net/cert/cert_verify_proc_mac.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_mac.h"
   6
   7 #include <CommonCrypto/CommonDigest.h>
   8 #include <CoreServices/CoreServices.h>
   9 #include <Security/Security.h>
  10
  11 #include <string>
  12 #include <vector>
  13
  14 #include "base/logging.h"
  15 #include "base/mac/mac_logging.h"
  16 #include "base/mac/scoped_cftyperef.h"
  17 #include "base/sha1.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/string_piece.h"
  19 #include "base/synchronization/lock.h"
  20 #include "crypto/mac_security_services_lock.h"
  21 #include "crypto/sha2.h"
  22 #include "net/base/net_errors.h"
  23 #include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
  24 #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
  25 #include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h"
  26 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
  27 #include "net/cert/crl_set.h"
  28 #include "net/cert/test_root_certs.h"
  29 #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
  30 #include "net/cert/x509_certificate_known_roots_mac.h"
  31 #include "net/cert/x509_util_mac.h"
  32
  33 // From 10.7.2 libsecurity_keychain-55035/lib/SecTrustPriv.h, for use with
  34 // SecTrustCopyExtendedResult.
  35 #ifndef kSecEVOrganizationName
  36 #define kSecEVOrganizationName CFSTR("Organization")
  37 #endif
  38
  39 using base::ScopedCFTypeRef;
  40
  41 namespace net {
  42
  43 namespace {
  44
  45 typedef OSStatus (*SecTrustCopyExtendedResultFuncPtr)(SecTrustRef,
  46                                                       CFDictionaryRef*);
  47
  48 int NetErrorFromOSStatus(OSStatus status) {
  49   switch (status) {
  50     case noErr:
  51       return OK;
  52     case errSecNotAvailable:
  53     case errSecNoCertificateModule:
  54     case errSecNoPolicyModule:
  55       return ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
  56     case errSecAuthFailed:
  57       return ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
  58     default: {
  59       OSSTATUS_LOG(ERROR, status) << "Unknown error mapped to ERR_FAILED";
  60       return ERR_FAILED;
  61     }
  62   }
  63 }
  64
  65 CertStatus CertStatusFromOSStatus(OSStatus status) {
  66   switch (status) {
  67     case noErr:
  68       return 0;
  69
  70     case CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT:
  71     case CSSMERR_TP_NOT_TRUSTED:
  72     case CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY:
  73       return CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
  74
  75     case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_EXPIRED:
  76     case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET:
  77       // "Expired" and "not yet valid" collapse into a single status.
  78       return CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
  79
  80     case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_REVOKED:
  81     case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_SUSPENDED:
  82       return CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
  83
  84     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
  85       return CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
  86
  87     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_NOT_FOUND:
  88     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_UNAVAILABLE:
  89     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_INCOMPLETE_REVOCATION_CHECK:
  90       return CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM;
  91
  92     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_EXPIRED:
  93     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_NOT_VALID_YET:
  94     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_SERVER_DOWN:
  95     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_NOT_TRUSTED:
  96     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT:
  97     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_POLICY_FAIL:
  98     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_BAD_RESPONSE:
  99     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_BAD_REQUEST:
 100     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_STATUS_UNRECOGNIZED:
 101     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_NETWORK_FAILURE:
 102     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_NOT_TRUSTED:
 103     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT:
 104     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_SIG_ERROR:
 105     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_NO_SIGNER:
 106     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_MALFORMED_REQ:
 107     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_INTERNAL_ERR:
 108     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_TRY_LATER:
 109     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_SIG_REQUIRED:
 110     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_UNAUTHORIZED:
 111     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_NONCE_MISMATCH:
 112       // We asked for a revocation check, but didn't get it.
 113       return CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION;
 114
 115     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_SSL_BAD_EXT_KEY_USE:
 116       // TODO(wtc): Should we add CERT_STATUS_WRONG_USAGE?
