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turns printfs back on
[freebsd-src/fkvm-freebsd.git] / crypto / openssl / ssl / s3_srvr.c
blob9414cf09fb6405d52ccba280b2116716e31c28dc
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
127
128 #include <stdio.h>
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
137 #include <openssl/dh.h>
138 #endif
139 #include <openssl/bn.h>
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
141 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
142 #endif
143 #include <openssl/md5.h>
144
145 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
146
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
149 #endif
150
151 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
152 {
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
155 else
156 return(NULL);
157 }
158
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
160 ssl3_accept,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
163
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
165 {
166 BUF_MEM *buf;
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
169 long num1;
170 int ret= -1;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
172
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
174 ERR_clear_error();
175 clear_sys_error();
176
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
178 cb=s->info_callback;
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
181
182 /* init things to blank */
183 s->in_handshake++;
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
185
186 if (s->cert == NULL)
187 {
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
189 return(-1);
190 }
191
192 for (;;)
193 {
194 state=s->state;
195
196 switch (s->state)
197 {
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
199 s->new_session=1;
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
201
202 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
203 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
206
207 s->server=1;
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
209
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
211 {
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
213 return -1;
214 }
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
216
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
218 {
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
220 {
221 ret= -1;
222 goto end;
223 }
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
225 {
226 ret= -1;
227 goto end;
228 }
229 s->init_buf=buf;
230 }
231
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
233 {
234 ret= -1;
235 goto end;
236 }
237
238 s->init_num=0;
239
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
241 {
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
244 */
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
246
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
250 }
251 else
252 {
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
257 }
258 break;
259
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
262
263 s->shutdown=0;
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
268 s->init_num=0;
269
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 break;
272
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
274 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
275 break;
276
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
280
281 s->shutdown=0;
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
284 s->new_session = 2;
285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
286 s->init_num=0;
287 break;
288
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
292 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
293
294 if (s->hit)
295 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
296 else
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
298 s->init_num=0;
299 break;
300
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
303 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
304 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
305 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
306 {
307 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
308 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
309 }
310 else
311 skip=1;
312 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
313 s->init_num=0;
314 break;
315
316 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
317 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
318 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
319
320 /* clear this, it may get reset by
321 * send_server_key_exchange */
322 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
324 && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
325 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
326 )
327 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
328 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
329 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
330 * be able to handle this) */
331 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
332 else
333 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
334
335
336 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
337 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
338 *
339 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
340 * message only if the cipher suite is either
341 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
342 * server certificate contains the server's
343 * public key for key exchange.
344 */
345 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
346 || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
347 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
348 || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
349 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
350 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
351 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
352 )
353 )
354 )
355 )
356 {
357 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
359 }
360 else
361 skip=1;
362
363 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
364 s->init_num=0;
365 break;
366
367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
368 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
369 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
370 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
371 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
372 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
373 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
374 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
375 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
376 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
377 * and in RFC 2246): */
378 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
379 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
380 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
381 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
382 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
383 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
384 {
385 /* no cert request */
386 skip=1;
387 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
388 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
389 }
390 else
391 {
392 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
393 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
394 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
395 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
397 #else
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
399 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
400 #endif
401 s->init_num=0;
402 }
403 break;
404
405 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
406 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
407 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
408 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
409 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
411 s->init_num=0;
412 break;
413
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
415 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
416 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
417 if (num1 > 0)
418 {
419 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
420 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
421 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
422 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
423 }
424
425 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
426 break;
427
428 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
430 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
431 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
432 if (ret <= 0)
433 goto end;
434 if (ret == 2)
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
436 else {
437 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
438 {
439 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
440 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
441 }
442 s->init_num=0;
443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
444 }
445 break;
446
447 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
448 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
449 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
450 if (ret <= 0)
451 goto end;
452 if (ret == 2)
453 {
454 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
455 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
456 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
457 * message is not sent.
