content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  12 #include "base/files/file_util.h"
  13 #include "base/hash.h"
  14 #include "base/path_service.h"
  15 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  16 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  17 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  18 #include "base/trace_event/trace_event.h"
  19 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  20 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  21 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  22 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  23 #include "content/common/content_switches_internal.h"
  24 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  25 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  26 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  27 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  28 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  29 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  30 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  31 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  32 #include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h"
  33
  34 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  35 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  36
  37 namespace content {
  38 namespace {
  39
  40 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  41 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  42 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  43 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  44 // of it, see:
  45 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  46 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  47   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  48   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  49   L"airfoilinject3.dll",          // Airfoil.
  50   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  51   L"assistant_x64.dll",           // Unknown.
  52   L"avcuf64.dll",                 // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
  53   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  54   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  55   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  56   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  57   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  58   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  59   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  60   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  61   L"esspd.dll",                   // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  62   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  63   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  64   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  65   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  66   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  67   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  68   L"icatcdll.dll",                // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  69   L"icdcnl.dll",                  // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  70   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  71   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  72   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  73   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  74   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  75   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  76   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  77   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  78   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  79   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  80   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  81   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  82   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  83   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  84   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  85   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  86   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  87   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  88   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  89   L"picrmi32.dll",                // PicRec.
  90   L"picrmi64.dll",                // PicRec.
  91   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  92   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  93   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  94   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  95   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
  96   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
  97   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
  98   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
  99   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
 100   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
 101   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
 102   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
 103   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
 104   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
 105   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
 106   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
 107   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
 108   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
 109   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 110   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 111   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 112   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 113   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 114   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 115 };
 116
 117 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 118 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 119 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 120 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 121                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 122                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 123   base::FilePath directory;
 124   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 125     return false;
 126
 127   if (sub_dir)
 128     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 129
 130   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 131   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 132                            directory.value().c_str());
 133   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 134     return false;
 135
 136   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 137   if (children)
 138     directory_str += L"*";
 139   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 140
 141   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 142                            directory_str.c_str());
 143   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 144     return false;
 145
 146   return true;
 147 }
 148
 149 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
 150 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
 151 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
 152                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 153                       sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 154   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 155   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 156                            key.c_str());
 157   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 158     return false;
 159
 160   key += L"\\*";
 161   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 162                            key.c_str());
 163   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 164     return false;
 165
 166   return true;
 167 }
 168
 169 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 170 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 171   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 172   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 173   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 174     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 175     return false;
 176   }
 177   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 178     return false;
 179   base::FilePath fname(path);
 180   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 181 }
 182
 183 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 184 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 185 // is also loaded in this process.
 186 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 187                         bool check_in_browser,
 188                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 189   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 190   if (!module) {
 191     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 192     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 193     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 194     std::wstring name(module_name);
 195     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 196     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 197     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 198     if (period <= 8)
 199       return;
 200     for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) {
 201       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0};
 202       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 203       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 204       if (check_in_browser) {
 205         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 206         if (!module)
 207           return;
 208         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 209         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 210         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 211           return;
 212       }
 213       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 214       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 215     }
 216   }
 217   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 218   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 219   return;
 220 }
 221
 222 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 223 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 224 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 225 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 226   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 227     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 228 }
 229
 230 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 231 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 232   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 233   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 234   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 235     HANDLE token;
 236     DWORD session_id_length;
 237     DWORD session_id = 0;
 238
 239     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 240     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 241         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 242     CloseHandle(token);
 243     if (session_id)
 244       s_session_id = session_id;
 245   }
 246
 247   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 248 }
 249
 250 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 251 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 252   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 253     return true;
 254
 255   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 256   // job.
 257   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 258     return true;
 259
 260   BOOL in_job = true;
 261   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 262   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 263     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 264   if (!in_job)
 265     return true;
 266
 267   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 268   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
 269   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 270                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 271                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 272     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 273     return true;
 274   }
 275   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 276     return true;
 277
 278   return false;
 279 }
 280
 281 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 282 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 283   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 284
 285   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 286   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 287   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 288                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 289                            L"Section");
 290   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 291     return false;
 292
 293   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 294   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 295   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 296   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 297                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 298                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 299   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 300     return false;
 301
 302   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 303   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 304   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 305   // system services.
 306   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 307                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 308                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 309   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 310     return false;
 311
 312   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 313   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 314   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 315                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 316                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 317   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 318     return false;
 319
 320   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 321 #ifndef NDEBUG
 322   base::FilePath app_dir;
 323   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 324     return false;
 325
 326   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 327   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 328                                                  long_path_buf,
 329                                                  MAX_PATH);
 330   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 331     return false;
 332
 333   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 334   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 335   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 336                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 337                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 338   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 339     return false;
 340 #endif  // NDEBUG
 341
 342   // Add the policy for read-only PDB file access for AddressSanitizer.
 343 #if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
 344   base::FilePath exe;
 345   if (!PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &exe))
 346     return false;
 347   base::FilePath pdb_path = exe.DirName().Append(L"*.pdb");
 348   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 349                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 350                            pdb_path.value().c_str());
 351   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 352     return false;
 353 #endif
 354
 355   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 356   return true;
 357 }
 358
 359 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 360   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 361   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 362   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 363                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 364                            L"Event");
 365   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 366     return false;
 367
 368   // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
 369   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 370     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
 371   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 372     return false;
 373
 374   // Close the proxy settings on XP.
 375   if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003)
 376     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key",
 377                  L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \
 378                      L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings");
 379   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 380     return false;
 381
 382
 383   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 384   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 385     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 386     // token is restricted.
