Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma

[linux/fpc-iii.git] / security / selinux / avc.c

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 * Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
 *
 * Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
 *           James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
 *
 * Update:   KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
 *      Replaced the avc_lock spinlock by RCU.
 *
 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
 */
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <linux/un.h>
#include <net/af_unix.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "avc_ss.h"
#include "classmap.h"

#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS                 512
#define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD         512
#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM               16

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field)     this_cpu_inc(avc_cache_stats.field)
#else
#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field)     do {} while (0)
#endif

struct avc_entry {
        u32                     ssid;
        u32                     tsid;
        u16                     tclass;
        struct av_decision      avd;
        struct avc_xperms_node  *xp_node;
};

struct avc_node {
        struct avc_entry        ae;
        struct hlist_node       list; /* anchored in avc_cache->slots[i] */
        struct rcu_head         rhead;
};

struct avc_xperms_decision_node {
        struct extended_perms_decision xpd;
        struct list_head xpd_list; /* list of extended_perms_decision */
};

struct avc_xperms_node {
        struct extended_perms xp;
        struct list_head xpd_head; /* list head of extended_perms_decision */
};

struct avc_cache {
        struct hlist_head       slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
        spinlock_t              slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
        atomic_t                lru_hint;       /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
        atomic_t                active_nodes;
        u32                     latest_notif;   /* latest revocation notification */
};

struct avc_callback_node {
        int (*callback) (u32 event);
        u32 events;
        struct avc_callback_node *next;
};

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
#endif

struct selinux_avc {
        unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
        struct avc_cache avc_cache;
};

static struct selinux_avc selinux_avc;

void selinux_avc_init(struct selinux_avc **avc)
{
        int i;

        selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold = AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD;
        for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
                INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[i]);
                spin_lock_init(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
        }
        atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
        atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
        *avc = &selinux_avc;
}

unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc)
{
        return avc->avc_cache_threshold;
}

void avc_set_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc,
                             unsigned int cache_threshold)
{
        avc->avc_cache_threshold = cache_threshold;
}

static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep;
static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep;
static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep;

static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
        return (ssid ^ (tsid<<2) ^ (tclass<<4)) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
}

/**
 * avc_init - Initialize the AVC.
 *
 * Initialize the access vector cache.
 */
void __init avc_init(void)
{
        avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
                                        0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
        avc_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_node",
                                        sizeof(struct avc_xperms_node),
                                        0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
        avc_xperms_decision_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
                                        "avc_xperms_decision_node",
                                        sizeof(struct avc_xperms_decision_node),
                                        0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
        avc_xperms_data_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_data",
                                        sizeof(struct extended_perms_data),
                                        0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}

int avc_get_hash_stats(struct selinux_avc *avc, char *page)
{
        int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
        struct avc_node *node;
        struct hlist_head *head;

        rcu_read_lock();

        slots_used = 0;
        max_chain_len = 0;
        for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
                head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[i];
                if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
                        slots_used++;
                        chain_len = 0;
                        hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list)
                                chain_len++;
                        if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
                                max_chain_len = chain_len;
                }
        }

        rcu_read_unlock();

        return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
                         "longest chain: %d\n",
                         atomic_read(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes),
                         slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
}

/*
 * using a linked list for extended_perms_decision lookup because the list is
 * always small. i.e. less than 5, typically 1
 */
static struct extended_perms_decision *avc_xperms_decision_lookup(u8 driver,
                                        struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
{
        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;

        list_for_each_entry(xpd_node, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
                if (xpd_node->xpd.driver == driver)
                        return &xpd_node->xpd;
        }
        return NULL;
}

static inline unsigned int
avc_xperms_has_perm(struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
                                        u8 perm, u8 which)
{
        unsigned int rc = 0;

        if ((which == XPERMS_ALLOWED) &&
                        (xpd->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED))
                rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
        else if ((which == XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) &&
                        (xpd->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
                rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->auditallow->p, perm);
        else if ((which == XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) &&
                        (xpd->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
                rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->dontaudit->p, perm);
        return rc;
}

static void avc_xperms_allow_perm(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node,
                                u8 driver, u8 perm)
{
        struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
        security_xperm_set(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver);
        xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
        if (xpd && xpd->allowed)
                security_xperm_set(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
}

