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[freebsd-src/fkvm-freebsd.git] / contrib / bind9 / doc / draft / draft-ihren-dnsext-threshold-validation-00.txt

Internet Draft                                          Johan Ihren
draft-ihren-dnsext-threshold-validation-00.txt          Autonomica
February 2003
Expires in six months


                        Threshold Validation: 

         A Mechanism for Improved Trust and Redundancy for DNSSEC Keys


Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as
   Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
   documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts
   as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
   progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.


Abstract

   This memo documents a proposal for a different method of validation
   for DNSSEC aware resolvers. The key change is that by changing from
   a model of one Key Signing Key, KSK, at a time to multiple KSKs it
   will be possible to increase the aggregated trust in the signed
   keys by leveraging from the trust associated with the different
   signees. 

   By having multiple keys to chose from validating resolvers get the
   opportunity to use local policy to reflect actual trust in
   different keys. For instance, it is possible to trust a single,
   particular key ultimately, while requiring multiple valid
   signatures by less trusted keys for validation to succeed.
   Furthermore, with multiple KSKs there are additional redundancy
   benefits available since it is possible to roll over different KSKs
   at different times which may make rollover scenarios easier to
   manage.

Contents

        1. Terminology
        2. Introduction and Background

        3. Trust in DNSSEC Keys
        3.1. Key Management, Split Keys and Trust Models
        3.2. Trust Expansion: Authentication versus Authorization

        4. Proposed Semantics for Signing the KEY Resource Record 
           Set
        4.1. Packet Size Considerations

        5. Proposed Use of Multiple "Trusted Keys" in a Validating 
           Resolver
        5.1. Not All Possible KSKs Need to Be Trusted
        5.2. Possible to do Threshold Validation
        5.3. Not All Trusted Keys Will Be Available

        6. Additional Benefits from Having Multiple KSKs
        6.1. More Robust Key Rollovers
        6.2. Evaluation of Multiple Key Distribution Mechanisms

        7. Security Considerations
        8. IANA Considerations.
        9. References
        9.1. Normative.
        9.2. Informative.
        10. Acknowledgments.
        11. Authors' Address


1. Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "SHALL", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED",
   and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   RFC 2119. 

   The term "zone" refers to the unit of administrative control in the
   Domain Name System. "Name server" denotes a DNS name server that is
   authoritative (i.e. knows all there is to know) for a DNS zone,
   typically the root zone. A "resolver", is a DNS "client", i.e. an
   entity that sends DNS queries to authoritative nameservers and
   interpret the results. A "validating resolver" is a resolver that
   attempts to perform DNSSEC validation on data it retrieves by doing
   DNS lookups.


2. Introduction and Background

   From a protocol perspective there is no real difference between
   different keys in DNSSEC. They are all just keys. However, in
   actual use there is lots of difference. First and foremost, most
   DNSSEC keys have in-band verification. I.e. the keys are signed by
   some other key, and this other key is in its turn also signed by
   yet another key. This way a "chain of trust" is created. Such
   chains have to end in what is referred to as a "trusted key" for
   validation of DNS lookups to be possible. 

   A "trusted key" is a the public part of a key that the resolver
   acquired by some other means than by looking it up in DNS. The
   trusted key has to be explicitly configured.

   A node in the DNS hierarchy that issues such out-of-band "trusted
   keys" is called a "security apex" and the trusted key for that apex
   is the ultimate source of trust for all DNS lookups within that
   entire subtree.

   DNSSEC is designed to be able to work with more than on security
   apex. These apexes will all share the problem of how to distribute
   their "trusted keys" in a way that provides validating resolvers
   confidence in the distributed keys. 

   Maximizing that confidence is crucial to the usefulness of DNSSEC
   and this document tries to address this issue.


3. Trust in DNSSEC Keys

   In the end the trust that a validating resolver will be able to put
   in a key that it cannot validate within DNSSEC will have to be a
   function of

            * trust in the key issuer, aka the KSK holder

            * trust in the distribution method

            * trust in extra, out-of-band verification

   The KSK holder needs to be trusted not to accidentally lose private
   keys in public places. Furthermore it needs to be trusted to
   perform correct identification of the ZSK holders in case they are
   separate from the KSK holder itself.

   The distribution mechanism can be more or less tamper-proof. If the
   key holder publishes the public key, or perhaps just a secure
   fingerprint of the key in a major newspaper it may be rather
   difficult to tamper with. A key acquired that way may be easier to
   trust than if it had just been downloaded from a web page.