 387     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 388   }
 389
 390   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 391   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 392   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 393   policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
 394
 395   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) {
 396     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 397   }
 398
 399   return true;
 400 }
 401
 402 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 403 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 404 // command_line as needed.
 405 void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
 406   const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line =
 407       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 408   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 409   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 410     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 411     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 412         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 413     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 414       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 415     }
 416     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 417   }
 418 }
 419
 420 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 421 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 422 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 423 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 424
 425 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 426                                                   HANDLE source_handle,
 427                                                   HANDLE target_process_handle,
 428                                                   LPHANDLE target_handle,
 429                                                   DWORD desired_access,
 430                                                   BOOL inherit_handle,
 431                                                   DWORD options);
 432
 433 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
 434
 435 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 436
 437 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 438     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 439     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 440     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 441
 442 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 443   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 444   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 445   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 446       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 447   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 448   NTSTATUS error;
 449   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 450   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 451   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 452
 453   // Get the object basic information.
 454   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 455   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 456   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 457                         &size);
 458   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 459
 460   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 461       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 462
 463   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 464     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask =
 465         ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
 466     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 467         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 468   }
 469 }
 470
 471 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 472                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 473                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 474                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 475                                  DWORD desired_access,
 476                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 477                                  DWORD options) {
 478   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 479   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 480                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 481                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 482     return FALSE;
 483
 484   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 485   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 486       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 487     return TRUE;
 488
 489   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 490   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 491   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 492     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 493     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 494       HANDLE temp_handle;
 495       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 496                                         target_process_handle,
 497                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 498                                         &temp_handle,
 499                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 500                                         FALSE, 0));
 501       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 502       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 503     }
 504   }
 505
 506   if (is_in_job) {
 507     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 508     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 509
 510     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 511     HANDLE temp_handle;
 512     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 513                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 514                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 515     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 516
 517     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 518     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get());
 519   }
 520
 521   return TRUE;
 522 }
 523 #endif
 524
 525 }  // namespace
 526
 527 void SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
 528                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 529                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 530                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 531   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) {
 532 #ifdef _WIN64
 533     policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
 534 #endif
 535     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 536   } else {
 537     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 538   }
 539 }
 540
 541 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 542 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 543 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 544   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 545   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 546       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 547   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 548 }
 549
 550 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 551   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 552   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 553   DCHECK(broker_services);
 554   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 555   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 556   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 557
 558   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 559 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 560   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 561   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 562   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 563   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 564   // original function.
 565   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 566       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 567     HMODULE module = NULL;
 568     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 569     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 570                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 571                               &module));
 572     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 573     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 574       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 575       result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 576           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 577           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 578       CHECK(result == 0);
 579       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
 580           reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
 581               g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
 582     }
 583   }
 584 #endif
 585
 586   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 587 }
 588
 589 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 590   DCHECK(target_services);
 591   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 592   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 593   g_target_services = target_services;
 594   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 595 }
 596
 597 base::Process StartSandboxedProcess(
 598     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 599     base::CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 600   const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
 601       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 602   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 603
 604   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 605
 606   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 607   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 608       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 609     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 610   }
 611
 612   ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
 613
 614   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 615   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 616   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 617   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 618
 619   if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
 620       browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 621       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 622     base::Process process =
 623         base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions());
 624     // TODO(rvargas) crbug.com/417532: Don't share a raw handle.
 625     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process.Handle());
 626     return process.Pass();
 627   }
 628
 629   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 630
 631   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 632                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 633                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 634                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 635                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 636
 637 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 638   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess &&
 639       IsWin32kRendererLockdownEnabled()) {
 640     if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
 641                         sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
 642                         NULL) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 643       return base::Process();
 644     }
 645     mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
 646   }
 647 #endif
 648
 649   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 650     return base::Process();
 651
 652   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 653                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 654
 655   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 656     return base::Process();
 657
 658   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 659
 660   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 661   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 662   if (delegate)
 663     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 664
 665   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 666     return base::Process();
 667
 668   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
 669 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 670     if (gfx::win::ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
 671       AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
 672                   NULL,
 673                   true,
 674                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 675                   policy);
 676     }
 677 #endif
 678   } else {
 679     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 680     // this subprocess. See
 681     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 682     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 683   }
 684
 685   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 686   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 687     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 688                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 689                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 690     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 691       return base::Process();
 692
 693     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 694     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 695                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 696                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 697     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 698       return base::Process();
 699   }
 700
 701   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 702     NOTREACHED();
 703     return base::Process();
 704   }
 705
 706   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 707     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 708     // have no effect.
 709     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 710     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 711   }
 712
 713   if (delegate) {
 714     bool success = true;
 715     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 716     if (!success)
 717       return base::Process();
 718   }
 719
 720   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 721
 722   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 723   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 724                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 725                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 726                policy, &temp_process_info);
 727   policy->Release();
 728   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 729
 730   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 731
 732   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 733     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 734       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 735     else
 736       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 737     return base::Process();
 738   }
 739
 740   if (delegate)
 741     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 742
 743   CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != -1);
 744   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 745   return base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle());
 746 }
 747
 748 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 749                            DWORD target_process_id,
 750                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 751                            DWORD desired_access,
 752                            DWORD options) {
 753   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 754   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 755     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 756                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 757                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 758
 759   }
 760
 761   // Try the broker next
 762   if (g_target_services &&
 763       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 764                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 765                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 766     return true;
 767   }
 768
 769   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 770   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 771   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 772                                     target_process_id));
 773   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 774     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 775                                 target_process.Get(), target_handle,
 776                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 777   }
 778
 779   return false;
 780 }
 781
 782 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 783   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 784 }
 785
 786 }  // namespace content