static void avc_xperms_decision_free(struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node)
{
        struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;

        xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
        if (xpd->allowed)
                kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->allowed);
        if (xpd->auditallow)
                kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->auditallow);
        if (xpd->dontaudit)
                kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->dontaudit);
        kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, xpd_node);
}

static void avc_xperms_free(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
{
        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node, *tmp;

        if (!xp_node)
                return;

        list_for_each_entry_safe(xpd_node, tmp, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
                list_del(&xpd_node->xpd_list);
                avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
        }
        kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_cachep, xp_node);
}

static void avc_copy_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
                                        struct extended_perms_decision *src)
{
        dest->driver = src->driver;
        dest->used = src->used;
        if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
                memcpy(dest->allowed->p, src->allowed->p,
                                sizeof(src->allowed->p));
        if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
                memcpy(dest->auditallow->p, src->auditallow->p,
                                sizeof(src->auditallow->p));
        if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
                memcpy(dest->dontaudit->p, src->dontaudit->p,
                                sizeof(src->dontaudit->p));
}

/*
 * similar to avc_copy_xperms_decision, but only copy decision
 * information relevant to this perm
 */
static inline void avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(u8 perm,
                        struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
                        struct extended_perms_decision *src)
{
        /*
         * compute index of the u32 of the 256 bits (8 u32s) that contain this
         * command permission
         */
        u8 i = perm >> 5;

        dest->used = src->used;
        if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
                dest->allowed->p[i] = src->allowed->p[i];
        if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
                dest->auditallow->p[i] = src->auditallow->p[i];
        if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
                dest->dontaudit->p[i] = src->dontaudit->p[i];
}

static struct avc_xperms_decision_node
                *avc_xperms_decision_alloc(u8 which)
{
        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
        struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;

        xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
        if (!xpd_node)
                return NULL;

        xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
        if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
                xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
                                                GFP_NOWAIT);
                if (!xpd->allowed)
                        goto error;
        }
        if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
                xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
                                                GFP_NOWAIT);
                if (!xpd->auditallow)
                        goto error;
        }
        if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
                xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
                                                GFP_NOWAIT);
                if (!xpd->dontaudit)
                        goto error;
        }
        return xpd_node;
error:
        avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
        return NULL;
}

static int avc_add_xperms_decision(struct avc_node *node,
                        struct extended_perms_decision *src)
{
        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;

        node->ae.xp_node->xp.len++;
        dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src->used);
        if (!dest_xpd)
                return -ENOMEM;
        avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, src);
        list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &node->ae.xp_node->xpd_head);
        return 0;
}

static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void)
{
        struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;

        xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
        if (!xp_node)
                return xp_node;
        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
        return xp_node;
}

static int avc_xperms_populate(struct avc_node *node,
                                struct avc_xperms_node *src)
{
        struct avc_xperms_node *dest;
        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
        struct avc_xperms_decision_node *src_xpd;

        if (src->xp.len == 0)
                return 0;
        dest = avc_xperms_alloc();
        if (!dest)
                return -ENOMEM;

        memcpy(dest->xp.drivers.p, src->xp.drivers.p, sizeof(dest->xp.drivers.p));
        dest->xp.len = src->xp.len;

        /* for each source xpd allocate a destination xpd and copy */
        list_for_each_entry(src_xpd, &src->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
                dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src_xpd->xpd.used);
                if (!dest_xpd)
                        goto error;
                avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, &src_xpd->xpd);
                list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &dest->xpd_head);
        }
        node->ae.xp_node = dest;
        return 0;
error:
        avc_xperms_free(dest);
        return -ENOMEM;

}

static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested,
                                        struct av_decision *avd,
                                        struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
                                        u8 perm,
                                        int result,
                                        u32 *deniedp)
{
        u32 denied, audited;

        denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
        if (unlikely(denied)) {
                audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
                if (audited && xpd) {
                        if (avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
                                audited &= ~requested;
                }
        } else if (result) {
                audited = denied = requested;
        } else {
                audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
                if (audited && xpd) {
                        if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
                                audited &= ~requested;
                }
        }

