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xattr: add missing consts to function arguments
[linux-2.6/openmoko-kernel/knife-kernel.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blob047365ac9faa62458ea09edbaece15fb453d02d8
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
18 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
19 *
20 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
21 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
22 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
23 */
24
25 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
28 #include <linux/errno.h>
29 #include <linux/sched.h>
30 #include <linux/security.h>
31 #include <linux/xattr.h>
32 #include <linux/capability.h>
33 #include <linux/unistd.h>
34 #include <linux/mm.h>
35 #include <linux/mman.h>
36 #include <linux/slab.h>
37 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
38 #include <linux/swap.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/namei.h>
43 #include <linux/mount.h>
44 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/kd.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/icmp.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
70 #include <net/ipv6.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78
79 #include "avc.h"
80 #include "objsec.h"
81 #include "netif.h"
82 #include "netnode.h"
83 #include "netport.h"
84 #include "xfrm.h"
85 #include "netlabel.h"
86 #include "audit.h"
87
88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
90
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
92
93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
95 extern int selinux_compat_net;
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
97
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
103
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 {
106 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
107 return 1;
108 }
109 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
110 #endif
111
112 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
113 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
114
115 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
116 {
117 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
118 return 1;
119 }
120 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
121 #else
122 int selinux_enabled = 1;
123 #endif
124
125 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
126 static struct security_operations *original_ops;
127
128 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
129 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
130 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
131 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
132 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
133
134 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
135 before the policy was loaded. */
136 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
137 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
138
139 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
140
141 /**
142 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
143 *
144 * Description:
145 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
146 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
147 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
148 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
149 *
150 */
151 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
152 {
153 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
154 }
155
156 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
157
158 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
159 {
160 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
161
162 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
163 if (!tsec)
164 return -ENOMEM;
165
166 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
167 task->security = tsec;
168
169 return 0;
170 }
171
172 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
173 {
174 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
175 task->security = NULL;
176 kfree(tsec);
177 }
178
179 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
180 {
181 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
182 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
183
184 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
185 if (!isec)
186 return -ENOMEM;
187
188 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
189 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
190 isec->inode = inode;
191 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
192 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
193 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
194 inode->i_security = isec;
195
196 return 0;
197 }
198
199 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
200 {
201 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
202 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
203
204 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
205 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
206 list_del_init(&isec->list);
207 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
208
209 inode->i_security = NULL;
210 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
211 }
212
213 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
214 {
215 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
216 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
217
218 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
219 if (!fsec)
220 return -ENOMEM;
221
222 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
223 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
224 file->f_security = fsec;
225
226 return 0;
227 }
228
229 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
230 {
231 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
232 file->f_security = NULL;
233 kfree(fsec);
234 }
235
236 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
237 {
238 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
239
240 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
241 if (!sbsec)
242 return -ENOMEM;
243
244 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
245 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
246 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
247 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
248 sbsec->sb = sb;
249 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
250 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
251 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sb->s_security = sbsec;
253
254 return 0;
255 }
256
257 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
258 {
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
260
261 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
262 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
263 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
264 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
265
266 sb->s_security = NULL;
267 kfree(sbsec);
268 }
269
270 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
271 {
272 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
273
274 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
275 if (!ssec)
276 return -ENOMEM;
277
278 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
279 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
280 sk->sk_security = ssec;
281
282 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
283
284 return 0;
285 }
286
287 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
288 {
289 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
290
291 sk->sk_security = NULL;
292 kfree(ssec);
293 }
294
295 /* The security server must be initialized before
296 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
297 extern int ss_initialized;
298
299 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
300
301 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
302 "uses xattr",
303 "uses transition SIDs",
304 "uses task SIDs",
305 "uses genfs_contexts",
306 "not configured for labeling",
307 "uses mountpoint labeling",
308 };
309
310 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
311
312 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
313 {
314 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
315 }
316
317 enum {
318 Opt_error = -1,
319 Opt_context = 1,
320 Opt_fscontext = 2,
321 Opt_defcontext = 3,
322 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
323 };
324
325 static match_table_t tokens = {
326 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
327 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
328 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
329 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_error, NULL},
331 };
332
333 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
334
335 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
336 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
337 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
338 {
339 int rc;
340
341 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
342 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
343 if (rc)
344 return rc;
345
346 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
347 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
348 return rc;
349 }
350
351 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
352 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
353 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
354 {
355 int rc;
356 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
357 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
358 if (rc)
359 return rc;
360
361 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
362 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
363 return rc;
364 }
365
366 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
367 {
368 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
369 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
370 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
371 int rc = 0;
372
373 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
374 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
375 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
376 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
377 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
378 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
379 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
380 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
381 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
382 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
383 goto out;
384 }
385 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
386 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
387 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
388 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
389 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
390 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
391 else
392 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
393 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
394 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
395 goto out;
396 }
397 }
398
399 sbsec->initialized = 1;
400
401 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
402 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
403 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
404 else
405 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
406 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
407 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
408
409 /* Initialize the root inode. */
410 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
411
412 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
413 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
414 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
415 populates itself. */
416 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
417 next_inode:
418 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
419 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
420 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
421 struct inode_security_struct, list);
422 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
423 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
424 inode = igrab(inode);
425 if (inode) {
426 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
427 inode_doinit(inode);
428 iput(inode);
429 }
430 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
431 list_del_init(&isec->list);
432 goto next_inode;
433 }
434 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
435 out:
436 return rc;
437 }
438
439 /*
440 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
441 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
442 * mount options, or whatever.
443 */
444 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
445 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
446 {
447 int rc = 0, i;
448 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
449 char *context = NULL;
450 u32 len;
451 char tmp;
452
453 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
454
455 if (!sbsec->initialized)
456 return -EINVAL;
457
458 if (!ss_initialized)
459 return -EINVAL;
460
461 /*
462 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
463 * settings this is going to need a mask
464 */
465 tmp = sbsec->flags;
466 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
467 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
468 if (tmp & 0x01)
469 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
470 tmp >>= 1;
471 }
472
473 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
474 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
475 rc = -ENOMEM;
476 goto out_free;
477 }
478
479 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
480 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
481 rc = -ENOMEM;
482 goto out_free;
483 }
484
485 i = 0;
486 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
487 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
488 if (rc)
489 goto out_free;
490 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
491 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
492 }
493 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
494 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
495 if (rc)
496 goto out_free;
497 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
498 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
499 }
500 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
501 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
502 if (rc)
503 goto out_free;
504 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
505 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
506 }
507 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
508 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
509 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
510
511 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
512 if (rc)
513 goto out_free;
514 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
515 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
516 }
517
518 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
519
520 return 0;
521
522 out_free:
523 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
524 return rc;
525 }
526
527 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
528 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
529 {
530 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
531 if (sbsec->initialized)
532 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
533 (old_sid != new_sid))
534 return 1;
535
536 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
537 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
538 */
539 if (!sbsec->initialized)
540 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
541 return 1;
542 return 0;
543 }
544
545 /*
546 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
547 * labeling information.
548 */
549 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
550 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
551 {
552 int rc = 0, i;
553 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
554 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
555 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
556 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
557 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
558 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
559 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
560 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
561 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
562 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
563
564 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
565
566 if (!ss_initialized) {
567 if (!num_opts) {
568 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
569 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
570 server is ready to handle calls. */
571 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
572 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
573 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
574 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
575 goto out;
576 }
577 rc = -EINVAL;
578 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
580 goto out;
581 }
582
583 /*
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
588 *
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
593 */
594 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
595 && (num_opts == 0))
596 goto out;
597
598 /*
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
602 */
603 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
604 u32 sid;
605 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
606 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
607 if (rc) {
608 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
609 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
610 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
611 goto out;
612 }
613 switch (flags[i]) {
614 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
615 fscontext_sid = sid;
616
617 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
618 fscontext_sid))
619 goto out_double_mount;
620
621 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
622 break;
623 case CONTEXT_MNT:
624 context_sid = sid;
625
626 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
627 context_sid))
628 goto out_double_mount;
629
630 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
631 break;
632 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
633 rootcontext_sid = sid;
634
635 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
636 rootcontext_sid))
637 goto out_double_mount;
638
639 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
640
641 break;
642 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
643 defcontext_sid = sid;
644
645 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
646 defcontext_sid))
647 goto out_double_mount;
648
649 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
650
651 break;
652 default:
653 rc = -EINVAL;
654 goto out;
655 }
656 }
657
658 if (sbsec->initialized) {
659 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
660 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
661 goto out_double_mount;
662 rc = 0;
663 goto out;
664 }
665
666 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
667 sbsec->proc = 1;
668
669 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
670 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
671 if (rc) {
672 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
673 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
674 goto out;
675 }
676
677 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
678 if (fscontext_sid) {
679
680 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
681 if (rc)
682 goto out;
683
684 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
685 }
686
687 /*
688 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
689 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
690 * the superblock context if not already set.
