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[gnutls.git] / doc / protocol / draft-ietf-tls-srp-01.txt

Network Working Group                                          D. Taylor
Internet-Draft                                    Forge Research Pty Ltd
Expires: December 28, 2001                                 June 29, 2001


                    Using SRP for TLS Authentication
                         draft-ietf-tls-srp-01

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 28, 2001.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This memo presents a technique for using the SRP (Secure Remote
   Password) protocol as an authentication method for the TLS (Transport
   Layer Security) protocol.












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Table of Contents

   1.    Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.    SRP Authentication in TLS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.1   Modifications to the TLS Handshake Sequence  . . . . . . . .  4
   2.1.1 Message Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.1.2 Session re-use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.2   SRP Verifier Message Digest Selection  . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.3   Changes to the Handshake Message Contents  . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.3.1 The Client Hello Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.3.2 The Server Hello Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.3.3 The Client Key Exchange Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.3.4 The Server Key Exchange Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.4   Calculating the Pre-master Secret  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.5   Cipher Suite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.6   New Message Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   2.6.1 ExtensionType  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   2.6.2 Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   2.6.3 Server Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   2.6.4 Client Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   2.6.5 Server Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.    Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
         References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
         Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   A.    Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
         Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

























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1. Introduction

   At the time of writing, TLS [1] uses public key certificiates with
   RSA/DSA digital signatures, or Kerberos, for authentication.

   These authentication methods do not seem well suited to the
   applications now being adapted to use TLS (IMAP [3], FTP [4], or
   TELNET [5], for example).  Given these protocols (and others like
   them) are designed to use the user name and password method of
   authentication, being able to use user names and passwords to
   authenticate the TLS connection seems to be a useful feature.

   SRP [2] is an authentication method that allows the use of user names
   and passwords over unencrypted channels without revealing the
   password to an eavesdropper.  SRP also supplies a shared secret at
   the end of the authetication sequence that can be used to generate
   encryption keys.

   This document describes the use of the SRP authentication method for
   TLS.































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2. SRP Authentication in TLS

2.1 Modifications to the TLS Handshake Sequence

   The SRP protocol can not be implemented using the sequence of
   handshake messages defined in [1] due to the sequence in which the
   SRP messages must be sent.

   This document proposes a new sequence of handshake messages for
   handshakes using the SRP authentication method.

2.1.1 Message Sequence

   Handshake Message Flow for SRP Authentication

          Client                                 Server
            |                                      |
       Client Hello (U, mds)-------------------->  |
            |  <---------------------------- Server Hello (md, g, N, s)
       Client Key Exchange (A) ----------------->  |
            |  <---------------------------- Server Key Exchange (B)
            |  <---------------------------- Server Hello Done
       change cipher spec                          |
       Finished -------------------------------->  |
            |                                change cipher spec
            |  <---------------------------- Finished
            |                                      |

   The identifiers given after each message name refer to the SRP
   variables included in that message.  The variables are defined in
   [2], except for (mds) and (md) which are defined in this document.

   Extended client and server hello messages, as defined in [6], are
   used to to send the initial client and server values.

   The client key exchange message is sent during the sequence of server
   messages.  This modification is required because the client must send
   its public key (A) before it receives the servers public key (B), as
   stated in Section 3 of [2].

2.1.2 Session re-use

   The short handshake mechanism for re-using sessions for new
   connections, and renegotiating keys for existing connections will
   still work with the SRP authentication mechanism and handshake.

   When a client attemps to re-use a session that uses SRP
   authentication, it MUST still include the SRP extension carrying the



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   user name (U) in the client hello message, in case the server cannot
   or will not allow re-use of the session, meaning a full handshake
   sequence is required.

   If a client requests an existing session and the server agrees to use
   it (meaning the short handshake will be used), the server MAY omit
   the SRP extension from the server hello message, as the information
   it contains is not used in the short handshake.

2.2 SRP Verifier Message Digest Selection

   SRP uses a message digest algorithm when creating password verifiers,
   and when performing calculations during authentication.  At the time
   of writing, SHA-1 is the only algorithm that has been defined for use
   with SRP.  However, there is no reason other message digest
   algorithms cannot be used, and the handshake messages and extensions
   defined by this draft include a message digest algorithm selection
   mechanism.

