0xd8,
 439      0x96, 0x4f, 0x98, 0x74, 0x76, 0xb4, 0x50, 0x4f, 0xd2, 0xbe},
 440     {0x0e, 0x50, 0x2d, 0x4d, 0xd1, 0xe1, 0x60, 0x36, 0x8a, 0x31,
 441      0xf0, 0x6a, 0x81, 0x04, 0x31, 0xba, 0x6f, 0x72, 0xc0, 0x41},
 442     {0x93, 0xd1, 0x53, 0x22, 0x29, 0xcc, 0x2a, 0xbd, 0x21, 0xdf,
 443      0xf5, 0x97, 0xee, 0x32, 0x0f, 0xe4, 0x24, 0x6f, 0x3d, 0x0c},
 444     // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, OU=NICCA, CN=NIC Certifying
 445     // Authority. Issued by C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2007.
 446     // Expires July 4th, 2015.
 447     {0xf5, 0x71, 0x79, 0xfa, 0xea, 0x10, 0xc5, 0x43, 0x8c, 0xb0,
 448      0xc6, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x7b, 0x6e, 0x0d, 0xb2, 0xff, 0x54},
 449     // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, CN=NIC CA 2011. Issued by
 450     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2011.
 451     // Expires March 11th 2016.
 452     {0x07, 0x7a, 0xc7, 0xde, 0x8d, 0xa5, 0x58, 0x64, 0x3a, 0x06,
 453      0xc5, 0x36, 0x9e, 0x55, 0x4f, 0xae, 0xb3, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0x66},
 454     // C=IN, O=National Informatics Centre, CN=NIC CA 2014. Issued by
 455     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2014.
 456     // Expires: March 5th, 2024.
 457     {0xe5, 0x8e, 0x31, 0x5b, 0xaa, 0xee, 0xaa, 0xc6, 0xe7, 0x2e,
 458      0xc9, 0x57, 0x36, 0x70, 0xca, 0x2f, 0x25, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x47},
 459     // C=DE, O=Fraunhofer, OU=Fraunhofer Corporate PKI,
 460     // CN=Fraunhofer Service CA 2007.
 461     // Expires: Jun 30 2019.
 462     // No compromise, just for robustness. See
 463     // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1076940
 464     {0x38, 0x4d, 0x0c, 0x1d, 0xc4, 0x77, 0xa7, 0xb3, 0xf8, 0x67,
 465      0x86, 0xd0, 0x18, 0x51, 0x9f, 0x58, 0x9f, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0x25},
 466   };
 467
 468   for (unsigned i = 0; i < kNumHashes; i++) {
 469     for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin();
 470          j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) {
 471       if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 &&
 472           memcmp(j->data(), kHashes[i], base::kSHA1Length) == 0) {
 473         return true;
 474       }
 475     }
 476   }
 477
 478   return false;
 479 }
 480
 481 static const size_t kMaxDomainLength = 18;
 482
 483 // CheckNameConstraints verifies that every name in |dns_names| is in one of
 484 // the domains specified by |domains|. The |domains| array is terminated by an
 485 // empty string.
 486 static bool CheckNameConstraints(const std::vector<std::string>& dns_names,
 487                                  const char domains[][kMaxDomainLength]) {
 488   for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator i = dns_names.begin();
 489        i != dns_names.end(); ++i) {
 490     bool ok = false;
 491     url::CanonHostInfo host_info;
 492     const std::string dns_name = CanonicalizeHost(*i, &host_info);
 493     if (host_info.IsIPAddress())
 494       continue;
 495
 496     const size_t registry_len = registry_controlled_domains::GetRegistryLength(
 497         dns_name,
 498         registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
 499         registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
 500     // If the name is not in a known TLD, ignore it. This permits internal
 501     // names.
 502     if (registry_len == 0)
 503       continue;
 504
 505     for (size_t j = 0; domains[j][0]; ++j) {
 506       const size_t domain_length = strlen(domains[j]);
 507       // The DNS name must have "." + domains[j] as a suffix.
 508       if (i->size() <= (1 /* period before domain */ + domain_length))
 509         continue;
 510
 511       const char* suffix = &dns_name[i->size() - domain_length - 1];
 512       if (suffix[0] != '.')
 513         continue;
 514       if (memcmp(&suffix[1], domains[j], domain_length) != 0)
 515         continue;
 516       ok = true;
 517       break;
 518     }
 519
 520     if (!ok)
 521       return false;
 522   }
 523
 524   return true;
 525 }
 526
 527 // PublicKeyDomainLimitation contains a SHA1, SPKI hash and a pointer to an
 528 // array of fixed-length strings that contain the domains that the SPKI is
 529 // allowed to issue for.