 117       return CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
 118
 119     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_BAD_URI:
 120     case CSSMERR_APPLETP_IDP_FAIL:
 121       return CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
 122
 123     case CSSMERR_CSP_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE:
 124       // Mapping UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE to CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY is not strictly
 125       // accurate, as the error may have been returned due to a key size
 126       // that exceeded the maximum supported. However, within
 127       // CertVerifyProcMac::VerifyInternal(), this code should only be
 128       // encountered as a certificate status code, and only when the key size
 129       // is smaller than the minimum required (1024 bits).
 130       return CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY;
 131
 132     default: {
 133       // Failure was due to something Chromium doesn't define a
 134       // specific status for (such as basic constraints violation, or
 135       // unknown critical extension)
 136       OSSTATUS_LOG(WARNING, status)
 137           << "Unknown error mapped to CERT_STATUS_INVALID";
 138       return CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
 139     }
 140   }
 141 }
 142
 143 // Creates a series of SecPolicyRefs to be added to a SecTrustRef used to
 144 // validate a certificate for an SSL server. |hostname| contains the name of
 145 // the SSL server that the certificate should be verified against. |flags| is
 146 // a bitwise-OR of VerifyFlags that can further alter how trust is validated,
 147 // such as how revocation is checked. If successful, returns noErr, and
 148 // stores the resultant array of SecPolicyRefs in |policies|.
 149 OSStatus CreateTrustPolicies(const std::string& hostname,
 150                              int flags,
 151                              ScopedCFTypeRef<CFArrayRef>* policies) {
 152   ScopedCFTypeRef<CFMutableArrayRef> local_policies(
 153       CFArrayCreateMutable(kCFAllocatorDefault, 0, &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks));
 154   if (!local_policies)
 155     return memFullErr;
 156
 157   SecPolicyRef ssl_policy;
 158   OSStatus status = x509_util::CreateSSLServerPolicy(hostname, &ssl_policy);
 159   if (status)
 160     return status;
 161   CFArrayAppendValue(local_policies, ssl_policy);
 162   CFRelease(ssl_policy);
 163
 164   // Explicitly add revocation policies, in order to override system
 165   // revocation checking policies and instead respect the application-level
 166   // revocation preference.
 167   status = x509_util::CreateRevocationPolicies(
 168       (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED),
 169       (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY),
 170       local_policies);
 171   if (status)
 172     return status;
 173
 174   policies->reset(local_policies.release());
 175   return noErr;
 176 }
 177
 178 // Saves some information about the certificate chain |cert_chain| in
 179 // |*verify_result|. The caller MUST initialize |*verify_result| before
 180 // calling this function.
 181 void GetCertChainInfo(CFArrayRef cert_chain,
 182                       CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO* chain_info,
 183                       CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
 184   SecCertificateRef verified_cert = NULL;
 185   std::vector<SecCertificateRef> verified_chain;
 186   for (CFIndex i = 0, count = CFArrayGetCount(cert_chain); i < count; ++i) {
 187     SecCertificateRef chain_cert = reinterpret_cast<SecCertificateRef>(
 188         const_cast<void*>(CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(cert_chain, i)));
 189     if (i == 0) {
 190       verified_cert = chain_cert;
 191     } else {
 192       verified_chain.push_back(chain_cert);
 193     }
 194
 195     if ((chain_info[i].StatusBits & CSSM_CERT_STATUS_IS_IN_ANCHORS) ||
 196         (chain_info[i].StatusBits & CSSM_CERT_STATUS_IS_ROOT)) {
 197       // The current certificate is either in the user's trusted store or is
 198       // a root (self-signed) certificate. Ignore the signature algorithm for
 199       // these certificates, as it is meaningless for security. We allow
 200       // self-signed certificates (i == 0 & IS_ROOT), since we accept that
 201       // any security assertions by such a cert are inherently meaningless.
 202       continue;
 203     }
 204
 205     x509_util::CSSMCachedCertificate cached_cert;
 206     OSStatus status = cached_cert.Init(chain_cert);
 207     if (status)
 208       continue;
 209     x509_util::CSSMFieldValue signature_field;
 210     status = cached_cert.GetField(&CSSMOID_X509V1SignatureAlgorithm,
 211                                   &signature_field);
 212     if (status || !signature_field.field())
 213       continue;
 214     // Match the behaviour of OS X system tools and defensively check that
 215     // sizes are appropriate. This would indicate a critical failure of the
 216     // OS X certificate library, but based on history, it is best to play it
 217     // safe.
