1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
3 // Security related flags and so on.
5 // Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation.
8 #include <linux/kernel.h>
9 #include <linux/device.h>
10 #include <linux/seq_buf.h>
12 #include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>
13 #include <asm/code-patching.h>
14 #include <asm/debugfs.h>
15 #include <asm/security_features.h>
16 #include <asm/setup.h>
19 u64 powerpc_security_features __read_mostly
= SEC_FTR_DEFAULT
;
21 enum count_cache_flush_type
{
22 COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE
= 0x1,
23 COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_SW
= 0x2,
24 COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW
= 0x4,
26 static enum count_cache_flush_type count_cache_flush_type
= COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE
;
27 static bool link_stack_flush_enabled
;
29 bool barrier_nospec_enabled
;
30 static bool no_nospec
;
31 static bool btb_flush_enabled
;
32 #if defined(CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)
33 static bool no_spectrev2
;
36 static void enable_barrier_nospec(bool enable
)
38 barrier_nospec_enabled
= enable
;
39 do_barrier_nospec_fixups(enable
);
42 void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
47 * It would make sense to check SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 below as well.
48 * But there's a good reason not to. The two flags we check below are
49 * both are enabled by default in the kernel, so if the hcall is not
50 * functional they will be enabled.
51 * On a system where the host firmware has been updated (so the ori
52 * functions as a barrier), but on which the hypervisor (KVM/Qemu) has
53 * not been updated, we would like to enable the barrier. Dropping the
54 * check for SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 achieves that. The only downside is
55 * we potentially enable the barrier on systems where the host firmware
56 * is not updated, but that's harmless as it's a no-op.
58 enable
= security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY
) &&
59 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR
);
61 if (!no_nospec
&& !cpu_mitigations_off())
62 enable_barrier_nospec(enable
);
65 static int __init
handle_nospectre_v1(char *p
)
71 early_param("nospectre_v1", handle_nospectre_v1
);
73 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
74 static int barrier_nospec_set(void *data
, u64 val
)
84 if (!!val
== !!barrier_nospec_enabled
)
87 enable_barrier_nospec(!!val
);
92 static int barrier_nospec_get(void *data
, u64
*val
)
94 *val
= barrier_nospec_enabled
? 1 : 0;
98 DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_barrier_nospec
, barrier_nospec_get
,
99 barrier_nospec_set
, "%llu\n");
101 static __init
int barrier_nospec_debugfs_init(void)
103 debugfs_create_file_unsafe("barrier_nospec", 0600,
104 powerpc_debugfs_root
, NULL
,
105 &fops_barrier_nospec
);
108 device_initcall(barrier_nospec_debugfs_init
);
110 static __init
int security_feature_debugfs_init(void)
112 debugfs_create_x64("security_features", 0400, powerpc_debugfs_root
,
113 &powerpc_security_features
);
116 device_initcall(security_feature_debugfs_init
);
117 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
119 #if defined(CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)
120 static int __init
handle_nospectre_v2(char *p
)
126 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2
);
127 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E || CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
129 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
130 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
132 if (no_spectrev2
|| cpu_mitigations_off())
133 do_btb_flush_fixups();
135 btb_flush_enabled
= true;
137 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E */
139 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
140 ssize_t
cpu_show_meltdown(struct device
*dev
, struct device_attribute
*attr
, char *buf
)
144 thread_priv
= security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV
);
148 seq_buf_init(&s
, buf
, PAGE_SIZE
- 1);
150 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "Mitigation: RFI Flush");
152 seq_buf_printf(&s
, ", L1D private per thread");
154 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "\n");
160 return sprintf(buf
, "Vulnerable: L1D private per thread\n");
162 if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV
) &&
163 !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR
))
164 return sprintf(buf
, "Not affected\n");
166 return sprintf(buf
, "Vulnerable\n");
169 ssize_t
cpu_show_l1tf(struct device
*dev
, struct device_attribute
*attr
, char *buf
)
171 return cpu_show_meltdown(dev
, attr
, buf
);
175 ssize_t
cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device
*dev
, struct device_attribute
*attr
, char *buf
)
179 seq_buf_init(&s
, buf
, PAGE_SIZE
- 1);
181 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR
)) {
182 if (barrier_nospec_enabled
)
183 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization");
185 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "Vulnerable");
187 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31
))
188 seq_buf_printf(&s
, ", ori31 speculation barrier enabled");
190 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "\n");
192 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "Not affected\n");
197 ssize_t
cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device
*dev
, struct device_attribute
*attr
, char *buf
)
202 seq_buf_init(&s
, buf
, PAGE_SIZE
- 1);
204 bcs
= security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED
);
205 ccd
= security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED
);
208 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "Mitigation: ");
211 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)");
214 seq_buf_printf(&s
, ", ");
217 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "Indirect branch cache disabled");
219 if (link_stack_flush_enabled
)
220 seq_buf_printf(&s
, ", Software link stack flush");
222 } else if (count_cache_flush_type
!= COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE
) {
223 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "Mitigation: Software count cache flush");
225 if (count_cache_flush_type
== COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW
)
226 seq_buf_printf(&s
, " (hardware accelerated)");
228 if (link_stack_flush_enabled
)
229 seq_buf_printf(&s
, ", Software link stack flush");
231 } else if (btb_flush_enabled
) {
232 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "Mitigation: Branch predictor state flush");
234 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "Vulnerable");
237 seq_buf_printf(&s
, "\n");
242 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
244 * Store-forwarding barrier support.
247 static enum stf_barrier_type stf_enabled_flush_types
;
248 static bool no_stf_barrier
;
251 static int __init
handle_no_stf_barrier(char *p
)
253 pr_info("stf-barrier: disabled on command line.");
254 no_stf_barrier
= true;
258 early_param("no_stf_barrier", handle_no_stf_barrier
);
260 /* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */
261 static int __init
handle_ssbd(char *p
)
263 if (!p
|| strncmp(p
, "auto", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p
, "on", 2) == 0 ) {
264 /* Until firmware tells us, we have the barrier with auto */
266 } else if (strncmp(p
, "off", 3) == 0) {
267 handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL
);
274 early_param("spec_store_bypass_disable", handle_ssbd
);
276 /* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */
277 static int __init
handle_no_ssbd(char *p
)
279 handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL
);
282 early_param("nospec_store_bypass_disable", handle_no_ssbd
);
284 static void stf_barrier_enable(bool enable
)
287 do_stf_barrier_fixups(stf_enabled_flush_types
);
289 do_stf_barrier_fixups(STF_BARRIER_NONE
);
291 stf_barrier
= enable
;
294 void setup_stf_barrier(void)
296 enum stf_barrier_type type
;
299 hv
= cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE
);
301 /* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */
302 if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300
))
303 type
= STF_BARRIER_EIEIO
;
304 else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S
))
305 type
= STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI
;
306 else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_206
))
307 type
= STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK
;
309 type
= STF_BARRIER_NONE
;
311 enable
= security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY
) &&
312 (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR
) ||
313 (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV
) && hv
));
315 if (type
== STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK
) {
316 pr_info("stf-barrier: fallback barrier available\n");
317 } else if (type
== STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI
) {
318 pr_info("stf-barrier: hwsync barrier available\n");
319 } else if (type
== STF_BARRIER_EIEIO
) {
320 pr_info("stf-barrier: eieio barrier available\n");
323 stf_enabled_flush_types
= type
;
325 if (!no_stf_barrier
&& !cpu_mitigations_off())
326 stf_barrier_enable(enable
);
329 ssize_t
cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device
*dev
, struct device_attribute
*attr
, char *buf
)
331 if (stf_barrier
&& stf_enabled_flush_types
!= STF_BARRIER_NONE
) {
333 switch (stf_enabled_flush_types
) {