691 */
692 if (context_sid) {
693 if (!fscontext_sid) {
694 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
695 if (rc)
696 goto out;
697 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
698 } else {
699 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
700 if (rc)
701 goto out;
702 }
703 if (!rootcontext_sid)
704 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
705
706 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
707 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
708 }
709
710 if (rootcontext_sid) {
711 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
712 if (rc)
713 goto out;
714
715 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
716 root_isec->initialized = 1;
717 }
718
719 if (defcontext_sid) {
720 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
721 rc = -EINVAL;
722 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
723 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
724 goto out;
725 }
726
727 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
728 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
729 sbsec, tsec);
730 if (rc)
731 goto out;
732 }
733
734 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
735 }
736
737 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
738 out:
739 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
740 return rc;
741 out_double_mount:
742 rc = -EINVAL;
743 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
744 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
745 goto out;
746 }
747
748 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
749 struct super_block *newsb)
750 {
751 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
752 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
753
754 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
755 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
756 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
757
758 /*
759 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
760 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
761 * with it later
762 */
763 if (!ss_initialized) {
764 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
765 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
766 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
767 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
768 return;
769 }
770
771 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
772 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
773
774 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
775 if (newsbsec->initialized)
776 return;
777
778 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
779
780 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
781
782 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
783 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
784 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
785
786 if (set_context) {
787 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
788
789 if (!set_fscontext)
790 newsbsec->sid = sid;
791 if (!set_rootcontext) {
792 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
793 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
794 newisec->sid = sid;
795 }
796 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
797 }
798 if (set_rootcontext) {
799 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
800 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
801 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
802 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
803
804 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
805 }
806
807 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
808 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
809 }
810
811 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
812 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
813 {
814 char *p;
815 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
816 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
817 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
818
819 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
820
821 /* Standard string-based options. */
822 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
823 int token;
824 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
825
826 if (!*p)
827 continue;
828
829 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
830
831 switch (token) {
832 case Opt_context:
833 if (context || defcontext) {
834 rc = -EINVAL;
835 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
836 goto out_err;
837 }
838 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
839 if (!context) {
840 rc = -ENOMEM;
841 goto out_err;
842 }
843 break;
844
845 case Opt_fscontext:
846 if (fscontext) {
847 rc = -EINVAL;
848 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
849 goto out_err;
850 }
851 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
852 if (!fscontext) {
853 rc = -ENOMEM;
854 goto out_err;
855 }
856 break;
857
858 case Opt_rootcontext:
859 if (rootcontext) {
860 rc = -EINVAL;
861 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
862 goto out_err;
863 }
864 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
865 if (!rootcontext) {
866 rc = -ENOMEM;
867 goto out_err;
868 }
869 break;
870
871 case Opt_defcontext:
872 if (context || defcontext) {
873 rc = -EINVAL;
874 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
875 goto out_err;
876 }
877 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
878 if (!defcontext) {
879 rc = -ENOMEM;
880 goto out_err;
881 }
882 break;
883
884 default:
885 rc = -EINVAL;
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
887 goto out_err;
888
889 }
890 }
891
892 rc = -ENOMEM;
893 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
894 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
895 goto out_err;
896
897 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
899 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
900 goto out_err;
901 }
902
903 if (fscontext) {
904 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
905 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
906 }
907 if (context) {
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
910 }
911 if (rootcontext) {
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
914 }
915 if (defcontext) {
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
918 }
919
920 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
921 return 0;
922
923 out_err:
924 kfree(context);
925 kfree(defcontext);
926 kfree(fscontext);
927 kfree(rootcontext);
928 return rc;
929 }
930 /*
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
932 */
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
934 {
935 int rc = 0;
936 char *options = data;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
938
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
940
941 if (!data)
942 goto out;
943
944 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
945
946 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
947 if (rc)
948 goto out_err;
949
950 out:
951 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
952
953 out_err:
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
955 return rc;
956 }
957
958 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
959 {
960 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
961 case S_IFSOCK:
962 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
963 case S_IFLNK:
964 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
965 case S_IFREG:
966 return SECCLASS_FILE;
967 case S_IFBLK:
968 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
969 case S_IFDIR:
970 return SECCLASS_DIR;
971 case S_IFCHR:
972 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
973 case S_IFIFO:
974 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
975
976 }
977
978 return SECCLASS_FILE;
979 }
980
981 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
982 {
983 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
984 }
985
986 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
987 {
988 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
989 }
990
991 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
992 {
993 switch (family) {
994 case PF_UNIX:
995 switch (type) {
996 case SOCK_STREAM:
997 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
998 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
999 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1000 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1001 }
1002 break;
1003 case PF_INET:
1004 case PF_INET6:
1005 switch (type) {
1006 case SOCK_STREAM:
1007 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1008 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1009 else
1010 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1011 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1012 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1013 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1014 else
1015 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1016 case SOCK_DCCP:
1017 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1018 default:
1019 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1020 }
1021 break;
1022 case PF_NETLINK:
1023 switch (protocol) {
1024 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1025 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1026 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1027 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1028 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1029 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1030 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1031 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1032 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1033 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1034 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1035 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1036 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1037 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1038 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1039 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1040 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1041 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1042 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1043 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1044 default:
1045 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1046 }
1047 case PF_PACKET:
1048 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1049 case PF_KEY:
1050 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1051 case PF_APPLETALK:
1052 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1053 }
1054
1055 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1056 }
1057
1058 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1059 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1060 u16 tclass,
1061 u32 *sid)
1062 {
1063 int buflen, rc;
1064 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1065
1066 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1067 if (!buffer)
1068 return -ENOMEM;
1069
1070 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1071 end = buffer+buflen;
1072 *--end = '\0';
1073 buflen--;
1074 path = end-1;
1075 *path = '/';
1076 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1077 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1078 if (buflen < 0)
1079 break;
1080 end -= de->namelen;
1081 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1082 *--end = '/';
1083 path = end;
1084 de = de->parent;
1085 }
1086 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1087 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1088 return rc;
1089 }
1090 #else
1091 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1092 u16 tclass,
1093 u32 *sid)
1094 {
1095 return -EINVAL;
1096 }
1097 #endif
1098
1099 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1100 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1101 {
1102 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1103 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1104 u32 sid;
1105 struct dentry *dentry;
1106 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1107 char *context = NULL;
1108 unsigned len = 0;
1109 int rc = 0;
1110
1111 if (isec->initialized)
1112 goto out;
1113
1114 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1115 if (isec->initialized)
1116 goto out_unlock;
1117
1118 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1119 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1120 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1121 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1122 server is ready to handle calls. */
1123 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1124 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1125 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1126 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1127 goto out_unlock;
1128 }
1129
1130 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1131 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1132 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1133 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1134 break;
1135 }
1136
1137 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1138 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1139 if (opt_dentry) {
1140 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1141 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1142 } else {
1143 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1144 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1145 }
1146 if (!dentry) {
1147 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1148 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1149 inode->i_ino);
1150 goto out_unlock;
1151 }
1152
1153 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1154 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1155 if (!context) {
1156 rc = -ENOMEM;
1157 dput(dentry);
1158 goto out_unlock;
1159 }
1160 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1161 context, len);
1162 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1163 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1164 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1165 NULL, 0);
1166 if (rc < 0) {
1167 dput(dentry);
1168 goto out_unlock;
1169 }
1170 kfree(context);
1171 len = rc;
1172 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1173 if (!context) {
1174 rc = -ENOMEM;
1175 dput(dentry);
1176 goto out_unlock;
1177 }
1178 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1179 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1180 context, len);
1181 }
1182 dput(dentry);
1183 if (rc < 0) {
1184 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1185 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1186 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1187 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1188 kfree(context);
1189 goto out_unlock;
1190 }
1191 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1192 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1193 rc = 0;
1194 } else {
1195 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1196 sbsec->def_sid,
1197 GFP_NOFS);
1198 if (rc) {
1199 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1200 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1201 __func__, context, -rc,
1202 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1203 kfree(context);
1204 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1205 rc = 0;
1206 break;
1207 }
1208 }
1209 kfree(context);
1210 isec->sid = sid;
1211 break;
1212 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1213 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1214 break;
1215 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1216 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1217 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1218
1219 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1220 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1221 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1222 sbsec->sid,
1223 isec->sclass,
1224 &sid);
1225 if (rc)
1226 goto out_unlock;
1227 isec->sid = sid;
1228 break;
1229 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1230 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1231 break;
1232 default:
1233 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1234 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1235
1236 if (sbsec->proc) {
1237 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1238 if (proci->pde) {
1239 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1240 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1241 isec->sclass,
1242 &sid);
1243 if (rc)
1244 goto out_unlock;
1245 isec->sid = sid;
1246 }
1247 }
1248 break;
1249 }
1250
1251 isec->initialized = 1;
1252
1253 out_unlock:
1254 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1255 out:
1256 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1257 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1258 return rc;
1259 }
1260
1261 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1262 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1263 {
1264 u32 perm = 0;
1265
1266 switch (sig) {
1267 case SIGCHLD:
1268 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1269 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1270 break;
1271 case SIGKILL:
1272 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1273 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1274 break;
1275 case SIGSTOP:
1276 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1277 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1278 break;
1279 default:
1280 /* All other signals. */
1281 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1282 break;
1283 }
1284
1285 return perm;
1286 }
1287
1288 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1289 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1290 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1291 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1292 u32 perms)
1293 {
1294 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1295
1296 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1297 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1298 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1299 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1300 }
1301
1302 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1303 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1304 #endif
1305
1306 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1307 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1308 int cap)
1309 {
1310 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1311 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1312 u16 sclass;
1313 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1314
1315 tsec = tsk->security;
1316
1317 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1318 ad.tsk = tsk;
1319 ad.u.cap = cap;
1320
1321 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1322 case 0:
1323 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1324 break;
1325 case 1:
1326 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1327 break;
1328 default:
1329 printk(KERN_ERR
1330 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1331 BUG();
1332 }
1333 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1334 }
1335
1336 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1337 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1338 u32 perms)
1339 {
1340 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1341
1342 tsec = tsk->security;
1343
1344 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1345 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1346 }
1347
1348 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1349 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1350 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1351 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1352 struct inode *inode,
1353 u32 perms,
1354 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1355 {
1356 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1357 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1358 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1359
1360 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1361 return 0;
1362
1363 tsec = tsk->security;
1364 isec = inode->i_security;
1365
1366 if (!adp) {
1367 adp = &ad;
1368 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1369 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1370 }
1371
1372 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1373 }
1374
1375 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1376 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1377 pathname if needed. */
1378 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1379 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1380 struct dentry *dentry,
1381 u32 av)
1382 {
1383 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1384 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1385 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1386 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1387 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1388 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1389 }
1390
1391 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1392 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1393 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1394 check a particular permission to the file.