 218     const CSSM_X509_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER* sig_algorithm =
 219         signature_field.GetAs<CSSM_X509_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER>();
 220     if (!sig_algorithm)
 221       continue;
 222
 223     const CSSM_OID* alg_oid = &sig_algorithm->algorithm;
 224     if (CSSMOIDEqual(alg_oid, &CSSMOID_MD2WithRSA)) {
 225       verify_result->has_md2 = true;
 226     } else if (CSSMOIDEqual(alg_oid, &CSSMOID_MD4WithRSA)) {
 227       verify_result->has_md4 = true;
 228     } else if (CSSMOIDEqual(alg_oid, &CSSMOID_MD5WithRSA)) {
 229       verify_result->has_md5 = true;
 230     }
 231   }
 232   if (!verified_cert)
 233     return;
 234
 235   verify_result->verified_cert =
 236       X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain);
 237 }
 238
 239 void AppendPublicKeyHashes(CFArrayRef chain,
 240                            HashValueVector* hashes) {
 241   const CFIndex n = CFArrayGetCount(chain);
 242   for (CFIndex i = 0; i < n; i++) {
 243     SecCertificateRef cert = reinterpret_cast<SecCertificateRef>(
 244         const_cast<void*>(CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(chain, i)));
 245
 246     CSSM_DATA cert_data;
 247     OSStatus err = SecCertificateGetData(cert, &cert_data);
 248     DCHECK_EQ(err, noErr);
 249     base::StringPiece der_bytes(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert_data.Data),
 250                                cert_data.Length);
 251     base::StringPiece spki_bytes;
 252     if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki_bytes))
 253       continue;
 254
 255     HashValue sha1(HASH_VALUE_SHA1);
 256     CC_SHA1(spki_bytes.data(), spki_bytes.size(), sha1.data());
 257     hashes->push_back(sha1);
 258
 259     HashValue sha256(HASH_VALUE_SHA256);
 260     CC_SHA256(spki_bytes.data(), spki_bytes.size(), sha256.data());
 261     hashes->push_back(sha256);
 262   }
 263 }
 264
 265 bool CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(CFArrayRef chain, CRLSet* crl_set) {
 266   if (CFArrayGetCount(chain) == 0)
 267     return true;
 268
 269   // We iterate from the root certificate down to the leaf, keeping track of
 270   // the issuer's SPKI at each step.
 271   std::string issuer_spki_hash;
 272   for (CFIndex i = CFArrayGetCount(chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
 273     SecCertificateRef cert = reinterpret_cast<SecCertificateRef>(
 274         const_cast<void*>(CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(chain, i)));
 275
 276     CSSM_DATA cert_data;
 277     OSStatus err = SecCertificateGetData(cert, &cert_data);
 278     if (err != noErr) {
 279       NOTREACHED();
 280       continue;
 281     }
 282     base::StringPiece der_bytes(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert_data.Data),
 283                                 cert_data.Length);
 284     base::StringPiece spki;
 285     if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki)) {
 286       NOTREACHED();
 287       continue;
 288     }
 289
 290     const std::string spki_hash = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki);
 291     x509_util::CSSMCachedCertificate cached_cert;
 292     if (cached_cert.Init(cert) != CSSM_OK) {
 293       NOTREACHED();
 294       continue;
 295     }
 296     x509_util::CSSMFieldValue serial_number;
 297     err = cached_cert.GetField(&CSSMOID_X509V1SerialNumber, &serial_number);
 298     if (err || !serial_number.field()) {
 299       NOTREACHED();
 300       continue;
 301     }
 302
 303     base::StringPiece serial(
 304         reinterpret_cast<const char*>(serial_number.field()->Data),
 305         serial_number.field()->Length);
 306
 307     CRLSet::Result result = crl_set->CheckSPKI(spki_hash);
 308
 309     if (result != CRLSet::REVOKED && !issuer_spki_hash.empty())
 310       result = crl_set->CheckSerial(serial, issuer_spki_hash);
 311
 312     issuer_spki_hash = spki_hash;
 313
 314     switch (result) {
 315       case CRLSet::REVOKED:
 316         return false;
 317       case CRLSet::UNKNOWN:
 318       case CRLSet::GOOD:
 319         continue;
 320       default:
 321         NOTREACHED();
 322         return false;
 323     }
 324   }
 325
 326   return true;
 327 }
 328
 329 // IsIssuedByKnownRoot returns true if the given chain is rooted at a root CA
 330 // that we recognise as a standard root.
