1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2 /* Userspace key control operations
4 * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
5 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
8 #include <linux/init.h>
9 #include <linux/sched.h>
10 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
11 #include <linux/slab.h>
12 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
13 #include <linux/key.h>
14 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
16 #include <linux/capability.h>
17 #include <linux/cred.h>
18 #include <linux/string.h>
19 #include <linux/err.h>
20 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
21 #include <linux/security.h>
22 #include <linux/uio.h>
23 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
24 #include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h>
27 #define KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE 4096
29 static const unsigned char keyrings_capabilities
[2] = {
30 [0] = (KEYCTL_CAPS0_CAPABILITIES
|
31 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
) ? KEYCTL_CAPS0_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
: 0) |
32 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
) ? KEYCTL_CAPS0_DIFFIE_HELLMAN
: 0) |
33 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
) ? KEYCTL_CAPS0_PUBLIC_KEY
: 0) |
34 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS
) ? KEYCTL_CAPS0_BIG_KEY
: 0) |
35 KEYCTL_CAPS0_INVALIDATE
|
36 KEYCTL_CAPS0_RESTRICT_KEYRING
|
39 [1] = (KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME
|
40 KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG
|
41 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
) ? KEYCTL_CAPS1_NOTIFICATIONS
: 0)
45 static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type
,
46 const char __user
*_type
,
51 ret
= strncpy_from_user(type
, _type
, len
);
54 if (ret
== 0 || ret
>= len
)
63 * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a
64 * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring.
66 * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to
67 * generate one from the payload.
69 * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it.
71 * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error
74 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key
, const char __user
*, _type
,
75 const char __user
*, _description
,
76 const void __user
*, _payload
,
80 key_ref_t keyring_ref
, key_ref
;
81 char type
[32], *description
;
86 if (plen
> 1024 * 1024 - 1)
89 /* draw all the data into kernel space */
90 ret
= key_get_type_from_user(type
, _type
, sizeof(type
));
96 description
= strndup_user(_description
, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE
);
97 if (IS_ERR(description
)) {
98 ret
= PTR_ERR(description
);
104 } else if ((description
[0] == '.') &&
105 (strncmp(type
, "keyring", 7) == 0)) {
111 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
116 payload
= kvmalloc(plen
, GFP_KERNEL
);
121 if (copy_from_user(payload
, _payload
, plen
) != 0)
125 /* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
126 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
127 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
)) {
128 ret
= PTR_ERR(keyring_ref
);
132 /* create or update the requested key and add it to the target
134 key_ref
= key_create_or_update(keyring_ref
, type
, description
,
135 payload
, plen
, KEY_PERM_UNDEF
,
137 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
138 ret
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
)->serial
;
139 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
142 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
145 key_ref_put(keyring_ref
);
147 kvfree_sensitive(payload
, plen
);
155 * Search the process keyrings and keyring trees linked from those for a
156 * matching key. Keyrings must have appropriate Search permission to be
159 * If a key is found, it will be attached to the destination keyring if there's
160 * one specified and the serial number of the key will be returned.
162 * If no key is found, /sbin/request-key will be invoked if _callout_info is
163 * non-NULL in an attempt to create a key. The _callout_info string will be
164 * passed to /sbin/request-key to aid with completing the request. If the
165 * _callout_info string is "" then it will be changed to "-".
167 SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key
, const char __user
*, _type
,
168 const char __user
*, _description
,
169 const char __user
*, _callout_info
,
170 key_serial_t
, destringid
)
172 struct key_type
*ktype
;
176 char type
[32], *description
, *callout_info
;
179 /* pull the type into kernel space */
180 ret
= key_get_type_from_user(type
, _type
, sizeof(type
));
184 /* pull the description into kernel space */
185 description
= strndup_user(_description
, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE
);
186 if (IS_ERR(description
)) {
187 ret
= PTR_ERR(description
);
191 /* pull the callout info into kernel space */
195 callout_info
= strndup_user(_callout_info
, PAGE_SIZE
);
196 if (IS_ERR(callout_info
)) {
197 ret
= PTR_ERR(callout_info
);
200 callout_len
= strlen(callout_info
);
203 /* get the destination keyring if specified */
206 dest_ref
= lookup_user_key(destringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
,
208 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref
)) {
209 ret
= PTR_ERR(dest_ref
);
214 /* find the key type */
215 ktype
= key_type_lookup(type
);
217 ret
= PTR_ERR(ktype
);
222 key
= request_key_and_link(ktype
, description
, NULL
, callout_info
,
223 callout_len
, NULL
, key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref
),
230 /* wait for the key to finish being constructed */
231 ret
= wait_for_key_construction(key
, 1);
242 key_ref_put(dest_ref
);
252 * Get the ID of the specified process keyring.
254 * The requested keyring must have search permission to be found.
