corrected verification examples

[gnutls.git] / doc / protocol / draft-hajjeh-tls-sign-03.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force                               I. Hajjeh 
INTERNET DRAFT                                                ESRGroups 
                                                               M. Badra 
                                                       LIMOS Laboratory 
 
Expires: November 2007                                        June 2007 
    
                                  TLS Sign  
                       <draft-hajjeh-tls-sign-03.txt> 
    
    
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Copyright Notice 
    
   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 
    
Abstract  
     
   TLS protocol provides authentication and data protection for 
   communication between two entities. However, missing from the 
   protocol is a way to perform non-repudiation service.  
     
   This document defines extensions to the TLS protocol to allow it to 
   perform non-repudiation service. It is based on [TLSSign] and it 
   provides the client and the server the ability to sign by TLS, 
   handshake and applications data using certificates such as X.509. 
    

 
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1 Introduction 
    
   Actually, TLS is the most deployed security protocol for securing 
   exchanges. It provides end-to-end secure communications between two 
   entities with authentication and data protection. However, what is 
   missing from the protocol is a way to provide the non-repudiation 
   service. 
    
   This document describes how the non-repudiation service may be 
   integrated as an optional module in TLS. This is in order to provide 
   both parties with evidence that the transaction has taken place and 
   to offer a clear separation with application design and development.  
    
   TLS-Sign's design motivations included:  
     
   o   TLS is application protocol-independent. Higher-level protocol   
       can operate on top of the TLS protocol transparently.  
     
   o   TLS is a modular nature protocol. Since TLS is developed in four  
       independent protocols, the approach defined in this document can  
       be added by extending the TLS protocol and with a total 
       reuse of pre-existing TLS infrastructures and implementations.  
        
   o   Several applications like E-Business require non-repudiation   
       proof of transactions. It is critical in these applications to   
       have the non-repudiation service that generates, distributes,   
       validates and maintains the evidence of an electronic   
       transaction. Since TLS is widely used to secure these   
       applications exchanges, the non-repudiation should be offered by   
       TLS.  
        
   o   Generic non-repudiation with TLS. TLS Sign provides a generic   
       non-repudiation service that can be easily used with protocols.    
       TLS Sign minimizes both design and implementation of the   
       signature service and that of the designers and implementators   
       who wish to use this module. 
    
1.2 Requirements language 
    
   The key words "MUST", "SHALL", "SHOULD", and "MAY", in this document 
   are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119. 
    
2 TLS Sign overview  
     
   TLS Sign is integrated as a higher-level module of the TLS Record 
   protocol. It is optionally used if the two entities agree. This is 
   negotiated by extending Client and Server Hello messages in the same 
   way defined in [TLSExt]. 
    
   In order to allow a TLS client to negotiate the TLS Sign, a new 
   extension type should be added to the Extended Client and Server 

 
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   Hellos messages. TLS clients and servers MAY include an extension of 
   type 'signature' in the Extended Client and Server Hellos messages. 
   The 'extension_data' field of this extension contains a 
   'signature_request' where:  
     
    enum {  
          pkcs7(0), smime(1), xmldsig(2), (255);  
       } ContentFormat;  
    
    struct {  
            ContentFormat content_format;  
            SignMethod sign_meth;  
            SignType sign_type<2..2^16-1>;  
         } SignatureRequest;  
    
    enum {  
          ssl_client_auth_cert(0), ssl_client_auth_cert_url(1), (255);  
       } SignMethod;  
     
    uint8 SignType[2]; 
    
   The client initiates the TLS Sign module by sending the 
   ExtendedClientHello including the 'signature' extension. This 
   extension contains:  
    
   - the SignType carrying the type of the non repudiation proof. It 
   can have one of these two values: 
    
   SignType non_repudiation_with_proof_of_origin      = { 0x00, 0x01 }; 
   SignType non_repudiation_without_proof_of_origin   = { 0x00, 0x02 }; 
    
   - the ContentFormat carrying the format of signed data. It can be 
   PKCS7 [PKCS7], S/MIME [S/MIME] or XMLDSIG [XMLDSIG] 
    
             ContentFormat PKCS7   = { 0x00, 0xA1 }; 
             ContentFormat SMIME   = { 0x00, 0xA2 }; 
             ContentFormat XMLDSIG = { 0x00, 0xA3 }; 
    
         o if the value of the ContentFormat is PKCS7, then the PKCS7  
           Content_type is of type signed-data. 
    
         o if the value of the ContentFormat is S/MIME, then S/MIME  
           Content_type is of type SignedData 
    
         o if the value of the ContentFormat is XMLDSIG, then XMLDSIG  
           signatureMethod algorithms. 
    
   - the SignMethod carrying the signature method that is used to sign 
   the application data (e.g. X509  authentication certificate). 
    
               SignMethod X509 = { 0x00, 0xB1 }; 

 
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   Actually, this document uses the same certificate used in client 
   authentication. Any new signature method MAY be added in future 
   versions (e.g. delegated attributes certificates). 
    
   The server MAY reject the connection by sending the error alert 
   "unsupported_extension" [TLSExt] and closing the connection. 
    
   The client and the server MAY or MAY NOT use the same certificates 
   used by the Handshake protocol. Several cases are possible: 
    
   - If the server has an interest in getting non-repudiation data from 
   the client and that the cipher_suites list sent by the client does 
   not include any cipher_suite with signature ability, the server MUST 
   (upon reception of tls_sign_on_off protocol message not followed by 
   a certificate with a type equals to ExtendedServerHello.sign_method) 
   close the connection by sending a fatal error. 
    
   - If the server has an interest in getting non-repudiation data from 
   the client and that the cipher_suites list sent by the client 
   includes at least a cipher_suite with signature ability, the server 
   SHOULD select a cipher_suite with signature ability and MUST provide 
   a certificate (e.g., RSA) that MAY be used for key exchange. 
   Further, the server MUST request a certificate from the client using 
   the TLS certificate request message (e.g., an RSA or a DSS 
   signature-capable certificate). If the client does not send a 
   certificate during the TLS Handshake, the server MUST close the TLS 
   session by sending a fatal error in the case where the client sends 
   a tls_sign_on_off protocol message not followed by a certificate 
   with a type equals to ExtendedServerHello.sign_method. 
    
   - The client or the server MAY use a certificate different to these 
   being used by TLS Handshake. This MAY happen when the server agrees 
   in getting non-repudiation data from the client and that the type of 
   the client certificate used by TLS Handshake and the type selected 
   by the server from the list in ExtendedClientHello.sign_method are 
   different, or when the ExtendedServerHello.cipher_suite does not 
   require client and/or server certificates. In these cases, the 
   client or the server sends a new message called certificate_sign, 
   right after sending the tls_sign_on_off protocol messages. The new 
   message contains the sender's certificate in which the type is the 
   same type selected by the server from the list in 
   ExtendedClientHello.sign_method. The certificate_sign is therefore 
   used to generate signed data. It is defined as follows: 
    
       opaque ASN.1Cert<2^24-1>; 
    
       struct { 
           ASN.1Cert certificate_list<1..2^24-1>; 
       } CertificateSign; 
    

 
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   The certificate_list, as defined in [TLS], is a sequence (chain) of 
   certificates. The sender's certificate MUST come first in the list. 
    
   If the server has no interest in getting non-repudiation data from 
   the client, it replays with an ordinary TLS ServerHello or return a 
   handshake failure alert and close the connection [TLS]. 
    
         Client                                               Server  
         ------                                               ------  
    
         ClientHello             -------->  
                                                         ServerHello  
                                                        Certificate* 
                                                  ServerKeyExchange*  
                                                 CertificateRequest*  
                                 <--------           ServerHelloDone  
         Certificate*  
         ClientKeyExchange  
         CertificateVerify* 
         [ChangeCipherSpec] 
         Finished                -------->  
                                                  [ChangeCipherSpec] 
                                 <--------                  Finished 
    
         TLSSignOnOff   <-------------------------->    TLSSignOnOff 
          
         CertificateSign* <-----------------------> CertificateSign* 
     
         (Signed) Application Data <---->  (Signed) Application Data 
    
   * Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not 
   always sent. 
    