 331 // static
 332 bool IsIssuedByKnownRoot(CFArrayRef chain) {
 333   int n = CFArrayGetCount(chain);
 334   if (n < 1)
 335     return false;
 336   SecCertificateRef root_ref = reinterpret_cast<SecCertificateRef>(
 337       const_cast<void*>(CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(chain, n - 1)));
 338   SHA1HashValue hash = X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(root_ref);
 339   return IsSHA1HashInSortedArray(
 340       hash, &kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes[0][0], sizeof(kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes));
 341 }
 342
 343 // Builds and evaluates a SecTrustRef for the certificate chain contained
 344 // in |cert_array|, using the verification policies in |trust_policies|. On
 345 // success, returns OK, and updates |trust_ref|, |trust_result|,
 346 // |verified_chain|, and |chain_info| with the verification results. On
 347 // failure, no output parameters are modified.
 348 //
 349 // Note: An OK return does not mean that |cert_array| is trusted, merely that
 350 // verification was performed successfully.
 351 //
 352 // This function should only be called while the Mac Security Services lock is
 353 // held.
 354 int BuildAndEvaluateSecTrustRef(CFArrayRef cert_array,
 355                                 CFArrayRef trust_policies,
 356                                 int flags,
 357                                 ScopedCFTypeRef<SecTrustRef>* trust_ref,
 358                                 SecTrustResultType* trust_result,
 359                                 ScopedCFTypeRef<CFArrayRef>* verified_chain,
 360                                 CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO** chain_info) {
 361   SecTrustRef tmp_trust = NULL;
 362   OSStatus status = SecTrustCreateWithCertificates(cert_array, trust_policies,
 363                                                    &tmp_trust);
 364   if (status)
 365     return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
 366   ScopedCFTypeRef<SecTrustRef> scoped_tmp_trust(tmp_trust);
 367
 368   if (TestRootCerts::HasInstance()) {
 369     status = TestRootCerts::GetInstance()->FixupSecTrustRef(tmp_trust);
 370     if (status)
 371       return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
 372   }
 373
 374   CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_DATA tp_action_data;
 375   memset(&tp_action_data, 0, sizeof(tp_action_data));
 376   tp_action_data.Version = CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_VERSION;
 377   // Allow CSSM to download any missing intermediate certificates if an
 378   // authorityInfoAccess extension or issuerAltName extension is present.
 379   tp_action_data.ActionFlags = CSSM_TP_ACTION_FETCH_CERT_FROM_NET |
 380                                CSSM_TP_ACTION_TRUST_SETTINGS;
 381
 382   // Note: For EV certificates, the Apple TP will handle setting these flags
 383   // as part of EV evaluation.
 384   if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED) {
 385     // Require a positive result from an OCSP responder or a CRL (or both)
 386     // for every certificate in the chain. The Apple TP automatically
 387     // excludes the self-signed root from this requirement. If a certificate
 388     // is missing both a crlDistributionPoints extension and an
 389     // authorityInfoAccess extension with an OCSP responder URL, then we
 390     // will get a kSecTrustResultRecoverableTrustFailure back from
 391     // SecTrustEvaluate(), with a
 392     // CSSMERR_APPLETP_INCOMPLETE_REVOCATION_CHECK error code. In that case,
 393     // we'll set our own result to include
 394     // CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM. If one or both extensions are
 395     // present, and a check fails (server unavailable, OCSP retry later,
 396     // signature mismatch), then we'll set our own result to include
 397     // CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION.