        *deniedp = denied;
        return audited;
}

static inline int avc_xperms_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
                                   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
                                   u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
                                   struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
                                   u8 perm, int result,
                                   struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
        u32 audited, denied;

        audited = avc_xperms_audit_required(
                        requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
        if (likely(!audited))
                return 0;
        return slow_avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
                        audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
}

static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
{
        struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
        avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
        kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
        avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
}

static void avc_node_delete(struct selinux_avc *avc, struct avc_node *node)
{
        hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
        call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
        atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
}

static void avc_node_kill(struct selinux_avc *avc, struct avc_node *node)
{
        avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
        kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
        avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
        atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
}

static void avc_node_replace(struct selinux_avc *avc,
                             struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
{
        hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
        call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
        atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
}

static inline int avc_reclaim_node(struct selinux_avc *avc)
{
        struct avc_node *node;
        int hvalue, try, ecx;
        unsigned long flags;
        struct hlist_head *head;
        spinlock_t *lock;

        for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
                hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc->avc_cache.lru_hint) &
                        (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
                head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
                lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];

                if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags))
                        continue;

                rcu_read_lock();
                hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list) {
                        avc_node_delete(avc, node);
                        avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
                        ecx++;
                        if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
                                rcu_read_unlock();
                                spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
                                goto out;
                        }
                }
                rcu_read_unlock();
                spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
        }
out:
        return ecx;
}

static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(struct selinux_avc *avc)
{
        struct avc_node *node;

        node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
        if (!node)
                goto out;

        INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
        avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);

        if (atomic_inc_return(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes) >
            avc->avc_cache_threshold)
                avc_reclaim_node(avc);

out:
        return node;
}

static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
{
        node->ae.ssid = ssid;
        node->ae.tsid = tsid;
        node->ae.tclass = tclass;
        memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
}

static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
                                               u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
        struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
        int hvalue;
        struct hlist_head *head;

        hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
        head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
        hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) {
                if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
                    tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
                    tsid == node->ae.tsid) {
                        ret = node;
                        break;
                }
        }

        return ret;
}

/**
 * avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry.
 * @ssid: source security identifier
 * @tsid: target security identifier
 * @tclass: target security class
 *
 * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the
 * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
 * based on @tclass.  If a valid AVC entry exists,
 * then this function returns the avc_node.
 * Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
 */
static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(struct selinux_avc *avc,
                                   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
        struct avc_node *node;

        avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
        node = avc_search_node(avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);

        if (node)
                return node;

        avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
        return NULL;
}

static int avc_latest_notif_update(struct selinux_avc *avc,
                                   int seqno, int is_insert)
{
        int ret = 0;
        static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(notif_lock);
        unsigned long flag;

        spin_lock_irqsave(&notif_lock, flag);
        if (is_insert) {
                if (seqno < avc->avc_cache.latest_notif) {
                        pr_warn("SELinux: avc:  seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
                               seqno, avc->avc_cache.latest_notif);
                        ret = -EAGAIN;
                }
        } else {
                if (seqno > avc->avc_cache.latest_notif)
                        avc->avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
        }
        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&notif_lock, flag);

        return ret;
}

/**
 * avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry.
 * @ssid: source security identifier
 * @tsid: target security identifier
 * @tclass: target security class
 * @avd: resulting av decision
 * @xp_node: resulting extended permissions
 *
 * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
 * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
 * The access vectors and the sequence number are
 * normally provided by the security server in
 * response to a security_compute_av() call.  If the
 * sequence number @avd->seqno is not less than the latest
 * revocation notification, then the function copies
 * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
 * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
 */
static struct avc_node *avc_insert(struct selinux_avc *avc,
                                   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
                                   struct av_decision *avd,
                                   struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
{
        struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
        int hvalue;
        unsigned long flag;

        if (avc_latest_notif_update(avc, avd->seqno, 1))
                goto out;

        node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
        if (node) {
                struct hlist_head *head;
                spinlock_t *lock;
                int rc = 0;

                hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
                avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
                rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node);
                if (rc) {
                        kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
                        return NULL;
                }
                head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
                lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];

                spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
                hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
                        if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
                            pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
                            pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
                                avc_node_replace(avc, node, pos);
                                goto found;
                        }
                }
                hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
found:
                spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
        }
out:
        return node;
}

