kvm tools, setup: Create private directory
[linux-2.6/next.git] / kernel / cred.c
blob174fa84eca303ced39cc03910114d495f7b777b0
1 /* Task credentials management - see Documentation/security/credentials.txt
3 * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
7 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
8 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
9 * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
11 #include <linux/module.h>
12 #include <linux/cred.h>
13 #include <linux/slab.h>
14 #include <linux/sched.h>
15 #include <linux/key.h>
16 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
17 #include <linux/init_task.h>
18 #include <linux/security.h>
19 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
21 #if 0
22 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
23 printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
24 #else
25 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
26 no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
27 #endif
29 static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
32 * The common credentials for the initial task's thread group
34 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
35 static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = {
36 .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
37 .tgid = 0,
38 .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_cred.tgcred.lock),
40 #endif
43 * The initial credentials for the initial task
45 struct cred init_cred = {
46 .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
47 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
48 .subscribers = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
49 .magic = CRED_MAGIC,
50 #endif
51 .securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
52 .cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET,
53 .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET,
54 .cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET,
55 .cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET,
56 .user = INIT_USER,
57 .user_ns = &init_user_ns,
58 .group_info = &init_groups,
59 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
60 .tgcred = &init_tgcred,
61 #endif
64 static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
66 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
67 atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n);
68 #endif
71 static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred)
73 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
74 return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers);
75 #else
76 return 0;
77 #endif
80 static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n)
82 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
83 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
85 atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers);
86 #endif
90 * Dispose of the shared task group credentials
92 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
93 static void release_tgcred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
95 struct thread_group_cred *tgcred =
96 container_of(rcu, struct thread_group_cred, rcu);
98 BUG_ON(atomic_read(&tgcred->usage) != 0);
100 key_put(tgcred->session_keyring);
101 key_put(tgcred->process_keyring);
102 kfree(tgcred);
104 #endif
107 * Release a set of thread group credentials.
109 static void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred)
111 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
112 struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = cred->tgcred;
114 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&tgcred->usage))
115 call_rcu(&tgcred->rcu, release_tgcred_rcu);
116 #endif
120 * The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials
122 static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
124 struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
126 kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred);
128 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
129 if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD ||
130 atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 ||
131 read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0)
132 panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with"
133 " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d\n",
134 cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr,
135 atomic_read(&cred->usage),
136 read_cred_subscribers(cred));
137 #else
138 if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
139 panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
140 cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
141 #endif
143 security_cred_free(cred);
144 key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
145 key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
146 release_tgcred(cred);
147 if (cred->group_info)
148 put_group_info(cred->group_info);
149 free_uid(cred->user);
150 kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred);
154 * __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials
155 * @cred: The record to release
157 * Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain.
159 void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
161 kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred,
162 atomic_read(&cred->usage),
163 read_cred_subscribers(cred));
165 BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
166 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
167 BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0);
168 cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD;
169 cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0);
170 #endif
171 BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
172 BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);
174 call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
176 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
179 * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits
181 void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
183 struct cred *cred;
185 kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
186 atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
187 read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
189 cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
190 tsk->real_cred = NULL;
191 validate_creds(cred);
192 alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
193 put_cred(cred);
195 cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
196 tsk->cred = NULL;
197 validate_creds(cred);
198 alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
199 put_cred(cred);
201 cred = (struct cred *) tsk->replacement_session_keyring;
202 if (cred) {
203 tsk->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
204 validate_creds(cred);
205 put_cred(cred);
210 * get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials
211 * @task: The task to query
213 * Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go
214 * away. Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
216 * The caller must also make sure task doesn't get deleted, either by holding a
217 * ref on task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
219 const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task)
221 const struct cred *cred;
223 rcu_read_lock();
225 do {
226 cred = __task_cred((task));
227 BUG_ON(!cred);
228 } while (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&((struct cred *)cred)->usage));
230 rcu_read_unlock();
231 return cred;
235 * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a
236 * later date without risk of ENOMEM.
238 struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
240 struct cred *new;
242 new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
243 if (!new)
244 return NULL;
246 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
247 new->tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
248 if (!new->tgcred) {
249 kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, new);
250 return NULL;
252 atomic_set(&new->tgcred->usage, 1);
253 #endif
255 atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
256 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
257 new->magic = CRED_MAGIC;
258 #endif
260 if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
261 goto error;
263 return new;
265 error:
266 abort_creds(new);
267 return NULL;
271 * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
273 * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds
274 * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to
275 * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
276 * calling commit_creds().
278 * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification.