334 case STF_BARRIER_EIEIO
:
337 case STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI
:
340 case STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK
:
346 return sprintf(buf
, "Mitigation: Kernel entry/exit barrier (%s)\n", type
);
349 if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV
) &&
350 !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR
))
351 return sprintf(buf
, "Not affected\n");
353 return sprintf(buf
, "Vulnerable\n");
356 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
357 static int stf_barrier_set(void *data
, u64 val
)
368 /* Only do anything if we're changing state */
369 if (enable
!= stf_barrier
)
370 stf_barrier_enable(enable
);
375 static int stf_barrier_get(void *data
, u64
*val
)
377 *val
= stf_barrier
? 1 : 0;
381 DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_stf_barrier
, stf_barrier_get
, stf_barrier_set
,
384 static __init
int stf_barrier_debugfs_init(void)
386 debugfs_create_file_unsafe("stf_barrier", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root
,
387 NULL
, &fops_stf_barrier
);
390 device_initcall(stf_barrier_debugfs_init
);
391 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
393 static void no_count_cache_flush(void)
395 count_cache_flush_type
= COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE
;
396 pr_info("count-cache-flush: software flush disabled.\n");
399 static void toggle_count_cache_flush(bool enable
)
401 if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE
) &&
402 !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK
))
406 patch_instruction_site(&patch__call_flush_count_cache
, PPC_INST_NOP
);
407 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
408 patch_instruction_site(&patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack
, PPC_INST_NOP
);
410 pr_info("link-stack-flush: software flush disabled.\n");
411 link_stack_flush_enabled
= false;
412 no_count_cache_flush();
416 // This enables the branch from _switch to flush_count_cache
417 patch_branch_site(&patch__call_flush_count_cache
,
418 (u64
)&flush_count_cache
, BRANCH_SET_LINK
);
420 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
421 // This enables the branch from guest_exit_cont to kvm_flush_link_stack
422 patch_branch_site(&patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack
,
423 (u64
)&kvm_flush_link_stack
, BRANCH_SET_LINK
);
426 pr_info("link-stack-flush: software flush enabled.\n");
427 link_stack_flush_enabled
= true;
429 // If we just need to flush the link stack, patch an early return
430 if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE
)) {
431 patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_link_stack_return
, PPC_INST_BLR
);
432 no_count_cache_flush();
436 if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST
)) {
437 count_cache_flush_type
= COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_SW
;
438 pr_info("count-cache-flush: full software flush sequence enabled.\n");
442 patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_count_cache_return
, PPC_INST_BLR
);
443 count_cache_flush_type
= COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW
;
444 pr_info("count-cache-flush: hardware assisted flush sequence enabled\n");
447 void setup_count_cache_flush(void)
451 if (no_spectrev2
|| cpu_mitigations_off()) {
452 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED
) ||
453 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED
))
454 pr_warn("Spectre v2 mitigations not fully under software control, can't disable\n");
460 * There's no firmware feature flag/hypervisor bit to tell us we need to
461 * flush the link stack on context switch. So we set it here if we see
462 * either of the Spectre v2 mitigations that aim to protect userspace.
464 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED
) ||
465 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE
))
466 security_ftr_set(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK
);
468 toggle_count_cache_flush(enable
);
471 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
472 static int count_cache_flush_set(void *data
, u64 val
)
483 toggle_count_cache_flush(enable
);
488 static int count_cache_flush_get(void *data
, u64
*val
)
490 if (count_cache_flush_type
== COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE
)
498 DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_count_cache_flush
, count_cache_flush_get
,
499 count_cache_flush_set
, "%llu\n");
501 static __init
int count_cache_flush_debugfs_init(void)
503 debugfs_create_file_unsafe("count_cache_flush", 0600,
504 powerpc_debugfs_root
, NULL
,
505 &fops_count_cache_flush
);
508 device_initcall(count_cache_flush_debugfs_init
);
509 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
510 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */