Merge tag 'trace-printf-v6.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace...

[drm/drm-misc.git] / crypto / jitterentropy-kcapi.c

/*
 * Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter --
 * Linux Kernel Crypto API specific code
 *
 * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2015 - 2023
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
 *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
 *    products derived from this software without specific prior
 *    written permission.
 *
 * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
 * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are
 * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
 * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
 * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
 * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
 * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
 * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
 * DAMAGE.
 */

#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha3.h>
#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <crypto/internal/rng.h>

#include "jitterentropy.h"

#define JENT_CONDITIONING_HASH  "sha3-256-generic"

/***************************************************************************
 * Helper function
 ***************************************************************************/

void *jent_kvzalloc(unsigned int len)
{
        return kvzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
}

void jent_kvzfree(void *ptr, unsigned int len)
{
        kvfree_sensitive(ptr, len);
}

void *jent_zalloc(unsigned int len)
{
        return kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
}

void jent_zfree(void *ptr)
{
        kfree_sensitive(ptr);
}

/*
 * Obtain a high-resolution time stamp value. The time stamp is used to measure
 * the execution time of a given code path and its variations. Hence, the time
 * stamp must have a sufficiently high resolution.
 *
 * Note, if the function returns zero because a given architecture does not
 * implement a high-resolution time stamp, the RNG code's runtime test
 * will detect it and will not produce output.
 */
void jent_get_nstime(__u64 *out)
{
        __u64 tmp = 0;

        tmp = random_get_entropy();

        /*
         * If random_get_entropy does not return a value, i.e. it is not
         * implemented for a given architecture, use a clock source.
         * hoping that there are timers we can work with.
         */
        if (tmp == 0)
                tmp = ktime_get_ns();

        *out = tmp;
        jent_raw_hires_entropy_store(tmp);
}

int jent_hash_time(void *hash_state, __u64 time, u8 *addtl,
                   unsigned int addtl_len, __u64 hash_loop_cnt,
                   unsigned int stuck)
{
        struct shash_desc *hash_state_desc = (struct shash_desc *)hash_state;
        SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hash_state_desc->tfm);
        u8 intermediary[SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE];
        __u64 j = 0;
        int ret;

        desc->tfm = hash_state_desc->tfm;

        if (sizeof(intermediary) != crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm)) {
                pr_warn_ratelimited("Unexpected digest size\n");
                return -EINVAL;
        }

        /*
         * This loop fills a buffer which is injected into the entropy pool.
         * The main reason for this loop is to execute something over which we
         * can perform a timing measurement. The injection of the resulting
         * data into the pool is performed to ensure the result is used and
         * the compiler cannot optimize the loop away in case the result is not
         * used at all. Yet that data is considered "additional information"
         * considering the terminology from SP800-90A without any entropy.
         *
         * Note, it does not matter which or how much data you inject, we are
         * interested in one Keccack1600 compression operation performed with
         * the crypto_shash_final.
         */
        for (j = 0; j < hash_loop_cnt; j++) {
                ret = crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
                      crypto_shash_update(desc, intermediary,
                                          sizeof(intermediary)) ?:
                      crypto_shash_finup(desc, addtl, addtl_len, intermediary);
                if (ret)
                        goto err;
        }

        /*
         * Inject the data from the previous loop into the pool. This data is
         * not considered to contain any entropy, but it stirs the pool a bit.
         */
        ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, intermediary, sizeof(intermediary));
        if (ret)
                goto err;

        /*
         * Insert the time stamp into the hash context representing the pool.
         *
         * If the time stamp is stuck, do not finally insert the value into the
         * entropy pool. Although this operation should not do any harm even
         * when the time stamp has no entropy, SP800-90B requires that any
         * conditioning operation to have an identical amount of input data
         * according to section 3.1.5.
         */
        if (!stuck) {
                ret = crypto_shash_update(hash_state_desc, (u8 *)&time,
                                          sizeof(__u64));
        }

err:
        shash_desc_zero(desc);
        memzero_explicit(intermediary, sizeof(intermediary));

        return ret;
}

int jent_read_random_block(void *hash_state, char *dst, unsigned int dst_len)
{
        struct shash_desc *hash_state_desc = (struct shash_desc *)hash_state;
        u8 jent_block[SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE];
        /* Obtain data from entropy pool and re-initialize it */
        int ret = crypto_shash_final(hash_state_desc, jent_block) ?:
                  crypto_shash_init(hash_state_desc) ?:
                  crypto_shash_update(hash_state_desc, jent_block,
                                      sizeof(jent_block));

        if (!ret && dst_len)
                memcpy(dst, jent_block, dst_len);

        memzero_explicit(jent_block, sizeof(jent_block));
        return ret;
}

/***************************************************************************
 * Kernel crypto API interface
 ***************************************************************************/

struct jitterentropy {
        spinlock_t jent_lock;
        struct rand_data *entropy_collector;
        struct crypto_shash *tfm;
        struct shash_desc *sdesc;
};

