Ignore machine-check MSRs

[freebsd-src/fkvm-freebsd.git] / contrib / bind9 / doc / draft / draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-12.txt

DNS Extensions                                                O. Kolkman
Internet-Draft                                                  RIPE NCC
Expires: June 17, 2004                                       J. Schlyter

                                                                E. Lewis
                                                                    ARIN
                                                       December 18, 2003


                   DNSKEY RR Secure Entry Point Flag
              draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-12

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 17, 2004.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   With the Delegation Signer (DS) resource record the concept of a
   public key acting as a secure entry point has been introduced. During
   exchanges of public keys with the parent there is a need to
   differentiate secure entry point keys from other public keys in the
   DNSKEY resource record (RR) set.  A flag bit in the DNSKEY RR is
   defined to indicate that DNSKEY is to be used as a secure entry
   point. The flag bit is intended to assist in operational procedures
   to correctly generate DS resource records, or to indicate what
   DNSKEYs are intended for static configuration. The flag bit is not to



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   be used in the DNS verification protocol. This document updates RFC
   2535 and RFC 3445.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2. The Secure Entry Point (SEP) Flag  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   3. DNSSEC Protocol Changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   4. Operational Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   5. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   6. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   7. Internationalization Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   8. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
      Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
      Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
      Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
      Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . 9


































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1. Introduction

   "All keys are equal but some keys are more equal than others" [6]

   With the definition of the Delegation Signer Resource Record (DS RR)
   [5] it has become important to differentiate between the keys in the
   DNSKEY RR set that are (to be) pointed to by parental DS RRs and the
   other keys in the DNSKEY RR set.  We refer to these public keys as
   Secure Entry Point (SEP) keys.  A SEP key either used to generate a
   DS RR or is distributed to resolvers that use the key as the root of
   a trusted subtree[3].

   In early deployment tests, the use of two (kinds of) key pairs for
   each zone has been prevalent.  For one kind of key pair the private
   key is used to sign just the zone's DNSKEY resource record (RR) set.
   Its public key is intended to be referenced by a DS RR at the parent
   or configured statically in a resolver.  The private key of the other
   kind of key pair is used to sign the rest of the zone's data sets.
   The former key pair is called a key-signing key (KSK) and the latter
   is called a zone-signing key (ZSK).  In practice there have been
   usually one of each kind of key pair, but there will be multiples of
   each at times.

   It should be noted that division of keys pairs into KSK's and ZSK's
   is not mandatory in any definition of DNSSEC, not even with the
   introduction of the DS RR.  But, in testing, this distinction has
   been helpful when designing key roll over (key super-cession)
   schemes.  Given that the distinction has proven helpful, the labels
   KSK and ZSK have begun to stick.

   There is a need to differentiate the public keys for the key pairs
   that are used for key signing from keys that are not used key signing
   (KSKs vs ZSKs). This need is driven by knowing which DNSKEYs are to
   be sent for generating DS RRs, which DNSKEYs are to be distributed to
   resolvers, and which keys are fed to the signer application at the
   appropriate time.

   In other words, the SEP bit provides an in-band method to communicate
   a DNSKEY RR's intended use to third parties. As an example we present
   3 use cases in which the bit is useful:

      The parent is a registry, the parent and the child use secured DNS
      queries and responses, with a preexisting trust-relation, or plain
      DNS over a secured channel to exchange the child's  DNSKEY RR
      sets. Since a DNSKEY RR set will contain a complete DNSKEY RRset
      the SEP bit can be used to isolate the DNSKEYs for which a DS RR
      needs to be created.




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      An administrator has configured a DNSKEY as root for a trusted
      subtree into security aware resolver. Using a special purpose tool
      that queries for the KEY RRs from that domain's apex, the
      administrator will be able to notice the roll over of the trusted
      anchor by a change of the subset of KEY RRs with the DS flag set.

      A signer might use the SEP bit on the public key to determine
      which private key to use to exclusively sign the DNSKEY RRset and
      which private key to use to sign the other RRsets in the zone.

   As demonstrated in the above examples it is important to be able to
   differentiate the SEP keys from the other keys in a DNSKEY RR set in
   the flow between signer and (parental) key-collector and in the flow
   between the signer and the resolver configuration. The SEP flag is to
   be of no interest to the flow between the verifier and the
   authoritative data store.

   The reason for the term "SEP" is a result of the observation that the
   distinction between KSK and ZSK key pairs is made by the signer, a
   key pair could be used as both a KSK and a ZSK at the same time. To
   be clear, the term SEP was coined to lessen the confusion caused by
   the overlap. ( Once this label was applied, it had the side effect of
   removing the temptation to have both a KSK flag bit and a ZSK flag
   bit.)

   The key words "MAY","MAY NOT", "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
   "RECOMMENDED", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT" in this document are to be
   interpreted as described in RFC2119 [1].

2. The Secure Entry Point (SEP) Flag


                           1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |              flags          |S|   protocol    |   algorithm   |
      |                             |E|               |               |
      |                             |P|               |               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               /
      /                        public key                             /
      /                                                               /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                                DNSKEY RR Format






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   This document assigns the 15'th bit in the flags field as the secure
   entry point (SEP) bit.  If the the bit is set to 1 the key is
   intended to be used as secure entry point key.  One SHOULD NOT assign
   special meaning to the key if the bit is set to 0.  Operators can
   recognize the secure entry point key by the even or odd-ness of the
   decimal representation of the flag field.

