2 * AppArmor security module
4 * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
15 #include "include/apparmor.h"
16 #include "include/audit.h"
17 #include "include/file.h"
18 #include "include/match.h"
19 #include "include/path.h"
20 #include "include/policy.h"
22 struct file_perms nullperms
;
26 * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
27 * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
28 * @mask: permission mask to convert
30 static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, u32 mask
)
36 if (mask
& AA_EXEC_MMAP
)
38 if (mask
& (MAY_READ
| AA_MAY_META_READ
))
40 if (mask
& (MAY_WRITE
| AA_MAY_META_WRITE
| AA_MAY_CHMOD
|
43 else if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
45 if (mask
& AA_MAY_CREATE
)
47 if (mask
& AA_MAY_DELETE
)
49 if (mask
& AA_MAY_LINK
)
51 if (mask
& AA_MAY_LOCK
)
57 audit_log_string(ab
, str
);
61 * file_audit_cb - call back for file specific audit fields
62 * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
63 * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
65 static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, void *va
)
67 struct common_audit_data
*sa
= va
;
68 kuid_t fsuid
= current_fsuid();
70 if (sa
->aad
->fs
.request
& AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK
) {
71 audit_log_format(ab
, " requested_mask=");
72 audit_file_mask(ab
, sa
->aad
->fs
.request
);
74 if (sa
->aad
->fs
.denied
& AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK
) {
75 audit_log_format(ab
, " denied_mask=");
76 audit_file_mask(ab
, sa
->aad
->fs
.denied
);
78 if (sa
->aad
->fs
.request
& AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK
) {
79 audit_log_format(ab
, " fsuid=%d",
80 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, fsuid
));
81 audit_log_format(ab
, " ouid=%d",
82 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, sa
->aad
->fs
.ouid
));
85 if (sa
->aad
->fs
.target
) {
86 audit_log_format(ab
, " target=");
87 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, sa
->aad
->fs
.target
);
92 * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations
93 * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
94 * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
95 * @gfp: allocation flags
96 * @op: operation being mediated
97 * @request: permissions requested
98 * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
99 * @target: name of target (MAYBE NULL)
101 * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
102 * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
104 * Returns: %0 or error on failure
106 int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile
*profile
, struct file_perms
*perms
,
107 gfp_t gfp
, int op
, u32 request
, const char *name
,
108 const char *target
, kuid_t ouid
, const char *info
, int error
)
110 int type
= AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO
;
111 struct common_audit_data sa
;
112 struct apparmor_audit_data aad
= {0,};
113 sa
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK
;
117 aad
.fs
.request
= request
;
119 aad
.fs
.target
= target
;
124 if (likely(!sa
.aad
->error
)) {
125 u32 mask
= perms
->audit
;
127 if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile
) == AUDIT_ALL
))
130 /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
131 sa
.aad
->fs
.request
&= mask
;
133 if (likely(!sa
.aad
->fs
.request
))
135 type
= AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT
;
137 /* only report permissions that were denied */
138 sa
.aad
->fs
.request
= sa
.aad
->fs
.request
& ~perms
->allow
;
140 if (sa
.aad
->fs
.request
& perms
->kill
)
141 type
= AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL
;
143 /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
144 if ((sa
.aad
->fs
.request
& perms
->quiet
) &&
145 AUDIT_MODE(profile
) != AUDIT_NOQUIET
&&
146 AUDIT_MODE(profile
) != AUDIT_ALL
)
147 sa
.aad
->fs
.request
&= ~perms
->quiet
;
149 if (!sa
.aad
->fs
.request
)
150 return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile
) ? 0 : sa
.aad
->error
;
153 sa
.aad
->fs
.denied
= sa
.aad
->fs
.request
& ~perms
->allow
;
154 return aa_audit(type
, profile
, gfp
, &sa
, file_audit_cb
);
158 * map_old_perms - map old file perms layout to the new layout
159 * @old: permission set in old mapping
161 * Returns: new permission mapping
163 static u32
map_old_perms(u32 old
)
167 new |= AA_MAY_META_READ
;
169 new |= AA_MAY_META_WRITE
| AA_MAY_CREATE
| AA_MAY_DELETE
|
170 AA_MAY_CHMOD