   The passwordMessageDigest enumerated, the srp_mds vector, and srp_md
   value are used to determine which message digest alorithm is to be
   used by the client when it is performing the SRP calculation.  The
   server determines which message digest algorithm to use based on the
   list of message digest algorithms requested by the client, and the
   list of available SRP verifiers known by the server.

   The client sends a list of message digest algorithms it can use for
   the SRP calculation using the srp_mds vector.  The server MUST select
   a message digest algorithm that is in the list supplied by the
   client, and the server MUST have access to an SRP verifier calculated
   with the selected message digest algorithm.

   If the server has access to multiple SRP verifiers for the given user
   (each calculated using a different message disgest algorithm), the
   server may select whichever matching message digest algorithm it
   chooses, so long as the selected message digest algorithm appears in
   the list sent by the client.

   If the server does not have an SRP verifier calculated with any of
   the message digest algorithms suggested by the client, the server
   must send a handshake failure alert.

2.3 Changes to the Handshake Message Contents

   This section describes the changes to the TLS handshake message
   contents when SRP is being used for authentication.  The definitons
   of the new message contents and the on-the-wire changes are given in
   Section 2.6.



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2.3.1 The Client Hello Message

   The user name is appended to the standard client hello message using
   the client hello extension mechanism defined in [6].

   The list of message digests the client can use is also included.
   This list represents all the message digests the client can use for
   the SRP calculations.

2.3.2 The Server Hello Message

   The message digest selected by the server (md), the generator (g),
   the prime (N), and the salt value (s) read from the SRP password file
   are appended to the server hello message using the client hello
   extension mechanism defined in [6].

2.3.3 The Client Key Exchange Message

   The client key exchange message carries the client's public key (A),
   which is calculated using both information known locally, and
   information received in the server hello message.  This message MUST
   be sent before the server key exchange message.

2.3.4 The Server Key Exchange Message

   The server key exchange message contains the servers public key (B).
   The server key exchange message MUST be sent after the client key
   exchange message.

2.4 Calculating the Pre-master Secret

   The shared secret resulting from the SRP calculations (S) (defined in
   [2]) is used as the pre-master secret.

   The finished messages perform the same function as the client and
   server evidence messages specified in [2].  If either the client or
   the server calculate an incorrect value, the finished messages will
   not be understood, and the connection will be dropped as specified in
   [1].

2.5 Cipher Suite Definitions

   The following cipher suites are added by this draft.  The numbers
   have been selected based on other RFCs and Internet Drafts that were
   current at the time of writing, so may need to be changed in future.

      CipherSuite   TLS_SRP_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x5B };




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      CipherSuite   TLS_SRP_WITH_RC4_128_SHA          = { 0x00,0x5C };

      CipherSuite   TLS_SRP_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA         = { 0x00,0x5D };

      CipherSuite   TLS_SRP_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5     = { 0x00,0x5E };

      CipherSuite   TLS_SRP_WITH_RC4_128_MD5          = { 0x00,0x5F };

      CipherSuite   TLS_SRP_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5         = { 0x00,0x60 };


2.6 New Message Structures

   This section shows the structure of the messages passed during a
   handshake that uses SRP for authentication.  The representation
   language used is the same as that used in [1].

   When encoding the numbers g, N, A, and B as opaque types, if the most
   significant bit is set, an extra byte of value 0x00 (all bits
   cleared) MUST be added as the most significant byte.  This is done as
   a safeguard against implementations that do not assume these numbers
   are positive.

2.6.1 ExtensionType

   A new value, "srp(6)", has been added to the enumerated
   ExtensionType, defined in [6].  This value is used as the extension
   number for the extensions in both the client hello message and the
   server hello message.  This value was chosen based on the version of
   defined in [6] that was current at the time of writing, so may be
   changed in future.

2.6.2 Client Hello

   The user name (U) and a list of message digests (srp_mds) are encoded
   in an SRPExtension structure, and sent in an extended client hello
   message, using an extension of type "srp".

   The list of message digests represents the list of message digests
   the client can use for the SRP calculations.