458 */
459 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
460 s->init_num = 0;
461 }
462 else
463 {
464 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
465 s->init_num=0;
466
467 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
468 * a client cert, it can be verified
469 */
470 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
471 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
472 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
473 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
474 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
475 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
476 }
477 break;
478
479 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
480 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
481
482 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
483 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
484 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
485
486 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
487 s->init_num=0;
488 break;
489
490 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
491 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
492 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
493 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
494 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
495 if (s->hit)
496 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
497 else
498 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
499 s->init_num=0;
500 break;
501
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
504
505 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
506 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
507 { ret= -1; goto end; }
508
509 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
510 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
511
512 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
514 s->init_num=0;
515
516 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
517 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
518 {
519 ret= -1;
520 goto end;
521 }
522
523 break;
524
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
526 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
527 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
528 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
529 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
530 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
531 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
532 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
533 if (s->hit)
534 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
535 else
536 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
537 s->init_num=0;
538 break;
539
540 case SSL_ST_OK:
541 /* clean a few things up */
542 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
543
544 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
545 s->init_buf=NULL;
546
547 /* remove buffering on output */
548 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
549
550 s->init_num=0;
551
552 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
553 {
554 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
555 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
556
557 s->new_session=0;
558
559 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
560
561 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
562 /* s->server=1; */
563 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
564
565 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
566 }
567
568 ret = 1;
569 goto end;
570 /* break; */
571
572 default:
573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
574 ret= -1;
575 goto end;
576 /* break; */
577 }
578
579 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
580 {
581 if (s->debug)
582 {
583 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
584 goto end;
585 }
586
587
588 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
589 {
590 new_state=s->state;
591 s->state=state;
592 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
593 s->state=new_state;
594 }
595 }
596 skip=0;
597 }
598 end:
599 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
600
601 s->in_handshake--;
602 if (cb != NULL)
603 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
604 return(ret);
605 }
606
607 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
608 {
609 unsigned char *p;
610
611 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
612 {
613 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
614 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
615 *(p++)=0;
616 *(p++)=0;
617 *(p++)=0;
618
619 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
620 /* number of bytes to write */
621 s->init_num=4;
622 s->init_off=0;
623 }
624
625 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
626 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
627 }
628
629 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
630 {
631 int ok;
632 long n;
633
634 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
635 * so permit appropriate message length */
636 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
637 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
638 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
639 -1,
640 s->max_cert_list,
641 &ok);
642 if (!ok) return((int)n);
643 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
644 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
645 {
646 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
647 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
648 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
649 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
651 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
652 {
653 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
654 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
655 }
656 #endif
657 return 2;
658 }
659 return 1;
660 }
661
662 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
663 {
664 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
665 unsigned int cookie_len;
666 long n;
667 unsigned long id;
668 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
669 SSL_CIPHER *c;
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
671 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
672 #endif
673 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
674
675 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
676 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
677 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
678 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
679 * TLSv1.
680 */
681 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
682 {
683 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
684 }
685 s->first_packet=1;
686 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
687 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
688 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
689 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
690 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
691 &ok);
692
693 if (!ok) return((int)n);
694 s->first_packet=0;
695 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
696
697 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
698 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
699 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
700 p+=2;
701
702 if (s->client_version < s->version)
703 {
704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
705 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
706 {
707 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
708 s->version = s->client_version;
709 }
710 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
711 goto f_err;
712 }
713
714 /* load the client random */
715 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
716 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
717
718 /* get the session-id */
719 j= *(p++);
720
721 s->hit=0;
722 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
723 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
724 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
725 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
726 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
727 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
728 * an earlier library version)
729 */
730 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
731 {
732 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
733 goto err;
734 }
735 else
736 {
737 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
738 if (i == 1)
739 { /* previous session */
740 s->hit=1;
741 }
742 else if (i == -1)
743 goto err;
744 else /* i == 0 */
745 {
746 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
747 goto err;
748 }
749 }
750
751 p+=j;
752
753 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
754 {
755 /* cookie stuff */
756 cookie_len = *(p++);
757
758 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
759 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
760 {
761 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
762 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
763 {
764 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
766 goto f_err;
767 }
768 }
769
770 /*
771 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
772 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
773 * does not cause an overflow.