   Out-of-band verification can for instance be the key being signed
   by a certificate issued by a known Certificate Authority that the
   resolver has reason to trust.

3.1. Simplicity vs Trust 

   The fewer keys that are in use the simpler the key management
   becomes. Therefore increasing the number of keys should only be
   considered when the complexity is not the major concern. A perfect
   example of this is the distinction between so called Key Signing
   Keys, KSK, and Zone Signing Keys, ZSK. This distinction adds
   overall complexity but simplifies real life operations and was an
   overall gain since operational simplification was considered to be
   a more crucial issue than the added complexity.

   In the case of a security apex there are additional issues to
   consider, among them

      * maximizing trust in the KSK received out-of-band

      * authenticating the legitimacy of the ZSKs used

   In some cases this will be easy, since the same entity will manage
   both ZSKs and KSKs (i.e. it will authenticate itself, somewhat
   similar to a self-signed certificate). In some environments it will
   be possible to get the trusted key installed in the resolver end by
   decree (this would seem to be a likely method within corporate and
   government environments).

   In other cases, however, this will possibly not be sufficient. In
   the case of the root zone this is obvious, but there may well be
   other cases.

3.2. Expanding the "Trust Base"

   For a security apex where the ZSKs and KSK are not held by the same
   entity the KSK will effectively authenticate the identity of
   whoever does real operational zone signing. The amount of trust
   that the data signed by a ZSK will get is directly dependent on
   whether the end resolver trusts the KSK or not, since the resolver
   has no OOB access to the public part of the ZSKs (for practical
   reasons).

   Since the KSK holder is distinct from the ZSK holder the obvious
   question is whether it would then be possible to further improve
   the situation by using multiple KSK holders and thereby expanding
   the trust base to the union of that available to each individual
   KSK holder. "Trust base" is an invented term intended to signify
   the aggregate of Internet resolvers that will eventually choose to
   trust a key issued by a particular KSK holder.

   A crucial issue when considering trust expansion through addition
   of multiple KSK holders is that the KSK holders are only used to
   authenticate the ZSKs used for signing the zone. I.e. the function
   performed by the KSK is basically:

             "This is indeed the official ZSK holder for this zone,
             I've verified this fact to the best of my abilitites."

   Which can be thought of as similar to the service of a public
   notary. I.e. the point with adding more KSK holders is to improve
   the public trust in data signed by the ZSK holders by improving the
   strength of available authentication. 

   Therefore adding more KSK holders, each with their own trust base,
   is by definition a good thing. More authentication is not
   controversial. On the contrary, when it comes to authentication,
   the more the merrier.

   
4. Proposed Semantics for Signing the KEY Resource Record Set

   In DNSSEC according to RFC2535 all KEY Resource Records are used to
   sign all authoritative data in the zone, including the KEY RRset
   itself, since RFC2535 makes no distinction between Key Signing
   Keys, KSK, and Zone Signing Keys, ZSK.  With Delegation Signer [DS]
   it is possible to change this to the KEY RRset being signed with
   all KSKs and ZSKs but the rest of the zone only being signed by the
   ZSKs.

   This proposal changes this one step further, by recommending that
   the KEY RRset is only signed by the Key Signing Keys, KSK, and
   explicitly not by the Zone Signing Keys, ZSK. The reason for this
   is to maximize the amount of space in the DNS response packet that
   is available for additional KSKs and signatures thereof. The rest
   of the authoritative zone contents are as previously signed by only
   the ZSKs.

4.1. Packet Size Considerations

   The reason for the change is to keep down the size of the aggregate
   of KEY RRset plus SIG(KEY) that resolvers will need to acquire to
   perform validation of data below a security apex. For DNSSEC data
   to be returned the DNSSEC OK bit in the EDNS0 OPT Record has to be
   set, and therefore the allowed packet size can be assumed to be at
   least the EDNS0 minimum of 4000 bytes.