256 * If successful, the ID of the requested keyring will be returned.
258 long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id
, int create
)
261 unsigned long lflags
;
264 lflags
= create
? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
: 0;
265 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, lflags
, KEY_NEED_SEARCH
);
266 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
267 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
271 ret
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
)->serial
;
272 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
278 * Join a (named) session keyring.
280 * Create and join an anonymous session keyring or join a named session
281 * keyring, creating it if necessary. A named session keyring must have Search
282 * permission for it to be joined. Session keyrings without this permit will
283 * be skipped over. It is not permitted for userspace to create or join
284 * keyrings whose name begin with a dot.
286 * If successful, the ID of the joined session keyring will be returned.
288 long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user
*_name
)
293 /* fetch the name from userspace */
296 name
= strndup_user(_name
, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE
);
307 /* join the session */
308 ret
= join_session_keyring(name
);
316 * Update a key's data payload from the given data.
318 * The key must grant the caller Write permission and the key type must support
319 * updating for this to work. A negative key can be positively instantiated
322 * If successful, 0 will be returned. If the key type does not support
323 * updating, then -EOPNOTSUPP will be returned.
325 long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id
,
326 const void __user
*_payload
,
334 if (plen
> PAGE_SIZE
)
337 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
341 payload
= kvmalloc(plen
, GFP_KERNEL
);
346 if (copy_from_user(payload
, _payload
, plen
) != 0)
350 /* find the target key (which must be writable) */
351 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
352 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
353 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
358 ret
= key_update(key_ref
, payload
, plen
);
360 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
362 kvfree_sensitive(payload
, plen
);
370 * The key must be grant the caller Write or Setattr permission for this to
371 * work. The key type should give up its quota claim when revoked. The key
372 * and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after a
373 * certain amount of time (/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay).
375 * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be revoked.
377 * If successful, 0 is returned.
379 long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id
)
385 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
386 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
387 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
390 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR
);
391 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
392 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
397 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
399 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &key
->flags
))
404 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
412 * The key must be grant the caller Invalidate permission for this to work.
413 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
416 * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be invalidated.
418 * If successful, 0 is returned.
420 long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id
)
428 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH
);
429 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
430 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
432 /* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keys */
433 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
434 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE
);
437 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL
,
438 &key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
)->flags
))
447 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
449 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &key
->flags
))
454 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
456 kleave(" = %ld", ret
);
461 * Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the
462 * special keyring IDs is used.
464 * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission and not have
465 * KEY_FLAG_KEEP set for this to work. If successful, 0 will be returned.
467 long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid
)
469 key_ref_t keyring_ref
;
473 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
474 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
)) {
475 ret
= PTR_ERR(keyring_ref
);
477 /* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keyrings */
478 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
479 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, 0,
480 KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE
);
481 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
))
483 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR
,
484 &key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref
)->flags
))
493 keyring
= key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref
);
494 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &keyring
->flags
))
497 ret
= keyring_clear(keyring
);
499 key_ref_put(keyring_ref
);
505 * Create a link from a keyring to a key if there's no matching key in the
506 * keyring, otherwise replace the link to the matching key with a link to the
509 * The key must grant the caller Link permission and the keyring must grant
510 * the caller Write permission. Furthermore, if an additional link is created,
511 * the keyring's quota will be extended.
513 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
515 long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id
, key_serial_t ringid
)
517 key_ref_t keyring_ref
, key_ref
;
520 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
521 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
)) {
522 ret
= PTR_ERR(keyring_ref
);
526 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_LINK
);
527 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
528 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
532 ret
= key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref
), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
));
534 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
536 key_ref_put(keyring_ref
);
542 * Unlink a key from a keyring.
544 * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work; the key
545 * itself need not grant the caller anything. If the last link to a key is
546 * removed then that key will be scheduled for destruction.
548 * Keys or keyrings with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be unlinked.
550 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
552 long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id
, key_serial_t ringid
)
554 key_ref_t keyring_ref
, key_ref
;
555 struct key
*keyring
, *key
;
558 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
559 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
)) {
560 ret
= PTR_ERR(keyring_ref
);
564 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
, KEY_NEED_UNLINK
);
565 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
566 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
570 keyring
= key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref
);
571 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
572 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &keyring
->flags
) &&
573 test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &key
->flags
))
576 ret
= key_unlink(keyring
, key
);
578 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
580 key_ref_put(keyring_ref
);
586 * Move a link to a key from one keyring to another, displacing any matching
587 * key from the destination keyring.
589 * The key must grant the caller Link permission and both keyrings must grant
590 * the caller Write permission. There must also be a link in the from keyring
591 * to the key. If both keyrings are the same, nothing is done.
