Explicitly add python-numpy dependency to install-build-deps.
[chromium-blink-merge.git] / components / nacl / loader / sandbox_linux / nacl_sandbox_linux.cc
blob1914116c4b3dd7f3e569e26b103428429741960f
1 // Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
3 // found in the LICENSE file.
5 #include "components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_sandbox_linux.h"
7 #include <errno.h>
8 #include <fcntl.h>
9 #include <sys/stat.h>
10 #include <sys/types.h>
11 #include <unistd.h>
13 #include "base/basictypes.h"
14 #include "base/callback.h"
15 #include "base/command_line.h"
16 #include "base/compiler_specific.h"
17 #include "base/logging.h"
18 #include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
19 #include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
20 #include "build/build_config.h"
21 #include "components/nacl/common/nacl_switches.h"
22 #include "components/nacl/loader/nonsfi/nonsfi_sandbox.h"
23 #include "components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_bpf_sandbox_linux.h"
24 #include "sandbox/linux/services/credentials.h"
25 #include "sandbox/linux/services/thread_helpers.h"
26 #include "sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h"
28 namespace nacl {
30 namespace {
32 // This is a poor man's check on whether we are sandboxed.
33 bool IsSandboxed() {
34 int proc_fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
35 if (proc_fd >= 0) {
36 PCHECK(0 == IGNORE_EINTR(close(proc_fd)));
37 return false;
39 return true;
42 } // namespace
44 NaClSandbox::NaClSandbox()
45 : layer_one_enabled_(false),
46 layer_one_sealed_(false),
47 layer_two_enabled_(false),
48 layer_two_is_nonsfi_(false),
49 proc_fd_(-1),
50 setuid_sandbox_client_(sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient::Create()) {
51 proc_fd_.reset(
52 HANDLE_EINTR(open("/proc", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)));
53 PCHECK(proc_fd_.is_valid());
56 NaClSandbox::~NaClSandbox() {
59 bool NaClSandbox::IsSingleThreaded() {
60 CHECK(proc_fd_.is_valid());
61 base::ScopedFD proc_self_task(HANDLE_EINTR(openat(
62 proc_fd_.get(), "self/task/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC)));
63 PCHECK(proc_self_task.is_valid());
64 return sandbox::ThreadHelpers::IsSingleThreaded(proc_self_task.get());
67 bool NaClSandbox::HasOpenDirectory() {
68 CHECK(proc_fd_.is_valid());
69 sandbox::Credentials credentials;
70 return credentials.HasOpenDirectory(proc_fd_.get());
73 void NaClSandbox::InitializeLayerOneSandbox() {
74 // Check that IsSandboxed() works. We should not be sandboxed at this point.
75 CHECK(!IsSandboxed()) << "Unexpectedly sandboxed!";
77 if (setuid_sandbox_client_->IsSuidSandboxChild()) {
78 setuid_sandbox_client_->CloseDummyFile();
80 // Make sure that no directory file descriptor is open, as it would bypass
81 // the setuid sandbox model.
82 CHECK(!HasOpenDirectory());
84 // Get sandboxed.
85 CHECK(setuid_sandbox_client_->ChrootMe());
86 CHECK(IsSandboxed());
87 layer_one_enabled_ = true;
91 void NaClSandbox::CheckForExpectedNumberOfOpenFds() {
92 if (setuid_sandbox_client_->IsSuidSandboxChild()) {
93 // We expect to have the following FDs open:
94 // 1-3) stdin, stdout, stderr.
95 // 4) The /dev/urandom FD used by base::GetUrandomFD().
96 // 5) A dummy pipe FD used to overwrite kSandboxIPCChannel.
97 // 6) The socket created by the SUID sandbox helper, used by ChrootMe().
98 // After ChrootMe(), this is no longer connected to anything.
99 // (Only present when running under the SUID sandbox.)
100 // 7) The socket for the Chrome IPC channel that's connected to the
101 // browser process, kPrimaryIPCChannel.
103 // This sanity check ensures that dynamically loaded libraries don't
104 // leave any FDs open before we enable the sandbox.
105 sandbox::Credentials credentials;
106 CHECK_EQ(7, credentials.CountOpenFds(proc_fd_.get()));
110 void NaClSandbox::InitializeLayerTwoSandbox(bool uses_nonsfi_mode) {
111 // seccomp-bpf only applies to the current thread, so it's critical to only
112 // have a single thread running here.
113 DCHECK(!layer_one_sealed_);
114 CHECK(IsSingleThreaded());
115 CheckForExpectedNumberOfOpenFds();
117 if (uses_nonsfi_mode) {
118 layer_two_enabled_ = nacl::nonsfi::InitializeBPFSandbox();
119 layer_two_is_nonsfi_ = true;
120 } else {
121 layer_two_enabled_ = nacl::InitializeBPFSandbox();
125 void NaClSandbox::SealLayerOneSandbox() {
126 if (!layer_two_enabled_) {
127 // If nothing prevents us, check that there is no superfluous directory
128 // open.
129 CHECK(!HasOpenDirectory());
131 proc_fd_.reset();
132 layer_one_sealed_ = true;
135 void NaClSandbox::CheckSandboxingStateWithPolicy() {
136 static const char kItIsDangerousMsg[] = " this is dangerous.";
137 static const char kItIsNotAllowedMsg[] =
138 " this is not allowed in this configuration.";
140 const bool no_sandbox_for_nonsfi_ok =
141 CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
142 switches::kNaClDangerousNoSandboxNonSfi);
143 const bool can_be_no_sandbox =
144 !layer_two_is_nonsfi_ || no_sandbox_for_nonsfi_ok;
146 if (!layer_one_enabled_ || !layer_one_sealed_) {
147 static const char kNoSuidMsg[] =
148 "The SUID sandbox is not engaged for NaCl:";
149 if (can_be_no_sandbox)
150 LOG(ERROR) << kNoSuidMsg << kItIsDangerousMsg;
151 else
152 LOG(FATAL) << kNoSuidMsg << kItIsNotAllowedMsg;
155 if (!layer_two_enabled_) {
156 static const char kNoBpfMsg[] =
157 "The seccomp-bpf sandbox is not engaged for NaCl:";
158 if (can_be_no_sandbox)
159 LOG(ERROR) << kNoBpfMsg << kItIsDangerousMsg;
160 else
161 LOG(FATAL) << kNoBpfMsg << kItIsNotAllowedMsg;
165 } // namespace nacl