774 */
775 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
776 {
777 /* too much data */
778 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
780 goto f_err;
781 }
782
783 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
784 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
785 cookie_len > 0)
786 {
787 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
788
789 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
790 {
791 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
792 cookie_len) == 0)
793 {
794 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
796 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
797 goto f_err;
798 }
799 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
800 }
801 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
802 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
803 {
804 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
806 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
807 goto f_err;
808 }
809 }
810
811 p += cookie_len;
812 }
813
814 n2s(p,i);
815 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
816 {
817 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
818 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
820 goto f_err;
821 }
822 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
823 {
824 /* not enough data */
825 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
827 goto f_err;
828 }
829 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
830 == NULL))
831 {
832 goto err;
833 }
834 p+=i;
835
836 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
837 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
838 {
839 j=0;
840 id=s->session->cipher->id;
841
842 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
843 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
844 #endif
845 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
846 {
847 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
848 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
849 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
850 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
851 #endif
852 if (c->id == id)
853 {
854 j=1;
855 break;
856 }
857 }
858 if (j == 0)
859 {
860 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
861 {
862 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
863 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
864 }
865 else
866 {
867 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
868 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
869 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
871 goto f_err;
872 }
873 }
874 }
875
876 /* compression */
877 i= *(p++);
878 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
879 {
880 /* not enough data */
881 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
883 goto f_err;
884 }
885 q=p;
886 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
887 {
888 if (p[j] == 0) break;
889 }
890
891 p+=i;
892 if (j >= i)
893 {
894 /* no compress */
895 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
897 goto f_err;
898 }
899
900 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
901 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
902 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
903 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
905 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
906 { /* See if we have a match */
907 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
908
909 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
910 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
911 {
912 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
913 v=comp->id;
914 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
915 {
916 if (v == q[o])
917 {
918 done=1;
919 break;
920 }
921 }
922 if (done) break;
923 }
924 if (done)
925 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
926 else
927 comp=NULL;
928 }
929 #endif
930
931 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
932 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
933 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
934 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
935 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
936 {
937 if (p < (d+n))
938 {
939 /* wrong number of bytes,
940 * there could be more to follow */
941 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
943 goto f_err;
944 }
945 }
946 #endif
947
948 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
949 * pick a cipher */
950
951 if (!s->hit)
952 {
953 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
954 s->session->compress_meth=0;
955 #else
956 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
957 #endif
958 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
959 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
960 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
961 if (ciphers == NULL)
962 {
963 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
965 goto f_err;
966 }
967 ciphers=NULL;
968 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
969 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
970
971 if (c == NULL)
972 {
973 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
975 goto f_err;
976 }
977 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
978 }
979 else
980 {
981 /* Session-id reuse */
982 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
983 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
984 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
985 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
986
987 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
988 {
989 sk=s->session->ciphers;
990 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
991 {
992 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
993 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
994 nc=c;
995 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
996 ec=c;
997 }
998 if (nc != NULL)
999 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1000 else if (ec != NULL)
1001 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1002 else
1003 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1004 }
1005 else
1006 #endif
1007 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1008 }
1009
1010 /* we now have the following setup.
1011 * client_random
1012 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1013 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1014 * compression - basically ignored right now
1015 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1016 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1017 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1018 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1019 */
1020
1021 ret=1;
1022 if (0)
1023 {
1024 f_err:
1025 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1026 }
1027 err:
1028 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1029 return(ret);
1030 }
1031
1032 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1033 {
1034 unsigned char *buf;
1035 unsigned char *p,*d;
1036 int i,sl;
1037 unsigned long l,Time;
1038
1039 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1040 {
1041 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1042 p=s->s3->server_random;
1043 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1044 l2n(Time,p);
1045 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1046 return -1;
1047 /* Do the message type and length last */
1048 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1049
1050 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1051 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1052
1053 /* Random stuff */
1054 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1055 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1056
1057 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1058 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1059 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1060 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1061 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1062 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1063 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1064 */
1065 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1066 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1067
1068 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1069 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1070 {
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1072 return -1;
1073 }
1074 *(p++)=sl;
1075 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1076 p+=sl;
1077
1078 /* put the cipher */
1079 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1080 p+=i;
1081
1082 /* put the compression method */