 398     tp_action_data.ActionFlags |= CSSM_TP_ACTION_REQUIRE_REV_PER_CERT;
 399
 400     // Note, even if revocation checking is disabled, SecTrustEvaluate() will
 401     // modify the OCSP options so as to attempt OCSP checking if it believes a
 402     // certificate may chain to an EV root. However, because network fetches
 403     // are disabled in CreateTrustPolicies() when revocation checking is
 404     // disabled, these will only go against the local cache.
 405   }
 406
 407   CFDataRef action_data_ref =
 408       CFDataCreateWithBytesNoCopy(kCFAllocatorDefault,
 409                                   reinterpret_cast<UInt8*>(&tp_action_data),
 410                                   sizeof(tp_action_data), kCFAllocatorNull);
 411   if (!action_data_ref)
 412     return ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
 413   ScopedCFTypeRef<CFDataRef> scoped_action_data_ref(action_data_ref);
 414   status = SecTrustSetParameters(tmp_trust, CSSM_TP_ACTION_DEFAULT,
 415                                  action_data_ref);
 416   if (status)
 417     return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
 418
 419   // Verify the certificate. A non-zero result from SecTrustGetResult()
 420   // indicates that some fatal error occurred and the chain couldn't be
 421   // processed, not that the chain contains no errors. We need to examine the
 422   // output of SecTrustGetResult() to determine that.
 423   SecTrustResultType tmp_trust_result;
 424   status = SecTrustEvaluate(tmp_trust, &tmp_trust_result);
 425   if (status)
 426     return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
 427   CFArrayRef tmp_verified_chain = NULL;
 428   CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO* tmp_chain_info;
 429   status = SecTrustGetResult(tmp_trust, &tmp_trust_result, &tmp_verified_chain,
 430                              &tmp_chain_info);
 431   if (status)
 432     return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
 433
 434   trust_ref->swap(scoped_tmp_trust);
 435   *trust_result = tmp_trust_result;
 436   verified_chain->reset(tmp_verified_chain);
 437   *chain_info = tmp_chain_info;
 438
 439   return OK;
 440 }
 441
 442 // OS X ships with both "GTE CyberTrust Global Root" and "Baltimore CyberTrust
 443 // Root" as part of its trusted root store. However, a cross-certified version
 444 // of the "Baltimore CyberTrust Root" exists that chains to "GTE CyberTrust
 445 // Global Root". When OS X/Security.framework attempts to evaluate such a
 446 // certificate chain, it disregards the "Baltimore CyberTrust Root" that exists
 447 // within Keychain and instead attempts to terminate the chain in the "GTE
 448 // CyberTrust Global Root". However, the GTE root is scheduled to be removed in
 449 // a future OS X update (for sunsetting purposes), and once removed, such
 450 // chains will fail validation, even though a trust anchor still exists.
 451 //
 452 // Rather than over-generalizing a solution that may mask a number of TLS
 453 // misconfigurations, attempt to specifically match the affected
 454 // cross-certified certificate and remove it from certificate chain processing.
 455 bool IsBadBaltimoreGTECertificate(SecCertificateRef cert) {
 456   // Matches the GTE-signed Baltimore CyberTrust Root
 457   // https://cacert.omniroot.com/Baltimore-to-GTE-04-12.pem
 458   static const SHA1HashValue kBadBaltimoreHashNew =
 459     { { 0x4D, 0x34, 0xEA, 0x92, 0x76, 0x4B, 0x3A, 0x31, 0x49, 0x11,
 460         0x99, 0x52, 0xF4, 0x19, 0x30, 0xCA, 0x11, 0x34, 0x83, 0x61 } };
 461   // Matches the legacy GTE-signed Baltimore CyberTrust Root
 462   // https://cacert.omniroot.com/gte-2-2025.pem
 463   static const SHA1HashValue kBadBaltimoreHashOld =
 464     { { 0x54, 0xD8, 0xCB, 0x49, 0x1F, 0xA1, 0x6D, 0xF8, 0x87, 0xDC,
 465         0x94, 0xA9, 0x34, 0xCC, 0x83, 0x6B, 0xDA, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0x69 } };
 466
 467   SHA1HashValue fingerprint = X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(cert);
 468
 469   return fingerprint.Equals(kBadBaltimoreHashNew) ||
 470          fingerprint.Equals(kBadBaltimoreHashOld);
 471 }
 472
 473 // Attempts to re-verify |cert_array| after adjusting the inputs to work around
 474 // known issues in OS X. To be used if BuildAndEvaluateSecTrustRef fails to
 475 // return a positive result for verification.