static void jent_kcapi_cleanup(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
        struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);

        spin_lock(&rng->jent_lock);

        if (rng->sdesc) {
                shash_desc_zero(rng->sdesc);
                kfree(rng->sdesc);
        }
        rng->sdesc = NULL;

        if (rng->tfm)
                crypto_free_shash(rng->tfm);
        rng->tfm = NULL;

        if (rng->entropy_collector)
                jent_entropy_collector_free(rng->entropy_collector);
        rng->entropy_collector = NULL;
        spin_unlock(&rng->jent_lock);
}

static int jent_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
        struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
        struct crypto_shash *hash;
        struct shash_desc *sdesc;
        int size, ret = 0;

        spin_lock_init(&rng->jent_lock);

        /*
         * Use SHA3-256 as conditioner. We allocate only the generic
         * implementation as we are not interested in high-performance. The
         * execution time of the SHA3 operation is measured and adds to the
         * Jitter RNG's unpredictable behavior. If we have a slower hash
         * implementation, the execution timing variations are larger. When
         * using a fast implementation, we would need to call it more often
         * as its variations are lower.
         */
        hash = crypto_alloc_shash(JENT_CONDITIONING_HASH, 0, 0);
        if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
                pr_err("Cannot allocate conditioning digest\n");
                return PTR_ERR(hash);
        }
        rng->tfm = hash;

        size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hash);
        sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!sdesc) {
                ret = -ENOMEM;
                goto err;
        }

        sdesc->tfm = hash;
        crypto_shash_init(sdesc);
        rng->sdesc = sdesc;

        rng->entropy_collector =
                jent_entropy_collector_alloc(CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR, 0,
                                             sdesc);
        if (!rng->entropy_collector) {
                ret = -ENOMEM;
                goto err;
        }

        spin_lock_init(&rng->jent_lock);
        return 0;

err:
        jent_kcapi_cleanup(tfm);
        return ret;
}

static int jent_kcapi_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
                             const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
                             u8 *rdata, unsigned int dlen)
{
        struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
        int ret = 0;

        spin_lock(&rng->jent_lock);

        ret = jent_read_entropy(rng->entropy_collector, rdata, dlen);

        if (ret == -3) {
                /* Handle permanent health test error */
                /*
                 * If the kernel was booted with fips=1, it implies that
                 * the entire kernel acts as a FIPS 140 module. In this case
                 * an SP800-90B permanent health test error is treated as
                 * a FIPS module error.
                 */
                if (fips_enabled)
                        panic("Jitter RNG permanent health test failure\n");

                pr_err("Jitter RNG permanent health test failure\n");
                ret = -EFAULT;
        } else if (ret == -2) {
                /* Handle intermittent health test error */
                pr_warn_ratelimited("Reset Jitter RNG due to intermittent health test failure\n");
                ret = -EAGAIN;
        } else if (ret == -1) {
                /* Handle other errors */
                ret = -EINVAL;
        }

        spin_unlock(&rng->jent_lock);

        return ret;
}

static int jent_kcapi_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
                            const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
        return 0;
}

static struct rng_alg jent_alg = {
        .generate               = jent_kcapi_random,
        .seed                   = jent_kcapi_reset,
        .seedsize               = 0,
        .base                   = {
                .cra_name               = "jitterentropy_rng",
                .cra_driver_name        = "jitterentropy_rng",
                .cra_priority           = 100,
                .cra_ctxsize            = sizeof(struct jitterentropy),
                .cra_module             = THIS_MODULE,
                .cra_init               = jent_kcapi_init,
                .cra_exit               = jent_kcapi_cleanup,
        }
};

static int __init jent_mod_init(void)
{
        SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
        struct crypto_shash *tfm;
        int ret = 0;

        jent_testing_init();

        tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(JENT_CONDITIONING_HASH, 0, 0);
        if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
                jent_testing_exit();
                return PTR_ERR(tfm);
        }

        desc->tfm = tfm;
        crypto_shash_init(desc);
        ret = jent_entropy_init(CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_OSR, 0, desc, NULL);
        shash_desc_zero(desc);
        crypto_free_shash(tfm);
        if (ret) {
                /* Handle permanent health test error */
                if (fips_enabled)
                        panic("jitterentropy: Initialization failed with host not compliant with requirements: %d\n", ret);

                jent_testing_exit();
                pr_info("jitterentropy: Initialization failed with host not compliant with requirements: %d\n", ret);
                return -EFAULT;
        }
        return crypto_register_rng(&jent_alg);
}

static void __exit jent_mod_exit(void)
{
        jent_testing_exit();
        crypto_unregister_rng(&jent_alg);
}

module_init(jent_mod_init);
module_exit(jent_mod_exit);

MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Non-physical True Random Number Generator based on CPU Jitter");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("jitterentropy_rng");