1083 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1084 *(p++)=0;
1085 #else
1086 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1087 *(p++)=0;
1088 else
1089 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1090 #endif
1091
1092 /* do the header */
1093 l=(p-d);
1094 d=buf;
1095 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1096 l2n3(l,d);
1097
1098 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1099 /* number of bytes to write */
1100 s->init_num=p-buf;
1101 s->init_off=0;
1102 }
1103
1104 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1105 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1106 }
1107
1108 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1109 {
1110 unsigned char *p;
1111
1112 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1113 {
1114 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1115
1116 /* do the header */
1117 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1118 *(p++)=0;
1119 *(p++)=0;
1120 *(p++)=0;
1121
1122 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1123 /* number of bytes to write */
1124 s->init_num=4;
1125 s->init_off=0;
1126 }
1127
1128 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1129 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1130 }
1131
1132 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1133 {
1134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1135 unsigned char *q;
1136 int j,num;
1137 RSA *rsa;
1138 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1139 unsigned int u;
1140 #endif
1141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1142 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1143 #endif
1144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1145 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1146 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1147 int encodedlen = 0;
1148 int curve_id = 0;
1149 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1150 #endif
1151 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1152 unsigned char *p,*d;
1153 int al,i;
1154 unsigned long type;
1155 int n;
1156 CERT *cert;
1157 BIGNUM *r[4];
1158 int nr[4],kn;
1159 BUF_MEM *buf;
1160 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1161
1162 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1163 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1164 {
1165 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1166 cert=s->cert;
1167
1168 buf=s->init_buf;
1169
1170 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1171 n=0;
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1173 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1174 {
1175 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1176 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1177 {
1178 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1179 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1180 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1181 if(rsa == NULL)
1182 {
1183 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1185 goto f_err;
1186 }
1187 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1188 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1189 }
1190 if (rsa == NULL)
1191 {
1192 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1194 goto f_err;
1195 }
1196 r[0]=rsa->n;
1197 r[1]=rsa->e;
1198 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1199 }
1200 else
1201 #endif
1202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1203 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1204 {
1205 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1206 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1207 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1208 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1209 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1210 if (dhp == NULL)
1211 {
1212 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1214 goto f_err;
1215 }
1216
1217 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1218 {
1219 DH_free(dh);
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1221 goto err;
1222 }
1223
1224 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1225 {
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1227 goto err;
1228 }
1229
1230 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1231 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1232 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1233 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1234 {
1235 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1236 {
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1238 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1239 goto err;
1240 }
1241 }
1242 else
1243 {
1244 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1245 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1246 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1247 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1248 {
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1250 goto err;
1251 }
1252 }
1253 r[0]=dh->p;
1254 r[1]=dh->g;
1255 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1256 }
1257 else
1258 #endif
1259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1260 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1261 {
1262 const EC_GROUP *group;
1263
1264 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1265 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1266 {
1267 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1268 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1269 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1270 }
1271 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1272 {
1273 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1275 goto f_err;
1276 }
1277
1278 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1279 {
1280 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1282 goto err;
1283 }
1284
1285 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1286 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1287 {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1289 goto err;
1290 }
1291 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1292 {
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1294 goto err;
1295 }
1296 ecdh = ecdhp;
1297
1298 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1299 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1300 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1301 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1302 {
1303 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1304 {
1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1306 goto err;
1307 }
1308 }
1309
1310 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1311 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1312 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1313 {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1315 goto err;
1316 }
1317
1318 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1319 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1320 {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1322 goto err;
1323 }
1324
1325 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1326 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1327 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1328 */
1329 if ((curve_id =
1330 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1331 == 0)
1332 {
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1334 goto err;
1335 }
1336
1337 /* Encode the public key.
1338 * First check the size of encoding and
1339 * allocate memory accordingly.
1340 */
1341 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1342 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1343 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1344 NULL, 0, NULL);
1345
1346 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1347 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1348 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1349 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1350 {
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1352 goto err;
1353 }
1354
1355
1356 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1357 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1358 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1359 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1360
1361 if (encodedlen == 0)
1362 {
1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1364 goto err;
1365 }
1366
1367 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1368
1369 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1370 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1371 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1372 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1373 * structure.