593 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
595 long keyctl_keyring_move(key_serial_t id
, key_serial_t from_ringid
,
596 key_serial_t to_ringid
, unsigned int flags
)
598 key_ref_t key_ref
, from_ref
, to_ref
;
601 if (flags
& ~KEYCTL_MOVE_EXCL
)
604 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_LINK
);
606 return PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
608 from_ref
= lookup_user_key(from_ringid
, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
609 if (IS_ERR(from_ref
)) {
610 ret
= PTR_ERR(from_ref
);
614 to_ref
= lookup_user_key(to_ringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
615 if (IS_ERR(to_ref
)) {
616 ret
= PTR_ERR(to_ref
);
620 ret
= key_move(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
), key_ref_to_ptr(from_ref
),
621 key_ref_to_ptr(to_ref
), flags
);
625 key_ref_put(from_ref
);
627 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
632 * Return a description of a key to userspace.
634 * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
636 * If there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it formatted
637 * in the following way:
639 * type;uid;gid;perm;description<NUL>
641 * If successful, we return the amount of description available, irrespective
642 * of how much we may have copied into the buffer.
644 long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid
,
648 struct key
*key
, *instkey
;
652 int desclen
, infolen
;
654 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(keyid
, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
, KEY_NEED_VIEW
);
655 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
656 /* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
657 * authorisation token handy */
658 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref
) == -EACCES
) {
659 instkey
= key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid
);
660 if (!IS_ERR(instkey
)) {
662 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(keyid
,
664 KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE
);
665 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref
))
670 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
675 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
676 desclen
= strlen(key
->description
);
678 /* calculate how much information we're going to return */
680 infobuf
= kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL
,
683 from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), key
->uid
),
684 from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), key
->gid
),
688 infolen
= strlen(infobuf
);
689 ret
= infolen
+ desclen
+ 1;
691 /* consider returning the data */
692 if (buffer
&& buflen
>= ret
) {
693 if (copy_to_user(buffer
, infobuf
, infolen
) != 0 ||
694 copy_to_user(buffer
+ infolen
, key
->description
,
701 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
707 * Search the specified keyring and any keyrings it links to for a matching
708 * key. Only keyrings that grant the caller Search permission will be searched
709 * (this includes the starting keyring). Only keys with Search permission can
712 * If successful, the found key will be linked to the destination keyring if
713 * supplied and the key has Link permission, and the found key ID will be
716 long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid
,
717 const char __user
*_type
,
718 const char __user
*_description
,
719 key_serial_t destringid
)
721 struct key_type
*ktype
;
722 key_ref_t keyring_ref
, key_ref
, dest_ref
;
723 char type
[32], *description
;
726 /* pull the type and description into kernel space */
727 ret
= key_get_type_from_user(type
, _type
, sizeof(type
));
731 description
= strndup_user(_description
, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE
);
732 if (IS_ERR(description
)) {
733 ret
= PTR_ERR(description
);
737 /* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
738 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH
);
739 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
)) {
740 ret
= PTR_ERR(keyring_ref
);
744 /* get the destination keyring if specified */
747 dest_ref
= lookup_user_key(destringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
,
749 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref
)) {
750 ret
= PTR_ERR(dest_ref
);
755 /* find the key type */
756 ktype
= key_type_lookup(type
);
758 ret
= PTR_ERR(ktype
);
763 key_ref
= keyring_search(keyring_ref
, ktype
, description
, true);
764 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
765 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
767 /* treat lack or presence of a negative key the same */
773 /* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
775 ret
= key_permission(key_ref
, KEY_NEED_LINK
);
779 ret
= key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref
), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
));
784 ret
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
)->serial
;
787 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
791 key_ref_put(dest_ref
);
793 key_ref_put(keyring_ref
);
801 * Call the read method
803 static long __keyctl_read_key(struct key
*key
, char *buffer
, size_t buflen
)
807 down_read(&key
->sem
);
808 ret
= key_validate(key
);
810 ret
= key
->type
->read(key
, buffer
, buflen
);
816 * Read a key's payload.
818 * The key must either grant the caller Read permission, or it must grant the
819 * caller Search permission when searched for from the process keyrings.
821 * If successful, we place up to buflen bytes of data into the buffer, if one
822 * is provided, and return the amount of data that is available in the key,
823 * irrespective of how much we copied into the buffer.
825 long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid
, char __user
*buffer
, size_t buflen
)
830 char *key_data
= NULL
;
833 /* find the key first */
834 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(keyid
, 0, KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK
);
835 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
840 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
842 ret
= key_read_state(key
);
844 goto key_put_out
; /* Negatively instantiated */
846 /* see if we can read it directly */
847 ret
= key_permission(key_ref
, KEY_NEED_READ
);
853 /* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings
854 * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be
855 * dangling off an instantiation key
857 if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref
)) {
862 /* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
864 if (!key
->type
->read
) {
869 if (!buffer
|| !buflen
) {
870 /* Get the key length from the read method */
871 ret
= __keyctl_read_key(key
, NULL
, 0);
876 * Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
877 * to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
879 * Allocating a temporary buffer to hold the keys before
880 * transferring them to user buffer to avoid potential
881 * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_lock.