1395 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1396 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1397 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1398 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1399 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1400 struct file *file,
1401 u32 av)
1402 {
1403 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1404 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1405 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1406 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1407 int rc;
1408
1409 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1410 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1411
1412 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1413 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1414 SECCLASS_FD,
1415 FD__USE,
1416 &ad);
1417 if (rc)
1418 return rc;
1419 }
1420
1421 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1422 if (av)
1423 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1424
1425 return 0;
1426 }
1427
1428 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1429 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1430 struct dentry *dentry,
1431 u16 tclass)
1432 {
1433 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1434 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1435 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1436 u32 newsid;
1437 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1438 int rc;
1439
1440 tsec = current->security;
1441 dsec = dir->i_security;
1442 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1443
1444 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1445 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1446
1447 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1448 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1449 &ad);
1450 if (rc)
1451 return rc;
1452
1453 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1454 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1455 } else {
1456 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1457 &newsid);
1458 if (rc)
1459 return rc;
1460 }
1461
1462 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1463 if (rc)
1464 return rc;
1465
1466 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1467 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1468 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1469 }
1470
1471 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1472 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1473 struct task_struct *ctx)
1474 {
1475 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1476
1477 tsec = ctx->security;
1478
1479 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1480 }
1481
1482 #define MAY_LINK 0
1483 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1484 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1485
1486 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1487 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1488 struct dentry *dentry,
1489 int kind)
1490
1491 {
1492 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1493 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1494 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1495 u32 av;
1496 int rc;
1497
1498 tsec = current->security;
1499 dsec = dir->i_security;
1500 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1501
1502 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1503 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1504
1505 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1506 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1507 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1508 if (rc)
1509 return rc;
1510
1511 switch (kind) {
1512 case MAY_LINK:
1513 av = FILE__LINK;
1514 break;
1515 case MAY_UNLINK:
1516 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1517 break;
1518 case MAY_RMDIR:
1519 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1520 break;
1521 default:
1522 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1523 __func__, kind);
1524 return 0;
1525 }
1526
1527 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1528 return rc;
1529 }
1530
1531 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1532 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1533 struct inode *new_dir,
1534 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1535 {
1536 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1537 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1538 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1539 u32 av;
1540 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1541 int rc;
1542
1543 tsec = current->security;
1544 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1545 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1546 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1547 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1548
1549 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1550
1551 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1552 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1553 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1554 if (rc)
1555 return rc;
1556 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1557 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1558 if (rc)
1559 return rc;
1560 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1561 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1562 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1563 if (rc)
1564 return rc;
1565 }
1566
1567 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1568 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1569 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1570 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1571 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1572 if (rc)
1573 return rc;
1574 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1575 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1576 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1577 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1578 new_isec->sclass,
1579 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1580 if (rc)
1581 return rc;
1582 }
1583
1584 return 0;
1585 }
1586
1587 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1588 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1589 struct super_block *sb,
1590 u32 perms,
1591 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1592 {
1593 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1594 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1595
1596 tsec = tsk->security;
1597 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1598 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1599 perms, ad);
1600 }
1601
1602 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1603 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1604 {
1605 u32 av = 0;
1606
1607 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1608 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1609 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1610 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1611 av |= FILE__READ;
1612
1613 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1614 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1615 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1616 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1617
1618 } else {
1619 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1620 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1621 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1622 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1623 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1624 av |= DIR__READ;
1625 }
1626
1627 return av;
1628 }
1629
1630 /*
1631 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1632 * open permission.
1633 */
1634 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1635 {
1636 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1637
1638 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1639 /*
1640 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1641 */
1642 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1643 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1644 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1645 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1646 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1647 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1648 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1649 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1650 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1651 av |= DIR__OPEN;
1652 else
1653 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1654 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1655 }
1656 return av;
1657 }
1658
1659 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1660 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1661 {
1662 u32 av = 0;
1663
1664 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1665 av |= FILE__READ;
1666 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1667 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1668 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1669 else
1670 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1671 }
1672 if (!av) {
1673 /*
1674 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1675 */
1676 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1677 }
1678
1679 return av;
1680 }
1681
1682 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1683
1684 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1685 {
1686 int rc;
1687
1688 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child);
1689 if (rc)
1690 return rc;
1691
1692 return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1693 }
1694
1695 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1696 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1697 {
1698 int error;
1699
1700 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1701 if (error)
1702 return error;
1703
1704 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1705 }
1706
1707 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1708 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1709 {
1710 int error;
1711
1712 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1713 if (error)
1714 return error;
1715
1716 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1717 }
1718
1719 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1720 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1721 {
1722 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1723 }
1724
1725 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1726 {
1727 int rc;
1728
1729 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1730 if (rc)
1731 return rc;
1732
1733 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1734 }
1735
1736 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1737 {
1738 int buflen, rc;
1739 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1740
1741 rc = -ENOMEM;
1742 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1743 if (!buffer)
1744 goto out;
1745
1746 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1747 end = buffer+buflen;
1748 *--end = '\0';
1749 buflen--;
1750 path = end-1;
1751 *path = '/';
1752 while (table) {
1753 const char *name = table->procname;
1754 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1755 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1756 if (buflen < 0)
1757 goto out_free;
1758 end -= namelen;
1759 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1760 *--end = '/';
1761 path = end;
1762 table = table->parent;
1763 }
1764 buflen -= 4;
1765 if (buflen < 0)
1766 goto out_free;
1767 end -= 4;
1768 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1769 path = end;
1770 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1771 out_free:
1772 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1773 out:
1774 return rc;
1775 }
1776
1777 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1778 {
1779 int error = 0;
1780 u32 av;
1781 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1782 u32 tsid;
1783 int rc;
1784
1785 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1786 if (rc)
1787 return rc;
1788
1789 tsec = current->security;
1790
1791 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1792 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1793 if (rc) {
1794 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1795 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1796 }
1797
1798 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1799 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1800 if (op == 001) {
1801 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1802 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1803 } else {
1804 av = 0;
1805 if (op & 004)
1806 av |= FILE__READ;
1807 if (op & 002)
1808 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1809 if (av)
1810 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1811 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1812 }
1813
1814 return error;
1815 }
1816
1817 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1818 {
1819 int rc = 0;
1820
1821 if (!sb)
1822 return 0;
1823
1824 switch (cmds) {
1825 case Q_SYNC:
1826 case Q_QUOTAON:
1827 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1828 case Q_SETINFO:
1829 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1830 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1831 NULL);
1832 break;
1833 case Q_GETFMT:
1834 case Q_GETINFO:
1835 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1836 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1837 NULL);
1838 break;
1839 default:
1840 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1841 break;
1842 }
1843 return rc;
1844 }
1845
1846 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1847 {
1848 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1849 }
1850
1851 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1852 {
1853 int rc;
1854
1855 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1856 if (rc)
1857 return rc;
1858
1859 switch (type) {
1860 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1861 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1862 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1863 break;
1864 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1865 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1866 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1867 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1868 break;
1869 case 0: /* Close log */
1870 case 1: /* Open log */
1871 case 2: /* Read from log */
1872 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1873 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1874 default:
1875 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1876 break;
1877 }
1878 return rc;
1879 }
1880
1881 /*
1882 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1883 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1884 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1885 *
1886 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1887 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1888 * the capability is granted.
1889 *
1890 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1891 * processes that allocate mappings.
1892 */
1893 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1894 {
1895 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1896 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1897
1898 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1899 if (rc == 0)
1900 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1901 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1902 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1903 0,
1904 NULL);
1905
1906 if (rc == 0)
1907 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1908
1909 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1910 }
1911
1912 /**
1913 * task_tracer_task - return the task that is tracing the given task
1914 * @task: task to consider
1915 *
1916 * Returns NULL if noone is tracing @task, or the &struct task_struct
1917 * pointer to its tracer.
1918 *
1919 * Must be called under rcu_read_lock().
1920 */
1921 static struct task_struct *task_tracer_task(struct task_struct *task)
1922 {
1923 if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
1924 return rcu_dereference(task->parent);
1925 return NULL;
1926 }
1927
1928 /* binprm security operations */
1929
1930 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1931 {
1932 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1933
1934 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1935 if (!bsec)
1936 return -ENOMEM;
1937
1938 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1939 bsec->set = 0;
1940
1941 bprm->security = bsec;
1942 return 0;
1943 }
1944
1945 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1946 {
1947 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1948 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1949 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1950 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1951 u32 newsid;
1952 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1953 int rc;
1954
1955 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1956 if (rc)
1957 return rc;
1958
1959 bsec = bprm->security;
1960
1961 if (bsec->set)
1962 return 0;
1963
1964 tsec = current->security;
1965 isec = inode->i_security;
1966
1967 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1968 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1969
1970 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1971 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1972 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1973 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1974
1975 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1976 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1977 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1978 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1979 } else {
1980 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1981 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1982 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1983 if (rc)
1984 return rc;
1985 }
1986
1987 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1988 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
1989
1990 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1991 newsid = tsec->sid;
1992
1993 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1994 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1995 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1996 if (rc)
1997 return rc;
1998 } else {
1999 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2000 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2001 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2002 if (rc)
2003 return rc;
2004
2005 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2006 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2007 if (rc)
2008 return rc;
2009
2010 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2011 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2012
2013 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2014 bsec->sid = newsid;
2015 }
2016
2017 bsec->set = 1;
2018 return 0;
2019 }
2020
2021 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2022 {
2023 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2024 }
2025
2026
2027 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2028 {
2029 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2030 int atsecure = 0;
2031
2032 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2033 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2034 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2035 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2036 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2037 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2038 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2039 }
2040
2041 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2042 }
2043
2044 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2045 {
2046 kfree(bprm->security);
2047 bprm->security = NULL;
2048 }
2049
2050 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2051 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2052
2053 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2054 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2055 {
2056 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2057 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2058 struct tty_struct *tty;
2059 struct fdtable *fdt;
2060 long j = -1;
2061 int drop_tty = 0;
2062
2063 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2064 tty = get_current_tty();
2065 if (tty) {
2066 file_list_lock();
2067 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2068 if (file) {
2069 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2070 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2071 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2072 file may belong to another process and we are only
2073 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2074 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2075 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2076 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2077 drop_tty = 1;
2078 }
2079 }
2080 file_list_unlock();
2081 }
2082 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2083 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2084 if (drop_tty)
2085 no_tty();
2086
2087 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2088
2089 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2090
2091 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2092 for (;;) {
2093 unsigned long set, i;
2094 int fd;
2095
2096 j++;
2097 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2098 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2099 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2100 break;
2101 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2102 if (!set)
2103 continue;
2104 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2105 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2106 if (set & 1) {
2107 file = fget(i);
2108 if (!file)
2109 continue;
2110 if (file_has_perm(current,
2111 file,
2112 file_to_av(file))) {
2113 sys_close(i);
2114 fd = get_unused_fd();
2115 if (fd != i) {
2116 if (fd >= 0)
2117 put_unused_fd(fd);
2118 fput(file);
2119 continue;
2120 }
2121 if (devnull) {
2122 get_file(devnull);
2123 } else {
2124 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2125 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2126 devnull = NULL;
2127 put_unused_fd(fd);
2128 fput(file);
2129 continue;
2130 }
2131 }
2132 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2133 }
2134 fput(file);
2135 }
2136 }
2137 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2138
2139 }
2140 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2141 }
2142
2143 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2144 {
2145 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2146 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2147 u32 sid;
2148 int rc;
2149
2150 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2151
2152 tsec = current->security;
2153
2154 bsec = bprm->security;
2155 sid = bsec->sid;
2156
2157 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2158 bsec->unsafe = 0;
2159 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2160 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2161 unchanged and kill. */
2162 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2163 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2164 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2165 if (rc) {
2166 bsec->unsafe = 1;
2167 return;
2168 }
2169 }
2170
2171 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2172 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2173 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2174 struct task_struct *tracer;
2175 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2176 u32 ptsid = 0;
2177
2178 rcu_read_lock();
2179 tracer = task_tracer_task(current);
2180 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2181 sec = tracer->security;
2182 ptsid = sec->sid;
2183 }
2184 rcu_read_unlock();
2185
2186 if (ptsid != 0) {
2187 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2188 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2189 if (rc) {
2190 bsec->unsafe = 1;
2191 return;
2192 }
2193 }
2194 }
2195 tsec->sid = sid;
2196 }
2197 }
2198
2199 /*
2200 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2201 */
2202 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2203 {
2204 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2205 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2206 struct itimerval itimer;
2207 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2208 int rc, i;
2209
2210 tsec = current->security;
2211 bsec = bprm->security;
2212
2213 if (bsec->unsafe) {
2214 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2215 return;
2216 }
2217 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2218 return;
2219
2220 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2221 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2222
2223 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2224 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2225 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2226 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2227 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2228 will be checked against the new SID. */
2229 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2230 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2231 if (rc) {
2232 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2233 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2234 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2235 flush_signals(current);
2236 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2237 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2238 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2239 recalc_sigpending();
2240 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2241 }
2242
2243 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2244 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2245
2246 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2247 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2248 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2249 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2250 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2251 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2252 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2253 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2254 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2255 RLIMIT_STACK.*/
2256 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2257 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2258 if (rc) {
2259 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2260 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2261 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2262 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2263 }
2264 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2265 /*
2266 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2267 * to be refigured.
