content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  12 #include "base/files/file_util.h"
  13 #include "base/hash.h"
  14 #include "base/memory/shared_memory.h"
  15 #include "base/metrics/sparse_histogram.h"
  16 #include "base/path_service.h"
  17 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
  19 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  20 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  21 #include "base/trace_event/trace_event.h"
  22 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  23 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  24 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  25 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  26 #include "content/common/content_switches_internal.h"
  27 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  28 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  29 #include "content/public/common/dwrite_font_platform_win.h"
  30 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  31 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  32 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  33 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  34 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  35 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h"
  36 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  37 #include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h"
  38
  39 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  40 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  41
  42 namespace content {
  43 namespace {
  44
  45 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  46 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  47 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  48 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  49 // of it, see:
  50 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  51 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  52   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  53   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  54   L"airfoilinject3.dll",          // Airfoil.
  55   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  56   L"assistant_x64.dll",           // Unknown.
  57   L"avcuf64.dll",                 // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
  58   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  59   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  60   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  61   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  62   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  63   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  64   L"cplushook.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  65   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  66   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  67   L"esspd.dll",                   // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  68   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  69   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  70   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  71   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  72   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  73   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  74   L"icatcdll.dll",                // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  75   L"icdcnl.dll",                  // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  76   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  77   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  78   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  79   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  80   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  81   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  82   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  83   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  84   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  85   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  86   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  87   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  88   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  89   L"pastali32.dll",               // PastaLeads.
  90   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  91   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  92   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  93   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  94   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  95   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  96   L"picrmi32.dll",                // PicRec.
  97   L"picrmi64.dll",                // PicRec.
  98   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  99   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
 100   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
 101   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
 102   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
 103   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
 104   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
 105   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
 106   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
 107   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
 108   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
 109   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
 110   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
 111   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
 112   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
 113   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
 114   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
 115   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
 116   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 117   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 118   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 119   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 120   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 121   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 122 };
 123
 124 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 125 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 126 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 127 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 128 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 129                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 130                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 131   base::FilePath directory;
 132   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 133     return false;
 134
 135   if (sub_dir)
 136     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 137
 138   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 139   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 140                            directory.value().c_str());
 141   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 142     return false;
 143
 144   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 145   if (children)
 146     directory_str += L"*";
 147   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 148
 149   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 150                            directory_str.c_str());
 151   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 152     return false;
 153
 154   return true;
 155 }
 156 #endif  // !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 157
 158 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 159 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 160   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 161   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 162   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 163     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 164     return false;
 165   }
 166   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 167     return false;
 168   base::FilePath fname(path);
 169   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 170 }
 171
 172 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 173 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 174 // is also loaded in this process.
 175 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 176                         bool check_in_browser,
 177                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 178   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 179   if (!module) {
 180     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 181     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 182     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 183     std::wstring name(module_name);
 184     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 185     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 186     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 187     if (period <= 8)
 188       return;
 189     for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) {
 190       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0};
 191       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 192       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 193       if (check_in_browser) {
 194         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 195         if (!module)
 196           return;
 197         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 198         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 199         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 200           return;
 201       }
 202       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 203       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 204     }
 205   }
 206   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 207   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 208   return;
 209 }
 210
 211 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 212 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 213 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 214 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 215   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 216     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 217 }
 218
 219 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 220 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 221   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 222   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 223   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 224     HANDLE token;
 225     DWORD session_id_length;
 226     DWORD session_id = 0;
 227
 228     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 229     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 230         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 231     CloseHandle(token);
 232     if (session_id)
 233       s_session_id = session_id;
 234   }
 235
 236   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 237 }
 238
 239 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 240 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 241   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 242     return true;
 243
 244   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 245   // job.
 246   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 247     return true;
 248
 249   BOOL in_job = true;
 250   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 251   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 252     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 253   if (!in_job)
 254     return true;
 255
 256   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 257   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {};
 258   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 259                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 260                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 261     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 262     return true;
 263   }
 264   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 265     return true;
 266
 267   return false;
 268 }
 269
 270 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 271 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 272   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 273
 274   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 275   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 276   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 277                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 278                            L"Section");
 279   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 280     return false;
 281
 282   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 283   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 284   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 285   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 286                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 287                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 288   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 289     return false;
 290
 291   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 292   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 293   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 294   // system services.
 295   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 296                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 297                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 298   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 299     return false;
 300
 301   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 302   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 303   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 304                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 305                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 306   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 307     return false;
 308
 309   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 310 #ifndef NDEBUG
 311   base::FilePath app_dir;
 312   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 313     return false;
 314
 315   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 316   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 317                                                  long_path_buf,
 318                                                  MAX_PATH);
 319   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 320     return false;
 321
 322   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 323   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 324   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 325                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 326                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 327   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 328     return false;
 329 #endif  // NDEBUG
 330
 331   // Add the policy for read-only PDB file access for AddressSanitizer.
