[PATCH] Avoid console spam with ext3 aborted journal.
[linux-2.6/verdex.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
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1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * All Rights Reserved.
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
21 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
23 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
24 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
26 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
27 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
28 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 #include <linux/init.h>
33 #include <asm/atomic.h>
34 #include <asm/types.h>
35 #include <linux/mm.h>
36 #include <linux/module.h>
38 #include <linux/audit.h>
39 #include <linux/personality.h>
40 #include <linux/time.h>
41 #include <asm/unistd.h>
43 /* 0 = no checking
44 1 = put_count checking
45 2 = verbose put_count checking
47 #define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
49 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
50 extern int audit_enabled;
52 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
53 * for saving names from getname(). */
54 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
56 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
57 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
58 * path_lookup. */
59 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
61 /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
62 a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
63 the syscall filter. */
64 enum audit_state {
65 AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
66 * No syscall-specific audit records can
67 * be generated. */
68 AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
69 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
70 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
71 * instead). */
72 AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
73 * and always fill it in at syscall
74 * entry time. This makes a full
75 * syscall record available if some
76 * other part of the kernel decides it
77 * should be recorded. */
78 AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
79 * always fill it in at syscall entry
80 * time, and always write out the audit
81 * record at syscall exit time. */
84 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
85 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
86 * pointers at syscall exit time).
88 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
89 struct audit_names {
90 const char *name;
91 unsigned long ino;
92 dev_t dev;
93 umode_t mode;
94 uid_t uid;
95 gid_t gid;
96 dev_t rdev;
99 struct audit_aux_data {
100 struct audit_aux_data *next;
101 int type;
104 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
106 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
107 struct audit_aux_data d;
108 struct ipc_perm p;
109 unsigned long qbytes;
110 uid_t uid;
111 gid_t gid;
112 mode_t mode;
116 /* The per-task audit context. */
117 struct audit_context {
118 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
119 enum audit_state state;
120 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
121 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
122 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
123 int major; /* syscall number */
124 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
125 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
126 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
127 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
128 int name_count;
129 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
130 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
131 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
133 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
134 pid_t pid;
135 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
136 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
137 unsigned long personality;
138 int arch;
140 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
141 int put_count;
142 int ino_count;
143 #endif
146 /* Public API */
147 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
148 * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
149 * syscall exit time. */
150 static LIST_HEAD(audit_tsklist);
151 static LIST_HEAD(audit_entlist);
152 static LIST_HEAD(audit_extlist);
154 struct audit_entry {
155 struct list_head list;
156 struct rcu_head rcu;
157 struct audit_rule rule;
160 /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
161 * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
162 static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
164 int i;
166 if (a->flags != b->flags)
167 return 1;
169 if (a->action != b->action)
170 return 1;
172 if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
173 return 1;
175 for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
176 if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
177 || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
178 return 1;
181 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
182 if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
183 return 1;
185 return 0;
188 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
189 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
190 * audit_netlink_sem. */
191 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
192 struct list_head *list)
194 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_PREPEND) {
195 entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_PREPEND;
196 list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
197 } else {
198 list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
200 return 0;
203 static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
205 struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
206 kfree(e);
209 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
210 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
211 * audit_netlink_sem. */
212 static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
213 struct list_head *list)
215 struct audit_entry *e;
217 /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
218 * deletion routine. */
219 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
220 if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
221 list_del_rcu(&e->list);
222 call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
223 return 0;
226 return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */
229 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
230 /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during
231 * AUDIT_ADD. */
232 static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
234 int i;
236 if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
237 && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
238 && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
239 return -1;
240 if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
241 return -1;
243 d->flags = s->flags;
244 d->action = s->action;
245 d->field_count = s->field_count;
246 for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
247 d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
248 d->values[i] = s->values[i];
250 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
251 return 0;
254 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
255 uid_t loginuid)
257 u32 flags;
258 struct audit_entry *entry;
259 int err = 0;
261 switch (type) {
262 case AUDIT_LIST:
263 /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