2268 */
2269 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2270 }
2271 }
2272
2273 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2274 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2275 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2276 }
2277
2278 /* superblock security operations */
2279
2280 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2281 {
2282 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2283 }
2284
2285 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2286 {
2287 superblock_free_security(sb);
2288 }
2289
2290 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2291 {
2292 if (plen > olen)
2293 return 0;
2294
2295 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2296 }
2297
2298 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2299 {
2300 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2301 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2302 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2303 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2304 }
2305
2306 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2307 {
2308 if (!*first) {
2309 **to = ',';
2310 *to += 1;
2311 } else
2312 *first = 0;
2313 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2314 *to += len;
2315 }
2316
2317 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2318 int len)
2319 {
2320 int current_size = 0;
2321
2322 if (!*first) {
2323 **to = '|';
2324 *to += 1;
2325 } else
2326 *first = 0;
2327
2328 while (current_size < len) {
2329 if (*from != '"') {
2330 **to = *from;
2331 *to += 1;
2332 }
2333 from += 1;
2334 current_size += 1;
2335 }
2336 }
2337
2338 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2339 {
2340 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2341 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2342 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2343 int open_quote = 0;
2344
2345 in_curr = orig;
2346 sec_curr = copy;
2347
2348 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2349 if (!nosec) {
2350 rc = -ENOMEM;
2351 goto out;
2352 }
2353
2354 nosec_save = nosec;
2355 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2356 in_save = in_end = orig;
2357
2358 do {
2359 if (*in_end == '"')
2360 open_quote = !open_quote;
2361 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2362 *in_end == '\0') {
2363 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2364
2365 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2366 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2367 else
2368 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2369
2370 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2371 }
2372 } while (*in_end++);
2373
2374 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2375 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2376 out:
2377 return rc;
2378 }
2379
2380 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2381 {
2382 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2383 int rc;
2384
2385 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2386 if (rc)
2387 return rc;
2388
2389 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2390 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2391 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2392 }
2393
2394 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2395 {
2396 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2397
2398 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2399 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2400 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2401 }
2402
2403 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2404 struct path *path,
2405 char *type,
2406 unsigned long flags,
2407 void *data)
2408 {
2409 int rc;
2410
2411 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2412 if (rc)
2413 return rc;
2414
2415 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2416 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2417 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2418 else
2419 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2420 FILE__MOUNTON);
2421 }
2422
2423 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2424 {
2425 int rc;
2426
2427 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2428 if (rc)
2429 return rc;
2430
2431 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2432 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2433 }
2434
2435 /* inode security operations */
2436
2437 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2438 {
2439 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2440 }
2441
2442 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2443 {
2444 inode_free_security(inode);
2445 }
2446
2447 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2448 char **name, void **value,
2449 size_t *len)
2450 {
2451 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2452 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2453 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2454 u32 newsid, clen;
2455 int rc;
2456 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2457
2458 tsec = current->security;
2459 dsec = dir->i_security;
2460 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2461
2462 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2463 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2464 } else {
2465 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2466 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2467 &newsid);
2468 if (rc) {
2469 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2470 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2471 "ino=%ld)\n",
2472 __func__,
2473 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2474 return rc;
2475 }
2476 }
2477
2478 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2479 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2480 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2481 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2482 isec->sid = newsid;
2483 isec->initialized = 1;
2484 }
2485
2486 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2487 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2488
2489 if (name) {
2490 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2491 if (!namep)
2492 return -ENOMEM;
2493 *name = namep;
2494 }
2495
2496 if (value && len) {
2497 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2498 if (rc) {
2499 kfree(namep);
2500 return rc;
2501 }
2502 *value = context;
2503 *len = clen;
2504 }
2505
2506 return 0;
2507 }
2508
2509 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2510 {
2511 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2512 }
2513
2514 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2515 {
2516 int rc;
2517
2518 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2519 if (rc)
2520 return rc;
2521 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2522 }
2523
2524 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2525 {
2526 int rc;
2527
2528 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2529 if (rc)
2530 return rc;
2531 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2532 }
2533
2534 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2535 {
2536 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2537 }
2538
2539 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2540 {
2541 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2542 }
2543
2544 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2545 {
2546 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2547 }
2548
2549 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2550 {
2551 int rc;
2552
2553 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2554 if (rc)
2555 return rc;
2556
2557 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2558 }
2559
2560 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2561 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2562 {
2563 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2564 }
2565
2566 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2567 {
2568 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2569 }
2570
2571 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2572 {
2573 int rc;
2574
2575 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2576 if (rc)
2577 return rc;
2578 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2579 }
2580
2581 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2582 struct nameidata *nd)
2583 {
2584 int rc;
2585
2586 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2587 if (rc)
2588 return rc;
2589
2590 if (!mask) {
2591 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2592 return 0;
2593 }
2594
2595 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2596 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2597 }
2598
2599 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2600 {
2601 int rc;
2602
2603 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2604 if (rc)
2605 return rc;
2606
2607 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2608 return 0;
2609
2610 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2611 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2612 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2613
2614 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2615 }
2616
2617 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2618 {
2619 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2620 }
2621
2622 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2623 {
2624 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2625 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2626 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2627 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2628 return -EPERM;
2629 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2630 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2631 Restrict to administrator. */
2632 return -EPERM;
2633 }
2634 }
2635
2636 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2637 ordinary setattr permission. */
2638 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2639 }
2640
2641 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2642 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2643 {
2644 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2645 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2646 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2647 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2648 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2649 u32 newsid;
2650 int rc = 0;
2651
2652 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2653 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2654
2655 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2656 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2657 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2658
2659 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2660 return -EPERM;
2661
2662 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2663 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2664
2665 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2666 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2667 if (rc)
2668 return rc;
2669
2670 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2671 if (rc)
2672 return rc;
2673
2674 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2675 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2676 if (rc)
2677 return rc;
2678
2679 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2680 isec->sclass);
2681 if (rc)
2682 return rc;
2683
2684 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2685 sbsec->sid,
2686 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2687 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2688 &ad);
2689 }
2690
2691 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2692 const void *value, size_t size,
2693 int flags)
2694 {
2695 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2696 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2697 u32 newsid;
2698 int rc;
2699
2700 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2701 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2702 return;
2703 }
2704
2705 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2706 if (rc) {
2707 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2708 "%s, rc=%d\n", __func__, (char *)value, -rc);
2709 return;
2710 }
2711
2712 isec->sid = newsid;
2713 return;
2714 }
2715
2716 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2717 {
2718 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2719 }
2720
2721 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2722 {
2723 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2724 }
2725
2726 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2727 {
2728 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2729 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2730
2731 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2732 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2733 return -EACCES;
2734 }
2735
2736 /*
2737 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2738 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2739 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2740 *
2741 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2742 */
2743 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2744 {
2745 u32 size;
2746 int error;
2747 char *context = NULL;
2748 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2749
2750 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2751 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2752
2753 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2754 if (error)
2755 return error;
2756 error = size;
2757 if (alloc) {
2758 *buffer = context;
2759 goto out_nofree;
2760 }
2761 kfree(context);
2762 out_nofree:
2763 return error;
2764 }
2765
2766 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2767 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2768 {
2769 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2770 u32 newsid;
2771 int rc;
2772
2773 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2774 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2775
2776 if (!value || !size)
2777 return -EACCES;
2778
2779 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2780 if (rc)
2781 return rc;
2782
2783 isec->sid = newsid;
2784 return 0;
2785 }
2786
2787 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2788 {
2789 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2790 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2791 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2792 return len;
2793 }
2794
2795 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2796 {
2797 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2798 }
2799
2800 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2801 {
2802 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2803 }
2804
2805 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2806 {
2807 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2808 *secid = isec->sid;
2809 }
2810
2811 /* file security operations */
2812
2813 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2814 {
2815 int rc;
2816 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2817
2818 if (!mask) {
2819 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2820 return 0;
2821 }
2822
2823 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2824 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2825 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2826
2827 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2828 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2829 if (rc)
2830 return rc;
2831
2832 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2833 }
2834
2835 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2836 {
2837 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2838 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2839 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2840 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2841
2842 if (!mask) {
2843 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2844 return 0;
2845 }
2846
2847 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2848 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2849 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2850
2851 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2852 }
2853
2854 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2855 {
2856 return file_alloc_security(file);
2857 }
2858
2859 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2860 {
2861 file_free_security(file);
2862 }
2863
2864 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2865 unsigned long arg)
2866 {
2867 int error = 0;
2868
2869 switch (cmd) {
2870 case FIONREAD:
2871 /* fall through */
2872 case FIBMAP:
2873 /* fall through */
2874 case FIGETBSZ:
2875 /* fall through */
2876 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2877 /* fall through */
2878 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2879 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2880 break;
2881
2882 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2883 /* fall through */
2884 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2885 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2886 break;
2887
2888 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2889 case FIONBIO:
2890 /* fall through */
2891 case FIOASYNC:
2892 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2893 break;
2894
2895 case KDSKBENT:
2896 case KDSKBSENT:
2897 error = task_has_capability(current, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2898 break;
2899
2900 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2901 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2902 */
2903 default:
2904 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2905 }
2906 return error;
2907 }
2908
2909 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2910 {
2911 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2912 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2913 /*
2914 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2915 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2916 * This has an additional check.