1374 */
1375 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1376
1377 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1378 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1379 */
1380 r[0]=NULL;
1381 r[1]=NULL;
1382 r[2]=NULL;
1383 r[3]=NULL;
1384 }
1385 else
1386 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1387 {
1388 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1390 goto f_err;
1391 }
1392 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1393 {
1394 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1395 n+=2+nr[i];
1396 }
1397
1398 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1399 {
1400 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1401 == NULL)
1402 {
1403 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1404 goto f_err;
1405 }
1406 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1407 }
1408 else
1409 {
1410 pkey=NULL;
1411 kn=0;
1412 }
1413
1414 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1415 {
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1417 goto err;
1418 }
1419 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1420 p= &(d[4]);
1421
1422 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1423 {
1424 s2n(nr[i],p);
1425 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1426 p+=nr[i];
1427 }
1428
1429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1430 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1431 {
1432 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1433 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1434 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1435 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1436 * the actual encoded point itself
1437 */
1438 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1439 p += 1;
1440 *p = 0;
1441 p += 1;
1442 *p = curve_id;
1443 p += 1;
1444 *p = encodedlen;
1445 p += 1;
1446 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1447 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1448 encodedlen);
1449 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1450 p += encodedlen;
1451 }
1452 #endif
1453
1454 /* not anonymous */
1455 if (pkey != NULL)
1456 {
1457 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1458 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1460 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1461 {
1462 q=md_buf;
1463 j=0;
1464 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1465 {
1466 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1467 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1468 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1469 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1470 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1471 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1472 (unsigned int *)&i);
1473 q+=i;
1474 j+=i;
1475 }
1476 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1477 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1478 {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1480 goto err;
1481 }
1482 s2n(u,p);
1483 n+=u+2;
1484 }
1485 else
1486 #endif
1487 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1488 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1489 {
1490 /* lets do DSS */
1491 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1492 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1493 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1494 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1495 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1496 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1497 {
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1499 goto err;
1500 }
1501 s2n(i,p);
1502 n+=i+2;
1503 }
1504 else
1505 #endif
1506 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1507 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1508 {
1509 /* let's do ECDSA */
1510 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1511 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1512 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1513 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1514 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1515 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1516 {
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1518 goto err;
1519 }
1520 s2n(i,p);
1521 n+=i+2;
1522 }
1523 else
1524 #endif
1525 {
1526 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1527 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1529 goto f_err;
1530 }
1531 }
1532
1533 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1534 l2n3(n,d);
1535
1536 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1537 * it off */
1538 s->init_num=n+4;
1539 s->init_off=0;
1540 }
1541
1542 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1543 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1544 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1545 f_err:
1546 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1547 err:
1548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1549 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1550 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1551 #endif
1552 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1553 return(-1);
1554 }
1555
1556 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1557 {
1558 unsigned char *p,*d;
1559 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1560 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1561 X509_NAME *name;
1562 BUF_MEM *buf;
1563
1564 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1565 {
1566 buf=s->init_buf;
1567
1568 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1569
1570 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1571 p++;
1572 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1573 d[0]=n;
1574 p+=n;
1575 n++;
1576
1577 off=n;
1578 p+=2;
1579 n+=2;
1580
1581 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1582 nl=0;
1583 if (sk != NULL)
1584 {
1585 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1586 {
1587 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1588 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1589 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1590 {
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1592 goto err;
1593 }
1594 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1595 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1596 {
1597 s2n(j,p);
1598 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1599 n+=2+j;
1600 nl+=2+j;
1601 }
1602 else
1603 {
1604 d=p;
1605 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1606 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1607 n+=j;
1608 nl+=j;
1609 }
1610 }
1611 }
1612 /* else no CA names */
1613 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1614 s2n(nl,p);
1615
1616 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1617 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1618 l2n3(n,d);
1619
1620 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1621 * it off */
1622
1623 s->init_num=n+4;
1624 s->init_off=0;
1625 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1626 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1627
1628 /* do the header */
1629 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1630 *(p++)=0;
1631 *(p++)=0;
1632 *(p++)=0;
1633 s->init_num += 4;
1634 #endif
1635
1636 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1637 }
1638
1639 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1640 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1641 err:
1642 return(-1);
1643 }
1644
1645 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1646 {
1647 int i,al,ok;
1648 long n;
1649 unsigned long l;
1650 unsigned char *p;
1651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1652 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1653 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1654 #endif
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1656 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1657 DH *dh_srvr;
1658 #endif
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1660 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1661 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1662
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1664 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1665 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1666 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1667 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1668 #endif
1669
1670 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1671 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1672 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1673 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1674 2048, /* ??? */
1675 &ok);
1676
1677 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1678 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1679
1680 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1681
1682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1683 if (l & SSL_kRSA)
1684 {
1685 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1686 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1687 {
1688 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1689 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1690 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1691 * be sent already */
1692 if (rsa == NULL)
1693 {
1694 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1696 goto f_err;
1697
1698 }
1699 }
1700 else
1701 {
1702 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1703 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1704 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1705 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1706 {
1707 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1709 goto f_err;
1710 }
1711 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
1712 }
1713
1714 /* TLS */
1715 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1716 {
1717 n2s(p,i);
1718 if (n != i+2)
1719 {
1720 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1721 {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1723 goto err;
1724 }
1725 else
1726 p-=2;
1727 }
1728 else
1729 n=i;
1730 }
1731
1732 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1733
1734 al = -1;
1735
1736 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1737 {
1738 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1739 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1740 }
1741
1742 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1743 {
1744 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1745 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1746 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1747 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1748 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1749 * protocol version.