 332 #if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
 333   base::FilePath exe;
 334   if (!PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &exe))
 335     return false;
 336   base::FilePath pdb_path = exe.DirName().Append(L"*.pdb");
 337   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 338                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 339                            pdb_path.value().c_str());
 340   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 341     return false;
 342 #endif
 343
 344 #if defined(SANITIZER_COVERAGE)
 345   DWORD coverage_dir_size =
 346       ::GetEnvironmentVariable(L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", NULL, 0);
 347   if (coverage_dir_size == 0) {
 348     LOG(WARNING) << "SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR was not set, coverage won't work.";
 349   } else {
 350     std::wstring coverage_dir;
 351     wchar_t* coverage_dir_str =
 352         base::WriteInto(&coverage_dir, coverage_dir_size);
 353     coverage_dir_size = ::GetEnvironmentVariable(
 354         L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", coverage_dir_str, coverage_dir_size);
 355     CHECK(coverage_dir.size() == coverage_dir_size);
 356     base::FilePath sancov_path =
 357         base::FilePath(coverage_dir).Append(L"*.sancov");
 358     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 359                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 360                              sancov_path.value().c_str());
 361     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 362       return false;
 363   }
 364 #endif
 365
 366   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 367   return true;
 368 }
 369
 370 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 371   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 372   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 373   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 374                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 375                            L"Event");
 376   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 377     return false;
 378
 379   // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
 380   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 381     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
 382   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 383     return false;
 384
 385   // Close the proxy settings on XP.
 386   if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003)
 387     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key",
 388                  L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \
 389                      L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings");
 390   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 391     return false;
 392
 393
 394   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 395   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 396     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 397     // token is restricted.
 398     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 399   }
 400
 401   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 402   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 403   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 404   policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
 405
 406   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) {
 407     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 408   }
 409
 410   return true;
 411 }
 412
 413 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 414 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 415 // command_line as needed.
 416 void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
 417   const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line =
 418       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 419   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 420   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 421     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 422     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 423         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 424     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 425       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 426     }
 427     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 428   }
 429 }
 430
 431 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 432 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 433 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 434 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 435
 436 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 437                                                   HANDLE source_handle,
 438                                                   HANDLE target_process_handle,
 439                                                   LPHANDLE target_handle,
 440                                                   DWORD desired_access,
 441                                                   BOOL inherit_handle,
 442                                                   DWORD options);
 443
 444 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
 445
 446 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 447
 448 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 449     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 450     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 451     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 452
 453 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 454   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 455   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 456   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 457       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 458   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 459   NTSTATUS error;
 460   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 461   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 462   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 463
 464   // Get the object basic information.
 465   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 466   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 467   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 468                         &size);
 469   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 470
 471   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 472       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 473
 474   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 475     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask =
 476         ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
 477     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 478         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 479   }
 480 }
 481
 482 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 483                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 484                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 485                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 486                                  DWORD desired_access,
 487                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 488                                  DWORD options) {
 489   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 490   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 491                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 492                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 493     return FALSE;
 494
 495   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 496   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 497       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 498     return TRUE;
 499
 500   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 501   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 502   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 503     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 504     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 505       HANDLE temp_handle;
 506       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 507                                         target_process_handle,
 508                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 509                                         &temp_handle,
 510                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 511                                         FALSE, 0));
 512       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 513       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 514     }
 515   }
 516
 517   if (is_in_job) {
 518     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 519     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 520
 521     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 522     HANDLE temp_handle;
 523     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 524                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 525                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 526     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 527
 528     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 529     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get());
 530   }
 531
 532   return TRUE;
 533 }
 534 #endif
 535
 536 }  // namespace
 537
 538 void SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
 539                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 540                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 541                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 542   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) {
 543 #ifdef _WIN64
 544     policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
 545 #endif
 546     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 547   } else {
 548     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 549   }
 550 }
 551
 552 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 553 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 554 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 555   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 556   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 557       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 558   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 559 }
 560
 561 void AddAppContainerPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy, const wchar_t* sid) {
 562   if (base::win::GetVersion() == base::win::VERSION_WIN8 ||
 563       base::win::GetVersion() == base::win::VERSION_WIN8_1) {
 564     const base::CommandLine& command_line =
 565         *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 566     if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAppContainer)) {
 567       policy->SetLowBox(sid);
 568     }
 569   }
 570 }
 571
 572 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 573   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 574   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 575   DCHECK(broker_services);
 576   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 577   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 578   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 579
 580   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 581 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 582   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 583   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 584   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 585   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 586   // original function.