2.1 tls sign on off protocol  
    
   To manage the generation of evidence, new sub-protocol is added by 
   this document, called tls_sign_on_off. This protocol consists of a 
   single message that is encrypted and compressed under the 
   established connection state. This message can be sent at any time 
   after the TLS session has been established. Thus, no man in the 
   middle can replay or inject this message. It consists of a single 
   byte of value 1 (tls_sign_on) or 0 (tls_sign_off). 
    
       enum {   
             change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22),   
             application_data(23), tls_sign(TBC), (255)   
          } ContentType;   
      
       struct {   
               enum { tls_sign_off(0), tls_sign_on(1), (255) } type;   
            } TLSSignOnOff;  

 
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   The tls_sign_on_off message is sent by the client and/or server to 
   notify the receiving party that subsequent records will carry data 
   signed under the negotiated parameters.   
    
   Note: TLSSignOnOff is an independent TLS Protocol content type, and 
   is not actually a TLS handshake message. 
    
 2.1.1 TLS sign packet format  
    
   This document defines a new packet format that encapsulates signed 
   data, the TLSSigntext. The packet format is shown below. The fields 
   are transmitted from left to right.  
    
   0                   1                   2                   3        
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1    
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
   | Content-Type  |     Flag      |     Version                   |   
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  
   |              Length           |  Signed Data ...  
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
    
   Content-Type 
    
   Same as TLSPlaintext.type. 
    
   Flag 
    
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
   |A R R R R R R R|   
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
    
   A = acknowledgement of receipt 
   R = Reserved 
    
   When the whole signed data is delivered to the receiver, the TLS 
   Sign will check the signature. If the signature is valid and that 
   the sender requires a proof of receipt, the receiver MUST generate a 
   TLSSigntext packet with the bit A set to 1 (acknowledgement of 
   receipt). This helps the receiver of the acknowledgment of receipt 
   in storing the data-field for later use (see section 2.2). The data-
   field of that message contains the digest of the whole data receiver 
   by the generator of the acknowledgement of receipt. The digest is 
   signed before sending the result to the other side. 
    
    2.1.3 bad_sign alert 
    
   This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect 
   signature. This message is always fatal. 
    

 
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2.2 Storing signed data  
    
   The objective of TLS Sign is to provide both parties with evidence 
   that can be stored and later presented to a third party to resolve 
   disputes that arise if and when a communication is repudiated by one 
   of the entities involved. This document provides the two basic types 
   of non-repudiation service:  
    
   o   Non-repudiation with proof of origin: provides the TLS server   
       with evidence proving that the TLS client has sent it the signed   
       data at a certain time.  
    
   o   Non-repudiation with proof of delivery: provides the TLS client   
       with evidence that the server has received the client's signed   
       data at a specific time.  
    
   TLS Handshake exchanges the current time and date according to the 
   entities internal clock. Thus, the time and date can be stored with 
   the signed data as a proof of communication. For B2C or B2B 
   transactions, non-repudiation with proof of origin and non-
   repudiation with proof of receipt are both important. If the TLS 
   client requests a non-repudiation service with proof of receipt, the 
   server SHOULD verify and send back to client a signature on the hash 
   of signed data.  
    
