2 Format of colon listings
3 ========================
6 $ gpg --fixed-list-mode --with-colons --list-keys \
7 --with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint wk@gnupg.org
9 pub:f:1024:17:6C7EE1B8621CC013:899817715:1055898235::m:::scESC:
10 fpr:::::::::ECAF7590EB3443B5C7CF3ACB6C7EE1B8621CC013:
11 uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>:
12 uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>:
13 sub:f:1536:16:06AD222CADF6A6E1:919537416:1036177416:::::e:
14 fpr:::::::::CF8BCC4B18DE08FCD8A1615906AD222CADF6A6E1:
15 sub:r:1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:899817788:1025961788:::::esc:
16 fpr:::::::::AB059359A3B81F410FCFF97F5CE086B5B5A18FF4:
18 The double --with-fingerprint prints the fingerprint for the subkeys
19 too, --fixed-list-mode is themodern listing way printing dates in
20 seconds since Epoch and does not merge the first userID with the pub
24 1. Field: Type of record
26 crt = X.509 certificate
27 crs = X.509 certificate and private key available
28 sub = subkey (secondary key)
30 ssb = secret subkey (secondary key)
31 uid = user id (only field 10 is used).
32 uat = user attribute (same as user id except for field 10).
34 rev = revocation signature
35 fpr = fingerprint: (fingerprint is in field 10)
36 pkd = public key data (special field format, see below)
37 grp = reserved for gpgsm
39 tru = trust database information
40 spk = signature subpacket
42 2. Field: A letter describing the calculated trust. This is a single
43 letter, but be prepared that additional information may follow
44 in some future versions. (not used for secret keys)
45 o = Unknown (this key is new to the system)
46 i = The key is invalid (e.g. due to a missing self-signature)
47 d = The key has been disabled
48 (deprecated - use the 'D' in field 12 instead)
49 r = The key has been revoked
50 e = The key has expired
51 - = Unknown trust (i.e. no value assigned)
53 '-' and 'q' may safely be treated as the same
54 value for most purposes
55 n = Don't trust this key at all
56 m = There is marginal trust in this key
57 f = The key is fully trusted
58 u = The key is ultimately trusted. This often means
59 that the secret key is available, but any key may
60 be marked as ultimately trusted.
62 3. Field: length of key in bits.
64 4. Field: Algorithm: 1 = RSA
65 16 = Elgamal (encrypt only)
66 17 = DSA (sometimes called DH, sign only)
67 20 = Elgamal (sign and encrypt - don't use them!)
68 (for other id's see include/cipher.h)
72 6. Field: Creation Date (in UTC). For UID and UAT records, this is the
73 self-signature date. Note that the dae is usally printed
74 in seconds since epoch, however, we are migrating to an ISO
75 8601 format (e.g. "19660205T091500"). This is currently
76 only relevant for X.509, A simple way to detect the format
77 is be scannning for the 'T'.
79 7. Field: Key or user ID/user attribute expiration date or empty if none.
81 8. Field: Used for serial number in crt records (used to be the Local-ID).
82 For UID and UAT records, this is a hash of the user ID contents
83 used to represent that exact user ID. For trust signatures,
84 this is the trust depth seperated by the trust value by a
87 9. Field: Ownertrust (primary public keys only)
88 This is a single letter, but be prepared that additional
89 information may follow in some future versions. For trust
90 signatures with a regular expression, this is the regular
91 expression value, quoted as in field 10.
93 10. Field: User-ID. The value is quoted like a C string to avoid
94 control characters (the colon is quoted "\x3a").
95 This is not used with --fixed-list-mode in gpg.
96 A UAT record puts the attribute subpacket count here, a
97 space, and then the total attribute subpacket size.
98 In gpgsm the issuer name comes here
99 An FPR record stores the fingerprint here.
100 The fingerprint of an revocation key is stored here.
102 11. Field: Signature class. This is a 2 digit hexnumber followed by
103 either the letter 'x' for an exportable signature or the
104 letter 'l' for a local-only signature.
105 The class byte of an revocation key is also given here,
106 'x' and 'l' ist used the same way.
108 12. Field: Key capabilities:
113 A key may have any combination of them in any order. In
114 addition to these letters, the primary key has uppercase
115 versions of the letters to denote the _usable_
116 capabilities of the entire key, and a potential letter 'D'
117 to indicate a disabled key.
119 13. Field: Used in FPR records for S/MIME keys to store the
120 fingerprint of the issuer certificate. This is useful to
121 build the certificate path based on certificates stored in
122 the local keyDB; it is only filled if the issuer
123 certificate is available. The root has been reached if
124 this is the same string as the fingerprint. The advantage
125 of using this value is that it is guaranteed to have been
126 been build by the same lookup algorithm as gpgsm uses.