/**
 * avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information
 * will be called by generic audit code
 * @ab: the audit buffer
 * @a: audit_data
 */
static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
        struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
        struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data;
        u32 av = sad->audited;
        const char **perms;
        int i, perm;

        audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ", sad->denied ? "denied" : "granted");

        if (av == 0) {
                audit_log_format(ab, " null");
                return;
        }

        perms = secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].perms;

        audit_log_format(ab, " {");
        i = 0;
        perm = 1;
        while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
                if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) {
                        audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]);
                        av &= ~perm;
                }
                i++;
                perm <<= 1;
        }

        if (av)
                audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);

        audit_log_format(ab, " } for ");
}

/**
 * avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information
 * will be called by generic audit code
 * @ab: the audit buffer
 * @a: audit_data
 */
static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
        struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
        struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data;
        char *scontext;
        u32 scontext_len;
        int rc;

        rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->ssid, &scontext,
                                     &scontext_len);
        if (rc)
                audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%d", sad->ssid);
        else {
                audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s", scontext);
                kfree(scontext);
        }

        rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->tsid, &scontext,
                                     &scontext_len);
        if (rc)
                audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", sad->tsid);
        else {
                audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
                kfree(scontext);
        }

        audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].name);

        if (sad->denied)
                audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u", sad->result ? 0 : 1);

        /* in case of invalid context report also the actual context string */
        rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->state, sad->ssid, &scontext,
                                           &scontext_len);
        if (!rc && scontext) {
                if (scontext_len && scontext[scontext_len - 1] == '\0')
                        scontext_len--;
                audit_log_format(ab, " srawcon=");
                audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, scontext, scontext_len);
                kfree(scontext);
        }

        rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->state, sad->tsid, &scontext,
                                           &scontext_len);
        if (!rc && scontext) {
                if (scontext_len && scontext[scontext_len - 1] == '\0')
                        scontext_len--;
                audit_log_format(ab, " trawcon=");
                audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, scontext, scontext_len);
                kfree(scontext);
        }
}

/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
noinline int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
                            u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
                            u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
                            struct common_audit_data *a,
                            unsigned int flags)
{
        struct common_audit_data stack_data;
        struct selinux_audit_data sad;

        if (WARN_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map)))
                return -EINVAL;

        if (!a) {
                a = &stack_data;
                a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
        }

        /*
         * When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry.  This is because
         * the collection of the dname in an inode audit message is not RCU
         * safe.  Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes
         * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation
         * happened a little later.
         */
        if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE) &&
            (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK))
                return -ECHILD;

        sad.tclass = tclass;
        sad.requested = requested;
        sad.ssid = ssid;
        sad.tsid = tsid;
        sad.audited = audited;
        sad.denied = denied;
        sad.result = result;
        sad.state = state;

        a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;

        common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback);
        return 0;
}

/**
 * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events.
 * @callback: callback function
 * @events: security events
 *
 * Register a callback function for events in the set @events.
 * Returns %0 on success or -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory
 * exists to add the callback.
 */
int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events)
{
        struct avc_callback_node *c;
        int rc = 0;

        c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!c) {
                rc = -ENOMEM;
                goto out;
        }

        c->callback = callback;
        c->events = events;
        c->next = avc_callbacks;
        avc_callbacks = c;
out:
        return rc;
}

/**
 * avc_update_node Update an AVC entry
 * @event : Updating event
 * @perms : Permission mask bits
 * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
 * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
 * @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
 * @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_NONBLOCKING, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0.
 *
 * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
 * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
 * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
 * will release later by RCU.
 */
static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
                           u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
                           u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
                           struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
                           u32 flags)
{
        int hvalue, rc = 0;
        unsigned long flag;
        struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
        struct hlist_head *head;
        spinlock_t *lock;