883 * key_data_len = (buflen <= PAGE_SIZE)
884 * ? buflen : actual length of key data
886 * This prevents allocating arbitrary large buffer which can
887 * be much larger than the actual key length. In the latter case,
888 * at least 2 passes of this loop is required.
890 key_data_len
= (buflen
<= PAGE_SIZE
) ? buflen
: 0;
893 key_data
= kvmalloc(key_data_len
, GFP_KERNEL
);
900 ret
= __keyctl_read_key(key
, key_data
, key_data_len
);
903 * Read methods will just return the required length without
904 * any copying if the provided length isn't large enough.
906 if (ret
<= 0 || ret
> buflen
)
910 * The key may change (unlikely) in between 2 consecutive
911 * __keyctl_read_key() calls. In this case, we reallocate
912 * a larger buffer and redo the key read when
913 * key_data_len < ret <= buflen.
915 if (ret
> key_data_len
) {
916 if (unlikely(key_data
))
917 kvfree_sensitive(key_data
, key_data_len
);
919 continue; /* Allocate buffer */
922 if (copy_to_user(buffer
, key_data
, ret
))
926 kvfree_sensitive(key_data
, key_data_len
);
935 * Change the ownership of a key
937 * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
938 * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. For the UID to be changed, or
939 * for the GID to be changed to a group the caller is not a member of, the
940 * caller must have sysadmin capability. If either uid or gid is -1 then that
941 * attribute is not changed.
943 * If the UID is to be changed, the new user must have sufficient quota to
944 * accept the key. The quota deduction will be removed from the old user to
945 * the new user should the attribute be changed.
947 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
949 long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id
, uid_t user
, gid_t group
)
951 struct key_user
*newowner
, *zapowner
= NULL
;
959 uid
= make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user
);
960 gid
= make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group
);
962 if ((user
!= (uid_t
) -1) && !uid_valid(uid
))
964 if ((group
!= (gid_t
) -1) && !gid_valid(gid
))
968 if (user
== (uid_t
) -1 && group
== (gid_t
) -1)
971 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
| KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
,
973 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
974 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
978 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
980 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
982 down_write(&key
->sem
);
985 bool is_privileged_op
= false;
987 /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
988 if (user
!= (uid_t
) -1 && !uid_eq(key
->uid
, uid
))
989 is_privileged_op
= true;
991 /* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
992 * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
993 if (group
!= (gid_t
) -1 && !gid_eq(gid
, key
->gid
) && !in_group_p(gid
))
994 is_privileged_op
= true;
996 if (is_privileged_op
&& !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
))
1000 /* change the UID */
1001 if (user
!= (uid_t
) -1 && !uid_eq(uid
, key
->uid
)) {
1003 newowner
= key_user_lookup(uid
);
1007 /* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
1008 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA
, &key
->flags
)) {
1009 unsigned maxkeys
= uid_eq(uid
, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
) ?
1010 key_quota_root_maxkeys
: key_quota_maxkeys
;
1011 unsigned maxbytes
= uid_eq(uid
, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
) ?
1012 key_quota_root_maxbytes
: key_quota_maxbytes
;
1014 spin_lock_irqsave(&newowner
->lock
, flags
);
1015 if (newowner
->qnkeys
+ 1 > maxkeys
||
1016 newowner
->qnbytes
+ key
->quotalen
> maxbytes
||
1017 newowner
->qnbytes
+ key
->quotalen
<
1022 newowner
->qnbytes
+= key
->quotalen
;
1023 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&newowner
->lock
, flags
);
1025 spin_lock_irqsave(&key
->user
->lock
, flags
);
1026 key
->user
->qnkeys
--;
1027 key
->user
->qnbytes
-= key
->quotalen
;
1028 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key
->user
->lock
, flags
);
1031 atomic_dec(&key
->user
->nkeys
);
1032 atomic_inc(&newowner
->nkeys
);
1034 if (key
->state
!= KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED
) {
1035 atomic_dec(&key
->user
->nikeys
);
1036 atomic_inc(&newowner
->nikeys
);
1039 zapowner
= key
->user
;
1040 key
->user
= newowner
;
1044 /* change the GID */
1045 if (group
!= (gid_t
) -1)
1048 notify_key(key
, NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR
, 0);
1052 up_write(&key
->sem
);
1055 key_user_put(zapowner
);
1060 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&newowner
->lock
, flags
);
1061 zapowner
= newowner
;
1067 * Change the permission mask on a key.
1069 * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
1070 * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. If the caller does not have
1071 * sysadmin capability, it may only change the permission on keys that it owns.