1750 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1751 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1752 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1753 {
1754 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1755 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1756
1757 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1758 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1759 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1760 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1761 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1762 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1763 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1764 }
1765 }
1766
1767 if (al != -1)
1768 {
1769 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1770 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1771 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1772 ERR_clear_error();
1773 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1774 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1775 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1776 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1777 goto err;
1778 }
1779
1780 s->session->master_key_length=
1781 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1782 s->session->master_key,
1783 p,i);
1784 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1785 }
1786 else
1787 #endif
1788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1789 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1790 {
1791 n2s(p,i);
1792 if (n != i+2)
1793 {
1794 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1795 {
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1797 goto err;
1798 }
1799 else
1800 {
1801 p-=2;
1802 i=(int)n;
1803 }
1804 }
1805
1806 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1807 {
1808 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1810 goto f_err;
1811 }
1812 else
1813 {
1814 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1815 {
1816 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1818 goto f_err;
1819 }
1820 else
1821 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1822 }
1823
1824 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1825 if (pub == NULL)
1826 {
1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1828 goto err;
1829 }
1830
1831 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1832
1833 if (i <= 0)
1834 {
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1836 goto err;
1837 }
1838
1839 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1840 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
1841
1842 BN_clear_free(pub);
1843 pub=NULL;
1844 s->session->master_key_length=
1845 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1846 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1847 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1848 }
1849 else
1850 #endif
1851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1852 if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
1853 {
1854 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1855 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1856 krb5_data authenticator;
1857 krb5_data enc_pms;
1858 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1859 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1860 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1861 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1862 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1863 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1864 int padl, outl;
1865 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1866 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1867
1868 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1869
1870 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1871
1872 n2s(p,i);
1873 enc_ticket.length = i;
1874
1875 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
1876 {
1877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1878 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1879 goto err;
1880 }
1881
1882 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1883 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1884
1885 n2s(p,i);
1886 authenticator.length = i;
1887
1888 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
1889 {
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1891 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1892 goto err;
1893 }
1894
1895 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1896 p+=authenticator.length;
1897
1898 n2s(p,i);
1899 enc_pms.length = i;
1900 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1901 p+=enc_pms.length;
1902
1903 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1904 ** after decryption
1905 */
1906 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1907 {
1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1909 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1910 goto err;
1911 }
1912
1913 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1914 enc_pms.length + 6))
1915 {
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1917 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1918 goto err;
1919 }
1920
1921 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1922 &kssl_err)) != 0)
1923 {
1924 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1925 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1926 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1927 if (kssl_err.text)
1928 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1929 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1931 kssl_err.reason);
1932 goto err;
1933 }
1934
1935 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1936 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1937 */
1938 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1939 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1940 {
1941 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1942 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1943 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1944 if (kssl_err.text)
1945 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1946 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1948 kssl_err.reason);
1949 goto err;
1950 }
1951
1952 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1953 {
1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1955 goto err;
1956 }
1957
1958 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1959 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1960 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1961
1962 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1963 if (enc == NULL)
1964 goto err;
1965
1966 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1967
1968 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1969 {
1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1971 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1972 goto err;
1973 }
1974 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
1975 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
1976 {
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1978 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1979 goto err;
1980 }
1981 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1982 {
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1984 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1985 goto err;
1986 }
1987 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
1988 {
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1990 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1991 goto err;
1992 }
1993 outl += padl;
1994 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1995 {
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1997 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1998 goto err;
1999 }
2000 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2001 {
2002 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2003 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2004 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2005 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2006 * the protocol version.