        /*
         * If we are in a non-blocking code path, e.g. VFS RCU walk,
         * then we must not add permissions to a cache entry
         * because we cannot safely audit the denial.  Otherwise,
         * during the subsequent blocking retry (e.g. VFS ref walk), we
         * will find the permissions already granted in the cache entry
         * and won't audit anything at all, leading to silent denials in
         * permissive mode that only appear when in enforcing mode.
         *
         * See the corresponding handling in slow_avc_audit(), and the
         * logic in selinux_inode_permission for the MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag,
         * which is transliterated into AVC_NONBLOCKING.
         */
        if (flags & AVC_NONBLOCKING)
                return 0;

        node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
        if (!node) {
                rc = -ENOMEM;
                goto out;
        }

        /* Lock the target slot */
        hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);

        head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
        lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];

        spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);

        hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
                if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
                    tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
                    tclass == pos->ae.tclass &&
                    seqno == pos->ae.avd.seqno){
                        orig = pos;
                        break;
                }
        }

        if (!orig) {
                rc = -ENOENT;
                avc_node_kill(avc, node);
                goto out_unlock;
        }

        /*
         * Copy and replace original node.
         */

        avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);

        if (orig->ae.xp_node) {
                rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, orig->ae.xp_node);
                if (rc) {
                        kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
                        goto out_unlock;
                }
        }

        switch (event) {
        case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
                node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
                if (node->ae.xp_node && (flags & AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS))
                        avc_xperms_allow_perm(node->ae.xp_node, driver, xperm);
                break;
        case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
        case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
                node->ae.avd.allowed &= ~perms;
                break;
        case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE:
                node->ae.avd.auditallow |= perms;
                break;
        case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE:
                node->ae.avd.auditallow &= ~perms;
                break;
        case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE:
                node->ae.avd.auditdeny |= perms;
                break;
        case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
                node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
                break;
        case AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS:
                avc_add_xperms_decision(node, xpd);
                break;
        }
        avc_node_replace(avc, node, orig);
out_unlock:
        spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
out:
        return rc;
}

/**
 * avc_flush - Flush the cache
 */
static void avc_flush(struct selinux_avc *avc)
{
        struct hlist_head *head;
        struct avc_node *node;
        spinlock_t *lock;
        unsigned long flag;
        int i;

        for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
                head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[i];
                lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[i];

                spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
                /*
                 * With preemptable RCU, the outer spinlock does not
                 * prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
                 */
                rcu_read_lock();
                hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list)
                        avc_node_delete(avc, node);
                rcu_read_unlock();
                spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
        }
}

/**
 * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
 * @seqno: policy sequence number
 */
int avc_ss_reset(struct selinux_avc *avc, u32 seqno)
{
        struct avc_callback_node *c;
        int rc = 0, tmprc;

        avc_flush(avc);

        for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
                if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
                        tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
                        /* save the first error encountered for the return
                           value and continue processing the callbacks */
                        if (!rc)
                                rc = tmprc;
                }
        }

        avc_latest_notif_update(avc, seqno, 0);
        return rc;
}

/*
 * Slow-path helper function for avc_has_perm_noaudit,
 * when the avc_node lookup fails. We get called with
 * the RCU read lock held, and need to return with it
 * still held, but drop if for the security compute.
 *
 * Don't inline this, since it's the slow-path and just
 * results in a bigger stack frame.
 */
static noinline
struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
                                u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                                u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
                                struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
{
        rcu_read_unlock();
        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
        security_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
        rcu_read_lock();
        return avc_insert(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
}

static noinline int avc_denied(struct selinux_state *state,
                               u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                               u16 tclass, u32 requested,
                               u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned int flags,
                               struct av_decision *avd)
{
        if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
                return -EACCES;

        if (enforcing_enabled(state) &&
            !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
                return -EACCES;

        avc_update_node(state->avc, AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver,
                        xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
        return 0;
}

