Fix clank compilation errors in the relocation_packer.
[chromium-blink-merge.git] / sandbox / linux / services / credentials_unittest.cc
blob12ef32006abd74f8124ed8aa2164b8b3c8438f9e
1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
3 // found in the LICENSE file.
5 #include "sandbox/linux/services/credentials.h"
7 #include <errno.h>
8 #include <fcntl.h>
9 #include <stdio.h>
10 #include <sys/stat.h>
11 #include <sys/types.h>
12 #include <unistd.h>
14 #include "base/file_util.h"
15 #include "base/files/scoped_file.h"
16 #include "base/logging.h"
17 #include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
18 #include "sandbox/linux/tests/unit_tests.h"
19 #include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
21 namespace sandbox {
23 namespace {
25 bool DirectoryExists(const char* path) {
26 struct stat dir;
27 errno = 0;
28 int ret = stat(path, &dir);
29 return -1 != ret || ENOENT != errno;
32 bool WorkingDirectoryIsRoot() {
33 char current_dir[PATH_MAX];
34 char* cwd = getcwd(current_dir, sizeof(current_dir));
35 PCHECK(cwd);
36 if (strcmp("/", cwd)) return false;
38 // The current directory is the root. Add a few paranoid checks.
39 struct stat current;
40 CHECK_EQ(0, stat(".", &current));
41 struct stat parrent;
42 CHECK_EQ(0, stat("..", &parrent));
43 CHECK_EQ(current.st_dev, parrent.st_dev);
44 CHECK_EQ(current.st_ino, parrent.st_ino);
45 CHECK_EQ(current.st_mode, parrent.st_mode);
46 CHECK_EQ(current.st_uid, parrent.st_uid);
47 CHECK_EQ(current.st_gid, parrent.st_gid);
48 return true;
51 // Give dynamic tools a simple thing to test.
52 TEST(Credentials, CreateAndDestroy) {
54 Credentials cred1;
55 (void) cred1;
57 scoped_ptr<Credentials> cred2(new Credentials);
60 TEST(Credentials, CountOpenFds) {
61 base::ScopedFD proc_fd(open("/proc", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
62 ASSERT_TRUE(proc_fd.is_valid());
63 Credentials creds;
64 int fd_count = creds.CountOpenFds(proc_fd.get());
65 int fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
66 ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
67 EXPECT_EQ(fd_count + 1, creds.CountOpenFds(proc_fd.get()));
68 ASSERT_EQ(0, IGNORE_EINTR(close(fd)));
69 EXPECT_EQ(fd_count, creds.CountOpenFds(proc_fd.get()));
72 TEST(Credentials, HasOpenDirectory) {
73 Credentials creds;
74 // No open directory should exist at startup.
75 EXPECT_FALSE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(-1));
77 // Have a "/dev" file descriptor around.
78 int dev_fd = open("/dev", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
79 base::ScopedFD dev_fd_closer(dev_fd);
80 EXPECT_TRUE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(-1));
82 EXPECT_FALSE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(-1));
85 TEST(Credentials, HasOpenDirectoryWithFD) {
86 Credentials creds;
88 int proc_fd = open("/proc", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
89 base::ScopedFD proc_fd_closer(proc_fd);
90 ASSERT_LE(0, proc_fd);
92 // Don't pass |proc_fd|, an open directory (proc_fd) should
93 // be detected.
94 EXPECT_TRUE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(-1));
95 // Pass |proc_fd| and no open directory should be detected.
96 EXPECT_FALSE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(proc_fd));
99 // Have a "/dev" file descriptor around.
100 int dev_fd = open("/dev", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
101 base::ScopedFD dev_fd_closer(dev_fd);
102 EXPECT_TRUE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(proc_fd));
105 // The "/dev" file descriptor should now be closed, |proc_fd| is the only
106 // directory file descriptor open.
