security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c

   1 /*
   2  * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
   3  * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
   4  *
   5  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   6  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   7  * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
   8  *
   9  * ima_policy.c
  10  *      - initialize default measure policy rules
  11  *
  12  */
  13 #include <linux/module.h>
  14 #include <linux/list.h>
  15 #include <linux/security.h>
  16 #include <linux/magic.h>
  17 #include <linux/parser.h>
  18
  19 #include "ima.h"
  20
  21 /* flags definitions */
  22 #define IMA_FUNC        0x0001
  23 #define IMA_MASK        0x0002
  24 #define IMA_FSMAGIC     0x0004
  25 #define IMA_UID         0x0008
  26
  27 enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };
  28
  29 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
  30 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
  31         LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
  32 };
  33
  34 struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
  35         struct list_head list;
  36         enum ima_action action;
  37         unsigned int flags;
  38         enum ima_hooks func;
  39         int mask;
  40         unsigned long fsmagic;
  41         uid_t uid;
  42         struct {
  43                 void *rule;     /* LSM file metadata specific */
  44                 int type;       /* audit type */
  45         } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
  46 };
  47
  48 /* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
  49  * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
  50  */
  51 static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
  52         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,
  53          .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  54         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  55         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  56         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  57         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,
  58          .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  59         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
  60         {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
  61          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
  62         {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
  63          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
  64         {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
  65          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}
  66 };
  67
  68 static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
  69 static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
  70 static struct list_head *ima_measure;
  71
  72 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
  73
  74 /**
  75  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
  76  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
  77  * @inode: a pointer to an inode
  78  * @func: LIM hook identifier
  79  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  80  *
  81  * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
  82  */
  83 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
  84                             struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
  85 {
  86         struct task_struct *tsk = current;
  87         int i;
  88
  89         if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
  90                 return false;
  91         if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
  92                 return false;
  93         if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
  94             && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
  95                 return false;
  96         if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid)
  97                 return false;
  98         for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
  99                 int rc;
 100                 u32 osid, sid;
 101
 102                 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
 103                         continue;
 104
 105                 switch (i) {
 106                 case LSM_OBJ_USER:
 107                 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 108                 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
 109                         security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
 110                         rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
 111                                                         rule->lsm[i].type,
 112                                                         AUDIT_EQUAL,
 113                                                         rule->lsm[i].rule,
 114                                                         NULL);
 115                         break;
 116                 case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 117                 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 118                 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
 119                         security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
 120                         rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
 121                                                         rule->lsm[i].type,
 122                                                         AUDIT_EQUAL,
 123                                                         rule->lsm[i].rule,
 124                                                         NULL);
 125                 default:
 126                         break;
 127                 }
 128                 if (!rc)
 129                         return false;
 130         }
 131         return true;
 132 }
 133
 134 /**
 135  * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
 136  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
 137  * @func: IMA hook identifier
 138  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
 139  *
 140  * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
 141  * conditions.
 142  *
 143  * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list,
 144  * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
 145  * change.)
 146  */
 147 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
 148 {
 149         struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
 150
 151         list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
 152                 bool rc;
 153
 154                 rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
 155                 if (rc)
 156                         return entry->action;
 157         }
 158         return 0;
 159 }
 160
 161 /**
 162  * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
 163  *
 164  * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
 165  * the new measure_policy_rules.
 166  */
 167 void ima_init_policy(void)
 168 {
 169         int i;
 170
 171         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++)
 172                 list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
 173         ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
 174 }
 175
 176 /**
 177  * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
 178  *
 179  * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
 180  * policy.  Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be
 181  * added to the policy.
 182  */
 183 void ima_update_policy(void)
 184 {
 185         const char *op = "policy_update";
 186         const char *cause = "already exists";
 187         int result = 1;
 188         int audit_info = 0;
 189
 190         if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) {
 191                 ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules;
 192                 cause = "complete";
 193                 result = 0;
 194         }
 195         integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 196                             NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
 197 }
 198
 199 enum {
 200         Opt_err = -1,
 201         Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
 202         Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
 203         Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
 204         Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid
 205 };
 206
 207 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 208         {Opt_measure, "measure"},
 209         {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
 210         {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
 211         {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
 212         {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
 213         {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
 214         {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
 215         {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
 216         {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
 217         {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
 218         {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
 219         {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
 220         {Opt_err, NULL}
 221 };
 222
 223 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
 224                              char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
 225 {
 226         int result;
 227
 228         entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
 229         result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
 230                                            AUDIT_EQUAL, args,
 231                                            &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
 232         return result;
 233 }
 234
 235 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 236 {
 237         struct audit_buffer *ab;
 238         char *p;
 239         int result = 0;
 240
 241         ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
 242
 243         entry->action = -1;
 244         while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) {
 245                 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 246                 int token;
 247                 unsigned long lnum;
 248
 249                 if (result < 0)
 250                         break;
 251                 if (!*p)
 252                         continue;
 253                 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
 254                 switch (token) {
 255                 case Opt_measure:
 256                         audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure");
 257                         entry->action = MEASURE;
 258                         break;
 259                 case Opt_dont_measure:
 260                         audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure");
 261                         entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
 262                         break;
 263                 case Opt_func:
 264                         audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
 265                         if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
 266                                 entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
 267                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
 268                                 entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
 269                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
 270                                 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
 271                         else
 272                                 result = -EINVAL;
 273                         if (!result)
 274                                 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
 275                         break;
 276                 case Opt_mask:
 277                         audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from);
 278                         if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
 279                                 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
 280                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
 281                                 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
 282                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
 283                                 entry->mask = MAY_READ;
 284                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
 285                                 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
 286                         else
 287                                 result = -EINVAL;
 288                         if (!result)
 289                                 entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
 290                         break;
 291                 case Opt_fsmagic:
 292                         audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from);
 293                         result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
 294                                                 &entry->fsmagic);
 295                         if (!result)
 296                                 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
 297                         break;
 298                 case Opt_uid:
 299                         audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from);
 300                         result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
 301                         if (!result) {
 302                                 entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum;
 303                                 if (entry->uid != lnum)
 304                                         result = -EINVAL;
 305                                 else
 306                                         entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
 307                         }
 308                         break;
 309                 case Opt_obj_user:
 310                         audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
 311                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 312                                                    LSM_OBJ_USER,
 313                                                    AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
 314                         break;
 315                 case Opt_obj_role:
 316                         audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
 317                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 318                                                    LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
 319                                                    AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
 320                         break;
 321                 case Opt_obj_type:
 322                         audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
 323                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 324                                                    LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
 325                                                    AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
 326                         break;
 327                 case Opt_subj_user:
 328                         audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
 329                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 330                                                    LSM_SUBJ_USER,
 331                                                    AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
 332                         break;
 333                 case Opt_subj_role:
 334                         audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
 335                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 336                                                    LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
 337                                                    AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
 338                         break;
 339                 case Opt_subj_type:
 340                         audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
 341                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 342                                                    LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
 343                                                    AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
 344                         break;
 345                 case Opt_err:
 346                         audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p);
 347                         break;
 348                 }
 349         }
 350         if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
 351                 result = -EINVAL;
 352
 353         audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
 354         audit_log_end(ab);
 355         return result;
 356 }
 357
 358 /**
 359  * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules
 360  * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
 361  *
 362  * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
 363  * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure.
 364  */
 365 int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 366 {
 367         const char *op = "update_policy";
 368         struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
 369         int result = 0;
 370         int audit_info = 0;
 371
 372         /* Prevent installed policy from changing */
 373         if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
 374                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 375                                     NULL, op, "already exists",
 376                                     -EACCES, audit_info);
 377                 return -EACCES;
 378         }
 379
 380         entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
 381         if (!entry) {
 382                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 383                                     NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
 384                 return -ENOMEM;
 385         }
 386
 387         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
 388
 389         result = ima_parse_rule(rule, entry);
 390         if (!result) {
 391                 mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
 392                 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
 393                 mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
 394         } else {
 395                 kfree(entry);
 396                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 397                                     NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
 398                                     audit_info);
 399         }
 400         return result;
 401 }
 402
 403 /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
 404 void ima_delete_rules(void)
 405 {
 406         struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
 407
 408         mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
 409         list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) {
 410                 list_del(&entry->list);
 411                 kfree(entry);
 412         }
 413         mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
 414 }