| AA_MAY_CHOWN
;
173 /* the old mapping lock and link_subset flags where overlaid
174 * and use was determined by part of a pair that they were in
177 new |= AA_MAY_LOCK
| AA_LINK_SUBSET
;
178 if (old
& 0x40) /* AA_EXEC_MMAP */
185 * compute_perms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms
186 * @dfa: dfa to compute perms for (NOT NULL)
187 * @state: state in dfa
188 * @cond: conditions to consider (NOT NULL)
190 * TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry, do computation conversion
193 * Returns: computed permission set
195 static struct file_perms
compute_perms(struct aa_dfa
*dfa
, unsigned int state
,
196 struct path_cond
*cond
)
198 struct file_perms perms
;
200 /* FIXME: change over to new dfa format
201 * currently file perms are encoded in the dfa, new format
202 * splits the permissions from the dfa. This mapping can be
203 * done at profile load
207 if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond
->uid
)) {
208 perms
.allow
= map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa
, state
));
209 perms
.audit
= map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa
, state
));
210 perms
.quiet
= map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa
, state
));
211 perms
.xindex
= dfa_user_xindex(dfa
, state
);
213 perms
.allow
= map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(dfa
, state
));
214 perms
.audit
= map_old_perms(dfa_other_audit(dfa
, state
));
215 perms
.quiet
= map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa
, state
));
216 perms
.xindex
= dfa_other_xindex(dfa
, state
);
218 perms
.allow
|= AA_MAY_META_READ
;
220 /* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
221 if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa
)[state
] & 0x80000000)
222 perms
.allow
|= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE
;
223 if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa
)[state
] & 0x40000000)
224 perms
.allow
|= AA_MAY_ONEXEC
;
230 * aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name
231 * @dfa: to match against (MAYBE NULL)
232 * @state: state to start matching in
233 * @name: string to match against dfa (NOT NULL)
234 * @cond: conditions to consider for permission set computation (NOT NULL)
235 * @perms: Returns - the permissions found when matching @name
237 * Returns: the final state in @dfa when beginning @start and walking @name
239 unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa
*dfa
, unsigned int start
,
240 const char *name
, struct path_cond
*cond
,
241 struct file_perms
*perms
)
249 state
= aa_dfa_match(dfa
, start
, name
);
250 *perms
= compute_perms(dfa
, state
, cond
);
256 * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked
257 * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion (NOT NULL)
259 * Returns: %1 if deleted else %0
261 static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry
*dentry
)
263 if (d_unlinked(dentry
) && d_backing_inode(dentry
)->i_nlink
== 0)
269 * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path
270 * @op: operation being checked
271 * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
272 * @path: path to check permissions of (NOT NULL)
273 * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies
274 * @request: requested permissions
275 * @cond: conditional info for this request (NOT NULL)
277 * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
279 int aa_path_perm(int op
, struct aa_profile
*profile
, const struct path
*path
,
280 int flags
, u32 request
, struct path_cond
*cond
)
283 struct file_perms perms
= {};
284 const char *name
, *info
= NULL
;
287 flags
|= profile
->path_flags
| (S_ISDIR(cond
->mode
) ? PATH_IS_DIR
: 0);
288 error
= aa_path_name(path
, flags
, &buffer
, &name
, &info
);
290 if (error
== -ENOENT
&& is_deleted(path
->dentry
)) {
291 /* Access to open files that are deleted are
292 * give a pass (implicit delegation)
296 perms
.allow
= request
;
299 aa_str_perms(profile
->file
.dfa
, profile
->file
.start
, name
, cond
,
301 if (request
& ~perms
.allow
)
304 error
= aa_audit_file(profile
, &perms
, GFP_KERNEL
, op
, request
, name
,
305 NULL
, cond
->uid
, info
, error
);
312 * xindex_is_subset - helper for aa_path_link
313 * @link: link permission set
314 * @target: target permission set
316 * test target x permissions are equal OR a subset of link x permissions
317 * this is done as part of the subset test, where a hardlink must have
318 * a subset of permissions that the target has.