127 For "uid" recods this lists the preferences n the sameway the
129 For "sig" records, this is the fingerprint of the key that
130 issued the signature. Note that this is only filled in if
131 the signature verified correctly. Note also that for
132 various technical reasons, this fingerprint is only
133 available if --no-sig-cache is used.
135 14. Field Flag field used in the --edit menu output:
137 15. Field Used in sec/sbb to print the serial number of a token
138 (internal protect mode 1002) or a '#' if that key is a
139 simple stub (internal protect mode 1001)
141 All dates are displayed in the format yyyy-mm-dd unless you use the
142 option --fixed-list-mode in which case they are displayed as seconds
143 since Epoch. More fields may be added later, so parsers should be
144 prepared for this. When parsing a number the parser should stop at the
145 first non-number character so that additional information can later be
148 If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this:
149 pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
151 ! !------ for information number of bits in the value
152 !--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y)
155 The "tru" trust database records have the fields:
157 2: Reason for staleness of trust. If this field is empty, then the
158 trustdb is not stale. This field may have multiple flags in it:
161 t: Trustdb was built with a different trust model than the one we
165 0: Classic trust model, as used in PGP 2.x.
166 1: PGP trust model, as used in PGP 6 and later. This is the same
167 as the classic trust model, except for the addition of trust
170 GnuPG before version 1.4 used the classic trust model by default.
171 GnuPG 1.4 and later uses the PGP trust model by default.
173 4: Date trustdb was created in seconds since 1/1/1970.
174 5: Date trustdb will expire in seconds since 1/1/1970.
176 The "spk" signature subpacket records have the fields:
178 2: Subpacket number as per RFC-2440 and later.
179 3: Flags in hex. Currently the only two bits assigned are 1, to
180 indicate that the subpacket came from the hashed part of the
181 signature, and 2, to indicate the subpacket was marked critical.
182 4: Length of the subpacket. Note that this is the length of the
183 subpacket, and not the length of field 5 below. Due to the need
184 for %-encoding, the length of field 5 may be up to 3x this value.
185 5: The subpacket data. Printable ASCII is shown as ASCII, but other
186 values are rendered as %XX where XX is the hex value for the byte.
189 Format of the "--status-fd" output
190 ==================================
191 Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with
192 the type of the status line and a some arguments depending on the
193 type (maybe none); an application should always be prepared to see
194 more arguments in future versions.
198 May be issued right before a signature verification starts. This
199 is useful to define a context for parsing ERROR status
200 messages. No arguments are currently defined.
202 GOODSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
203 The signature with the keyid is good. For each signature only
204 one of the three codes GOODSIG, BADSIG or ERRSIG will be
205 emitted and they may be used as a marker for a new signature.
206 The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
207 escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid
208 if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might
209 eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
211 EXPSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
212 The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature is
213 expired. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and
214 %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long
215 keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might
216 eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
218 EXPKEYSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
219 The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was
220 made by an expired key. The username is the primary one
221 encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used
222 instead of the long keyid if it is available. This is the
223 case with CMS and might eventually also be available for
226 REVKEYSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
227 The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was
228 made by a revoked key. The username is the primary one encoded
229 in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead
230 of the long keyid if it is available. This is the case with
231 CMS and might eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
233 BADSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
234 The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay. The
235 username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
236 escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid
237 if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might
238 eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
240 ERRSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <pubkey_algo> <hash_algo> \
241 <sig_class> <timestamp> <rc>
242 It was not possible to check the signature. This may be
243 caused by a missing public key or an unsupported algorithm. A
244 RC of 4 indicates unknown algorithm, a 9 indicates a missing
245 public key. The other fields give more information about this
246 signature. sig_class is a 2 byte hex-value. The fingerprint
247 may be used instead of the long keyid if it is available.
248 This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be
249 available for OpenPGP.
251 Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number with seconds since
252 epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the
253 presence of the letter 'T' inside.
255 VALIDSIG <fingerprint in hex> <sig_creation_date> <sig-timestamp>
256 <expire-timestamp> [ <sig-version> <reserved> <pubkey-algo>
257 <hash-algo> <sig-class> <primary-key-fpr> ]
259 The signature with the keyid is good. This is the same as
260 GOODSIG but has the fingerprint as the argument. Both status
261 lines are emitted for a good signature. All arguments here
262 are on one long line. sig-timestamp is the signature creation
263 time in seconds after the epoch. expire-timestamp is the
264 signature expiration time in seconds after the epoch (zero
265 means "does not expire"). sig-version, pubkey-algo, hash-algo,
266 and sig-class (a 2-byte hex value) are all straight from the
267 signature packet. PRIMARY-KEY-FPR is the fingerprint of the
268 primary key or identical to the first argument. This is
269 useful to get back to the primary key without running gpg
270 again for this purpose.
272 The optional parameters are used for OpenPGP and are not
273 available for CMS signatures.
275 Note, that *-TIMESTAMP may either be a number with seconds
276 since epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the
277 presence of the letter 'T' inside.
279 SIG_ID <radix64_string> <sig_creation_date> <sig-timestamp>
280 This is emitted only for signatures of class 0 or 1 which
281 have been verified okay. The string is a signature id
282 and may be used in applications to detect replay attacks
283 of signed messages. Note that only DLP algorithms give
284 unique ids - others may yield duplicated ones when they
285 have been created in the same second.
287 Note, that SIG-TIMESTAMP may either be a number with seconds
288 since epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the
289 presence of the letter 'T' inside.
292 ENC_TO <long keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
293 The message is encrypted to this keyid.
294 keytype is the numerical value of the public key algorithm,
295 keylength is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known
296 (which is currently always the case).
299 No data has been found. Codes for what are:
301 2 - Expected a packet but did not found one.
302 3 - Invalid packet found, this may indicate a non OpenPGP
304 4 - signature expected but not found
305 You may see more than one of these status lines.
308 Unexpected data has been encountered
309 0 - not further specified 1
312 TRUST_UNDEFINED <error token>
313 TRUST_NEVER <error token>
317 For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted
318 to indicate how trustworthy the signature is. The error token
319 values are currently only emiited by gpgsm.
321 PKA_TRUST_GOOD <mailbox>
322 PKA_TRUST_BAD <mailbox>
323 Depending on the outcome of the PKA check one of the above
324 status codes is emitted in addition to a TRUST_* status.
325 Without PKA info available or
328 This is deprecated in favor of KEYEXPIRED.
330 KEYEXPIRED <expire-timestamp>
331 The key has expired. expire-timestamp is the expiration time
332 in seconds after the epoch.
334 Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number with seconds since
335 epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the
336 presence of the letter 'T' inside.
339 The used key has been revoked by its owner. No arguments yet.
342 The ASCII armor is corrupted. No arguments yet.
345 The IDEA algorithms has been used in the data. A
346 program might want to fallback to another program to handle
347 the data if GnuPG failed. This status message used to be emitted
348 also for RSA but this has been dropped after the RSA patent expired.
349 However we can't change the name of the message.
361 NEED_PASSPHRASE <long main keyid> <long keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
362 Issued whenever a passphrase is needed.
363 keytype is the numerical value of the public key algorithm
364 or 0 if this is not applicable, keylength is the length
365 of the key or 0 if it is not known (this is currently always the case).
367 NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash>
368 Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed.
370 NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN <card_type> <chvno> [<serialno>]
371 Issued whenever a PIN is requested to unlock a card.
374 No passphrase was supplied. An application which encounters this
375 message may want to stop parsing immediately because the next message
376 will probably be a BAD_PASSPHRASE. However, if the application
377 is a wrapper around the key edit menu functionality it might not
378 make sense to stop parsing but simply ignoring the following
381 BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
382 The supplied passphrase was wrong or not given. In the latter case
383 you may have seen a MISSING_PASSPHRASE.
386 The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material
390 The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong
391 passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message.
394 The decryption process succeeded. This means, that either the
395 correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase
396 for a conventional encrypted message was given. The program
397 itself may return an errorcode because it may not be possible to
398 verify a signature for some reasons.
400 NO_PUBKEY <long keyid>
401 NO_SECKEY <long keyid>
402 The key is not available
404 IMPORT_CHECK <long keyid> <fingerprint> <user ID>
405 This status is emitted in interactive mode right before
406 the "import.okay" prompt.
408 IMPORTED <long keyid> <username>
409 The keyid and name of the signature just imported
411 IMPORT_OK <reason> [<fingerprint>]
412 The key with the primary key's FINGERPRINT has been imported.
414 0 := Not actually changed
415 1 := Entirely new key.
419 16 := Contains private key.
420 The flags may be ORed.
422 IMPORT_PROBLEM <reason> [<fingerprint>]
423 Issued for each import failure. Reason codes are:
424 0 := "No specific reason given".
425 1 := "Invalid Certificate".
426 2 := "Issuer Certificate missing".
427 3 := "Certificate Chain too long".
428 4 := "Error storing certificate".
430 IMPORT_RES <count> <no_user_id> <imported> <imported_rsa> <unchanged>
431 <n_uids> <n_subk> <n_sigs> <n_revoc> <sec_read> <sec_imported> <sec_dups> <not_imported>
432 Final statistics on import process (this is one long line)
434 FILE_START <what> <filename>
435 Start processing a file <filename>. <what> indicates the performed
442 Marks the end of a file processing which has been started
447 Mark the start and end of the actual decryption process. These
448 are also emitted when in --list-only mode.