 476 //
 477 // This function should only be called while the Mac Security Services lock is
 478 // held.
 479 void RetrySecTrustEvaluateWithAdjustedChain(
 480     CFArrayRef cert_array,
 481     CFArrayRef trust_policies,
 482     int flags,
 483     ScopedCFTypeRef<SecTrustRef>* trust_ref,
 484     SecTrustResultType* trust_result,
 485     ScopedCFTypeRef<CFArrayRef>* verified_chain,
 486     CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO** chain_info) {
 487   CFIndex count = CFArrayGetCount(*verified_chain);
 488   CFIndex slice_point = 0;
 489
 490   for (CFIndex i = 1; i < count; ++i) {
 491     SecCertificateRef cert = reinterpret_cast<SecCertificateRef>(
 492         const_cast<void*>(CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(*verified_chain, i)));
 493     if (cert == NULL)
 494       return;  // Strange times; can't fix things up.
 495
 496     if (IsBadBaltimoreGTECertificate(cert)) {
 497       slice_point = i;
 498       break;
 499     }
 500   }
 501   if (slice_point == 0)
 502     return;  // Nothing to do.
 503
 504   ScopedCFTypeRef<CFMutableArrayRef> adjusted_cert_array(
 505       CFArrayCreateMutable(NULL, 0, &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks));
 506   // Note: This excludes the certificate at |slice_point|.
 507   CFArrayAppendArray(adjusted_cert_array, cert_array,
 508                      CFRangeMake(0, slice_point));
 509
 510   // Ignore the result; failure will preserve the old verification results.
 511   BuildAndEvaluateSecTrustRef(
 512       adjusted_cert_array, trust_policies, flags, trust_ref, trust_result,
 513       verified_chain, chain_info);
 514 }
 515
 516 }  // namespace
 517
 518 CertVerifyProcMac::CertVerifyProcMac() {}
 519
 520 CertVerifyProcMac::~CertVerifyProcMac() {}
 521
 522 bool CertVerifyProcMac::SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const {
 523   return false;
 524 }
 525
 526 int CertVerifyProcMac::VerifyInternal(
 527     X509Certificate* cert,
 528     const std::string& hostname,
 529     int flags,
 530     CRLSet* crl_set,
 531     const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
 532     CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
 533   ScopedCFTypeRef<CFArrayRef> trust_policies;
 534   OSStatus status = CreateTrustPolicies(hostname, flags, &trust_policies);
 535   if (status)
 536     return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
 537
 538   // Create and configure a SecTrustRef, which takes our certificate(s)
 539   // and our SSL SecPolicyRef. SecTrustCreateWithCertificates() takes an
 540   // array of certificates, the first of which is the certificate we're
 541   // verifying, and the subsequent (optional) certificates are used for
 542   // chain building.
 543   ScopedCFTypeRef<CFArrayRef> cert_array(cert->CreateOSCertChainForCert());
 544
 545   // Serialize all calls that may use the Keychain, to work around various
 546   // issues in OS X 10.6+ with multi-threaded access to Security.framework.
