content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  12 #include "base/files/file_util.h"
  13 #include "base/hash.h"
  14 #include "base/memory/shared_memory.h"
  15 #include "base/metrics/sparse_histogram.h"
  16 #include "base/path_service.h"
  17 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
  19 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  20 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  21 #include "base/trace_event/trace_event.h"
  22 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  23 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  24 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  25 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  26 #include "content/common/content_switches_internal.h"
  27 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  28 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  29 #include "content/public/common/dwrite_font_platform_win.h"
  30 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  31 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  32 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  33 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  34 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  35 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h"
  36 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  37 #include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h"
  38
  39 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  40 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  41
  42 namespace content {
  43 namespace {
  44
  45 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  46 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  47 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  48 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  49 // of it, see:
  50 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  51 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  52   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  53   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  54   L"airfoilinject3.dll",          // Airfoil.
  55   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  56   L"assistant_x64.dll",           // Unknown.
  57   L"avcuf64.dll",                 // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
  58   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  59   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  60   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  61   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  62   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  63   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  64   L"cplushook.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  65   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  66   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  67   L"esspd.dll",                   // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  68   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  69   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  70   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  71   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  72   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  73   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  74   L"icatcdll.dll",                // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  75   L"icdcnl.dll",                  // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  76   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  77   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  78   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  79   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  80   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  81   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  82   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  83   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  84   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  85   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  86   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  87   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  88   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  89   L"pastali32.dll",               // PastaLeads.
  90   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  91   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  92   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  93   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  94   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  95   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  96   L"picrmi32.dll",                // PicRec.
  97   L"picrmi64.dll",                // PicRec.
  98   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  99   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
 100   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
 101   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
 102   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
 103   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
 104   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
 105   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
 106   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
 107   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
 108   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
 109   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
 110   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
 111   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
 112   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
 113   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
 114   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
 115   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
 116   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 117   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 118   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 119   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 120   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 121   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 122 };
 123
 124 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 125 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 126 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 127 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 128                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 129                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 130   base::FilePath directory;
 131   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 132     return false;
 133
 134   if (sub_dir)
 135     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 136
 137   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 138   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 139                            directory.value().c_str());
 140   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 141     return false;
 142
 143   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 144   if (children)
 145     directory_str += L"*";
 146   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 147
 148   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 149                            directory_str.c_str());
 150   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 151     return false;
 152
 153   return true;
 154 }
 155
 156 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
 157 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
 158 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
 159                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 160                       sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 161   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 162   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 163                            key.c_str());
 164   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 165     return false;
 166
 167   key += L"\\*";
 168   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 169                            key.c_str());
 170   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 171     return false;
 172
 173   return true;
 174 }
 175
 176 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 177 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 178   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 179   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 180   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 181     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 182     return false;
 183   }
 184   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 185     return false;
 186   base::FilePath fname(path);
 187   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 188 }
 189
 190 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 191 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 192 // is also loaded in this process.
 193 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 194                         bool check_in_browser,
 195                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 196   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 197   if (!module) {
 198     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 199     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 200     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 201     std::wstring name(module_name);
 202     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 203     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 204     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 205     if (period <= 8)
 206       return;
 207     for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) {
 208       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0};
 209       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 210       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 211       if (check_in_browser) {
 212         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 213         if (!module)
 214           return;
 215         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 216         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 217         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 218           return;
 219       }
 220       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 221       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 222     }
 223   }
 224   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 225   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 226   return;
 227 }
 228
 229 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 230 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 231 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 232 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 233   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 234     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 235 }
 236
 237 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 238 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 239   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 240   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 241   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 242     HANDLE token;
 243     DWORD session_id_length;
 244     DWORD session_id = 0;
 245
 246     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 247     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 248         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 249     CloseHandle(token);
 250     if (session_id)
 251       s_session_id = session_id;
 252   }
 253
 254   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 255 }
 256
 257 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 258 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 259   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 260     return true;
 261
 262   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 263   // job.
 264   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 265     return true;
 266
 267   BOOL in_job = true;
 268   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 269   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 270     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 271   if (!in_job)
 272     return true;
 273
 274   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 275   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
 276   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 277                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 278                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 279     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 280     return true;
 281   }
 282   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 283     return true;
 284
 285   return false;
 286 }
 287
 288 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 289 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 290   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 291
 292   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 293   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 294   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 295                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 296                            L"Section");
 297   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 298     return false;
 299
 300   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 301   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 302   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 303   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 304                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 305                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 306   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 307     return false;
 308
 309   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 310   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 311   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 312   // system services.