450 BEGIN_ENCRYPTION <mdc_method> <sym_algo>
452 Mark the start and end of the actual encryption process.
455 Mark the start of the actual signing process. This may be used
456 as an indication that all requested secret keys are ready for
459 DELETE_PROBLEM reason_code
460 Deleting a key failed. Reason codes are:
462 2 - Must delete secret key first
463 3 - Ambigious specification
465 PROGRESS what char cur total
466 Used by the primegen and Public key functions to indicate progress.
467 "char" is the character displayed with no --status-fd enabled, with
468 the linefeed replaced by an 'X'. "cur" is the current amount
469 done and "total" is amount to be done; a "total" of 0 indicates that
470 the total amount is not known. 100/100 may be used to detect the
472 Well known values for WHAT:
473 "pk_dsa" - DSA key generation
474 "pk_elg" - Elgamal key generation
475 "primegen" - Prime generation
476 "need_entropy" - Waiting for new entropy in the RNG
477 "file:XXX" - processing file XXX
478 (note that current gpg versions leave out the
480 "tick" - generic tick without any special meaning - useful
481 for letting clients know that the server is
483 "starting_agent" - A gpg-agent was started because it is not
487 SIG_CREATED <type> <pubkey algo> <hash algo> <class> <timestamp> <key fpr>
488 A signature has been created using these parameters.
492 (only the first character should be checked)
493 class: 2 hex digits with the signature class
495 Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number with seconds since
496 epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the
497 presence of the letter 'T' inside.
499 KEY_CREATED <type> <fingerprint> [<handle>]
500 A key has been created
501 type: 'B' = primary and subkey
504 The fingerprint is one of the primary key for type B and P and
505 the one of the subkey for S. Handle is an arbitrary
506 non-whitespace string used to match key parameters from batch
509 KEY_NOT_CREATED [<handle>]
510 The key from batch run has not been created due to errors.
513 SESSION_KEY <algo>:<hexdigits>
514 The session key used to decrypt the message. This message will
515 only be emitted when the special option --show-session-key
516 is used. The format is suitable to be passed to the option
517 --override-session-key
520 NOTATION_DATA <string>
521 name and string are %XX escaped; the data may be splitted
522 among several notation_data lines.
524 USERID_HINT <long main keyid> <string>
525 Give a hint about the user ID for a certain keyID.
528 string is %XX escaped
534 INV_RECP <reason> <requested_recipient>
535 Issued for each unusable recipient. The reasons codes
536 currently in use are:
537 0 := "No specific reason given".
539 2 := "Ambigious specification"
540 3 := "Wrong key usage"
545 8 := "Policy mismatch"
546 9 := "Not a secret key"
547 10 := "Key not trusted"
549 Note that this status is also used for gpgsm's SIGNER command
550 where it relates to signer's of course.
553 Issued when no recipients are usable.
555 ALREADY_SIGNED <long-keyid>
556 Warning: This is experimental and might be removed at any time.
559 The output was truncated to MAXNO items. This status code is issued
560 for certain external requests
562 ERROR <error location> <error code>
564 This is a generic error status message, it might be followed
565 by error location specific data. <error token> and
566 <error_location> should not contain a space. The error code
567 is a either a string commencing with a letter or such string
568 prefix with a numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.:
571 ATTRIBUTE <fpr> <octets> <type> <index> <count>
572 <timestamp> <expiredate> <flags>
573 This is one long line issued for each attribute subpacket when
574 an attribute packet is seen during key listing. <fpr> is the
575 fingerprint of the key. <octets> is the length of the
576 attribute subpacket. <type> is the attribute type
577 (1==image). <index>/<count> indicates that this is the Nth
578 indexed subpacket of count total subpackets in this attribute
579 packet. <timestamp> and <expiredate> are from the
580 self-signature on the attribute packet. If the attribute
581 packet does not have a valid self-signature, then the
582 timestamp is 0. <flags> are a bitwise OR of:
583 0x01 = this attribute packet is a primary uid
584 0x02 = this attribute packet is revoked
585 0x04 = this attribute packet is expired
587 CARDCTRL <what> [<serialno>]
588 This is used to control smartcard operations.
589 Defined values for WHAT are:
590 1 = Request insertion of a card. Serialnumber may be given
591 to request a specific card.
592 2 = Request removal of a card.
593 3 = Card with serialnumber detected
594 4 = No card available.
595 5 = No card reader available
598 PLAINTEXT <format> <timestamp> <filename>
599 This indicates the format of the plaintext that is about to be
600 written. The format is a 1 byte hex code that shows the
601 format of the plaintext: 62 ('b') is binary data, 74 ('t') is
602 text data with no character set specified, and 75 ('u') is
603 text data encoded in the UTF-8 character set. The timestamp
604 is in seconds since the epoch. If a filename is available it
605 gets printed as the third argument, percent-escaped as usual.
607 PLAINTEXT_LENGTH <length>
608 This indicates the length of the plaintext that is about to be
609 written. Note that if the plaintext packet has partial length
610 encoding it is not possible to know the length ahead of time.
611 In that case, this status tag does not appear.
613 SIG_SUBPACKET <type> <flags> <len> <data>
614 This indicates that a signature subpacket was seen. The
615 format is the same as the "spk" record above.
617 SC_OP_FAILURE [<code>]
618 An operation on a smartcard definitely failed. Currently
619 there is no indication of the actual error code, but
620 application should be prepared to later accept more arguments.
621 Defined values for CODE are:
622 0 - unspecified error (identically to a missing CODE)
627 A smart card operaion succeeded. This status is only printed
628 for certain operation and is mostly useful to check whether a
629 PIN change really worked.
631 BACKUP_KEY_CREATED fingerprint fname
632 A backup key named FNAME has been created for the key with
636 Format of the "--attribute-fd" output
637 =====================================
639 When --attribute-fd is set, during key listings (--list-keys,
640 --list-secret-keys) GnuPG dumps each attribute packet to the file
641 descriptor specified. --attribute-fd is intended for use with
642 --status-fd as part of the required information is carried on the
643 ATTRIBUTE status tag (see above).
645 The contents of the attribute data is specified by 2440bis, but for
646 convenience, here is the Photo ID format, as it is currently the only
649 Byte 0-1: The length of the image header. Due to a historical
650 accident (i.e. oops!) back in the NAI PGP days, this is
651 a little-endian number. Currently 16 (0x10 0x00).
653 Byte 2: The image header version. Currently 0x01.
655 Byte 3: Encoding format. 0x01 == JPEG.
657 Byte 4-15: Reserved, and currently unused.
659 All other data after this header is raw image (JPEG) data.
662 Format of the "--list-config" output
663 ====================================
665 --list-config outputs information about the GnuPG configuration for
666 the benefit of frontends or other programs that call GnuPG. There are
667 several list-config items, all colon delimited like the rest of the
668 --with-colons output. The first field is always "cfg" to indicate
669 configuration information. The second field is one of (with
672 version: the third field contains the version of GnuPG.
676 pubkey: the third field contains the public key algorithmdcaiphers
677 this version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. The
678 algorithm numbers are as specified in RFC-2440.
680 cfg:pubkey:1;2;3;16;17
682 cipher: the third field contains the symmetric ciphers this version of
683 GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. The cipher numbers
684 are as specified in RFC-2440.
686 cfg:cipher:2;3;4;7;8;9;10
688 digest: the third field contains the digest (hash) algorithms this
689 version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. The
690 digest numbers are as specified in RFC-2440.
692 cfg:digest:1;2;3;8;9;10
694 compress: the third field contains the compression algorithms this
695 version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. The
696 algorithm numbers are as specified in RFC-2440.
700 group: the third field contains the name of the group, and the fourth
701 field contains the values that the group expands to, separated
704 For example, a group of:
705 group mynames = paige 0x12345678 joe patti
708 cfg:group:mynames:patti;joe;0x12345678;paige
713 Key generation shows progress by printing different characters to
715 "." Last 10 Miller-Rabin tests failed
716 "+" Miller-Rabin test succeeded
717 "!" Reloading the pool with fresh prime numbers
718 "^" Checking a new value for the generator
719 "<" Size of one factor decreased
720 ">" Size of one factor increased
722 The prime number for Elgamal is generated this way:
724 1) Make a prime number q of 160, 200, 240 bits (depending on the keysize)
725 2) Select the length of the other prime factors to be at least the size
726 of q and calculate the number of prime factors needed
727 3) Make a pool of prime numbers, each of the length determined in step 2
728 4) Get a new permutation out of the pool or continue with step 3
729 if we have tested all permutations.
730 5) Calculate a candidate prime p = 2 * q * p[1] * ... * p[n] + 1
731 6) Check that this prime has the correct length (this may change q if
732 it seems not to be possible to make a prime of the desired length)
733 7) Check whether this is a prime using trial divisions and the
735 8) Continue with step 4 if we did not find a prime in step 7.
736 9) Find a generator for that prime.
738 This algorithm is based on Lim and Lee's suggestion from the
739 Crypto '97 proceedings p. 260.
742 Unattended key generation
743 =========================
744 This feature allows unattended generation of keys controlled by a
745 parameter file. To use this feature, you use --gen-key together with
746 --batch and feed the parameters either from stdin or from a file given
749 The format of this file is as follows:
750 o Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 chars.
751 o You must use UTF-8 encoding to specify non-ascii characters.
752 o Empty lines are ignored.
753 o Leading and trailing spaces are ignored.
754 o A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates a comment line.
755 o Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the
756 arguments are separated by white space from the keyword.
757 o Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments
758 are separated by white space.
759 o The first parameter must be "Key-Type", control statements
760 may be placed anywhere.
761 o Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file
762 is reached, the next "Key-Type" parameter is encountered or at the
763 control statement "%commit"
764 o Control statements:
768 Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking).