 587   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 588       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 589     HMODULE module = NULL;
 590     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 591     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 592                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 593                               &module));
 594     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 595     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 596       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 597       result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 598           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 599           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 600       CHECK(result == 0);
 601       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
 602           reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
 603               g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
 604     }
 605   }
 606 #endif
 607
 608   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 609 }
 610
 611 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 612   DCHECK(target_services);
 613   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 614   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 615   g_target_services = target_services;
 616   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 617 }
 618
 619 base::Process StartSandboxedProcess(
 620     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 621     base::CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 622   const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
 623       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 624   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 625
 626   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 627
 628   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 629   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 630       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 631     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 632   }
 633
 634   ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
 635
 636   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 637   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 638   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 639   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 640
 641   if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
 642       browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 643       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 644     base::Process process =
 645         base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions());
 646     // TODO(rvargas) crbug.com/417532: Don't share a raw handle.
 647     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process.Handle());
 648     return process.Pass();
 649   }
 650
 651   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 652
 653   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 654                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 655                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 656                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 657                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 658
 659 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 660   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess &&
 661       IsWin32kRendererLockdownEnabled()) {
 662     if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
 663                         sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
 664                         NULL) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 665       return base::Process();
 666     }
 667     mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
 668   }
 669 #endif
 670
 671   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 672     return base::Process();
 673
 674   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 675                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 676
 677   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 678     return base::Process();
 679
 680   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 681
 682   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 683   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 684   if (delegate)
 685     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 686
 687   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 688     return base::Process();
 689
 690   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
 691 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 692     if (gfx::win::ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
 693       AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
 694                   NULL,
 695                   true,
 696                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 697                   policy);
 698
 699       // If DirectWrite is enabled for font rendering then open the font cache
 700       // section which is created by the browser and pass the handle to the
 701       // renderer process. This is needed because renderer processes on
 702       // Windows 8+ may be running in an AppContainer sandbox and hence their
 703       // kernel object namespace may be partitioned.
 704       std::string name(content::kFontCacheSharedSectionName);
 705       name.append(base::UintToString(base::GetCurrentProcId()));
 706
 707       base::SharedMemory direct_write_font_cache_section;
 708       if (direct_write_font_cache_section.Open(name, true)) {
 709         void* shared_handle =
 710             policy->AddHandleToShare(direct_write_font_cache_section.handle());
 711         cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kFontCacheSharedHandle,
 712             base::UintToString(reinterpret_cast<unsigned int>(shared_handle)));
 713       }
 714     }
 715 #endif
 716   } else {
 717     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 718     // this subprocess. See
 719     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 720     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 721   }
 722
 723   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 724   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 725     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 726                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 727                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 728     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 729       return base::Process();
 730
 731     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 732     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 733                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 734                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 735     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 736       return base::Process();
 737   }
 738
 739   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 740     NOTREACHED();
 741     return base::Process();
 742   }
 743
 744   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 745     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 746     // have no effect.
 747     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 748     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 749   }
 750
 751   if (delegate) {
 752     bool success = true;
 753     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 754     if (!success)
 755       return base::Process();
 756   }
 757
 758   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 759
 760   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 761   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 762                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 763                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 764                policy, &temp_process_info);
 765   DWORD last_error = ::GetLastError();
 766   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 767
 768   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 769
 770   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 771     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 772       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 773     else if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_PROCESS) {
 774       // TODO(shrikant): Remove this special case handling after determining
 775       // cause for lowbox/createprocess errors.
 776       sandbox::PolicyBase* policy_base =
 777           static_cast<sandbox::PolicyBase*>(policy);
 778       UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY(policy_base->GetLowBoxSid() ?
 779                                       "Process.Sandbox.Lowbox.Launch.Error" :
 780                                       "Process.Sandbox.Launch.Error",
 781                                   last_error);
 782     } else
 783       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 784
 785     policy->Release();
 786     return base::Process();
 787   }
 788   policy->Release();
 789
 790   if (delegate)
 791     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 792
 793   CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != -1);
 794   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 795   return base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle());
 796 }
 797
 798 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 799                            DWORD target_process_id,
 800                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 801                            DWORD desired_access,
 802                            DWORD options) {
 803   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 804   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 805     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 806                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 807                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 808
 809   }
 810
 811   // Try the broker next
 812   if (g_target_services &&
 813       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 814                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 815                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 816     return true;
 817   }
 818
 819   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 820   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 821   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 822                                     target_process_id));
 823   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 824     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 825                                 target_process.Get(), target_handle,
 826                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 827   }
 828
 829   return false;
 830 }
 831
 832 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 833   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 834 }
 835
 836 }  // namespace content