2917 */
2918 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2919 if (rc)
2920 return rc;
2921 }
2922 #endif
2923
2924 if (file) {
2925 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2926 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2927
2928 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2929 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2930 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2931
2932 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2933 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2934
2935 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2936 }
2937 return 0;
2938 }
2939
2940 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2941 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2942 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2943 {
2944 int rc = 0;
2945 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
2946
2947 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2948 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2949 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2950 if (rc || addr_only)
2951 return rc;
2952
2953 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2954 prot = reqprot;
2955
2956 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2957 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2958 }
2959
2960 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2961 unsigned long reqprot,
2962 unsigned long prot)
2963 {
2964 int rc;
2965
2966 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2967 if (rc)
2968 return rc;
2969
2970 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2971 prot = reqprot;
2972
2973 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2974 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2975 rc = 0;
2976 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2977 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2978 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2979 PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2980 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2981 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2982 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2983 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2984 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2985 /*
2986 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2987 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2988 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2989 * modified content. This typically should only
2990 * occur for text relocations.
2991 */
2992 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2993 FILE__EXECMOD);
2994 }
2995 if (rc)
2996 return rc;
2997 }
2998 #endif
2999
3000 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3001 }
3002
3003 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3004 {
3005 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3006 }
3007
3008 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3009 unsigned long arg)
3010 {
3011 int err = 0;
3012
3013 switch (cmd) {
3014 case F_SETFL:
3015 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3016 err = -EINVAL;
3017 break;
3018 }
3019
3020 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3021 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3022 break;
3023 }
3024 /* fall through */
3025 case F_SETOWN:
3026 case F_SETSIG:
3027 case F_GETFL:
3028 case F_GETOWN:
3029 case F_GETSIG:
3030 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3031 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3032 break;
3033 case F_GETLK:
3034 case F_SETLK:
3035 case F_SETLKW:
3036 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3037 case F_GETLK64:
3038 case F_SETLK64:
3039 case F_SETLKW64:
3040 #endif
3041 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3042 err = -EINVAL;
3043 break;
3044 }
3045 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3046 break;
3047 }
3048
3049 return err;
3050 }
3051
3052 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3053 {
3054 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3055 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3056
3057 tsec = current->security;
3058 fsec = file->f_security;
3059 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3060
3061 return 0;
3062 }
3063
3064 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3065 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3066 {
3067 struct file *file;
3068 u32 perm;
3069 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3070 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3071
3072 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3073 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3074
3075 tsec = tsk->security;
3076 fsec = file->f_security;
3077
3078 if (!signum)
3079 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3080 else
3081 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3082
3083 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3084 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3085 }
3086
3087 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3088 {
3089 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3090 }
3091
3092 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3093 {
3094 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3095 struct inode *inode;
3096 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3097 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3098 fsec = file->f_security;
3099 isec = inode->i_security;
3100 /*
3101 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3102 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3103 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3104 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3105 * struct as its SID.
3106 */
3107 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3108 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3109 /*
3110 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3111 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3112 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3113 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3114 * new inode label or new policy.
3115 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3116 */
3117 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3118 }
3119
3120 /* task security operations */
3121
3122 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3123 {
3124 int rc;
3125
3126 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3127 if (rc)
3128 return rc;
3129
3130 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3131 }
3132
3133 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3134 {
3135 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3136 int rc;
3137
3138 tsec1 = current->security;
3139
3140 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3141 if (rc)
3142 return rc;
3143 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3144
3145 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3146 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3147
3148 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3149 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3150 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3151 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3152 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3153
3154 return 0;
3155 }
3156
3157 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3158 {
3159 task_free_security(tsk);
3160 }
3161
3162 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3163 {
3164 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3165 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3166 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3167 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3168 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3169 capable hook. */
3170 return 0;
3171 }
3172
3173 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3174 {
3175 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3176 }
3177
3178 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3179 {
3180 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3181 return 0;
3182 }
3183
3184 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3185 {
3186 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3187 }
3188
3189 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3190 {
3191 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3192 }
3193
3194 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3195 {
3196 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3197 }
3198
3199 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3200 {
3201 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3202 *secid = tsec->sid;
3203 }
3204
3205 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3206 {
3207 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3208 return 0;
3209 }
3210
3211 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3212 {
3213 int rc;
3214
3215 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3216 if (rc)
3217 return rc;
3218
3219 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3220 }
3221
3222 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3223 {
3224 int rc;
3225
3226 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3227 if (rc)
3228 return rc;
3229
3230 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3231 }
3232
3233 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3234 {
3235 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3236 }
3237
3238 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3239 {
3240 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3241 int rc;
3242
3243 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3244 if (rc)
3245 return rc;
3246
3247 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3248 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3249 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3250 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3251 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3252 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3253
3254 return 0;
3255 }
3256
3257 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3258 {
3259 int rc;
3260
3261 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3262 if (rc)
3263 return rc;
3264
3265 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3266 }
3267
3268 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3269 {
3270 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3271 }
3272
3273 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3274 {
3275 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3276 }
3277
3278 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3279 int sig, u32 secid)
3280 {
3281 u32 perm;
3282 int rc;
3283 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3284
3285 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3286 if (rc)
3287 return rc;
3288
3289 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
3290 return 0;
3291
3292 if (!sig)
3293 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3294 else
3295 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3296 tsec = p->security;
3297 if (secid)
3298 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3299 else
3300 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3301 return rc;
3302 }
3303
3304 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3305 unsigned long arg2,
3306 unsigned long arg3,
3307 unsigned long arg4,
3308 unsigned long arg5,
3309 long *rc_p)
3310 {
3311 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3312 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3313 the state of the current process. */
3314 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3315 }
3316
3317 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3318 {
3319 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3320 }
3321
3322 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3323 {
3324 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3325
3326 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3327
3328 tsec = p->security;
3329 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3330 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3331 return;
3332 }
3333
3334 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3335 struct inode *inode)
3336 {
3337 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3338 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3339
3340 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3341 isec->initialized = 1;
3342 return;
3343 }
3344
3345 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3346 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3347 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3348 {
3349 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3350 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3351
3352 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3353 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3354 if (ih == NULL)
3355 goto out;
3356
3357 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3358 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3359 goto out;
3360
3361 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3362 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3363 ret = 0;
3364
3365 if (proto)
3366 *proto = ih->protocol;
3367
3368 switch (ih->protocol) {
3369 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3370 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3371
3372 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3373 break;
3374
3375 offset += ihlen;
3376 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3377 if (th == NULL)
3378 break;
3379
3380 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3381 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3382 break;
3383 }
3384
3385 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3386 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3387
3388 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3389 break;
3390
3391 offset += ihlen;
3392 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3393 if (uh == NULL)
3394 break;
3395
3396 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3397 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3398 break;
3399 }
3400
3401 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3402 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3403
3404 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3405 break;
3406
3407 offset += ihlen;
3408 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3409 if (dh == NULL)
3410 break;
3411
3412 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3413 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3414 break;
3415 }
3416
3417 default:
3418 break;
3419 }
3420 out:
3421 return ret;
3422 }
3423
3424 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3425
3426 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3427 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3428 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3429 {
3430 u8 nexthdr;
3431 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3432 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3433
3434 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3435 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3436 if (ip6 == NULL)
3437 goto out;
3438
3439 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3440 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3441 ret = 0;
3442
3443 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3444 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3445 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3446 if (offset < 0)
3447 goto out;
3448
3449 if (proto)
3450 *proto = nexthdr;
3451
3452 switch (nexthdr) {
3453 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3454 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3455
3456 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3457 if (th == NULL)
3458 break;
3459
3460 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3461 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3462 break;
3463 }
3464
3465 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3466 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3467
3468 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3469 if (uh == NULL)
3470 break;
3471
3472 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3473 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3474 break;
3475 }
3476
3477 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3478 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3479
3480 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3481 if (dh == NULL)
3482 break;
3483
3484 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3485 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3486 break;
3487 }
3488
3489 /* includes fragments */
3490 default:
3491 break;
3492 }
3493 out:
3494 return ret;
3495 }
3496
3497 #endif /* IPV6 */
3498
3499 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3500 char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3501 {
3502 int ret = 0;
3503
3504 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3505 case PF_INET:
3506 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3507 if (ret || !addrp)
3508 break;
3509 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3510 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3511 break;
3512
3513 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3514 case PF_INET6:
3515 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3516 if (ret || !addrp)
3517 break;
3518 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3519 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3520 break;
3521 #endif /* IPV6 */
3522 default:
3523 break;
3524 }
3525
3526 if (unlikely(ret))
3527 printk(KERN_WARNING
3528 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3529 " unable to parse packet\n");
3530
3531 return ret;
3532 }
3533
3534 /**
3535 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3536 * @skb: the packet
3537 * @family: protocol family
3538 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3539 *
3540 * Description:
3541 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3542 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3543 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3544 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3545 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3546 * peer labels.