1073 long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id
, key_perm_t perm
)
1080 if (perm
& ~(KEY_POS_ALL
| KEY_USR_ALL
| KEY_GRP_ALL
| KEY_OTH_ALL
))
1083 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
| KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
,
1085 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
1086 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
1090 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
1092 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */
1094 down_write(&key
->sem
);
1096 /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
1097 if (uid_eq(key
->uid
, current_fsuid()) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
1099 notify_key(key
, NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR
, 0);
1103 up_write(&key
->sem
);
1110 * Get the destination keyring for instantiation and check that the caller has
1111 * Write permission on it.
1113 static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid
,
1114 struct request_key_auth
*rka
,
1115 struct key
**_dest_keyring
)
1119 *_dest_keyring
= NULL
;
1121 /* just return a NULL pointer if we weren't asked to make a link */
1125 /* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
1127 dkref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
1129 return PTR_ERR(dkref
);
1130 *_dest_keyring
= key_ref_to_ptr(dkref
);
1134 if (ringid
== KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY
)
1137 /* otherwise specify the destination keyring recorded in the
1138 * authorisation key (any KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING) */
1139 if (ringid
>= KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING
) {
1140 *_dest_keyring
= key_get(rka
->dest_keyring
);
1148 * Change the request_key authorisation key on the current process.
1150 static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key
*key
)
1154 new = prepare_creds();
1158 key_put(new->request_key_auth
);
1159 new->request_key_auth
= key_get(key
);
1161 return commit_creds(new);
1165 * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
1166 * destination keyring if one is given.
1168 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1169 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1171 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1173 static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id
,
1174 struct iov_iter
*from
,
1175 key_serial_t ringid
)
1177 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1178 struct request_key_auth
*rka
;
1179 struct key
*instkey
, *dest_keyring
;
1180 size_t plen
= from
? iov_iter_count(from
) : 0;
1184 kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id
, plen
, ringid
);
1190 if (plen
> 1024 * 1024 - 1)
1193 /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
1194 * assumed before calling this */
1196 instkey
= cred
->request_key_auth
;
1200 rka
= instkey
->payload
.data
[0];
1201 if (rka
->target_key
->serial
!= id
)
1204 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
1209 payload
= kvmalloc(plen
, GFP_KERNEL
);
1214 if (!copy_from_iter_full(payload
, plen
, from
))
1218 /* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the
1219 * requesting task */
1220 ret
= get_instantiation_keyring(ringid
, rka
, &dest_keyring
);
1224 /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
1225 ret
= key_instantiate_and_link(rka
->target_key
, payload
, plen
,
1226 dest_keyring
, instkey
);
1228 key_put(dest_keyring
);
1230 /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
1231 * instantiation of the key */
1233 keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL
);
1236 kvfree_sensitive(payload
, plen
);
1242 * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
1243 * destination keyring if one is given.
1245 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1246 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1248 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1250 long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id
,
1251 const void __user
*_payload
,
1253 key_serial_t ringid
)
1255 if (_payload
&& plen
) {
1256 struct iov_iter from
;
1259 ret
= import_ubuf(ITER_SOURCE
, (void __user
*)_payload
, plen
,
1264 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id
, &from
, ringid
);
1267 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id
, NULL
, ringid
);
1271 * Instantiate a key with the specified multipart payload and link the key into
1272 * the destination keyring if one is given.
1274 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1275 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1277 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1279 long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id
,
1280 const struct iovec __user
*_payload_iov
,
1282 key_serial_t ringid
)
1284 struct iovec iovstack
[UIO_FASTIOV
], *iov
= iovstack
;
1285 struct iov_iter from
;
1291 ret
= import_iovec(ITER_SOURCE
, _payload_iov
, ioc
,
1292 ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack
), &iov
, &from
);
1295 ret
= keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id
, &from
, ringid
);
1301 * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and link
1302 * the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
1304 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1305 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1307 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
1308 * after the timeout expires.
1310 * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
1311 * them to return -ENOKEY until the negative key expires.
1313 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1315 long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id
, unsigned timeout
, key_serial_t ringid
)
1317 return keyctl_reject_key(id
, timeout
, ENOKEY
, ringid
);
1321 * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and error
1322 * code and link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
1324 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1325 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1327 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
1328 * after the timeout expires.
1330 * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
1331 * them to return the specified error code until the negative key expires.
