1 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 # Security configuration
6 menu "Security options"
8 source "security/keys/Kconfig"
10 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
11 bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
14 This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
17 If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
18 unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
20 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
23 prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override"
24 default PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
26 Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory
27 permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace
30 This allows people to limit that - either never override, or
31 require actual active ptrace attachment.
33 Defaults to the traditional behavior (for now)
35 config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
36 bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior"
38 This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
39 permissions if you have ptrace access rights.
41 config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE
42 bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override"
44 This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
45 permissions for active ptracers like gdb.
47 config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
50 Never override memory mapping permissions
55 bool "Enable different security models"
59 This allows you to choose different security modules to be
60 configured into your kernel.
62 If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
65 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
67 config HAS_SECURITY_AUDIT
73 bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
75 This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
76 various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM).
78 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
80 config SECURITY_NETWORK
81 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
84 This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
85 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
86 implement socket and networking access controls.
87 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
89 config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
90 bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
91 depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
93 This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
94 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
95 implement Infiniband access controls.
96 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
98 config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
99 bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
100 depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
102 This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
103 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
104 implement per-packet access controls based on labels
105 derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
106 designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
107 to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
109 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
112 bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
115 This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
116 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
117 implement pathname based access controls.
118 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
121 bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
122 depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
124 This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
125 Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
126 Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
127 of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
130 Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
131 initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
132 create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
133 helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
134 correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
135 of the kernel itself.
137 Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
138 confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
139 it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
140 providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
142 See <https://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
144 See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
145 See Documentation/arch/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable
146 Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
148 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
150 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
151 int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
152 depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
153 default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
156 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
157 from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
158 can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
160 For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
161 a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
162 On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
163 Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
164 this low address space will need the permission specific to the
167 config HARDENED_USERCOPY
168 bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
171 This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
172 copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
173 copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
174 are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
175 separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
176 or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes
177 of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
179 config FORTIFY_SOURCE
180 bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
181 depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
182 # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645
183 depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32
185 Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
186 where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
188 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
189 bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
191 By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
192 binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
193 interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
194 either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
195 option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
196 runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
197 To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
198 calls through a single executable that can not have its name
201 Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
202 "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
203 passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
204 and choose what real programs are called.
206 If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
207 disabled, choose this option and then set
208 STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
210 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
211 string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
212 depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
213 default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
215 The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
216 program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
217 be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
220 If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
221 specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
223 source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
224 source "security/smack/Kconfig"
225 source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
226 source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
227 source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
228 source "security/yama/Kconfig"
229 source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
230 source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
231 source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
232 source "security/ipe/Kconfig"
234 source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
237 prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized"
238 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
239 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
240 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
241 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
242 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
245 This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY
246 in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't
247 change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config,
248 for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set.
250 Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be
251 initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM.
253 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
254 bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
256 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
257 bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
259 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
260 bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
262 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
263 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
265 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
266 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
271 string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
272 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
273 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
274 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
275 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
276 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf"
278 A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
279 Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order
280 LSM_ORDER_FIRST and LSM_ORDER_LAST, which are always enabled
281 if selected in the kernel configuration, will be ignored.
282 This can be controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.
284 If unsure, leave this as the default.
286 source "security/Kconfig.hardening"