770 Perform the key generation. An implicit commit is done
771 at the next "Key-Type" parameter.
774 Do not write the key to the default or commandline given
775 keyring but to <filename>. This must be given before the first
776 commit to take place, duplicate specification of the same filename
777 is ignored, the last filename before a commit is used.
778 The filename is used until a new filename is used (at commit points)
779 and all keys are written to that file. If a new filename is given,
780 this file is created (and overwrites an existing one).
781 Both control statements must be given.
782 o The order of the parameters does not matter except for "Key-Type"
783 which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only for the
784 generated keyblock and parameters from previous key generations are not
785 used. Some syntactically checks may be performed.
786 The currently defined parameters are:
787 Key-Type: <algo-number>|<algo-string>
788 Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the
789 primary key. The algorithm must be capable of signing.
790 This is a required parameter.
791 Key-Length: <length-in-bits>
792 Length of the key in bits. Default is 1024.
793 Key-Usage: <usage-list>
794 Space or comma delimited list of key usage, allowed values are
795 "encrypt", "sign", and "auth". This is used to generate the
796 key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is capable of
797 this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary keys
798 are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given
799 here, the "cert" flag will be on. If no Key-Usage is
800 specified, all the allowed usages for that particular
802 Subkey-Type: <algo-number>|<algo-string>
803 This generates a secondary key. Currently only one subkey
805 Subkey-Length: <length-in-bits>
806 Length of the subkey in bits. Default is 1024.
807 Subkey-Usage: <usage-list>
808 Similar to Key-Usage.
810 If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key,
811 enter it here. Default is not to use any passphrase.
813 Name-Comment: <string>
815 The 3 parts of a key. Remember to use UTF-8 here.
816 If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created.
817 Expire-Date: <iso-date>|(<number>[d|w|m|y])
818 Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It
819 may either be entered in ISO date format (2000-08-15) or as
820 number of days, weeks, month or years. Without a letter days
822 Preferences: <string>
823 Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for
824 this key. This expects the same type of string as "setpref"
826 Revoker: <algo>:<fpr> [sensitive]
827 Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the
828 public key algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1,
829 DSA=17, etc.) Fpr is the fingerprint of the designated
830 revoker. The optional "sensitive" flag marks the designated
831 revoker as sensitive information. Only v4 keys may be
834 This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines
835 KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. STRING may be up to 100
836 characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for
837 batch key generation to associate a key parameter block with a
840 This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred
841 keyserver URL for the key.
846 %echo Generating a standard key
851 Name-Real: Joe Tester
852 Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
853 Name-Email: joe@foo.bar
858 # Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
862 $ gpg --batch --gen-key foo
864 $ gpg --no-default-keyring --secret-keyring ./foo.sec \
865 --keyring ./foo.pub --list-secret-keys
866 /home/wk/work/gnupg-stable/scratch/foo.sec
867 ------------------------------------------
868 sec 1024D/915A878D 2000-03-09 Joe Tester (with stupid passphrase) <joe@foo.bar>
869 ssb 1024g/8F70E2C0 2000-03-09
873 Layout of the TrustDB
874 =====================
875 The TrustDB is built from fixed length records, where the first byte
876 describes the record type. All numeric values are stored in network
877 byte order. The length of each record is 40 bytes. The first record of
878 the DB is always of type 1 and this is the only record of this type.
880 FIXME: The layout changed, document it here.
884 Unused record, can be reused for any purpose.
888 Version information for this TrustDB. This is always the first
889 record of the DB and the only one with type 1.
891 3 bytes 'gpg' magic value
892 1 byte Version of the TrustDB (2)
893 1 byte marginals needed
894 1 byte completes needed
895 1 byte max_cert_depth
896 The three items are used to check whether the cached
897 validity value from the dir record can be used.
898 1 u32 locked flags [not used]
899 1 u32 timestamp of trustdb creation
900 1 u32 timestamp of last modification which may affect the validity
901 of keys in the trustdb. This value is checked against the
902 validity timestamp in the dir records.
903 1 u32 timestamp of last validation [currently not used]
904 (Used to keep track of the time, when this TrustDB was checked
906 1 u32 record number of keyhashtable [currently not used]
907 1 u32 first free record
908 1 u32 record number of shadow directory hash table [currently not used]
909 It does not make sense to combine this table with the key table
910 because the keyid is not in every case a part of the fingerprint.
911 1 u32 record number of the trusthashtbale
914 Record type 2: (directory record)
916 Informations about a public key certificate.
917 These are static values which are never changed without user interaction.
921 1 u32 LID . (This is simply the record number of this record.)
922 1 u32 List of key-records (the first one is the primary key)
923 1 u32 List of uid-records
927 1 byte maximum validity of all the user ids
928 1 u32 time of last validity check.
929 1 u32 Must check when this time has been reached.
930 (0 = no check required)
933 Record type 3: (key record)
935 Informations about a primary public key.
936 (This is mainly used to lookup a trust record)
941 1 u32 next - next key record
944 1 byte pubkey algorithm
945 1 byte length of the fingerprint (in bytes)
946 20 bytes fingerprint of the public key
947 (This is the value we use to identify a key)
949 Record type 4: (uid record)
951 Informations about a userid
952 We do not store the userid but the hash value of the userid because that
957 1 u32 LID points to the directory record.
958 1 u32 next next userid
959 1 u32 pointer to preference record
960 1 u32 siglist list of valid signatures
962 1 byte validity of the key calculated over this user id
963 20 bytes ripemd160 hash of the username.
966 Record type 5: (pref record)
968 This record type is not anymore used.
972 1 u32 LID; points to the directory record (and not to the uid record!).
973 (or 0 for standard preference record)
975 30 byte preference data
977 Record type 6 (sigrec)
979 Used to keep track of key signatures. Self-signatures are not
980 stored. If a public key is not in the DB, the signature points to
981 a shadow dir record, which in turn has a list of records which
982 might be interested in this key (and the signature record here
987 1 u32 LID points back to the dir record
988 1 u32 next next sigrec of this uid or 0 to indicate the
991 1 u32 Local_id of signatures dir or shadow dir record
992 1 byte Flag: Bit 0 = checked: Bit 1 is valid (we have a real
993 directory record for this)
994 1 = valid is set (but may be revoked)
998 Record type 8: (shadow directory record)
1000 This record is used to reserve a LID for a public key. We
1001 need this to create the sig records of other keys, even if we
1002 do not yet have the public key of the signature.
1003 This record (the record number to be more precise) will be reused
1004 as the dir record when we import the real public key.
1008 1 u32 LID (This is simply the record number of this record.)
1010 1 byte pubkey algorithm
1012 1 u32 hintlist A list of records which have references to
1013 this key. This is used for fast access to
1014 signature records which are not yet checked.
1015 Note, that this is only a hint and the actual records
1016 may not anymore hold signature records for that key
1017 but that the code cares about this.
1022 Record Type 10 (hash table)
1024 Due to the fact that we use fingerprints to lookup keys, we can
1025 implement quick access by some simple hash methods, and avoid
1026 the overhead of gdbm. A property of fingerprints is that they can be
1027 used directly as hash values. (They can be considered as strong
1029 What we use is a dynamic multilevel architecture, which combines
1030 hashtables, record lists, and linked lists.
1032 This record is a hashtable of 256 entries; a special property
1033 is that all these records are stored consecutively to make one
1034 big table. The hash value is simple the 1st, 2nd, ... byte of
1035 the fingerprint (depending on the indirection level).
1037 When used to hash shadow directory records, a different table is used
1038 and indexed by the keyid.
1042 n u32 recnum; n depends on the record length:
1043 n = (reclen-2)/4 which yields 9 for the current record length
1046 the total number of such record which makes up the table is:
1048 which is 29 for a record length of 40.
1050 To look up a key we use the first byte of the fingerprint to get
1051 the recnum from this hashtable and look up the addressed record:
1052 - If this record is another hashtable, we use 2nd byte
1053 to index this hash table and so on.
1054 - if this record is a hashlist, we walk all entries
1055 until we found one a matching one.
1056 - if this record is a key record, we compare the
1057 fingerprint and to decide whether it is the requested key;
1060 Record type 11 (hash list)
1062 see hash table for an explanation.
1063 This is also used for other purposes.
1067 1 u32 next next hash list record
1068 n times n = (reclen-5)/5
1071 For the current record length of 40, n is 7
1075 Record type 254 (free record)
1077 All these records form a linked list of unused records.
1087 GNUPG uses PGP 2 packet headers and also understands OpenPGP packet header.
1088 There is one enhancement used with the old style packet headers:
1090 CTB bits 10, the "packet-length length bits", have values listed in
1091 the following table:
1093 00 - 1-byte packet-length field
1094 01 - 2-byte packet-length field
1095 10 - 4-byte packet-length field
1096 11 - no packet length supplied, unknown packet length
1098 As indicated in this table, depending on the packet-length length
1099 bits, the remaining 1, 2, 4, or 0 bytes of the packet structure field
1100 are a "packet-length field". The packet-length field is a whole
1101 number field. The value of the packet-length field is defined to be
1102 the value of the whole number field.
1104 A value of 11 is currently used in one place: on compressed data.
1105 That is, a compressed data block currently looks like <A3 01 . . .>,
1106 where <A3>, binary 10 1000 11, is an indefinite-length packet. The
1107 proper interpretation is "until the end of the enclosing structure",
1108 although it should never appear outermost (where the enclosing
1109 structure is a file).
1111 + This will be changed with another version, where the new meaning of
1112 + the value 11 (see below) will also take place.