1333 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1335 long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id
, unsigned timeout
, unsigned error
,
1336 key_serial_t ringid
)
1338 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1339 struct request_key_auth
*rka
;
1340 struct key
*instkey
, *dest_keyring
;
1343 kenter("%d,%u,%u,%d", id
, timeout
, error
, ringid
);
1345 /* must be a valid error code and mustn't be a kernel special */
1347 error
>= MAX_ERRNO
||
1348 error
== ERESTARTSYS
||
1349 error
== ERESTARTNOINTR
||
1350 error
== ERESTARTNOHAND
||
1351 error
== ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK
)
1354 /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
1355 * assumed before calling this */
1357 instkey
= cred
->request_key_auth
;
1361 rka
= instkey
->payload
.data
[0];
1362 if (rka
->target_key
->serial
!= id
)
1365 /* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
1367 ret
= get_instantiation_keyring(ringid
, rka
, &dest_keyring
);
1371 /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
1372 ret
= key_reject_and_link(rka
->target_key
, timeout
, error
,
1373 dest_keyring
, instkey
);
1375 key_put(dest_keyring
);
1377 /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
1378 * instantiation of the key */
1380 keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL
);
1387 * Read or set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys and
1388 * return the old setting.
1390 * If a thread or process keyring is specified then it will be created if it
1391 * doesn't yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful.
1393 long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl
)
1396 int ret
, old_setting
;
1398 old_setting
= current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring
);
1400 if (reqkey_defl
== KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE
)
1403 new = prepare_creds();
1407 switch (reqkey_defl
) {
1408 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING
:
1409 ret
= install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
1414 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING
:
1415 ret
= install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
1420 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT
:
1421 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING
:
1422 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING
:
1423 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING
:
1424 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING
:
1427 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE
:
1428 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING
:
1435 new->jit_keyring
= reqkey_defl
;
1444 * Set or clear the timeout on a key.
1446 * Either the key must grant the caller Setattr permission or else the caller
1447 * must hold an instantiation authorisation token for the key.
1449 * The timeout is either 0 to clear the timeout, or a number of seconds from
1450 * the current time. The key and any links to the key will be automatically
1451 * garbage collected after the timeout expires.
1453 * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be timed out.
1455 * If successful, 0 is returned.
1457 long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id
, unsigned timeout
)
1459 struct key
*key
, *instkey
;
1463 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
| KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
,
1465 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
1466 /* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
1467 * if we have the authorisation token handy */
1468 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref
) == -EACCES
) {
1469 instkey
= key_get_instantiation_authkey(id
);
1470 if (!IS_ERR(instkey
)) {
1472 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
,
1474 KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE
);
1475 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref
))
1480 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
1485 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
1487 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &key
->flags
)) {
1490 key_set_timeout(key
, timeout
);
1491 notify_key(key
, NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR
, 0);
1500 * Assume (or clear) the authority to instantiate the specified key.
1502 * This sets the authoritative token currently in force for key instantiation.
1503 * This must be done for a key to be instantiated. It has the effect of making
1504 * available all the keys from the caller of the request_key() that created a
1505 * key to request_key() calls made by the caller of this function.
1507 * The caller must have the instantiation key in their process keyrings with a
1508 * Search permission grant available to the caller.
1510 * If the ID given is 0, then the setting will be cleared and 0 returned.
1512 * If the ID given has a matching an authorisation key, then that key will be
1513 * set and its ID will be returned. The authorisation key can be read to get
1514 * the callout information passed to request_key().
1516 long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id
)
1518 struct key
*authkey
;
1521 /* special key IDs aren't permitted */
1526 /* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
1528 ret
= keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL
);
1532 /* attempt to assume the authority temporarily granted to us whilst we
1533 * instantiate the specified key
1534 * - the authorisation key must be in the current task's keyrings
1537 authkey
= key_get_instantiation_authkey(id
);
1538 if (IS_ERR(authkey
)) {
1539 ret
= PTR_ERR(authkey
);
1543 ret
= keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey
);
1545 ret
= authkey
->serial
;
1552 * Get a key's the LSM security label.
1554 * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
1556 * If there's a buffer, then up to buflen bytes of data will be placed into it.
1558 * If successful, the amount of information available will be returned,
1559 * irrespective of how much was copied (including the terminal NUL).
1561 long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid
,
1562 char __user
*buffer
,
1565 struct key
*key
, *instkey
;
1570 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(keyid
, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
, KEY_NEED_VIEW
);
1571 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
1572 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref
) != -EACCES
)
1573 return PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
1575 /* viewing a key under construction is also permitted if we
1576 * have the authorisation token handy */
1577 instkey
= key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid
);
1578 if (IS_ERR(instkey
))
1579 return PTR_ERR(instkey
);
1582 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(keyid
, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
,
1583 KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE
);
1584 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
))
1585 return PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
1588 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
1589 ret
= security_key_getsecurity(key
, &context
);
1591 /* if no information was returned, give userspace an empty
1594 if (buffer
&& buflen
> 0 &&
1595 copy_to_user(buffer
, "", 1) != 0)
1597 } else if (ret
> 0) {
1598 /* return as much data as there's room for */
1599 if (buffer
&& buflen
> 0) {
1603 if (copy_to_user(buffer
, context
, buflen
) != 0)
1610 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
1615 * Attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
1618 * The keyring must exist and must grant the caller LINK permission, and the
1619 * parent process must be single-threaded and must have the same effective
1620 * ownership as this process and mustn't be SUID/SGID.
1622 * The keyring will be emplaced on the parent when it next resumes userspace.
1624 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1626 long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
1628 struct task_struct
*me
, *parent
;
1629 const struct cred
*mycred
, *pcred
;
1630 struct callback_head
*newwork
, *oldwork
;
1631 key_ref_t keyring_r
;
1635 keyring_r
= lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK
);
1636 if (IS_ERR(keyring_r
))
1637 return PTR_ERR(keyring_r
);
1641 /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
1642 * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
1644 cred
= cred_alloc_blank();
1647 newwork
= &cred
->rcu
;
1649 cred
->session_keyring
= key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r
);
1651 init_task_work(newwork
, key_change_session_keyring
);
1655 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock
);
1659 parent
= rcu_dereference_protected(me
->real_parent
,
1660 lockdep_is_held(&tasklist_lock
));
1662 /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
1663 if (parent
->pid
<= 1 || !parent
->mm
)
1666 /* the parent must be single threaded */
1667 if (!thread_group_empty(parent
))
1670 /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
1671 * there's no point */
1672 mycred
= current_cred();
1673 pcred
= __task_cred(parent
);
1674 if (mycred
== pcred
||
1675 mycred
->session_keyring
== pcred
->session_keyring
) {
1680 /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
1682 if (!uid_eq(pcred
->uid
, mycred
->euid
) ||
1683 !uid_eq(pcred
->euid
, mycred
->euid
) ||
1684 !uid_eq(pcred
->suid
, mycred
->euid
) ||
1685 !gid_eq(pcred
->gid
, mycred
->egid
) ||
1686 !gid_eq(pcred
->egid
, mycred
->egid
) ||
1687 !gid_eq(pcred
->sgid
, mycred
->egid
))
1690 /* the keyrings must have the same UID */
1691 if ((pcred
->session_keyring
&&
1692 !uid_eq(pcred
->session_keyring
->uid
, mycred
->euid
)) ||
1693 !uid_eq(mycred
->session_keyring
->uid
, mycred
->euid
))
1696 /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
1697 oldwork
= task_work_cancel_func(parent
, key_change_session_keyring
);
1699 /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
1701 ret
= task_work_add(parent
, newwork
, TWA_RESUME
);
1705 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock
);
1708 put_cred(container_of(oldwork
, struct cred
, rcu
));
1714 key_ref_put(keyring_r
);
1719 * Apply a restriction to a given keyring.
1721 * The caller must have Setattr permission to change keyring restrictions.
1723 * The requested type name may be a NULL pointer to reject all attempts
1724 * to link to the keyring. In this case, _restriction must also be NULL.
1725 * Otherwise, both _type and _restriction must be non-NULL.
1727 * Returns 0 if successful.
1729 long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id
, const char __user
*_type
,
1730 const char __user
*_restriction
)
1734 char *restriction
= NULL
;
1737 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR
);
1738 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
))
1739 return PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
1746 ret
= key_get_type_from_user(type
, _type
, sizeof(type
));
1750 restriction
= strndup_user(_restriction
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1751 if (IS_ERR(restriction
)) {
1752 ret
= PTR_ERR(restriction
);
1760 ret
= keyring_restrict(key_ref
, _type
? type
: NULL
, restriction
);
1763 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
1767 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
1769 * Watch for changes to a key.
1771 * The caller must have View permission to watch a key or keyring.
1773 long keyctl_watch_key(key_serial_t id
, int watch_queue_fd
, int watch_id
)
1775 struct watch_queue
*wqueue
;
1776 struct watch_list
*wlist
= NULL
;
1777 struct watch
*watch
= NULL
;
1782 if (watch_id
< -1 || watch_id
> 0xff)
1785 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_VIEW
);
1786 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
))
1787 return PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
1788 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
1790 wqueue
= get_watch_queue(watch_queue_fd
);
1791 if (IS_ERR(wqueue
)) {
1792 ret
= PTR_ERR(wqueue
);
1796 if (watch_id
>= 0) {
1798 if (!key
->watchers
) {
1799 wlist
= kzalloc(sizeof(*wlist
), GFP_KERNEL
);
1802 init_watch_list(wlist
, NULL
);
1805 watch
= kzalloc(sizeof(*watch
), GFP_KERNEL
);
1809 init_watch(watch
, wqueue
);
1810 watch
->id
= key
->serial
;
1811 watch
->info_id
= (u32
)watch_id
<< WATCH_INFO_ID__SHIFT
;
1813 ret
= security_watch_key(key
);
1817 down_write(&key
->sem
);
1818 if (!key
->watchers
) {
1819 key
->watchers
= wlist
;
1823 ret
= add_watch_to_object(watch
, key
->watchers
);
1824 up_write(&key
->sem
);
1830 if (key
->watchers
) {
1831 down_write(&key
->sem
);
1832 ret
= remove_watch_from_object(key
->watchers
,
1833 wqueue
, key_serial(key
),
1835 up_write(&key
->sem
);
1844 put_watch_queue(wqueue
);
1849 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
1852 * Get keyrings subsystem capabilities.