 530 struct PublicKeyDomainLimitation {
 531   uint8_t public_key[base::kSHA1Length];
 532   const char (*domains)[kMaxDomainLength];
 533 };
 534
 535 // static
 536 bool CertVerifyProc::HasNameConstraintsViolation(
 537     const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes,
 538     const std::string& common_name,
 539     const std::vector<std::string>& dns_names,
 540     const std::vector<std::string>& ip_addrs) {
 541   static const char kDomainsANSSI[][kMaxDomainLength] = {
 542     "fr",  // France
 543     "gp",  // Guadeloupe
 544     "gf",  // Guyane
 545     "mq",  // Martinique
 546     "re",  // Réunion
 547     "yt",  // Mayotte
 548     "pm",  // Saint-Pierre et Miquelon
 549     "bl",  // Saint Barthélemy
 550     "mf",  // Saint Martin
 551     "wf",  // Wallis et Futuna
 552     "pf",  // Polynésie française
 553     "nc",  // Nouvelle Calédonie
 554     "tf",  // Terres australes et antarctiques françaises
 555     "",
 556   };
 557
 558   static const char kDomainsIndiaCCA[][kMaxDomainLength] = {
 559     "gov.in",
 560     "nic.in",
 561     "ac.in",
 562     "rbi.org.in",
 563     "bankofindia.co.in",
 564     "ncode.in",
 565     "tcs.co.in",
 566     "",
 567   };
 568
 569   static const char kDomainsTest[][kMaxDomainLength] = {
 570     "example.com",
 571     "",
 572   };
 573
 574   static const PublicKeyDomainLimitation kLimits[] = {
 575     // C=FR, ST=France, L=Paris, O=PM/SGDN, OU=DCSSI,
 576     // CN=IGC/A/emailAddress=igca@sgdn.pm.gouv.fr
 577     {
 578       {0x79, 0x23, 0xd5, 0x8d, 0x0f, 0xe0, 0x3c, 0xe6, 0xab, 0xad,
 579        0xae, 0x27, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x14, 0xd1, 0xa8, 0x73},
 580       kDomainsANSSI,
 581     },
 582     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2007
 583     // Expires: July 4th 2015.
 584     {
 585       {0xfe, 0xe3, 0x95, 0x21, 0x2d, 0x5f, 0xea, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0xdc,
 586        0xcf, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0xc0, 0x58, 0x27, 0xd8, 0xb8, 0xe4},
 587       kDomainsIndiaCCA,
 588     },
 589     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2011
 590     // Expires: March 11 2016.
 591     {
 592       {0xf1, 0x42, 0xf6, 0xa2, 0x7d, 0x29, 0x3e, 0xa8, 0xf9, 0x64,
 593        0x52, 0x56, 0xed, 0x07, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xf2, 0xdb, 0x1c, 0xdf},
 594       kDomainsIndiaCCA,
 595     },
 596     // C=IN, O=India PKI, CN=CCA India 2014
 597     // Expires: March 5 2024.
 598     {
 599       {0x36, 0x8c, 0x4a, 0x1e, 0x2d, 0xb7, 0x81, 0xe8, 0x6b, 0xed,
 600        0x5a, 0x0a, 0x42, 0xb8, 0xc5, 0xcf, 0x6d, 0xb3, 0x57, 0xe1},
 601       kDomainsIndiaCCA,
 602     },
 603     // Not a real certificate - just for testing. This is the SPKI hash of
 604     // the keys used in net/data/ssl/certificates/name_constraint_*.crt.
 605     {
 606       {0x61, 0xec, 0x82, 0x8b, 0xdb, 0x5c, 0x78, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xcc,
 607        0x4f, 0x0f, 0x14, 0xbb, 0x85, 0x31, 0x93, 0x9f, 0xf7, 0x3d},
 608       kDomainsTest,
 609     },
 610   };
 611
 612   for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kLimits); ++i) {
 613     for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin();
 614          j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) {
 615       if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 &&
 616           memcmp(j->data(), kLimits[i].public_key, base::kSHA1Length) == 0) {
 617         if (dns_names.empty() && ip_addrs.empty()) {
 618           std::vector<std::string> dns_names;
 619           dns_names.push_back(common_name);
 620           if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].domains))
 621             return true;
 622         } else {
 623           if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].domains))
 624             return true;
 625         }
 626       }
 627     }
 628   }
 629
 630   return false;
 631 }
 632
 633 // static
 634 bool CertVerifyProc::HasTooLongValidity(const X509Certificate& cert) {
 635   const base::Time& start = cert.valid_start();
 636   const base::Time& expiry = cert.valid_expiry();
 637   if (start.is_max() || start.is_null() || expiry.is_max() ||
 638       expiry.is_null() || start > expiry) {
 639     return true;
 640   }
 641
 642   base::Time::Exploded exploded_start;
 643   base::Time::Exploded exploded_expiry;
 644   cert.valid_start().UTCExplode(&exploded_start);
 645   cert.valid_expiry().UTCExplode(&exploded_expiry);
 646
 647   if (exploded_expiry.year - exploded_start.year > 10)
 648     return true;
 649
 650   int month_diff = (exploded_expiry.year - exploded_start.year) * 12 +
 651                    (exploded_expiry.month - exploded_start.month);
 652
 653   // Add any remainder as a full month.
 654   if (exploded_expiry.day_of_month > exploded_start.day_of_month)
 655     ++month_diff;
 656
 657   static const base::Time time_2012_07_01 =
 658       base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2012, 7, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0});
 659   static const base::Time time_2015_04_01 =
 660       base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2015, 4, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0});
 661   static const base::Time time_2019_07_01 =
 662       base::Time::FromUTCExploded({2019, 7, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0});
 663
 664   // For certificates issued before the BRs took effect.
 665   if (start < time_2012_07_01 && (month_diff > 120 || expiry > time_2019_07_01))
 666     return true;
 667
 668   // For certificates issued after 1 July 2012: 60 months.
 669   if (start >= time_2012_07_01 && month_diff > 60)
 670     return true;
 671
 672   // For certificates issued after 1 April 2015: 39 months.
 673   if (start >= time_2015_04_01 && month_diff > 39)
 674     return true;
 675
 676   return false;
 677 }
 678
 679 }  // namespace net