3547 *
3548 */
3549 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3550 {
3551 int err;
3552 u32 xfrm_sid;
3553 u32 nlbl_sid;
3554 u32 nlbl_type;
3555
3556 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3557 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3558
3559 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3560 if (unlikely(err)) {
3561 printk(KERN_WARNING
3562 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3563 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3564 return -EACCES;
3565 }
3566
3567 return 0;
3568 }
3569
3570 /* socket security operations */
3571 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3572 u32 perms)
3573 {
3574 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3575 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3576 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3577 int err = 0;
3578
3579 tsec = task->security;
3580 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3581
3582 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3583 goto out;
3584
3585 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3586 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3587 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3588
3589 out:
3590 return err;
3591 }
3592
3593 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3594 int protocol, int kern)
3595 {
3596 int err = 0;
3597 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3598 u32 newsid;
3599
3600 if (kern)
3601 goto out;
3602
3603 tsec = current->security;
3604 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3605 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3606 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3607 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3608
3609 out:
3610 return err;
3611 }
3612
3613 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3614 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3615 {
3616 int err = 0;
3617 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3618 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3619 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3620 u32 newsid;
3621
3622 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3623
3624 tsec = current->security;
3625 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3626 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3627 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3628 isec->initialized = 1;
3629
3630 if (sock->sk) {
3631 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3632 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3633 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3634 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3635 }
3636
3637 return err;
3638 }
3639
3640 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3641 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3642 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3643
3644 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3645 {
3646 u16 family;
3647 int err;
3648
3649 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3650 if (err)
3651 goto out;
3652
3653 /*
3654 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3655 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3656 * check the first address now.
3657 */
3658 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3659 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3660 char *addrp;
3661 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3662 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3663 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3664 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3665 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3666 unsigned short snum;
3667 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3668 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3669
3670 tsec = current->security;
3671 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3672
3673 if (family == PF_INET) {
3674 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3675 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3676 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3677 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3678 } else {
3679 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3680 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3681 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3682 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3683 }
3684
3685 if (snum) {
3686 int low, high;
3687
3688 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3689
3690 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3691 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3692 snum, &sid);
3693 if (err)
3694 goto out;
3695 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3696 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3697 ad.u.net.family = family;
3698 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3699 isec->sclass,
3700 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3701 if (err)
3702 goto out;
3703 }
3704 }
3705
3706 switch (isec->sclass) {
3707 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3708 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3709 break;
3710
3711 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3712 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3713 break;
3714
3715 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3716 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3717 break;
3718
3719 default:
3720 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3721 break;
3722 }
3723
3724 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3725 if (err)
3726 goto out;
3727
3728 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3729 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3730 ad.u.net.family = family;
3731
3732 if (family == PF_INET)
3733 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3734 else
3735 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3736
3737 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3738 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3739 if (err)
3740 goto out;
3741 }
3742 out:
3743 return err;
3744 }
3745
3746 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3747 {
3748 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3749 int err;
3750
3751 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3752 if (err)
3753 return err;
3754
3755 /*
3756 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3757 */
3758 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3759 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3760 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3761 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3762 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3763 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3764 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3765 unsigned short snum;
3766 u32 sid, perm;
3767
3768 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3769 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3770 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3771 return -EINVAL;
3772 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3773 } else {
3774 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3775 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3776 return -EINVAL;
3777 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3778 }
3779
3780 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3781 if (err)
3782 goto out;
3783
3784 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3785 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3786
3787 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3788 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3789 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3790 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3791 if (err)
3792 goto out;
3793 }
3794
3795 out:
3796 return err;
3797 }
3798
3799 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3800 {
3801 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3802 }
3803
3804 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3805 {
3806 int err;
3807 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3808 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3809
3810 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3811 if (err)
3812 return err;
3813
3814 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3815
3816 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3817 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3818 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3819 newisec->initialized = 1;
3820
3821 return 0;
3822 }
3823
3824 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3825 int size)
3826 {
3827 int rc;
3828
3829 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3830 if (rc)
3831 return rc;
3832
3833 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3834 }
3835
3836 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3837 int size, int flags)
3838 {
3839 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3840 }
3841
3842 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3843 {
3844 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3845 }
3846
3847 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3848 {
3849 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3850 }
3851
3852 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3853 {
3854 int err;
3855
3856 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3857 if (err)
3858 return err;
3859
3860 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3861 }
3862
3863 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3864 int optname)
3865 {
3866 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3867 }
3868
3869 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3870 {
3871 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3872 }
3873
3874 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3875 struct socket *other,
3876 struct sock *newsk)
3877 {
3878 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3879 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3880 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3881 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3882 int err;
3883
3884 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3885 if (err)
3886 return err;
3887
3888 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3889 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3890
3891 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3892 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3893
3894 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3895 isec->sclass,
3896 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3897 if (err)
3898 return err;
3899
3900 /* connecting socket */
3901 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3902 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3903
3904 /* server child socket */
3905 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3906 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3907 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3908
3909 return err;
3910 }
3911
3912 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3913 struct socket *other)
3914 {
3915 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3916 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3917 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3918 int err;
3919
3920 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3921 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3922
3923 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3924 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3925
3926 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3927 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3928 if (err)
3929 return err;
3930
3931 return 0;
3932 }
3933
3934 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3935 u32 peer_sid,
3936 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3937 {
3938 int err;
3939 u32 if_sid;
3940 u32 node_sid;
3941
3942 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3943 if (err)
3944 return err;
3945 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3946 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3947 if (err)
3948 return err;
3949
3950 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3951 if (err)
3952 return err;
3953 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3954 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3955 }
3956
3957 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
3958 struct sk_buff *skb,
3959 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3960 u16 family,
3961 char *addrp)
3962 {
3963 int err;
3964 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3965 u16 sk_class;
3966 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
3967 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
3968
3969 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
3970 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
3971
3972 switch (sk_class) {
3973 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3974 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3975 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3976 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3977 break;
3978 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3979 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3980 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3981 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3982 break;
3983 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3984 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3985 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3986 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3987 break;
3988 default:
3989 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3990 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3991 recv_perm = 0;
3992 break;
3993 }
3994
3995 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
3996 if (err)
3997 return err;
3998 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3999 if (err)
4000 return err;
4001
4002 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4003 if (err)
4004 return err;
4005 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4006 if (err)
4007 return err;
4008
4009 if (!recv_perm)
4010 return 0;
4011 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4012 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4013 if (unlikely(err)) {
4014 printk(KERN_WARNING
4015 "SELinux: failure in"
4016 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4017 " network port label not found\n");
4018 return err;
4019 }
4020 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4021 }
4022
4023 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4024 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4025 u16 family, char *addrp)
4026 {
4027 int err;
4028 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4029 u32 peer_sid;
4030 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4031
4032 if (selinux_compat_net)
4033 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4034 family, addrp);
4035 else
4036 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4037 PACKET__RECV, ad);
4038 if (err)
4039 return err;
4040
4041 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4042 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4043 if (err)
4044 return err;
4045 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4046 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4047 } else {
4048 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4049 if (err)
4050 return err;
4051 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4052 }
4053
4054 return err;
4055 }
4056
4057 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4058 {
4059 int err;
4060 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4061 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4062 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4063 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4064 char *addrp;
4065
4066 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4067 return 0;
4068
4069 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4070 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4071 family = PF_INET;
4072
4073 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4074 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4075 ad.u.net.family = family;
4076 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4077 if (err)
4078 return err;
4079
4080 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4081 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4082 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4083 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4084 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4085 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4086 family, addrp);
4087
4088 if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4089 u32 peer_sid;
4090
4091 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4092 if (err)
4093 return err;
4094 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4095 peer_sid, &ad);
4096 if (err)
4097 return err;
4098 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4099 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4100 }
4101
4102 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4103 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4104 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4105 if (err)
4106 return err;
4107 }
4108
4109 return err;
4110 }
4111
4112 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4113 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4114 {
4115 int err = 0;
4116 char *scontext;
4117 u32 scontext_len;
4118 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4119 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4120 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4121
4122 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4123
4124 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4125 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4126 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4127 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4128 }
4129 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4130 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
4131 goto out;
4132 }
4133
4134 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4135
4136 if (err)
4137 goto out;
4138
4139 if (scontext_len > len) {
4140 err = -ERANGE;
4141 goto out_len;
4142 }
4143
4144 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4145 err = -EFAULT;
4146
4147 out_len:
4148 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4149 err = -EFAULT;
4150
4151 kfree(scontext);
4152 out:
4153 return err;
4154 }
4155
4156 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4157 {
4158 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4159 u16 family;
4160
4161 if (sock)
4162 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4163 else if (skb && skb->sk)
4164 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4165 else
4166 goto out;
4167
4168 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4169 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4170 else if (skb)
4171 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4172
4173 out:
4174 *secid = peer_secid;
4175 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4176 return -EINVAL;
4177 return 0;
4178 }
4179
4180 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4181 {
4182 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4183 }
4184
4185 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4186 {
4187 sk_free_security(sk);
4188 }
4189
4190 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4191 {
4192 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4193 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4194
4195 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4196 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4197 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4198
4199 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4200 }
4201
4202 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4203 {
4204 if (!sk)
4205 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4206 else {
4207 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4208
4209 *secid = sksec->sid;
4210 }
4211 }
4212
4213 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4214 {
4215 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4216 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4217
4218 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4219 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4220 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4221 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4222
4223 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4224 }
4225
4226 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4227 struct request_sock *req)
4228 {
4229 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4230 int err;
4231 u32 newsid;
4232 u32 peersid;
4233
4234 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4235 if (err)
4236 return err;
4237 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4238 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4239 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4240 return 0;
4241 }
4242
4243 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4244 if (err)
4245 return err;
4246
4247 req->secid = newsid;
4248 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4249 return 0;
4250 }
4251
4252 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4253 const struct request_sock *req)
4254 {
4255 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4256
4257 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4258 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4259 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4260 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4261 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4262 time it will have been created and available. */
4263
4264 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4265 * thread with access to newsksec */
4266 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4267 }
4268
4269 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4270 struct sk_buff *skb)
4271 {
4272 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4273
4274 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4275 }
4276
4277 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4278 struct flowi *fl)
4279 {
4280 fl->secid = req->secid;
4281 }
4282
4283 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4284 {
4285 int err = 0;
4286 u32 perm;
4287 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4288 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4289 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4290
4291 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4292 err = -EINVAL;
4293 goto out;
4294 }
4295 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4296
4297 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4298 if (err) {
4299 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4300 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4301 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4302 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4303 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4304 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4305 err = 0;
4306 }
4307
4308 /* Ignore */
4309 if (err == -ENOENT)
4310 err = 0;
4311 goto out;
4312 }
4313
4314 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4315 out:
4316 return err;
4317 }
4318
4319 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4320
4321 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4322 u16 family)
4323 {
4324 char *addrp;
4325 u32 peer_sid;
4326 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4327 u8 secmark_active;
4328 u8 peerlbl_active;
4329
4330 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4331 return NF_ACCEPT;
4332
4333 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4334 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4335 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4336 return NF_ACCEPT;
4337