 313   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 314                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 315                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 316   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 317     return false;
 318
 319   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 320   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 321   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 322                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 323                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 324   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 325     return false;
 326
 327   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 328 #ifndef NDEBUG
 329   base::FilePath app_dir;
 330   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 331     return false;
 332
 333   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 334   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 335                                                  long_path_buf,
 336                                                  MAX_PATH);
 337   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 338     return false;
 339
 340   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 341   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 342   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 343                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 344                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 345   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 346     return false;
 347 #endif  // NDEBUG
 348
 349   // Add the policy for read-only PDB file access for AddressSanitizer.
 350 #if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
 351   base::FilePath exe;
 352   if (!PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &exe))
 353     return false;
 354   base::FilePath pdb_path = exe.DirName().Append(L"*.pdb");
 355   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 356                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 357                            pdb_path.value().c_str());
 358   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 359     return false;
 360 #endif
 361
 362 #if defined(SANITIZER_COVERAGE)
 363   DWORD coverage_dir_size =
 364       ::GetEnvironmentVariable(L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", NULL, 0);
 365   if (coverage_dir_size == 0) {
 366     LOG(WARNING) << "SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR was not set, coverage won't work.";
 367   } else {
 368     std::wstring coverage_dir;
 369     wchar_t* coverage_dir_str = WriteInto(&coverage_dir, coverage_dir_size);
 370     coverage_dir_size = ::GetEnvironmentVariable(
 371         L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", coverage_dir_str, coverage_dir_size);
 372     CHECK(coverage_dir.size() == coverage_dir_size);
 373     base::FilePath sancov_path =
 374         base::FilePath(coverage_dir).Append(L"*.sancov");
 375     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 376                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 377                              sancov_path.value().c_str());
 378     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 379       return false;
 380   }
 381 #endif
 382
 383   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 384   return true;
 385 }
 386
 387 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 388   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 389   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 390   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 391                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 392                            L"Event");
 393   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 394     return false;
 395
 396   // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
 397   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 398     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
 399   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 400     return false;
 401
 402   // Close the proxy settings on XP.
 403   if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003)
 404     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key",
 405                  L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \
 406                      L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings");
 407   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 408     return false;
 409
 410
 411   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 412   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 413     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 414     // token is restricted.
 415     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 416   }
 417
 418   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 419   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 420   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 421   policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
 422
 423   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) {
 424     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 425   }
 426
 427   return true;
 428 }
 429
 430 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 431 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 432 // command_line as needed.
 433 void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
 434   const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line =
 435       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 436   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 437   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 438     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 439     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 440         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 441     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 442       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 443     }
 444     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 445   }
 446 }
 447
 448 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 449 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 450 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 451 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 452
 453 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 454                                                   HANDLE source_handle,
 455                                                   HANDLE target_process_handle,
 456                                                   LPHANDLE target_handle,
 457                                                   DWORD desired_access,
 458                                                   BOOL inherit_handle,
 459                                                   DWORD options);
 460
 461 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
 462
 463 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 464
 465 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 466     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 467     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 468     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 469
 470 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 471   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 472   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 473   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 474       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 475   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 476   NTSTATUS error;
 477   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 478   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 479   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 480
 481   // Get the object basic information.
 482   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 483   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 484   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 485                         &size);
 486   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 487
 488   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 489       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 490
 491   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 492     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask =
 493         ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
 494     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 495         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 496   }
 497 }
 498
 499 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 500                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 501                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 502                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 503                                  DWORD desired_access,
 504                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 505                                  DWORD options) {
 506   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 507   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 508                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 509                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 510     return FALSE;
 511
 512   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 513   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 514       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 515     return TRUE;
 516
 517   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 518   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 519   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 520     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 521     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 522       HANDLE temp_handle;
 523       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 524                                         target_process_handle,
 525                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 526                                         &temp_handle,
 527                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 528                                         FALSE, 0));
 529       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 530       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 531     }
 532   }
 533
 534   if (is_in_job) {
 535     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 536     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 537
 538     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 539     HANDLE temp_handle;
 540     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 541                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 542                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 543     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 544
 545     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 546     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get());
 547   }
 548
 549   return TRUE;
 550 }
 551 #endif
 552
 553 }  // namespace
 554
 555 void SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
 556                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 557                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 558                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 559   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) {
 560 #ifdef _WIN64
 561     policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
 562 #endif
 563     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 564   } else {
 565     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 566   }
 567 }
 568
 569 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 570 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 571 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 572   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 573   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 574       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 575   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 576 }
 577
 578 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 579   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 580   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 581   DCHECK(broker_services);
 582   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 583   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 584   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 585
 586   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 587 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 588   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 589   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 590   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 591   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 592   // original function.