2007 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2008 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2009 */
2010 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2011 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2012 {
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2014 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2015 goto err;
2016 }
2017 }
2018
2019 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2020
2021 s->session->master_key_length=
2022 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2023 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2024
2025 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2026 {
2027 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2028 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2029 {
2030 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2031 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2032 }
2033 }
2034
2035
2036 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2037 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2038 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2039 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2040 */
2041 }
2042 else
2043 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2044
2045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2046 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2047 {
2048 int ret = 1;
2049 int field_size = 0;
2050 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2051 const EC_GROUP *group;
2052 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2053
2054 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2055 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2056 {
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2058 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2059 goto err;
2060 }
2061
2062 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2063 if (l & SSL_kECDH)
2064 {
2065 /* use the certificate */
2066 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2067 }
2068 else
2069 {
2070 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2071 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2072 */
2073 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2074 }
2075
2076 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2077 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2078
2079 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2080 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2081 {
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2083 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2084 goto err;
2085 }
2086
2087 /* Let's get client's public key */
2088 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2089 {
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2091 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2092 goto err;
2093 }
2094
2095 if (n == 0L)
2096 {
2097 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2098
2099 if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
2100 {
2101 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2103 goto f_err;
2104 }
2105 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2106 == NULL) ||
2107 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2108 {
2109 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2110 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2111 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2112 * never executed. When that support is
2113 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2114 * received in the certificate is
2115 * authorized for key agreement.
2116 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2117 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2118 * group.
2119 */
2120 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2122 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2123 goto f_err;
2124 }
2125
2126 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2127 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2128 {
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2130 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2131 goto err;
2132 }
2133 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2134 }
2135 else
2136 {
2137 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2138 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2139 */
2140 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2141 {
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2143 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2144 goto err;
2145 }
2146
2147 /* Get encoded point length */
2148 i = *p;
2149 p += 1;
2150 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2151 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2152 {
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2154 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2155 goto err;
2156 }
2157 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2158 * currently, so set it to the start
2159 */
2160 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2161 }
2162
2163 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2164 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2165 if (field_size <= 0)
2166 {
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2168 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2169 goto err;
2170 }
2171 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2172 if (i <= 0)
2173 {
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2175 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2176 goto err;
2177 }
2178
2179 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2180 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2181 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2182 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2183 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2184
2185 /* Compute the master secret */
2186 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2187 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2188
2189 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2190 return (ret);
2191 }
2192 else
2193 #endif
2194 {
2195 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2197 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2198 goto f_err;
2199 }
2200
2201 return(1);
2202 f_err:
2203 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2204 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2205 err:
2206 #endif
2207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2208 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2209 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2210 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2211 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2212 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2213 #endif
2214 return(-1);
2215 }
2216
2217 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2218 {
2219 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2220 unsigned char *p;
2221 int al,ok,ret=0;
2222 long n;
2223 int type=0,i,j;
2224 X509 *peer;
2225
2226 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2227 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2228 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2229 -1,
2230 514, /* 514? */
2231 &ok);
2232
2233 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2234
2235 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2236 {
2237 peer=s->session->peer;
2238 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2239 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2240 }
2241 else
2242 {
2243 peer=NULL;
2244 pkey=NULL;
2245 }
2246
2247 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2248 {
2249 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2250 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2251 {
2252 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2254 goto f_err;
2255 }
2256 ret=1;
2257 goto end;
2258 }
2259
2260 if (peer == NULL)
2261 {
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2263 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2264 goto f_err;
2265 }
2266
2267 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2268 {
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2270 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2271 goto f_err;
2272 }
2273
2274 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2275 {
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2277 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2278 goto f_err;
2279 }
2280
2281 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2282 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2283 n2s(p,i);
2284 n-=2;
2285 if (i > n)
2286 {
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2288 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2289 goto f_err;
2290 }
2291
2292 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2293 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2294 {
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2296 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2297 goto f_err;
2298 }
2299
2300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2301 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2302 {