1114 + A value of 11 for other packets enables a special length encoding,
1115 + which is used in case, where the length of the following packet can
1116 + not be determined prior to writing the packet; especially this will
1117 + be used if large amounts of data are processed in filter mode.
1119 + It works like this: After the CTB (with a length field of 11) a
1120 + marker field is used, which gives the length of the following datablock.
1121 + This is a simple 2 byte field (MSB first) containing the amount of data
1122 + following this field, not including this length field. After this datablock
1123 + another length field follows, which gives the size of the next datablock.
1124 + A value of 0 indicates the end of the packet. The maximum size of a
1125 + data block is limited to 65534, thereby reserving a value of 0xffff for
1126 + future extensions. These length markers must be inserted into the data
1127 + stream just before writing the data out.
1129 + This 2 byte field is large enough, because the application must buffer
1130 + this amount of data to prepend the length marker before writing it out.
1131 + Data block sizes larger than about 32k doesn't make any sense. Note
1132 + that this may also be used for compressed data streams, but we must use
1133 + another packet version to tell the application that it can not assume,
1134 + that this is the last packet.
1137 GNU extensions to the S2K algorithm
1138 ===================================
1139 S2K mode 101 is used to identify these extensions.
1140 After the hash algorithm the 3 bytes "GNU" are used to make
1141 clear that these are extensions for GNU, the next bytes gives the
1142 GNU protection mode - 1000. Defined modes are:
1143 1001 - do not store the secret part at all
1144 1002 - a stub to access smartcards (not used in 1.2.x)
1149 NOTE: This is deprecated and will be removed in future versions.
1151 This mode can be used to perform multiple operations with one call to
1152 gpg. It comes handy in cases where you have to verify a lot of
1153 signatures. Currently we support only detached signatures. This mode
1154 is a kludge to avoid running gpg n daemon mode and using Unix Domain
1155 Sockets to pass the data to it. There is no easy portable way to do
1156 this under Windows, so we use plain old pipes which do work well under
1157 Windows. Because there is no way to signal multiple EOFs in a pipe we
1158 have to embed control commands in the data stream: We distinguish
1159 between a data state and a control state. Initially the system is in
1160 data state but it won't accept any data. Instead it waits for
1161 transition to control state which is done by sending a single '@'
1162 character. While in control state the control command os expected and
1163 this command is just a single byte after which the system falls back
1164 to data state (but does not necesary accept data now). The simplest
1165 control command is a '@' which just inserts this character into the
1168 Here is the format we use for detached signatures:
1169 "@<" - Begin of new stream
1170 "@B" - Detached signature follows.
1171 This emits a control packet (1,'B')
1172 <detached_signature>
1173 "@t" - Signed text follows.
1174 This emits the control packet (2, 'B')
1176 "@." - End of operation. The final control packet forces signature
1178 "@>" - End of stream
1187 * For packet version 3 we calculate the keyids this way:
1188 RSA := low 64 bits of n
1189 ELGAMAL := build a v3 pubkey packet (with CTB 0x99) and calculate
1190 a rmd160 hash value from it. This is used as the
1191 fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid.
1193 * Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet;
1194 "import" knows how to handle this. The rationale behind it is
1203 Keyserver Message Format
1204 =========================
1206 The keyserver may be contacted by a Unix Domain socket or via TCP.
1208 The format of a request is:
1212 "Content-length:" digits
1216 Where command-tag is
1224 The format of a response is:
1227 "GNUPG/1.0" status-code status-text
1228 "Content-length:" digits
1231 followed by <digits> bytes of data
1236 o 1xx: Informational - Request received, continuing process
1238 o 2xx: Success - The action was successfully received, understood,
1241 o 4xx: Client Error - The request contains bad syntax or cannot be
1244 o 5xx: Server Error - The server failed to fulfill an apparently
1249 Documentation on HKP (the http keyserver protocol):
1251 A minimalistic HTTP server on port 11371 recognizes a GET for /pks/lookup.
1252 The standard http URL encoded query parameters are this (always key=value):
1254 - op=index (like pgp -kv), op=vindex (like pgp -kvv) and op=get (like
1257 - search=<stringlist>. This is a list of words that must occur in the key.
1258 The words are delimited with space, points, @ and so on. The delimiters
1259 are not searched for and the order of the words doesn't matter (but see
1262 - exact=on. This switch tells the hkp server to only report exact matching
1263 keys back. In this case the order and the "delimiters" are important.
1265 - fingerprint=on. Also reports the fingerprints when used with 'index' or
1268 The keyserver also recognizes http-POSTs to /pks/add. Use this to upload
1272 A better way to do this would be a request like:
1274 /pks/lookup/<gnupg_formatierte_user_id>?op=<operation>
1276 This can be implemented using Hurd's translator mechanism.
1277 However, I think the whole key server stuff has to be re-thought;
1278 I have some ideas and probably create a white paper.