 593   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 594       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 595     HMODULE module = NULL;
 596     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 597     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 598                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 599                               &module));
 600     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 601     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 602       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 603       result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 604           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 605           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 606       CHECK(result == 0);
 607       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
 608           reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
 609               g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
 610     }
 611   }
 612 #endif
 613
 614   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 615 }
 616
 617 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 618   DCHECK(target_services);
 619   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 620   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 621   g_target_services = target_services;
 622   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 623 }
 624
 625 base::Process StartSandboxedProcess(
 626     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 627     base::CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 628   const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
 629       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 630   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 631
 632   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 633
 634   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 635   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 636       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 637     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 638   }
 639
 640   ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
 641
 642   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 643   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 644   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 645   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 646
 647   if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
 648       browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 649       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 650     base::Process process =
 651         base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions());
 652     // TODO(rvargas) crbug.com/417532: Don't share a raw handle.
 653     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process.Handle());
 654     return process.Pass();
 655   }
 656
 657   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 658
 659   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 660                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 661                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 662                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 663                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 664
 665 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 666   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess &&
 667       IsWin32kRendererLockdownEnabled()) {
 668     if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
 669                         sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
 670                         NULL) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 671       return base::Process();
 672     }
 673     mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
 674   }
 675 #endif
 676
 677   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 678     return base::Process();
 679
 680   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 681                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 682
 683   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 684     return base::Process();
 685
 686   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 687
 688   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 689   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 690   if (delegate)
 691     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 692
 693   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 694     return base::Process();
 695
 696   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
 697 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 698     if (gfx::win::ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
 699       AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
 700                   NULL,
 701                   true,
 702                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 703                   policy);
 704
 705       // If DirectWrite is enabled for font rendering then open the font cache
 706       // section which is created by the browser and pass the handle to the
 707       // renderer process. This is needed because renderer processes on
 708       // Windows 8+ may be running in an AppContainer sandbox and hence their
 709       // kernel object namespace may be partitioned.
 710       std::string name(content::kFontCacheSharedSectionName);
 711       name.append(base::UintToString(base::GetCurrentProcId()));
 712
 713       base::SharedMemory direct_write_font_cache_section;
 714       if (direct_write_font_cache_section.Open(name, true)) {
 715         void* shared_handle =
 716             policy->AddHandleToShare(direct_write_font_cache_section.handle());
 717         cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kFontCacheSharedHandle,
 718             base::UintToString(reinterpret_cast<unsigned int>(shared_handle)));
 719       }
 720     }
 721 #endif
 722   } else {
 723     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 724     // this subprocess. See
 725     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 726     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 727   }
 728
 729   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 730   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 731     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 732                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 733                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 734     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 735       return base::Process();
 736
 737     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 738     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 739                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 740                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 741     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 742       return base::Process();
 743   }
 744
 745   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 746     NOTREACHED();
 747     return base::Process();
 748   }
 749
 750   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 751     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 752     // have no effect.
 753     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 754     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 755   }
 756
 757   if (delegate) {
 758     bool success = true;
 759     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 760     if (!success)
 761       return base::Process();
 762   }
 763
 764   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 765
 766   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 767   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 768                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 769                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 770                policy, &temp_process_info);
 771   DWORD last_error = ::GetLastError();
 772   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 773
 774   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 775
 776   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 777     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 778       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 779     else if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_PROCESS) {
 780       // TODO(shrikant): Remove this special case handling after determining
 781       // cause for lowbox/createprocess errors.
 782       sandbox::PolicyBase* policy_base =
 783           static_cast<sandbox::PolicyBase*>(policy);
 784       UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY(policy_base->GetLowBoxSid() ?
 785                                       "Process.Sandbox.Lowbox.Launch.Error" :
 786                                       "Process.Sandbox.Launch.Error",
 787                                   last_error);
 788     } else
 789       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 790
 791     policy->Release();
 792     return base::Process();
 793   }
 794   policy->Release();
 795
 796   if (delegate)
 797     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 798
 799   CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != -1);
 800   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 801   return base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle());
 802 }
 803
 804 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 805                            DWORD target_process_id,
 806                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 807                            DWORD desired_access,
 808                            DWORD options) {
 809   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 810   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 811     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 812                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 813                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 814
 815   }
 816
 817   // Try the broker next
 818   if (g_target_services &&
 819       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 820                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 821                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 822     return true;
 823   }
 824
 825   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 826   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 827   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 828                                     target_process_id));
 829   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 830     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 831                                 target_process.Get(), target_handle,
 832                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 833   }
 834
 835   return false;
 836 }
 837
 838 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 839   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 840 }
 841
 842 }  // namespace content