1854 long keyctl_capabilities(unsigned char __user
*_buffer
, size_t buflen
)
1856 size_t size
= buflen
;
1859 if (size
> sizeof(keyrings_capabilities
))
1860 size
= sizeof(keyrings_capabilities
);
1861 if (copy_to_user(_buffer
, keyrings_capabilities
, size
) != 0)
1863 if (size
< buflen
&&
1864 clear_user(_buffer
+ size
, buflen
- size
) != 0)
1868 return sizeof(keyrings_capabilities
);
1872 * The key control system call
1874 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl
, int, option
, unsigned long, arg2
, unsigned long, arg3
,
1875 unsigned long, arg4
, unsigned long, arg5
)
1878 case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID
:
1879 return keyctl_get_keyring_ID((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1882 case KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
:
1883 return keyctl_join_session_keyring((const char __user
*) arg2
);
1886 return keyctl_update_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1887 (const void __user
*) arg3
,
1891 return keyctl_revoke_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
);
1893 case KEYCTL_DESCRIBE
:
1894 return keyctl_describe_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1895 (char __user
*) arg3
,
1899 return keyctl_keyring_clear((key_serial_t
) arg2
);
1902 return keyctl_keyring_link((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1903 (key_serial_t
) arg3
);
1906 return keyctl_keyring_unlink((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1907 (key_serial_t
) arg3
);
1910 return keyctl_keyring_search((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1911 (const char __user
*) arg3
,
1912 (const char __user
*) arg4
,
1913 (key_serial_t
) arg5
);
1916 return keyctl_read_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1917 (char __user
*) arg3
,
1921 return keyctl_chown_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1925 case KEYCTL_SETPERM
:
1926 return keyctl_setperm_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1929 case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE
:
1930 return keyctl_instantiate_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1931 (const void __user
*) arg3
,
1933 (key_serial_t
) arg5
);
1936 return keyctl_negate_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1938 (key_serial_t
) arg4
);
1940 case KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING
:
1941 return keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(arg2
);
1943 case KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT
:
1944 return keyctl_set_timeout((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1947 case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY
:
1948 return keyctl_assume_authority((key_serial_t
) arg2
);
1950 case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY
:
1951 return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1952 (char __user
*) arg3
,
1955 case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT
:
1956 return keyctl_session_to_parent();
1959 return keyctl_reject_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1962 (key_serial_t
) arg5
);
1964 case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV
:
1965 return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
1966 (key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1967 (const struct iovec __user
*) arg3
,
1969 (key_serial_t
) arg5
);
1971 case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE
:
1972 return keyctl_invalidate_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
);
1974 case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT
:
1975 return keyctl_get_persistent((uid_t
)arg2
, (key_serial_t
)arg3
);
1977 case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE
:
1978 return keyctl_dh_compute((struct keyctl_dh_params __user
*) arg2
,
1979 (char __user
*) arg3
, (size_t) arg4
,
1980 (struct keyctl_kdf_params __user
*) arg5
);
1982 case KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
:
1983 return keyctl_restrict_keyring((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1984 (const char __user
*) arg3
,
1985 (const char __user
*) arg4
);
1987 case KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
:
1990 return keyctl_pkey_query((key_serial_t
)arg2
,
1991 (const char __user
*)arg4
,
1992 (struct keyctl_pkey_query __user
*)arg5
);
1994 case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT
:
1995 case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT
:
1996 case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN
:
1997 return keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(
1999 (const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user
*)arg2
,
2000 (const char __user
*)arg3
,
2001 (const void __user
*)arg4
,
2002 (void __user
*)arg5
);
2004 case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY
:
2005 return keyctl_pkey_verify(
2006 (const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user
*)arg2
,
2007 (const char __user
*)arg3
,
2008 (const void __user
*)arg4
,
2009 (const void __user
*)arg5
);
2012 return keyctl_keyring_move((key_serial_t
)arg2
,
2015 (unsigned int)arg5
);
2017 case KEYCTL_CAPABILITIES
:
2018 return keyctl_capabilities((unsigned char __user
*)arg2
, (size_t)arg3
);
2020 case KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY
:
2021 return keyctl_watch_key((key_serial_t
)arg2
, (int)arg3
, (int)arg4
);