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   enum { client, server } ClientOrServerExtension;

   enum  { sha-1(0), (255) } PasswordMessageDigest;

   struct {
      select(ClientOrServerExtension) {
         case client:
            opaque srp_U<1..2^8-1>;
            PasswordMessageDigest srp_mds<1..2^8-1>;
         case server:
            PasswordMessageDigest srp_md;
            opaque srp_s<1..2^8-1>
            opaque srp_N<1..2^16-1>;
            opaque srp_g<1..2^16-1>;
      }
   } SRPExtension;


2.6.3 Server Hello

   The message digest selected by the server (md), the generator (g),
   the prime (N), and the salt value (s) are encoded in an SRPExtension
   structure, which is sent in an extended server hello message, using
   an extension of type "srp".

   The SRPParams structure is defined above.

2.6.4 Client Key Exchange

   When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the client's
   ephemeral public key (A) is sent in the client key exchange message,
   encoded in an ClientSRPPublic structure.

   An extra value, srp, has been added to the enumerated
   KeyExchangeAlgorithm, originally defined in TLS [1].
















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   struct {
      select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
         case rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret;
         case diffie_hellman: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic;
         case srp: ClientSRPPublic;   /* new entry */
      } exchange_keys;
   } ClientKeyExchange;

   enum { rsa, diffie_hellman, srp } KeyExchangeAlgorithm;

   struct {
      opaque srp_A<1..2^16-1>;
   } ClientSRPPublic;


2.6.5 Server Key Exchange

   When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the server's
   ephemeral public key (B) is sent in the server key exchange message,
   encoded in an ServerSRPPublic structure.

   struct {
      select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
         case diffie_hellman:
            ServerDHParams params;
            Signature signed_params;
         case rsa:
            ServerRSAParams params;
            Signature signed_params;
         case srp:
            ServerSRPPublic;   /* new entry */
      };
   } ServerKeyExchange;

   struct {
      opaque srp_B<1..2^16-1>;
   } ServerSRPPublic;     /* SRP parameters */














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3. Security Considerations

   If an attacker is able to steal the SRP verifier file, the attacker
   can masquerade as the real host.  Filesystem based X.509 certificate
   installations are vulnerable to a similar attack unless the servers
   certificate is issued from a PKI that maintains revocation lists, and
   the client TLS code can both contact the PKI and make use of the
   revocation list.

   Not all clients and servers will be able to interoperate once the
   number of message digest algorithms used for creating password
   verifiers is increased.  For example, a client may only support SHA-
   1, whereas the verifiers on the server were created with a different
   message digest algoritm.

   Because the initial handshake messages are unprotected, an attacker
   can modify the list of message digests in the client hello message.
   For example, an attacker could rewrite the message to remove all but
   the weakest message digest.  There is no way to know this has
   happened until the finished messages are compared.

   An attacker can also modify the server hello message to use a
   different message digest than that selected by the server.  If this
   happens, the handshake will fail after the change cipher spec
   messages are sent, as the client and server will have calculated
   different pre-master secret vales.

























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References

   [1]  Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol", RFC 2246, January
        1999.

   [2]  Wu, T., "The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System", RFC
        2945, September 2000.

   [3]  Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", RFC 2595, June
        1999.

   [4]  Ford-Hutchinson, P., Carpenter, M., Hudson, T., Murray, E. and
        V. Wiegand, "Securing FTP with TLS", draft-murray-auth-ftp-ssl-
        06 (work in progress), September 2000.

   [5]  Boe, M. and J. Altman, "TLS-based Telnet Security", draft-ietf-
        tn3270e-telnet-tls-05 (work in progress), October 2000.

   [6]  Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J. and T.
        Wright, "TLS Extensions", draft-ietf-tls-extensions-00 (work in
        progress), June 2001.


Author's Address

   David Taylor
   Forge Research Pty Ltd

   EMail: DavidTaylor@forge.com.au
   URI:   http://www.forge.com.au/





















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Appendix A. Acknowledgements

   The following people have contributed ideas and time to this draft:
   Raif Naffah, Tom  Wu, Nikos Mavroyanopoulos















































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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
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   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
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Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.



















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