   When querying for KEY + SIG(KEY) for "." (the case that is assumed
   to be most crucial) the size of the response packet after the
   change to only sign the KEY RR with the KSKs break down into a
   rather large space of possibilities. Here are a few examples for
   the possible alternatives for different numbers of KSKs and ZSKs
   for some different key lengths (all RSA keys, with a public
   exponent that is < 254). This is all based upon the size of the
   response for the particular example of querying for
   
        ". KEY IN"

   with a response of entire KEY + SIG(KEY) with the authority and
   additional sections empty:

              ZSK/768 and KSK/1024   (real small)
              Max 12 KSK +  3 ZSK  at 3975
                  10 KSK +  8 ZSK  at 3934
                   8 KSK + 13 ZSK  at 3893

              ZSK/768 + KSK/1280
              MAX 10 KSK +  2 ZSK  at 3913
                   8 KSK +  9 ZSK  at 3970
                   6 KSK + 15 ZSK  at 3914

              ZSK/768 + KSK/1536
              MAX  8 KSK +  4 ZSK  at 3917
                   7 KSK +  8 ZSK  at 3938
                   6 KSK + 12 ZSK  at 3959

              ZSK/768 + KSK/2048
              MAX  6 KSK +  5 ZSK  at 3936
                   5 KSK + 10 ZSK  at 3942

              ZSK/1024 + KSK/1024
              MAX 12 KSK +  2 ZSK  at 3943
                  11 KSK +  4 ZSK  at 3930
                  10 KSK +  6 ZSK  at 3917
                   8 KSK + 10 ZSK  at 3891

              ZSK/1024 + KSK/1536
              MAX  8 KSK +  3 ZSK  at 3900
                   7 KSK +  6 ZSK  at 3904
                   6 KSK +  9 ZSK  at 3908

              ZSK/1024 + KSK/2048
              MAX  6 KSK +  4 ZSK  at 3951
                   5 KSK +  8 ZSK  at 3972
                   4 KSK + 12 ZSK  at 3993

   Note that these are just examples and this document is not making
   any recommendations on suitable choices of either key lengths nor
   number of different keys employed at a security apex.

   This document does however, based upon the above figures, make the
   recommendation that at a security apex that expects to distribute
   "trusted keys" the KEY RRset should only be signed with the KSKs
   and not with the ZSKs to keep the size of the response packets
   down.


5. Proposed Use of Multiple "Trusted Keys" in a Validating Resolver

   In DNSSEC according to RFC2535[RFC2535] validation is the process
   of tracing a chain of signatures (and keys) upwards through the DNS
   hierarchy until a "trusted key" is reached. If there is a known
   trusted key present at a security apex above the starting point
   validation becomes an exercise with a binary outcome: either the
   validation succeeds or it fails. No intermediate states are
   possible.

   With multiple "trusted keys" (i.e. the KEY RRset for the security
   apex signed by multiple KSKs) this changes into a more complicated
   space of alternatives. From the perspective of complexity that may
   be regarded as a change for the worse. However, from a perspective
   of maximizing available trust the multiple KSKs add value to the
   system.

5.1. Possible to do Threshold Validation

   With multiple KSKs a new option that opens for the security
   concious resolver is to not trust a key individually. Instead the
   resolver may decide to require the validated signatures to exceed a
   threshold. For instance, given M trusted keys it is possible for
   the resolver to require N-of-M signatures to treat the data as
   validated.

   I.e. with the following pseudo-configuration in a validating
   resolver

        security-apex "." IN {
           keys { ksk-1 .... ;
                  ksk-2 .... ;
                  ksk-3 .... ; 
                  ksk-4 .... ;
                  ksk-5 .... ;
                };
           validation {
              # Note that ksk-4 is not present below
              keys { ksk-1; ksk-2; ksk-3; ksk-5; }; 
              # 3 signatures needed with 4 possible keys, aka 75%
              needed-signatures 3;
           };
        };

   we configure five trusted keys for the root zone, but require two
   valid signatures for the top-most KEY for validation to
   succeed. I.e.  threshold validation does not force multiple
   signatures on the entire signature chain, only on the top-most
   signature, closest to the security apex for which the resolver has
   trusted keys.                    

5.2. Not All Trusted Keys Will Be Available

   With multiple KSKs held and managed by separate entities the end
   resolvers will not always manage to get access to all possible
   trusted keys. In the case of just a single KSK this would be fatal
   to validation and necessary to avoid at whatever cost. But with
   several fully trusted keys available the resolver can decide to
   trust several of them individually. An example based upon more
   pseudo-configuration:

        security-apex "." IN {
           keys { ksk-1 .... ;
                  ksk-2 .... ;
                  ksk-3 .... ; 
                  ksk-4 .... ;
                  ksk-5 .... ;
                };
           validation {
              # Only these two keys are trusted independently
              keys { ksk-1; ksk-4; }; 
              # With these keys a single signature is sufficient
              needed-signatures 1;
           };
        };

   Here we have the same five keys and instruct the validating
   resolver to fully trust data that ends up with just one signature
   from by a fully trusted key.