107 EXPECT_FALSE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(proc_fd));
110 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, DropAllCaps) {
111 Credentials creds;
112 CHECK(creds.DropAllCapabilities());
113 CHECK(!creds.HasAnyCapability());
116 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, GetCurrentCapString) {
117 Credentials creds;
118 CHECK(creds.DropAllCapabilities());
119 const char kNoCapabilityText[] = "=";
120 CHECK(*creds.GetCurrentCapString() == kNoCapabilityText);
123 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, MoveToNewUserNS) {
124 Credentials creds;
125 creds.DropAllCapabilities();
126 bool moved_to_new_ns = creds.MoveToNewUserNS();
127 fprintf(stdout,
128 "Unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER supported: %s\n",
129 moved_to_new_ns ? "true." : "false.");
130 fflush(stdout);
131 if (!moved_to_new_ns) {
132 fprintf(stdout, "This kernel does not support unprivileged namespaces. "
133 "USERNS tests will succeed without running.\n");
134 fflush(stdout);
135 return;
137 CHECK(creds.HasAnyCapability());
138 creds.DropAllCapabilities();
139 CHECK(!creds.HasAnyCapability());
142 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, SupportsUserNS) {
143 Credentials creds;
144 creds.DropAllCapabilities();
145 bool user_ns_supported = Credentials::SupportsNewUserNS();
146 bool moved_to_new_ns = creds.MoveToNewUserNS();
147 CHECK_EQ(user_ns_supported, moved_to_new_ns);
150 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, UidIsPreserved) {
151 Credentials creds;
152 creds.DropAllCapabilities();
153 uid_t old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid;
154 gid_t old_rgid, old_egid, old_sgid;
155 PCHECK(0 == getresuid(&old_ruid, &old_euid, &old_suid));
156 PCHECK(0 == getresgid(&old_rgid, &old_egid, &old_sgid));
157 // Probably missing kernel support.
158 if (!creds.MoveToNewUserNS()) return;
159 uid_t new_ruid, new_euid, new_suid;
160 PCHECK(0 == getresuid(&new_ruid, &new_euid, &new_suid));
161 CHECK(old_ruid == new_ruid);
162 CHECK(old_euid == new_euid);
163 CHECK(old_suid == new_suid);
165 gid_t new_rgid, new_egid, new_sgid;
166 PCHECK(0 == getresgid(&new_rgid, &new_egid, &new_sgid));
167 CHECK(old_rgid == new_rgid);
168 CHECK(old_egid == new_egid);
169 CHECK(old_sgid == new_sgid);
172 bool NewUserNSCycle(Credentials* creds) {
173 DCHECK(creds);
174 if (!creds->MoveToNewUserNS() ||
175 !creds->HasAnyCapability() ||
176 !creds->DropAllCapabilities() ||
177 creds->HasAnyCapability()) {
178 return false;
180 return true;
183 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, NestedUserNS) {
184 Credentials creds;
185 CHECK(creds.DropAllCapabilities());
186 // Probably missing kernel support.
187 if (!creds.MoveToNewUserNS()) return;
188 creds.DropAllCapabilities();
189 // As of 3.12, the kernel has a limit of 32. See create_user_ns().
190 const int kNestLevel = 10;
191 for (int i = 0; i < kNestLevel; ++i) {
192 CHECK(NewUserNSCycle(&creds)) << "Creating new user NS failed at iteration "
193 << i << ".";
197 // Test the WorkingDirectoryIsRoot() helper.
198 TEST(Credentials, CanDetectRoot) {
199 ASSERT_EQ(0, chdir("/proc/"));
200 ASSERT_FALSE(WorkingDirectoryIsRoot());
201 ASSERT_EQ(0, chdir("/"));
202 ASSERT_TRUE(WorkingDirectoryIsRoot());
205 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, DISABLE_ON_LSAN(DropFileSystemAccessIsSafe)) {
206 Credentials creds;
207 CHECK(creds.DropAllCapabilities());
208 // Probably missing kernel support.
209 if (!creds.MoveToNewUserNS()) return;
210 CHECK(creds.DropFileSystemAccess());
211 CHECK(!DirectoryExists("/proc"));
212 CHECK(WorkingDirectoryIsRoot());
213 // We want the chroot to never have a subdirectory. A subdirectory
214 // could allow a chroot escape.
215 CHECK_NE(0, mkdir("/test", 0700));
218 // Check that after dropping filesystem access and dropping privileges
219 // it is not possible to regain capabilities.
220 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, DISABLE_ON_LSAN(CannotRegainPrivileges)) {
221 Credentials creds;
222 CHECK(creds.DropAllCapabilities());
223 // Probably missing kernel support.
224 if (!creds.MoveToNewUserNS()) return;
225 CHECK(creds.DropFileSystemAccess());
226 CHECK(creds.DropAllCapabilities());
228 // The kernel should now prevent us from regaining capabilities because we
229 // are in a chroot.
230 CHECK(!Credentials::SupportsNewUserNS());
231 CHECK(!creds.MoveToNewUserNS());
234 } // namespace.
236 } // namespace sandbox.