264 always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
265 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_tsklist, list)
266 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
267 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
268 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_entlist, list)
269 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
270 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
271 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_extlist, list)
272 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
273 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
274 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
275 break;
276 case AUDIT_ADD:
277 if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
278 return -ENOMEM;
279 if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
280 kfree(entry);
281 return -EINVAL;
283 flags = entry->rule.flags;
284 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
285 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_tsklist);
286 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
287 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_entlist);
288 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
289 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_extlist);
290 audit_log(NULL, "auid %u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
291 break;
292 case AUDIT_DEL:
293 flags =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags;
294 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
295 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_tsklist);
296 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
297 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_entlist);
298 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
299 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_extlist);
300 audit_log(NULL, "auid %u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
301 break;
302 default:
303 return -EINVAL;
306 return err;
308 #endif
310 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
311 * otherwise. */
312 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
313 struct audit_rule *rule,
314 struct audit_context *ctx,
315 enum audit_state *state)
317 int i, j;
319 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
320 u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
321 u32 value = rule->values[i];
322 int result = 0;
324 switch (field) {
325 case AUDIT_PID:
326 result = (tsk->pid == value);
327 break;
328 case AUDIT_UID:
329 result = (tsk->uid == value);
330 break;
331 case AUDIT_EUID:
332 result = (tsk->euid == value);
333 break;
334 case AUDIT_SUID:
335 result = (tsk->suid == value);
336 break;
337 case AUDIT_FSUID:
338 result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
339 break;
340 case AUDIT_GID:
341 result = (tsk->gid == value);
342 break;
343 case AUDIT_EGID:
344 result = (tsk->egid == value);
345 break;
346 case AUDIT_SGID:
347 result = (tsk->sgid == value);
348 break;
349 case AUDIT_FSGID:
350 result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
351 break;
352 case AUDIT_PERS:
353 result = (tsk->personality == value);
354 break;
355 case AUDIT_ARCH:
356 if (ctx)
357 result = (ctx->arch == value);
358 break;
360 case AUDIT_EXIT:
361 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
362 result = (ctx->return_code == value);
363 break;
364 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
365 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
366 result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
367 break;
368 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
369 if (ctx) {
370 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
371 if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
372 ++result;
373 break;
377 break;
378 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
379 if (ctx) {
380 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
381 if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
382 ++result;
383 break;
387 break;
388 case AUDIT_INODE:
389 if (ctx) {
390 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
391 if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
392 ++result;
393 break;
397 break;
398 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
399 result = 0;
400 if (ctx)
401 result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
402 break;
403 case AUDIT_ARG0:
404 case AUDIT_ARG1:
405 case AUDIT_ARG2:
406 case AUDIT_ARG3:
407 if (ctx)
408 result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
409 break;
412 if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
413 result = !result;
414 if (!result)
415 return 0;
417 switch (rule->action) {
418 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
419 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
420 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
422 return 1;
425 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
426 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
427 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
429 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
431 struct audit_entry *e;
432 enum audit_state state;
434 rcu_read_lock();
435 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) {
436 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
437 rcu_read_unlock();
438 return state;
441 rcu_read_unlock();
442 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
445 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
446 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
447 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write and audit
448 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
450 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
451 struct audit_context *ctx,
452 struct list_head *list)
454 struct audit_entry *e;
455 enum audit_state state;
456 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
457 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
459 rcu_read_lock();
460 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
461 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
462 && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
463 rcu_read_unlock();
464 return state;
467 rcu_read_unlock();
468 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
471 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
472 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
473 int return_valid,
474 int return_code)
476 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
478 if (likely(!context))
479 return NULL;
480 context->return_valid = return_valid;
481 context->return_code = return_code;
483 if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
484 enum audit_state state;
485 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_extlist);
486 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
487 context->auditable = 1;
490 context->pid = tsk->pid;
491 context->uid = tsk->uid;
492 context->gid = tsk->gid;
493 context->euid = tsk->euid;
494 context->suid = tsk->suid;
495 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
496 context->egid = tsk->egid;
497 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
498 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
499 context->personality = tsk->personality;
500 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
501 return context;
504 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
506 int i;
508 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
509 if (context->auditable
510 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
511 printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
512 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
513 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
514 __LINE__,
515 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
516 context->name_count, context->put_count,
517 context->ino_count);
518 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
519 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
520 context->names[i].name,
521 context->names[i].name);
522 dump_stack();
523 return;
525 #endif
526 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
527 context->put_count = 0;
528 context->ino_count = 0;
529 #endif
531 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
532 if (context->names[i].name)
533 __putname(context->names[i].name);
534 context->name_count = 0;
537 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
539 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
541 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
542 context->aux = aux->next;
543 kfree(aux);
547 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
548 enum audit_state state)
550 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
552 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
553 context->state = state;
554 context->loginuid = loginuid;
557 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
559 struct audit_context *context;
561 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
562 return NULL;
563 audit_zero_context(context, state);
564 return context;
567 /* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
568 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
569 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
570 * needed. */
571 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
573 struct audit_context *context;
574 enum audit_state state;
576 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
577 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
579 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
580 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
581 return 0;
583 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
584 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
585 return -ENOMEM;
588 /* Preserve login uid */
589 context->loginuid = -1;
590 if (current->audit_context)
591 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
593 tsk->audit_context = context;
594 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
595 return 0;
598 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
600 struct audit_context *previous;
601 int count = 0;
603 do {
604 previous = context->previous;
605 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
606 ++count;
607 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
608 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
609 context->serial, context->major,
610 context->name_count, count);
612 audit_free_names(context);
613 audit_free_aux(context);
614 kfree(context);
615 context = previous;
616 } while (context);
617 if (count >= 10)
618 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
621 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
623 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
624 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
625 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
627 get_task_comm(name, current);
628 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=%s", name);
630 if (!mm)
631 return;
633 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
634 vma = mm->mmap;
635 while (vma) {
636 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
637 vma->vm_file) {
638 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
639 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
640 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
641 break;
643 vma = vma->vm_next;
645 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
648 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
650 int i;
651 struct audit_buffer *ab;
653 ab = audit_log_start(context);
654 if (!ab)
655 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
656 audit_log_format(ab, "syscall=%d", context->major);
657 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
658 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
659 audit_log_format(ab, " arch=%x", context->arch);
660 if (context->return_valid)
661 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
662 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
663 context->return_code);
664 audit_log_format(ab,
665 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
666 " pid=%d loginuid=%d uid=%d gid=%d"
667 " euid=%d suid=%d fsuid=%d"
668 " egid=%d sgid=%d fsgid=%d",
669 context->argv[0],
670 context->argv[1],
671 context->argv[2],
672 context->argv[3],
673 context->name_count,
674 context->pid,
675 context->loginuid,
676 context->uid,
677 context->gid,
678 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
679 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
680 audit_log_task_info(ab);
681 audit_log_end(ab);
682 while (context->aux) {
683 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
685 ab = audit_log_start(context);
686 if (!ab)
687 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
689 aux = context->aux;
690 context->aux = aux->next;
692 audit_log_format(ab, "auxitem=%d", aux->type);
693 switch (aux->type) {
694 case AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM: {
695 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
696 audit_log_format(ab,
697 " qbytes=%lx uid=%d gid=%d mode=%x",
698 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
701 audit_log_end(ab);
702 kfree(aux);
705 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
706 ab = audit_log_start(context);
707 if (!ab)
708 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
709 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
710 if (context->names[i].name) {
711 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
712 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
714 if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
715 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
716 " uid=%d gid=%d rdev=%02x:%02x",
717 context->names[i].ino,
718 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
719 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
720 context->names[i].mode,
721 context->names[i].uid,
722 context->names[i].gid,
723 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
724 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
725 audit_log_end(ab);
729 /* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
730 * __put_task_struct. */
731 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
733 struct audit_context *context;
735 task_lock(tsk);
736 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
737 task_unlock(tsk);
739 if (likely(!context))
740 return;
742 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
743 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */
744 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
745 audit_log_exit(context);
747 audit_free_context(context);
750 /* Compute a serial number for the audit record. Audit records are
751 * written to user-space as soon as they are generated, so a complete
752 * audit record may be written in several pieces. The timestamp of the
753 * record and this serial number are used by the user-space daemon to
754 * determine which pieces belong to the same audit record. The
755 * (timestamp,serial) tuple is unique for each syscall and is live from
756 * syscall entry to syscall exit.
758 * Atomic values are only guaranteed to be 24-bit, so we count down.