/*
 * The avc extended permissions logic adds an additional 256 bits of
 * permissions to an avc node when extended permissions for that node are
 * specified in the avtab. If the additional 256 permissions is not adequate,
 * as-is the case with ioctls, then multiple may be chained together and the
 * driver field is used to specify which set contains the permission.
 */
int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
                           u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
                           u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
        struct avc_node *node;
        struct av_decision avd;
        u32 denied;
        struct extended_perms_decision local_xpd;
        struct extended_perms_decision *xpd = NULL;
        struct extended_perms_data allowed;
        struct extended_perms_data auditallow;
        struct extended_perms_data dontaudit;
        struct avc_xperms_node local_xp_node;
        struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
        int rc = 0, rc2;

        xp_node = &local_xp_node;
        if (WARN_ON(!requested))
                return -EACCES;

        rcu_read_lock();

        node = avc_lookup(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);
        if (unlikely(!node)) {
                node = avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
        } else {
                memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
                xp_node = node->ae.xp_node;
        }
        /* if extended permissions are not defined, only consider av_decision */
        if (!xp_node || !xp_node->xp.len)
                goto decision;

        local_xpd.allowed = &allowed;
        local_xpd.auditallow = &auditallow;
        local_xpd.dontaudit = &dontaudit;

        xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
        if (unlikely(!xpd)) {
                /*
                 * Compute the extended_perms_decision only if the driver
                 * is flagged
                 */
                if (!security_xperm_test(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver)) {
                        avd.allowed &= ~requested;
                        goto decision;
                }
                rcu_read_unlock();
                security_compute_xperms_decision(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
                                                 driver, &local_xpd);
                rcu_read_lock();
                avc_update_node(state->avc, AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested,
                                driver, xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno,
                                &local_xpd, 0);
        } else {
                avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(xperm, &local_xpd, xpd);
        }
        xpd = &local_xpd;

        if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, xperm, XPERMS_ALLOWED))
                avd.allowed &= ~requested;

decision:
        denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
        if (unlikely(denied))
                rc = avc_denied(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
                                driver, xperm, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);

        rcu_read_unlock();

        rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
                        &avd, xpd, xperm, rc, ad);
        if (rc2)
                return rc2;
        return rc;
}

/**
 * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
 * @ssid: source security identifier
 * @tsid: target security identifier
 * @tclass: target security class
 * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
 * @flags:  AVC_STRICT, AVC_NONBLOCKING, or 0
 * @avd: access vector decisions
 *
 * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
 * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
 * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
 * a new decision and add it to the cache.  Return a copy of the decisions
 * in @avd.  Return %0 if all @requested permissions are granted,
 * -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or another -errno upon
 * other errors.  This function is typically called by avc_has_perm(),
 * but may also be called directly to separate permission checking from
 * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but
 * should be released for the auditing.
 */
inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state,
                                u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                                u16 tclass, u32 requested,
                                unsigned int flags,
                                struct av_decision *avd)
{
        struct avc_node *node;
        struct avc_xperms_node xp_node;
        int rc = 0;
        u32 denied;

        if (WARN_ON(!requested))
                return -EACCES;

        rcu_read_lock();

        node = avc_lookup(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);
        if (unlikely(!node))
                node = avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
        else
                memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));

        denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
        if (unlikely(denied))
                rc = avc_denied(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0,
                                flags, avd);

        rcu_read_unlock();
        return rc;
}

/**
 * avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing.
 * @ssid: source security identifier
 * @tsid: target security identifier
 * @tclass: target security class
 * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
 * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
 *
 * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
 * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
 * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
 * a new decision and add it to the cache.  Audit the granting or denial of
 * permissions in accordance with the policy.  Return %0 if all @requested
 * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
 * another -errno upon other errors.
 */
int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
                 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
{
        struct av_decision avd;
        int rc, rc2;

        rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
                                  &avd);

        rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
                        auditdata, 0);
        if (rc2)
                return rc2;
        return rc;
}

u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state)
{
        return state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif;
}

void avc_disable(void)
{
        /*
         * If you are looking at this because you have realized that we are
         * not destroying the avc_node_cachep it might be easy to fix, but
         * I don't know the memory barrier semantics well enough to know.  It's
         * possible that some other task dereferenced security_ops when
         * it still pointed to selinux operations.  If that is the case it's
         * possible that it is about to use the avc and is about to need the
         * avc_node_cachep.  I know I could wrap the security.c security_ops call
         * in an rcu_lock, but seriously, it's not worth it.  Instead I just flush
         * the cache and get that memory back.
         */
        if (avc_node_cachep) {
                avc_flush(selinux_state.avc);
                /* kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep); */
        }
}