320 * Returns: %1 if subset else %0
322 static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link
, u32 target
)
324 if (((link
& ~AA_X_UNSAFE
) != (target
& ~AA_X_UNSAFE
)) ||
325 ((link
& AA_X_UNSAFE
) && !(target
& AA_X_UNSAFE
)))
332 * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
333 * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
334 * @old_dentry: the target dentry (NOT NULL)
335 * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in (NOT NULL)
336 * @new_dentry: the link being created (NOT NULL)
338 * Handle the permission test for a link & target pair. Permission
339 * is encoded as a pair where the link permission is determined
340 * first, and if allowed, the target is tested. The target test
341 * is done from the point of the link match (not start of DFA)
342 * making the target permission dependent on the link permission match.
344 * The subset test if required forces that permissions granted
345 * on link are a subset of the permission granted to target.
347 * Returns: %0 if allowed else error
349 int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile
*profile
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
350 const struct path
*new_dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
352 struct path link
= { new_dir
->mnt
, new_dentry
};
353 struct path target
= { new_dir
->mnt
, old_dentry
};
354 struct path_cond cond
= {
355 d_backing_inode(old_dentry
)->i_uid
,
356 d_backing_inode(old_dentry
)->i_mode
358 char *buffer
= NULL
, *buffer2
= NULL
;
359 const char *lname
, *tname
= NULL
, *info
= NULL
;
360 struct file_perms lperms
, perms
;
361 u32 request
= AA_MAY_LINK
;
367 /* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
368 error
= aa_path_name(&link
, profile
->path_flags
, &buffer
, &lname
,
373 /* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
374 error
= aa_path_name(&target
, profile
->path_flags
, &buffer2
, &tname
,
380 /* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
381 state
= aa_str_perms(profile
->file
.dfa
, profile
->file
.start
, lname
,
384 if (!(lperms
.allow
& AA_MAY_LINK
))
387 /* test to see if target can be paired with link */
388 state
= aa_dfa_null_transition(profile
->file
.dfa
, state
);
389 aa_str_perms(profile
->file
.dfa
, state
, tname
, &cond
, &perms
);
391 /* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
394 lperms
.audit
= perms
.audit
;
395 lperms
.quiet
= perms
.quiet
;
396 lperms
.kill
= perms
.kill
;
398 if (!(perms
.allow
& AA_MAY_LINK
)) {
399 info
= "target restricted";
403 /* done if link subset test is not required */
404 if (!(perms
.allow
& AA_LINK_SUBSET
))
407 /* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are a
408 * subset of the allowed permissions on target.
410 aa_str_perms(profile
->file
.dfa
, profile
->file
.start
, tname
, &cond
,
413 /* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
414 request
= lperms
.allow
& ~AA_MAY_LINK
;
415 lperms
.allow
&= perms
.allow
| AA_MAY_LINK
;
417 request
|= AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK
& (lperms
.allow
& ~perms
.allow
);
418 if (request
& ~lperms
.allow
) {
420 } else if ((lperms
.allow
& MAY_EXEC
) &&
421 !xindex_is_subset(lperms
.xindex
, perms
.xindex
)) {
422 lperms
.allow
&= ~MAY_EXEC
;
424 info
= "link not subset of target";
432 error
= aa_audit_file(profile
, &lperms
, GFP_KERNEL
, OP_LINK
, request
,
433 lname
, tname
, cond
.uid
, info
, error
);
441 * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
442 * @op: operation being checked
443 * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
444 * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on (NOT NULL)
445 * @request: requested permissions
447 * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
449 int aa_file_perm(int op
, struct aa_profile
*profile
, struct file
*file
,
452 struct path_cond cond
= {
453 .uid
= file_inode(file
)->i_uid
,
454 .mode
= file_inode(file
)->i_mode
457 return aa_path_perm(op
, profile
, &file
->f_path
, PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED
,