   The following figure explains the different events for proving and 
   storing signed data [RFC2828]. RFC 2828 uses the term "critical 
   action" to refer to the act of communication between the two 
   entities. For a complete non-repudiation deployment, 6 phases should 
   be respected: 
    
   --------   --------   --------   --------   --------     --------  
   Phase 1:   Phase 2:   Phase 3:   Phase 4:   Phase 5:     Phase 6:  
   Request    Generate   Transfer   Verify     Retain       Resolve  
   Service    Evidence   Evidence   Evidence   Evidence     Dispute  
   --------   --------   --------   --------   --------     --------  
   Service    Critical   Evidence   Evidence   Archive      Evidence  
   Request => Action  => Stored  => Is      => Evidence     Is  
   Is Made    Occurs     For Later  Tested     In Case      Verified  
              and        Use |          ^      Critical         ^  
              Evidence       v          |      Action Is        |  
              Is         +-------------------+ Repudiated       |  
              Generated  |Verifiable Evidence|------>       ----+  
                         +-------------------+  
    
   1- Requesting explicit transaction evidence before sending data. 
   Normally, this action is taken by the SSL/TLS client  
    
   2- If the server accepts, the client will generate evidence by 
   signing data using his X.509 authentication certificate. Server will 
   go through the same process if the evidence of receipt is requested. 

 
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   3 - The signed data is then sent by the initiator (client or server) 
   and stored it locally, or by a third party, for a later use if 
   needed. 
    
   4 - The entity that receive the evidence process to verify the 
   signed data. 
    
   5- The evidence is then stored by the receiver entity for a later 
   use if needed. 
    
   6- In this phase, which occurs only if the critical action is 
   repudiated, the evidence is retrieved from storage, presented, and 
   verified to resolve the dispute. 
    
   With this method, the stored signed data (or evidence) can be 
   retrieved by both parties, presented and verified if the critical 
   action is repudiated. 
    
Security Considerations 
    
   Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. 
    
IANA Considerations 
    
   This document defines a new TLS extension "signature", assigned the 
   value TBD from the TLS ExtensionType registry defined in [TLSEXT]. 
    
   This document defines one TLS ContentType: tls_sign(TBD). This 
   ContentType value is assigned from the TLS ContentType registry 
   defined in [TLS]. 
    
   This document defines a new handshake message, certificate_sign, 
   whose value is to be allocated from the TLS HandshakeType registry 
   defined in [TLS]. 
    
   The bad_sign alert that is defined in this document is assigned to 
   the TLS Alert registry defined in [TLS]. 
    
References 
    
   [TLS]     Dierks, T., et. al., "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",  
             RFC 2246, January 1999. 
    
   [TLSExt]  Blake-Wilson, S., et. al., "Transport Layer Security TLS)  
             Extensions", RFC 3546, June 2003. 
    
   [PKCS7]   RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #7: RSA Cryptographic Message  
             Syntax Standard," version 1.5, November 1993.  
        
   [S/MIME]  Ramsdell, B., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",  

 
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             RFC 2633, June 1999.  
    
   [XMLDSIG] Eastlake, D., et. al, "(Extensible Markup Language) XML  
             Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275, March 2002.  
    
   [TLSSign] Hajjeh, I., Serhrouchni, A., "Integrating a signature   
             module in SSL/TLS, ICETE2004., ACM/IEEE, First   
             International Conference on E-Business and  
             Telecommunication Networks, Portugal, August 2004.  
    
   [RFC2828] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, May   
             2000. 
    
Author's Addresses 
    
   Ibrahim Hajjeh 
   Engineering and Scientific Research Groups (ESRGroups) 
   82 rue Baudricourt 
   75013 Paris               Phone: NA  
   France                    Email: Ibrahim.Hajjeh@esrgroups.org 
    
   Mohamad Badra 
   LIMOS Laboratory - UMR 6158, CNRS 
   France                    Email: badra@isima.fr 
    
   Acknowledgements  
    
   The authors would like to thank Eric Rescorla for discussions and 
   comments on the design of TLS Sign. 
    
Appendix  Changelog 
    
   Changes from -01 to -02: 
    
   o Add an IANA section. 
    
   o Small clarifications to section 2.  
    
   o Add the bad_sign alert and the certificate_sign message. 
    
   Changes from -00 to -01: 
    
   o Clarifications to the format of the signed data in Section 2. 
    
   o Small clarifications to TLS SIGN negotiation in Section 2. 
    
   o Added Jacques Demerjian and Mohammed Achemlal as 
     contributors/authors. 
    
   Full Copyright Statement 
    

 
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