   The typical case where this will be useful is for the case where
   there is a risk of the resolver not catching a rollover event by
   one of the KSKs. By doing rollovers of different KSKs with
   different schedules it is possible for a resolver to "survive"
   missing a rollover without validation breaking. This improves
   overall robustness from a management point of view.

5.3. Not All Possible KSKs Need to Be Trusted

   With just one key available it simply has to be trusted, since that
   is the only option available. With multiple KSKs the validating
   resolver immediately get the option of implementing a local policy
   of only trusting some of the possible keys.

   This local policy can be implemented either by simply not
   configuring keys that are not trusted or, possibly, configure them
   but specify to the resolver that certain keys are not to be
   ultimately trusted alone.


6. Additional Benefits from Having Multiple KSKs

6.1. More Robust Key Rollovers

   With only one KSK the rollover operation will be a delicate
   operation since the new trusted key needs to reach every validating
   resolver before the old key is retired. For this reason it is
   expected that long periods of overlap will be needed.

   With multiple KSKs this changes into a system where different
   "series" of KSKs can have different rollover schedules, thereby
   changing from one "big" rollover to several "smaller" rollovers.

   If the resolver trusts several of the available keys individually
   then even a failure to track a certain rollover operation within
   the overlap period will not be fatal to validation since the other
   available trusted keys will be sufficient.

6.2. Evaluation of Multiple Key Distribution Mechanisms

   Distribution of the trusted keys for the DNS root zone is
   recognized to be a difficult problem that ...

   With only one trusted key, from one single "source" to distribute
   it will be difficult to evaluate what distribution mechanism works
   best. With multiple KSKs, held by separate entitites it will be
   possible to measure how large fraction of the resolver population
   that is trusting what subsets of KSKs.


7. Security Considerations

   From a systems perspective the simplest design is arguably the
   best, i.e. one single holder of both KSK and ZSKs. However, if that
   is not possible in all cases a more complex scheme is needed where
   additional trust is injected by using multiple KSK holders, each
   contributing trust, then there are only two alternatives
   available. The first is so called "split keys", where a single key
   is split up among KSK holders, each contributing trust. The second
   is the multiple KSK design outlined in this proposal.

   Both these alternatives provide for threshold mechanisms. However
   split keys makes the threshold integral to the key generating
   mechanism (i.e. it will be a property of the keys how many
   signatures are needed). In the case of multiple KSKs the threshold
   validation is not a property of the keys but rather local policy in
   the validating resolver. A benefit from this is that it is possible
   for different resolvers to use different trust policies. Some may
   configure threshold validation requiring multiple signatures and
   specific keys (optimizing for security) while others may choose to
   accept a single signature from a larger set of keys (optimizing for
   redundancy). Since the security requirements are different it would
   seem to be a good idea to make this choice local policy rather than
   global policy.

   Furthermore, a clear issue for validating resolvers will be how to
   ensure that they track all rollover events for keys they
   trust. Even with operlap during the rollover (which is clearly
   needed) there is still a need to be exceedingly careful not to miss
   any rollovers (or fail to acquire a new key) since without this
   single key validation will fail. With multiple KSKs this operation
   becomes more robust, since different KSKs may roll at different
   times according to different rollover schedules and losing one key,
   for whatever reason, will not be crucial unless the resolver
   intentionally chooses to be completely dependent on that exact key.

8. IANA Considerations.

   NONE.


9. References

9.1. Normative.

   [RFC2535] Domain Name System Security Extensions. D. Eastlake. 
             March 1999.

   [RFC3090] DNS Security Extension Clarification on Zone Status. 
             E. Lewis.  March 2001.


9.2. Informative.

   [RFC3110] RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name System
             (DNS). D.  Eastlake 3rd. May 2001.

   [RFC3225] Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC. D. Conrad. 
             December 2001.

   [DS]      Delegation Signer Resource Record. 
             O. Gudmundsson. October 2002. Work In Progress.

10. Acknowledgments.

   Bill Manning came up with the original idea of moving complexity
   from the signing side down to the resolver in the form of threshold
   validation. I've also had much appreciated help from (in no
   particular order) Jakob Schlyter, Paul Vixie, Olafur Gudmundson and
   Olaf Kolkman.


11. Authors' Address
Johan Ihren
Autonomica AB
Bellmansgatan 30
SE-118 47 Stockholm, Sweden
johani@autonomica.se