3. DNSSEC Protocol Changes

   The bit MUST NOT be used during the resolving and verification
   process. The SEP flag is only used to provide a hint about the
   different administrative properties of the key and therefore the use
   of the SEP flag does not change the DNS resolution protocol or the
   resolution process.

4. Operational Guidelines

   The SEP bit is set by the key-pair-generator and MAY be used by the
   zone signer to decide whether the public part of the key pair is to
   be prepared for input to a DS RR generation function.  The SEP bit is
   recommended to be set (to 1) whenever the public key of the key pair
   will be distributed to the parent zone to build the authentication
   chain or if the public key is to be distributed for static
   configuration in verifiers.

   When a key pair is created, the operator needs to indicate whether
   the SEP bit is to be set in the DNSKEY RR.  As the SEP bit is within
   the data that is used to compute the 'key tag field' in the SIG RR,
   changing the SEP bit will change the identity of the key within DNS.
   In other words, once a key is used to generate signatures, the
   setting of the SEP bit is to remain constant. If not, a verifier will
   not be able to find the relevant KEY RR.

   When signing a zone, it is intended that the key(s) with the SEP bit
   set (if such keys exist) are used to sign the KEY RR set of the zone.
   The same key can be used to sign the rest of the zone data too.  It
   is conceivable that not all keys with a SEP bit set will sign the
   DNSKEY RR set, such keys might be pending retirement or not yet in
   use.

   When verifying a RR set, the SEP bit is not intended to play a role.
   How the key is used by the verifier is not intended to be a
   consideration at key creation time.

   Although the SEP flag provides a hint on which public key is to be
   used as trusted root, administrators can choose to ignore the fact
   that a DNSKEY has its SEP bit set or not when configuring a trusted
   root for their resolvers.



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   Using the SEP flag a key roll over can be automated. The parent can
   use an existing trust relation to verify DNSKEY RR sets in which a
   new DNSKEY RR with the SEP flag appears.

5. Security Considerations

   As stated in Section 3 the flag is not to be used in the resolution
   protocol or to determine the security status of a key. The flag is to
   be used for administrative purposes only.

   No trust in a key should be inferred from this flag - trust MUST be
   inferred from an existing chain of trust or an out-of-band exchange.

   Since this flag might be used for automating public key exchanges, we
   think the following consideration is in place.

   Automated mechanisms for roll over of the DS RR might be vulnerable
   to a class of replay attacks.  This might happen after a public key
   exchange where a DNSKEY RR set, containing two DNSKEY RRs with the
   SEP flag set, is sent to the parent.  The parent verifies the DNSKEY
   RR set with the existing trust relation and creates the new DS RR
   from the DNSKEY RR that the current DS RR is not pointing to.  This
   key exchange might be replayed. Parents are encouraged to implement a
   replay defense. A simple defense can be based on a registry of keys
   that have been used to generate DS RRs during the most recent roll
   over. These same considerations apply to entities that configure keys
   in resolvers.

6. IANA Considerations

   The flag bits  in the DNSKEY RR are assigned by IETF consensus and
   registered in the DNSKEY Flags registry (created by [4]). This
   document assigns the 15th bit in the DNSKEY RR as the Secure Entry
   Point (SEP) bit.

7. Internationalization Considerations

   Although SEP is a popular acronym in many different languages, there
   are no internationalization considerations.

8. Acknowledgments

   The ideas documented in this document are inspired by communications
   we had with numerous people and ideas published by other folk. Among
   others Mark Andrews, Rob Austein, Miek Gieben, Olafur Gudmundsson,
   Daniel Karrenberg, Dan Massey, Scott Rose, Marcos Sanz and Sam Weiler
   have contributed ideas and provided feedback.




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   This document saw the light during a workshop on DNSSEC operations
   hosted by USC/ISI in August 2002.

Normative References

   [1]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [2]  Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
        2535, March 1999.

   [3]  Lewis, E., "DNS Security Extension Clarification on Zone
        Status", RFC 3090, March 2001.

   [4]  Weiler, S., "Legacy Resolver Compatibility for Delegation
        Signer", draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change-05 (work
        in progress), October 2003.

Informative References

   [5]  Gudmundsson, O., "Delegation Signer Resource Record",
        draft-ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer-15 (work in progress), June
        2003.

   [6]  Orwell, G. and R. Steadman (illustrator), "Animal Farm; a Fairy
        Story", ISBN 0151002177 (50th anniversary edition), April 1996.


Authors' Addresses

   Olaf M. Kolkman
   RIPE NCC
   Singel 256
   Amsterdam  1016 AB
   NL

   Phone: +31 20 535 4444
   EMail: olaf@ripe.net
   URI:   http://www.ripe.net/


   Jakob Schlyter
   Karl Gustavsgatan 15
   Goteborg  SE-411 25
   Sweden

   EMail: jakob@schlyter.se




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   Edward P. Lewis
   ARIN
   3635 Concorde Parkway Suite 200
   Chantilly, VA  20151
   US

   Phone: +1 703 227 9854
   EMail: edlewis@arin.net
   URI:   http://www.arin.net/










































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Intellectual Property Statement

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   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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   Internet Society.











































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