4338 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4339 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4340 ad.u.net.family = family;
4341 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4342 return NF_DROP;
4343
4344 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4345 return NF_DROP;
4346
4347 if (peerlbl_active)
4348 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4349 peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4350 return NF_DROP;
4351
4352 if (secmark_active)
4353 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4354 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4355 return NF_DROP;
4356
4357 return NF_ACCEPT;
4358 }
4359
4360 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4361 struct sk_buff *skb,
4362 const struct net_device *in,
4363 const struct net_device *out,
4364 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4365 {
4366 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4367 }
4368
4369 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4370 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4371 struct sk_buff *skb,
4372 const struct net_device *in,
4373 const struct net_device *out,
4374 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4375 {
4376 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4377 }
4378 #endif /* IPV6 */
4379
4380 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4381 int ifindex,
4382 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4383 u16 family, char *addrp)
4384 {
4385 int err;
4386 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4387 u16 sk_class;
4388 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4389 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4390
4391 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4392 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4393
4394 switch (sk_class) {
4395 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4396 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4397 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4398 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4399 break;
4400 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4401 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4402 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4403 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4404 break;
4405 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4406 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4407 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4408 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4409 break;
4410 default:
4411 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4412 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4413 send_perm = 0;
4414 break;
4415 }
4416
4417 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4418 if (err)
4419 return err;
4420 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4421 return err;
4422
4423 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4424 if (err)
4425 return err;
4426 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4427 if (err)
4428 return err;
4429
4430 if (send_perm != 0)
4431 return 0;
4432
4433 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4434 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4435 if (unlikely(err)) {
4436 printk(KERN_WARNING
4437 "SELinux: failure in"
4438 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4439 " network port label not found\n");
4440 return err;
4441 }
4442 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4443 }
4444
4445 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4446 int ifindex,
4447 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4448 u16 family,
4449 char *addrp,
4450 u8 proto)
4451 {
4452 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4453 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4454
4455 if (sk == NULL)
4456 return NF_ACCEPT;
4457 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4458
4459 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4460 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4461 ad, family, addrp))
4462 return NF_DROP;
4463 } else {
4464 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4465 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4466 return NF_DROP;
4467 }
4468
4469 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4470 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4471 return NF_DROP;
4472
4473 return NF_ACCEPT;
4474 }
4475
4476 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4477 u16 family)
4478 {
4479 u32 secmark_perm;
4480 u32 peer_sid;
4481 struct sock *sk;
4482 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4483 char *addrp;
4484 u8 proto;
4485 u8 secmark_active;
4486 u8 peerlbl_active;
4487
4488 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4489 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4490 ad.u.net.family = family;
4491 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4492 return NF_DROP;
4493
4494 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4495 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4496 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4497 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4498 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4499 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4500 family, addrp, proto);
4501
4502 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4503 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4504 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4505 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4506 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4507 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4508 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4509 return NF_ACCEPT;
4510
4511 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4512 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4513 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4514 return NF_ACCEPT;
4515
4516 /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4517 * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4518 * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4519 * directly from the packet */
4520 sk = skb->sk;
4521 if (sk) {
4522 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4523 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4524 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4525 } else {
4526 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4527 return NF_DROP;
4528 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4529 }
4530
4531 if (secmark_active)
4532 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4533 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4534 return NF_DROP;
4535
4536 if (peerlbl_active) {
4537 u32 if_sid;
4538 u32 node_sid;
4539
4540 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4541 return NF_DROP;
4542 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4543 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4544 return NF_DROP;
4545
4546 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4547 return NF_DROP;
4548 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4549 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4550 return NF_DROP;
4551 }
4552
4553 return NF_ACCEPT;
4554 }
4555
4556 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4557 struct sk_buff *skb,
4558 const struct net_device *in,
4559 const struct net_device *out,
4560 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4561 {
4562 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4563 }
4564
4565 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4566 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4567 struct sk_buff *skb,
4568 const struct net_device *in,
4569 const struct net_device *out,
4570 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4571 {
4572 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4573 }
4574 #endif /* IPV6 */
4575
4576 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4577
4578 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4579 {
4580 int err;
4581
4582 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4583 if (err)
4584 return err;
4585
4586 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4587 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4588
4589 return err;
4590 }
4591
4592 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4593 {
4594 int err;
4595 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4596
4597 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4598 if (err)
4599 return err;
4600
4601 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4602 ad.u.cap = capability;
4603
4604 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4605 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4606 }
4607
4608 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4609 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4610 u16 sclass)
4611 {
4612 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4613 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4614
4615 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4616 if (!isec)
4617 return -ENOMEM;
4618
4619 isec->sclass = sclass;
4620 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4621 perm->security = isec;
4622
4623 return 0;
4624 }
4625
4626 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4627 {
4628 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4629 perm->security = NULL;
4630 kfree(isec);
4631 }
4632
4633 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4634 {
4635 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4636
4637 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4638 if (!msec)
4639 return -ENOMEM;
4640
4641 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4642 msg->security = msec;
4643
4644 return 0;
4645 }
4646
4647 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4648 {
4649 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4650
4651 msg->security = NULL;
4652 kfree(msec);
4653 }
4654
4655 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4656 u32 perms)
4657 {
4658 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4659 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4660 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4661
4662 tsec = current->security;
4663 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4664
4665 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4666 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4667
4668 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4669 }
4670
4671 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4672 {
4673 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4674 }
4675
4676 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4677 {
4678 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4679 }
4680
4681 /* message queue security operations */
4682 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4683 {
4684 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4685 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4686 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4687 int rc;
4688
4689 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4690 if (rc)
4691 return rc;
4692
4693 tsec = current->security;
4694 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4695
4696 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4697 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4698
4699 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4700 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4701 if (rc) {
4702 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4703 return rc;
4704 }
4705 return 0;
4706 }
4707
4708 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4709 {
4710 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4711 }
4712
4713 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4714 {
4715 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4716 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4717 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4718
4719 tsec = current->security;
4720 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4721
4722 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4723 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4724
4725 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4726 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4727 }
4728
4729 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4730 {
4731 int err;
4732 int perms;
4733
4734 switch (cmd) {
4735 case IPC_INFO:
4736 case MSG_INFO:
4737 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4738 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4739 case IPC_STAT:
4740 case MSG_STAT:
4741 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4742 break;
4743 case IPC_SET:
4744 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4745 break;
4746 case IPC_RMID:
4747 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4748 break;
4749 default:
4750 return 0;
4751 }
4752
4753 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4754 return err;
4755 }
4756
4757 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4758 {
4759 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4760 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4761 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4762 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4763 int rc;
4764
4765 tsec = current->security;
4766 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4767 msec = msg->security;
4768
4769 /*
4770 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4771 */
4772 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4773 /*
4774 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4775 * message queue this message will be stored in
4776 */
4777 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4778 isec->sid,
4779 SECCLASS_MSG,
4780 &msec->sid);
4781 if (rc)
4782 return rc;
4783 }
4784
4785 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4786 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4787
4788 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4789 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4790 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4791 if (!rc)
4792 /* Can this process send the message */
4793 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4794 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4795 if (!rc)
4796 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4797 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4798 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4799
4800 return rc;
4801 }
4802
4803 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4804 struct task_struct *target,
4805 long type, int mode)
4806 {
4807 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4808 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4809 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4810 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4811 int rc;
4812
4813 tsec = target->security;
4814 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4815 msec = msg->security;
4816
4817 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4818 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4819
4820 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4821 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4822 if (!rc)
4823 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4824 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4825 return rc;
4826 }
4827
4828 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4829 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4830 {
4831 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4832 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4833 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4834 int rc;
4835
4836 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4837 if (rc)
4838 return rc;
4839
4840 tsec = current->security;
4841 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4842
4843 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4844 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4845
4846 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4847 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4848 if (rc) {
4849 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4850 return rc;
4851 }
4852 return 0;
4853 }
4854
4855 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4856 {
4857 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4858 }
4859
4860 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4861 {
4862 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4863 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4864 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4865
4866 tsec = current->security;
4867 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4868
4869 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4870 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4871
4872 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4873 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4874 }
4875
4876 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4877 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4878 {
4879 int perms;
4880 int err;
4881
4882 switch (cmd) {
4883 case IPC_INFO:
4884 case SHM_INFO:
4885 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4886 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4887 case IPC_STAT:
4888 case SHM_STAT:
4889 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4890 break;
4891 case IPC_SET:
4892 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4893 break;
4894 case SHM_LOCK:
4895 case SHM_UNLOCK:
4896 perms = SHM__LOCK;
4897 break;
4898 case IPC_RMID:
4899 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4900 break;
4901 default:
4902 return 0;
4903 }
4904
4905 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4906 return err;
4907 }
4908
4909 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4910 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4911 {
4912 u32 perms;
4913 int rc;
4914
4915 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4916 if (rc)
4917 return rc;
4918
4919 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4920 perms = SHM__READ;
4921 else
4922 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4923
4924 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4925 }
4926
4927 /* Semaphore security operations */
4928 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4929 {
4930 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4931 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4932 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4933 int rc;
4934
4935 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4936 if (rc)
4937 return rc;
4938
4939 tsec = current->security;
4940 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4941
4942 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4943 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4944
4945 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4946 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
4947 if (rc) {
4948 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4949 return rc;
4950 }
4951 return 0;
4952 }
4953
4954 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4955 {
4956 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4957 }
4958
4959 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4960 {
4961 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4962 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4963 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4964
4965 tsec = current->security;
4966 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4967
4968 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4969 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4970
4971 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4972 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4973 }
4974
4975 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4976 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4977 {
4978 int err;
4979 u32 perms;
4980
4981 switch (cmd) {
4982 case IPC_INFO:
4983 case SEM_INFO:
4984 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4985 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4986 case GETPID:
4987 case GETNCNT:
4988 case GETZCNT:
4989 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4990 break;
4991 case GETVAL:
4992 case GETALL:
4993 perms = SEM__READ;
4994 break;
4995 case SETVAL:
4996 case SETALL:
4997 perms = SEM__WRITE;
4998 break;
4999 case IPC_RMID:
5000 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5001 break;
5002 case IPC_SET:
5003 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5004 break;
5005 case IPC_STAT:
5006 case SEM_STAT:
5007 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5008 break;
5009 default:
5010 return 0;
5011 }
5012
5013 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5014 return err;
5015 }
5016
5017 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5018 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5019 {
5020 u32 perms;
5021
5022 if (alter)
5023 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5024 else
5025 perms = SEM__READ;
5026
5027 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5028 }
5029
5030 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5031 {
5032 u32 av = 0;
5033
5034 av = 0;
5035 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5036 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5037 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5038 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5039
5040 if (av == 0)
5041 return 0;
5042
5043 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5044 }
5045
5046 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5047 {
5048 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5049 *secid = isec->sid;
5050 }
5051
5052 /* module stacking operations */
5053 static int selinux_register_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
5054 {
5055 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
5056 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security "
5057 "module registered.\n", __func__);
5058 return -EINVAL;
5059 }
5060
5061 secondary_ops = ops;
5062
5063 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
5064 __func__,
5065 name);
5066
5067 return 0;
5068 }
5069
5070 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5071 {
5072 if (inode)
5073 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5074 }
5075
5076 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5077 char *name, char **value)
5078 {
5079 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5080 u32 sid;
5081 int error;
5082 unsigned len;
5083
5084 if (current != p) {
5085 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5086 if (error)
5087 return error;
5088 }
5089
5090 tsec = p->security;
5091
5092 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5093 sid = tsec->sid;
5094 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5095 sid = tsec->osid;
5096 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5097 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5098 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5099 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5100 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5101 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5102 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5103 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5104 else
5105 return -EINVAL;
5106
5107 if (!sid)
5108 return 0;
5109
5110 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5111 if (error)
5112 return error;
5113 return len;
5114 }
5115
5116 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5117 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5118 {
5119 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5120 struct task_struct *tracer;
5121 u32 sid = 0;
5122 int error;
5123 char *str = value;
5124
5125 if (current != p) {
5126 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5127 security attributes. */
5128 return -EACCES;
5129 }
5130
5131 /*
5132 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5133 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5134 * above restriction is ever removed.