 547   base::AutoLock lock(crypto::GetMacSecurityServicesLock());
 548
 549   ScopedCFTypeRef<SecTrustRef> trust_ref;
 550   SecTrustResultType trust_result = kSecTrustResultDeny;
 551   ScopedCFTypeRef<CFArrayRef> completed_chain;
 552   CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO* chain_info = NULL;
 553
 554   int rv = BuildAndEvaluateSecTrustRef(
 555       cert_array, trust_policies, flags, &trust_ref, &trust_result,
 556       &completed_chain, &chain_info);
 557   if (rv != OK)
 558     return rv;
 559   if (trust_result != kSecTrustResultUnspecified &&
 560       trust_result != kSecTrustResultProceed) {
 561     RetrySecTrustEvaluateWithAdjustedChain(
 562         cert_array, trust_policies, flags, &trust_ref, &trust_result,
 563         &completed_chain, &chain_info);
 564   }
 565
 566   if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED)
 567     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
 568
 569   if (crl_set && !CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(completed_chain, crl_set))
 570     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
 571
 572   GetCertChainInfo(completed_chain, chain_info, verify_result);
 573
 574   // As of Security Update 2012-002/OS X 10.7.4, when an RSA key < 1024 bits
 575   // is encountered, CSSM returns CSSMERR_TP_VERIFY_ACTION_FAILED and adds
 576   // CSSMERR_CSP_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE as a certificate status. Avoid mapping
 577   // the CSSMERR_TP_VERIFY_ACTION_FAILED to CERT_STATUS_INVALID if the only
 578   // error was due to an unsupported key size.
 579   bool policy_failed = false;
 580   bool weak_key_or_signature_algorithm = false;
 581
 582   // Evaluate the results
 583   OSStatus cssm_result;
 584   switch (trust_result) {
 585     case kSecTrustResultUnspecified:
 586     case kSecTrustResultProceed:
 587       // Certificate chain is valid and trusted ("unspecified" indicates that
 588       // the user has not explicitly set a trust setting)
 589       break;
 590
 591     // According to SecTrust.h, kSecTrustResultConfirm isn't returned on 10.5+,
 592     // and it is marked deprecated in the 10.9 SDK.
 593     case kSecTrustResultDeny:
 594       // Certificate chain is explicitly untrusted.
 595       verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
 596       break;
 597
 598     case kSecTrustResultRecoverableTrustFailure:
 599       // Certificate chain has a failure that can be overridden by the user.
 600       status = SecTrustGetCssmResultCode(trust_ref, &cssm_result);
 601       if (status)
 602         return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
 603       if (cssm_result == CSSMERR_TP_VERIFY_ACTION_FAILED) {
 604         policy_failed = true;
 605       } else {
 606         verify_result->cert_status |= CertStatusFromOSStatus(cssm_result);
 607       }
 608       // Walk the chain of error codes in the CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO
 609       // structure which can catch multiple errors from each certificate.
 610       for (CFIndex index = 0, chain_count = CFArrayGetCount(completed_chain);
 611            index < chain_count; ++index) {
 612         if (chain_info[index].StatusBits & CSSM_CERT_STATUS_EXPIRED ||
 613             chain_info[index].StatusBits & CSSM_CERT_STATUS_NOT_VALID_YET)
 614           verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
 615         if (!IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status) &&
 616             chain_info[index].NumStatusCodes == 0) {
 617           LOG(WARNING) << "chain_info[" << index << "].NumStatusCodes is 0"
 618                           ", chain_info[" << index << "].StatusBits is "
 619                        << chain_info[index].StatusBits;
 620         }
 621         for (uint32 status_code_index = 0;
 622              status_code_index < chain_info[index].NumStatusCodes;
 623              ++status_code_index) {
 624           // As of OS X 10.9, attempting to verify a certificate chain that
 625           // contains a weak signature algorithm (MD2, MD5) in an intermediate
 626           // or leaf cert will be treated as a (recoverable) policy validation
 627           // failure, with the status code CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERTIFICATE
 628           // added to the Status Codes. Don't treat this code as an invalid
 629           // certificate; instead, map it to a weak key. Any truly invalid
 630           // certificates will have the major error (cssm_result) set to
 631           // CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERTIFICATE, rather than
 632           // CSSMERR_TP_VERIFY_ACTION_FAILED.
 633           CertStatus mapped_status = 0;
 634           if (policy_failed &&
 635               chain_info[index].StatusCodes[status_code_index] ==
 636                   CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERTIFICATE) {
 637               mapped_status = CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
 638               weak_key_or_signature_algorithm = true;
 639           } else {
 640               mapped_status = CertStatusFromOSStatus(
 641                   chain_info[index].StatusCodes[status_code_index]);
 642               if (mapped_status == CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY)
 643                 weak_key_or_signature_algorithm = true;
 644           }
 645           verify_result->cert_status |= mapped_status;
 646         }
 647       }
 648       if (policy_failed && !weak_key_or_signature_algorithm) {
 649         // If CSSMERR_TP_VERIFY_ACTION_FAILED wasn't returned due to a weak
 650         // key, map it back to an appropriate error code.
 651         verify_result->cert_status |= CertStatusFromOSStatus(cssm_result);
 652       }
 653       if (!IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) {
 654         LOG(ERROR) << "cssm_result=" << cssm_result;
 655         verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
 656         NOTREACHED();
 657       }
 658       break;
 659
 660     default:
 661       status = SecTrustGetCssmResultCode(trust_ref, &cssm_result);
 662       if (status)
 663         return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
 664       verify_result->cert_status |= CertStatusFromOSStatus(cssm_result);
 665       if (!IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) {
 666         LOG(WARNING) << "trust_result=" << trust_result;
 667         verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
 668       }
 669       break;
 670   }
 671
 672   // Perform hostname verification independent of SecTrustEvaluate. In order to
 673   // do so, mask off any reported name errors first.
 674   verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
 675   if (!cert->VerifyNameMatch(hostname,
 676                              &verify_result->common_name_fallback_used)) {
 677     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
 678   }
 679
 680   // TODO(wtc): Suppress CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM for now to be
 681   // compatible with Windows, which in turn implements this behavior to be
 682   // compatible with WinHTTP, which doesn't report this error (bug 3004).
 683   verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM;
 684
 685   AppendPublicKeyHashes(completed_chain, &verify_result->public_key_hashes);
 686   verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root = IsIssuedByKnownRoot(completed_chain);
 687
 688   if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status))
 689     return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 690
 691   if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) {
 692     // Determine the certificate's EV status using SecTrustCopyExtendedResult(),
 693     // which is an internal/private API function added in OS X 10.5.7.
 694     // Note: "ExtendedResult" means extended validation results.
 695     CFBundleRef bundle =
 696         CFBundleGetBundleWithIdentifier(CFSTR("com.apple.security"));
 697     if (bundle) {
 698       SecTrustCopyExtendedResultFuncPtr copy_extended_result =
 699           reinterpret_cast<SecTrustCopyExtendedResultFuncPtr>(
 700               CFBundleGetFunctionPointerForName(bundle,
 701                   CFSTR("SecTrustCopyExtendedResult")));
 702       if (copy_extended_result) {
 703         CFDictionaryRef ev_dict_temp = NULL;
 704         status = copy_extended_result(trust_ref, &ev_dict_temp);
 705         ScopedCFTypeRef<CFDictionaryRef> ev_dict(ev_dict_temp);
 706         ev_dict_temp = NULL;
 707         if (status == noErr && ev_dict) {
 708           // In 10.7.3, SecTrustCopyExtendedResult returns noErr and populates
 709           // ev_dict even for non-EV certificates, but only EV certificates
 710           // will cause ev_dict to contain kSecEVOrganizationName. In previous
 711           // releases, SecTrustCopyExtendedResult would only return noErr and
 712           // populate ev_dict for EV certificates, but would always include
 713           // kSecEVOrganizationName in that case, so checking for this key is
 714           // appropriate for all known versions of SecTrustCopyExtendedResult.
 715           // The actual organization name is unneeded here and can be accessed
 716           // through other means. All that matters here is the OS' conception
 717           // of whether or not the certificate is EV.
 718           if (CFDictionaryContainsKey(ev_dict,
 719                                       kSecEVOrganizationName)) {
 720             verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
 721             if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY)
 722               verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
 723           }
 724         }
 725       }
 726     }
 727   }
 728
 729   return OK;
 730 }
 731
 732 }  // namespace net