760 * NOTE: Another possibility is to store the formatted records off the
761 * audit context (for those records that have a context), and emit them
762 * all at syscall exit. However, this could delay the reporting of
763 * significant errors until syscall exit (or never, if the system
764 * halts). */
765 static inline unsigned int audit_serial(void)
767 static atomic_t serial = ATOMIC_INIT(0xffffff);
768 unsigned int a, b;
770 do {
771 a = atomic_read(&serial);
772 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&serial))
773 atomic_set(&serial, 0xffffff);
774 b = atomic_read(&serial);
775 } while (b != a - 1);
777 return 0xffffff - b;
780 /* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
781 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
782 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
783 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
784 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
785 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
786 * be written). */
787 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
788 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
789 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
791 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
792 enum audit_state state;
794 BUG_ON(!context);
796 /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
797 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
798 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
799 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
800 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
802 * i386 no
803 * x86_64 no
804 * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
806 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
807 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
809 if (context->in_syscall) {
810 struct audit_context *newctx;
812 #if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
813 /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
814 if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
815 return;
816 #endif
817 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
818 printk(KERN_ERR
819 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
820 " entering syscall=%d\n",
821 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
822 #endif
823 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
824 if (newctx) {
825 newctx->previous = context;
826 context = newctx;
827 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
828 } else {
829 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
830 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
831 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
832 * to abandon auditing. */
833 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
836 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
838 if (!audit_enabled)
839 return;
841 context->arch = arch;
842 context->major = major;
843 context->argv[0] = a1;
844 context->argv[1] = a2;
845 context->argv[2] = a3;
846 context->argv[3] = a4;
848 state = context->state;
849 if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
850 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_entlist);
851 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
852 return;
854 context->serial = audit_serial();
855 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
856 context->in_syscall = 1;
857 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
860 /* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
861 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
862 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
863 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
864 * free the names stored from getname(). */
865 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
867 struct audit_context *context;
869 get_task_struct(tsk);
870 task_lock(tsk);
871 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
872 task_unlock(tsk);
874 /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
875 * called __put_task_struct. */
876 if (likely(!context))
877 return;
879 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
880 audit_log_exit(context);
882 context->in_syscall = 0;
883 context->auditable = 0;
885 if (context->previous) {
886 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
887 context->previous = NULL;
888 audit_free_context(context);
889 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
890 } else {
891 audit_free_names(context);
892 audit_free_aux(context);
893 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
894 tsk->audit_context = context;
896 put_task_struct(tsk);
899 /* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
900 void audit_getname(const char *name)
902 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
904 if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
905 return;
907 if (!context->in_syscall) {
908 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
909 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
910 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
911 dump_stack();
912 #endif
913 return;
915 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
916 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
917 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
918 ++context->name_count;
921 /* Intercept a putname request. Called from
922 * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
923 * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
924 * exit. */
925 void audit_putname(const char *name)
927 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
929 BUG_ON(!context);
930 if (!context->in_syscall) {
931 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
932 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
933 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
934 if (context->name_count) {
935 int i;
936 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
937 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
938 context->names[i].name,
939 context->names[i].name);
941 #endif
942 __putname(name);
944 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
945 else {
946 ++context->put_count;
947 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
948 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
949 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
950 " put_count=%d\n",
951 __FILE__, __LINE__,
952 context->serial, context->major,
953 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
954 context->put_count);
955 dump_stack();
958 #endif
961 /* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
962 * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
963 void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
965 int idx;
966 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
968 if (!context->in_syscall)
969 return;
970 if (context->name_count
971 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
972 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
973 idx = context->name_count - 1;
974 else if (context->name_count > 1
975 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
976 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
977 idx = context->name_count - 2;
978 else {
979 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
980 * associated name? */
981 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
982 return;
983 idx = context->name_count++;
984 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
985 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
986 ++context->ino_count;
987 #endif
989 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
990 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
991 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
992 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
993 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
994 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
997 void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
998 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1000 if (ctx) {
1001 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1002 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1003 *serial = ctx->serial;
1004 ctx->auditable = 1;
1005 } else {
1006 *t = CURRENT_TIME;
1007 *serial = 0;
1011 extern int audit_set_type(struct audit_buffer *ab, int type);
1013 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1015 if (task->audit_context) {
1016 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1018 ab = audit_log_start(NULL);
1019 if (ab) {
1020 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1021 "old loginuid=%u new loginuid=%u",
1022 task->pid, task->uid,
1023 task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
1024 audit_set_type(ab, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1025 audit_log_end(ab);
1027 task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
1029 return 0;
1032 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1034 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1037 int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1039 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1040 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1042 if (likely(!context))
1043 return 0;
1045 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
1046 if (!ax)
1047 return -ENOMEM;
1049 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1050 ax->uid = uid;
1051 ax->gid = gid;
1052 ax->mode = mode;
1054 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM;
1055 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1056 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1057 return 0;