2303 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2304 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2305 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2306 if (i < 0)
2307 {
2308 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2310 goto f_err;
2311 }
2312 if (i == 0)
2313 {
2314 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2316 goto f_err;
2317 }
2318 }
2319 else
2320 #endif
2321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2322 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2323 {
2324 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2325 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2326 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2327 if (j <= 0)
2328 {
2329 /* bad signature */
2330 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2332 goto f_err;
2333 }
2334 }
2335 else
2336 #endif
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2338 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2339 {
2340 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2341 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2342 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2343 if (j <= 0)
2344 {
2345 /* bad signature */
2346 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2348 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2349 goto f_err;
2350 }
2351 }
2352 else
2353 #endif
2354 {
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2356 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2357 goto f_err;
2358 }
2359
2360
2361 ret=1;
2362 if (0)
2363 {
2364 f_err:
2365 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2366 }
2367 end:
2368 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2369 return(ret);
2370 }
2371
2372 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2373 {
2374 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2375 X509 *x=NULL;
2376 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2377 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2378 unsigned char *d;
2379 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2380
2381 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2382 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2383 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2384 -1,
2385 s->max_cert_list,
2386 &ok);
2387
2388 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2389
2390 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2391 {
2392 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2393 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2394 {
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2396 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2397 goto f_err;
2398 }
2399 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2400 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2401 {
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2403 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2404 goto f_err;
2405 }
2406 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2407 return(1);
2408 }
2409
2410 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2411 {
2412 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2414 goto f_err;
2415 }
2416 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2417
2418 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2419 {
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2421 goto err;
2422 }
2423
2424 n2l3(p,llen);
2425 if (llen+3 != n)
2426 {
2427 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2429 goto f_err;
2430 }
2431 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2432 {
2433 n2l3(p,l);
2434 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2435 {
2436 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2438 goto f_err;
2439 }
2440
2441 q=p;
2442 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2443 if (x == NULL)
2444 {
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2446 goto err;
2447 }
2448 if (p != (q+l))
2449 {
2450 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2452 goto f_err;
2453 }
2454 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2455 {
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2457 goto err;
2458 }
2459 x=NULL;
2460 nc+=l+3;
2461 }
2462
2463 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2464 {
2465 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2466 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2467 {
2468 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2470 goto f_err;
2471 }
2472 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2473 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2474 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2475 {
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2477 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2478 goto f_err;
2479 }
2480 }
2481 else
2482 {
2483 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2484 if (!i)
2485 {
2486 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2488 goto f_err;
2489 }
2490 }
2491
2492 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2493 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2494 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2495 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2496
2497 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2498 * when we arrive here. */
2499 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2500 {
2501 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2502 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2503 {
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2505 goto err;
2506 }
2507 }
2508 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2509 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2510 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2511 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2512 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2513
2514 sk=NULL;
2515
2516 ret=1;
2517 if (0)
2518 {
2519 f_err:
2520 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2521 }
2522 err:
2523 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2524 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2525 return(ret);
2526 }
2527
2528 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2529 {
2530 unsigned long l;
2531 X509 *x;
2532
2533 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2534 {
2535 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2536 if (x == NULL &&
2537 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2538 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2539 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2540 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2541 {
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2543 return(0);
2544 }
2545
2546 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2548 s->init_num=(int)l;
2549 s->init_off=0;
2550 }
2551
2552 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2553 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2554 }
2555
2556
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2558 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2559 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2560 {
2561 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2562 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2563 switch (nid) {
2564 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2565 return 1;
2566 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2567 return 2;
2568 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2569 return 3;
2570 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2571 return 4;
2572 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2573 return 5;
2574 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2575 return 6;
2576 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2577 return 7;
2578 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2579 return 8;
2580 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2581 return 9;
2582 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2583 return 10;
2584 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2585 return 11;
2586 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2587 return 12;
2588 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2589 return 13;
2590 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2591 return 14;
2592 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2593 return 15;
2594 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2595 return 16;
2596 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2597 return 17;
2598 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2599 return 18;
2600 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2601 return 19;
2602 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2603 return 20;
2604 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2605 return 21;
2606 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2607 return 22;
2608 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2609 return 23;
2610 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2611 return 24;
2612 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2613 return 25;
2614 default:
2615 return 0;
2616 }
2617 }
2618 #endif
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