1 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 # Security configuration
6 menu "Security options"
8 source "security/keys/Kconfig"
10 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
11 bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
14 This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
17 If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
18 unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
20 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
23 prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override"
24 default PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
26 Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory
27 permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace
30 This allows people to limit that - either never override, or
31 require actual active ptrace attachment.
33 Defaults to the traditional behavior (for now)
35 config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
36 bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior"
38 This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
39 permissions if you have ptrace access rights.
41 config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE
42 bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override"
44 This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
45 permissions for active ptracers like gdb.
47 config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
50 Never override memory mapping permissions
55 bool "Enable different security models"
59 This allows you to choose different security modules to be
60 configured into your kernel.
62 If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
65 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
68 bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
70 This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
71 various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM).
73 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
75 config SECURITY_NETWORK
76 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
79 This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
80 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
81 implement socket and networking access controls.
82 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
84 config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
85 bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
86 depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
88 This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
89 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
90 implement Infiniband access controls.
91 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
93 config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
94 bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
95 depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
97 This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
98 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
99 implement per-packet access controls based on labels
100 derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
101 designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
102 to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
104 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
107 bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
110 This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
111 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
112 implement pathname based access controls.
113 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
116 bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
117 depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
119 This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
120 Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
121 Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
122 of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
125 Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
126 initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
127 create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
128 helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
129 correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
130 of the kernel itself.
132 Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
133 confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
134 it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
135 providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
137 See <https://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
139 See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
140 See Documentation/arch/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable
141 Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
143 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
145 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
146 int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
147 depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
148 default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
151 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
152 from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
153 can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
155 For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
156 a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
157 On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
158 Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
159 this low address space will need the permission specific to the
162 config HARDENED_USERCOPY
163 bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
166 This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
167 copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
168 copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
169 are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
170 separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
171 or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes
172 of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
174 config FORTIFY_SOURCE
175 bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
176 depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
177 # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645
178 depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32
180 Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
181 where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
183 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
184 bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
186 By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
187 binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
188 interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
189 either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
190 option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
191 runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
192 To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
193 calls through a single executable that can not have its name
196 Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
197 "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
198 passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
199 and choose what real programs are called.
201 If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
202 disabled, choose this option and then set
203 STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
205 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
206 string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
207 depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
208 default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
210 The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
211 program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
212 be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
215 If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
216 specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
218 source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
219 source "security/smack/Kconfig"
220 source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
221 source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
222 source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
223 source "security/yama/Kconfig"
224 source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
225 source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
226 source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
227 source "security/ipe/Kconfig"
229 source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
232 prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized"
233 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
234 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
235 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
236 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
237 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
240 This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY
241 in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't
242 change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config,
243 for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set.
245 Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be
246 initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM.
248 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
249 bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
251 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
252 bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
254 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
255 bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
257 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
258 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
260 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
261 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
266 string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
267 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
268 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
269 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
270 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
271 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf"
273 A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
274 Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order
275 LSM_ORDER_FIRST and LSM_ORDER_LAST, which are always enabled
276 if selected in the kernel configuration, will be ignored.
277 This can be controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.
279 If unsure, leave this as the default.
281 source "security/Kconfig.hardening"