5135 */
5136 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5137 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5138 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5139 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5140 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5141 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5142 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5143 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5144 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5145 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5146 else
5147 error = -EINVAL;
5148 if (error)
5149 return error;
5150
5151 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5152 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5153 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5154 str[size-1] = 0;
5155 size--;
5156 }
5157 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5158 if (error)
5159 return error;
5160 }
5161
5162 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5163 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5164 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5165 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5166 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5167 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5168 tsec = p->security;
5169 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5170 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5171 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5172 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5173 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5174 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5175 if (error)
5176 return error;
5177 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5178 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5179 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5180 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5181 struct av_decision avd;
5182
5183 if (sid == 0)
5184 return -EINVAL;
5185
5186 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5187 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5188 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5189 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5190 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5191 do_each_thread(g, t)
5192 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5193 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5194 return -EPERM;
5195 }
5196 while_each_thread(g, t);
5197 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5198 }
5199
5200 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5201 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5202 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5203 if (error)
5204 return error;
5205
5206 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5207 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5208 task_lock(p);
5209 rcu_read_lock();
5210 tracer = task_tracer_task(p);
5211 if (tracer != NULL) {
5212 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5213 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5214 rcu_read_unlock();
5215 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5216 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5217 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5218 if (!error)
5219 tsec->sid = sid;
5220 task_unlock(p);
5221 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5222 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5223 if (error)
5224 return error;
5225 } else {
5226 rcu_read_unlock();
5227 tsec->sid = sid;
5228 task_unlock(p);
5229 }
5230 } else
5231 return -EINVAL;
5232
5233 return size;
5234 }
5235
5236 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5237 {
5238 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5239 }
5240
5241 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5242 {
5243 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5244 }
5245
5246 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5247 {
5248 kfree(secdata);
5249 }
5250
5251 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5252
5253 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5254 unsigned long flags)
5255 {
5256 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5257 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5258
5259 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5260 if (!ksec)
5261 return -ENOMEM;
5262
5263 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5264 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5265 else
5266 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5267 k->security = ksec;
5268
5269 return 0;
5270 }
5271
5272 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5273 {
5274 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5275
5276 k->security = NULL;
5277 kfree(ksec);
5278 }
5279
5280 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5281 struct task_struct *ctx,
5282 key_perm_t perm)
5283 {
5284 struct key *key;
5285 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5286 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5287
5288 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5289
5290 tsec = ctx->security;
5291 ksec = key->security;
5292
5293 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5294 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5295 appear to be created. */
5296 if (perm == 0)
5297 return 0;
5298
5299 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5300 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5301 }
5302
5303 #endif
5304
5305 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5306 .name = "selinux",
5307
5308 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
5309 .capget = selinux_capget,
5310 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5311 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5312 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5313 .capable = selinux_capable,
5314 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5315 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5316 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5317 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5318
5319 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5320 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5321
5322 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5323 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5324 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5325 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5326 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5327 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5328 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5329
5330 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5331 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5332 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5333 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5334 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5335 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5336 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5337 .sb_get_mnt_opts = selinux_get_mnt_opts,
5338 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5339 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5340 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5341
5342
5343 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5344 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5345 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5346 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5347 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5348 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5349 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5350 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5351 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5352 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5353 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5354 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5355 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5356 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5357 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5358 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5359 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5360 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5361 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5362 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5363 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5364 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5365 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5366 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5367 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5368 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5369 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5370
5371 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5372 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5373 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5374 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5375 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5376 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5377 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5378 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5379 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5380 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5381 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5382
5383 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5384
5385 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5386 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5387 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5388 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5389 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5390 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5391 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5392 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5393 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5394 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5395 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5396 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5397 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5398 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5399 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5400 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5401 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5402 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5403 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5404 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5405 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5406 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5407 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5408
5409 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5410 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5411
5412 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5413 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5414
5415 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5416 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5417 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5418 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5419 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5420 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5421
5422 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5423 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5424 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5425 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5426 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5427
5428 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5429 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5430 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5431 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5432 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5433
5434 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
5435
5436 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5437
5438 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5439 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5440
5441 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5442 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5443 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5444
5445 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5446 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5447
5448 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5449 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5450 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5451 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5452 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5453 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5454 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5455 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5456 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5457 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5458 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5459 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5460 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5461 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5462 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5463 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5464 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5465 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5466 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5467 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5468 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5469 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5470 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5471 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5472 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5473
5474 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5475 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5476 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5477 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5478 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5479 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5480 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5481 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5482 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5483 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5484 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5485 #endif
5486
5487 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5488 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5489 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5490 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5491 #endif
5492
5493 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5494 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5495 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5496 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5497 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5498 #endif
5499 };
5500
5501 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5502 {
5503 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5504
5505 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5506 selinux_enabled = 0;
5507 return 0;
5508 }
5509
5510 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5511 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5512 return 0;
5513 }
5514
5515 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5516
5517 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5518 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5519 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5520 tsec = current->security;
5521 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5522
5523 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5524 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5525 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5526 avc_init();
5527
5528 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
5529 if (!secondary_ops)
5530 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5531 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5532 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5533
5534 if (selinux_enforcing)
5535 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5536 else
5537 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5538
5539 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5540 /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
5541 selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
5542 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
5543 selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
5544 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
5545 #endif
5546
5547 return 0;
5548 }
5549
5550 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5551 {
5552 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5553
5554 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5555 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5556 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5557 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5558 next_sb:
5559 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5560 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5561 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5562 struct superblock_security_struct,
5563 list);
5564 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5565 sb->s_count++;
5566 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5567 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5568 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5569 if (sb->s_root)
5570 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5571 drop_super(sb);
5572 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5573 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5574 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5575 goto next_sb;
5576 }
5577 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5578 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5579 }
5580
5581 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5582 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5583 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5584
5585 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5586
5587 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5588 {
5589 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5590 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5591 .pf = PF_INET,
5592 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5593 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5594 },
5595 {
5596 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5597 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5598 .pf = PF_INET,
5599 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5600 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5601 }
5602 };
5603
5604 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5605
5606 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5607 {
5608 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5609 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5610 .pf = PF_INET6,
5611 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5612 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5613 },
5614 {
5615 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5616 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5617 .pf = PF_INET6,
5618 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5619 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5620 }
5621 };
5622
5623 #endif /* IPV6 */
5624
5625 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5626 {
5627 int err = 0;
5628 u32 iter;
5629
5630 if (!selinux_enabled)
5631 goto out;
5632
5633 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5634
5635 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++) {
5636 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5637 if (err)
5638 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n",
5639 err);
5640 }
5641
5642 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5643 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++) {
5644 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5645 if (err)
5646 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n",
5647 err);
5648 }
5649 #endif /* IPV6 */
5650
5651 out:
5652 return err;
5653 }
5654
5655 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5656
5657 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5658 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5659 {
5660 u32 iter;
5661
5662 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5663
5664 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++)
5665 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5666 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5667 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++)
5668 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5669 #endif /* IPV6 */
5670 }
5671 #endif
5672
5673 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5674
5675 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5676 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5677 #endif
5678
5679 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5680
5681 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5682 static int selinux_disabled;
5683
5684 int selinux_disable(void)
5685 {
5686 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5687
5688 if (ss_initialized) {
5689 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5690 return -EINVAL;
5691 }
5692
5693 if (selinux_disabled) {
5694 /* Only do this once. */
5695 return -EINVAL;
5696 }
5697
5698 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5699
5700 selinux_disabled = 1;
5701 selinux_enabled = 0;
5702
5703 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5704 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5705
5706 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5707 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5708
5709 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5710 exit_sel_fs();
5711
5712 return 0;
5713 }
5714 #endif
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