280 * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
282 * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
284 struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
286 struct task_struct *task = current;
287 const struct cred *old;
288 struct cred *new;
290 validate_process_creds();
292 new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
293 if (!new)
294 return NULL;
296 kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
298 old = task->cred;
299 memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
301 atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
302 set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
303 get_group_info(new->group_info);
304 get_uid(new->user);
306 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
307 key_get(new->thread_keyring);
308 key_get(new->request_key_auth);
309 atomic_inc(&new->tgcred->usage);
310 #endif
312 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
313 new->security = NULL;
314 #endif
316 if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
317 goto error;
318 validate_creds(new);
319 return new;
321 error:
322 abort_creds(new);
323 return NULL;
325 EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
328 * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve()
329 * - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex
331 struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
333 struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL;
334 struct cred *new;
336 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
337 tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
338 if (!tgcred)
339 return NULL;
340 #endif
342 new = prepare_creds();
343 if (!new) {
344 kfree(tgcred);
345 return new;
348 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
349 /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
350 key_put(new->thread_keyring);
351 new->thread_keyring = NULL;
353 /* create a new per-thread-group creds for all this set of threads to
354 * share */
355 memcpy(tgcred, new->tgcred, sizeof(struct thread_group_cred));
357 atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
358 spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
360 /* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */
361 key_get(tgcred->session_keyring);
362 tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
364 release_tgcred(new);
365 new->tgcred = tgcred;
366 #endif
368 return new;
372 * Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
374 * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
375 * set.
377 * The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
378 * objective and subjective credentials
380 int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
382 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
383 struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
384 #endif
385 struct cred *new;
386 int ret;
388 if (
389 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
390 !p->cred->thread_keyring &&
391 #endif
392 clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
394 p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
395 get_cred(p->cred);
396 alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
397 kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
398 p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
399 read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
400 atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
401 return 0;
404 new = prepare_creds();
405 if (!new)
406 return -ENOMEM;
408 if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
409 ret = create_user_ns(new);
410 if (ret < 0)
411 goto error_put;
414 /* cache user_ns in cred. Doesn't need a refcount because it will
415 * stay pinned by cred->user
417 new->user_ns = new->user->user_ns;
419 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
420 /* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
421 * had one */
422 if (new->thread_keyring) {
423 key_put(new->thread_keyring);
424 new->thread_keyring = NULL;
425 if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
426 install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
429 /* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in
430 * a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a
431 * bit */
432 if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
433 tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
434 if (!tgcred) {
435 ret = -ENOMEM;
436 goto error_put;
438 atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
439 spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
440 tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
441 tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring);
443 release_tgcred(new);
444 new->tgcred = tgcred;
446 #endif
448 atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
449 p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
450 alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
451 validate_creds(new);
452 return 0;
454 error_put:
455 put_cred(new);
456 return ret;
460 * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
461 * @new: The credentials to be assigned
463 * Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
464 * the old set. Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are
465 * updated. This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are
466 * in an overridden state.
468 * This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
470 * Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end
471 * of, say, sys_setgid().
473 int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
475 struct task_struct *task = current;
476 const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
478 kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
479 atomic_read(&new->usage),
480 read_cred_subscribers(new));
482 BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
483 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
484 BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2);
485 validate_creds(old);
486 validate_creds(new);
487 #endif
488 BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
490 get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
492 /* dumpability changes */
493 if (old->euid != new->euid ||
494 old->egid != new->egid ||
495 old->fsuid != new->fsuid ||
496 old->fsgid != new->fsgid ||
497 !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) {
498 if (task->mm)
499 set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
500 task->pdeath_signal = 0;
501 smp_wmb();
504 /* alter the thread keyring */
505 if (new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
506 key_fsuid_changed(task);
507 if (new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
508 key_fsgid_changed(task);
510 /* do it
511 * - What if a process setreuid()'s and this brings the
512 * new uid over his NPROC rlimit? We can check this now
513 * cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters
514 * we should be checking for it. -DaveM
516 alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
517 if (new->user != old->user)
518 atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
519 rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
520 rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
521 if (new->user != old->user)
522 atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
523 alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);
525 /* send notifications */
526 if (new->uid != old->uid ||
527 new->euid != old->euid ||
528 new->suid != old->suid ||
529 new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
530 proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID);
532 if (new->gid != old->gid ||
533 new->egid != old->egid ||
534 new->sgid != old->sgid ||
535 new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
536 proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
538 /* release the old obj and subj refs both */
539 put_cred(old);
540 put_cred(old);
541 return 0;
543 EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
546 * abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task
547 * @new: The credentials that were going to be applied
549 * Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the
550 * current task.
552 void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
554 kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
555 atomic_read(&new->usage),
556 read_cred_subscribers(new));
558 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
559 BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0);
560 #endif
561 BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
562 put_cred(new);
564 EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);
567 * override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials
568 * @new: The credentials to be assigned
570 * Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current
571 * process, returning the old set for later reversion.
573 const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
575 const struct cred *old = current->cred;
577 kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
578 atomic_read(&new->usage),
579 read_cred_subscribers(new));
581 validate_creds(old);
582 validate_creds(new);
583 get_cred(new);
584 alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
585 rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
586 alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);
588 kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
589 atomic_read(&old->usage),
590 read_cred_subscribers(old));
591 return old;
593 EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
596 * revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override
597 * @old: The credentials to be restored
599 * Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set,
600 * discarding the override set.
602 void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
604 const struct cred *override = current->cred;
606 kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old,
607 atomic_read(&old->usage),
608 read_cred_subscribers(old));
610 validate_creds(old);
611 validate_creds(override);
612 alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
613 rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
614 alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
615 put_cred(override);
617 EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
620 * initialise the credentials stuff
622 void __init cred_init(void)
624 /* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */
625 cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred),
626 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
630 * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
631 * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
633 * Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service. This can then be used to
634 * override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that
635 * task that requires a different subjective context.
637 * @daemon is used to provide a base for the security record, but can be NULL.
638 * If @daemon is supplied, then the security data will be derived from that;
639 * otherwise they'll be set to 0 and no groups, full capabilities and no keys.
641 * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired.
643 * Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
645 * Does not take, and does not return holding current->cred_replace_mutex.
647 struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
649 const struct cred *old;
650 struct cred *new;
652 new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
653 if (!new)
654 return NULL;
656 kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
658 if (daemon)
659 old = get_task_cred(daemon);
660 else
661 old = get_cred(&init_cred);
663 validate_creds(old);
665 *new = *old;
666 atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
667 set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
668 get_uid(new->user);
669 get_group_info(new->group_info);
671 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
672 atomic_inc(&init_tgcred.usage);
673 new->tgcred = &init_tgcred;
674 new->request_key_auth = NULL;
675 new->thread_keyring = NULL;
676 new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
677 #endif
679 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
680 new->security = NULL;
681 #endif
682 if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
683 goto error;
685 put_cred(old);
686 validate_creds(new);
687 return new;
689 error:
690 put_cred(new);
691 put_cred(old);
692 return NULL;
694 EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
697 * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
698 * @new: The credentials to alter
699 * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
701 * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
702 * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
704 int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
706 return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
708 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
711 * set_security_override_from_ctx - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
712 * @new: The credentials to alter
713 * @secctx: The LSM security context to generate the security ID from.
715 * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
716 * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. The
717 * security ID is specified in string form as a security context to be
718 * interpreted by the LSM.
720 int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
722 u32 secid;
723 int ret;
725 ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
726 if (ret < 0)
727 return ret;
729 return set_security_override(new, secid);
731 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
734 * set_create_files_as - Set the LSM file create context in a set of credentials
735 * @new: The credentials to alter
736 * @inode: The inode to take the context from
738 * Change the LSM file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same
739 * as the object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have
740 * the same MAC context as that inode.
742 int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
744 new->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
745 new->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
746 return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
748 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
750 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
752 bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
754 if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
755 return true;
756 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
758 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
759 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
761 if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) {
762 if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
763 return true;
764 if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
765 (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
766 return true;
768 #endif
769 return false;
771 EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);
774 * dump invalid credentials
776 static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label,
777 const struct task_struct *tsk)
779 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: %s credentials: %p %s%s%s\n",
780 label, cred,
781 cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "",
782 cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "",
783 cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : "");
784 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->magic=%x, put_addr=%p\n",
785 cred->magic, cred->put_addr);
786 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->usage=%d, subscr=%d\n",
787 atomic_read(&cred->usage),
788 read_cred_subscribers(cred));
789 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
790 cred->uid, cred->euid, cred->suid, cred->fsuid);
791 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
792 cred->gid, cred->egid, cred->sgid, cred->fsgid);
793 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
794 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %p\n", cred->security);
795 if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE &&
796 (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) !=
797 (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)))
798 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security {%x, %x}\n",
799 ((u32*)cred->security)[0],
800 ((u32*)cred->security)[1]);
801 #endif
805 * report use of invalid credentials
807 void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
809 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n");
810 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
811 dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
812 BUG();
814 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds);
817 * check the credentials on a process
819 void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk,
820 const char *file, unsigned line)
822 if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) {
823 if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 ||
824 creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
825 goto invalid_creds;
826 } else {
827 if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 ||
828 read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 ||
829 creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) ||
830 creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
831 goto invalid_creds;
833 return;
835 invalid_creds:
836 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials\n");
837 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
839 dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk);
840 if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred)
841 dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk);
842 else
843 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds\n");
844 BUG();
846 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds);
849 * check creds for do_exit()
851 void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
853 kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})",
854 tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
855 atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
856 read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
858 __validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__);
861 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */