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[linux/fpc-iii.git] / security / integrity / evm / evm_crypto.c
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1 /*
2 * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
4 * Authors:
5 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
6 * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
8 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
9 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
10 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
12 * File: evm_crypto.c
13 * Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
16 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
18 #include <linux/module.h>
19 #include <linux/crypto.h>
20 #include <linux/xattr.h>
21 #include <linux/evm.h>
22 #include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
23 #include <crypto/hash.h>
24 #include "evm.h"
26 #define EVMKEY "evm-key"
27 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
28 static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
29 static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
31 struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
32 struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
34 static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
36 #define EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY 0
38 static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;
40 /**
41 * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
42 * @key: pointer to a buffer with the key data
43 * @size: length of the key data
45 * This function allows setting the EVM HMAC key from the kernel
46 * without using the "encrypted" key subsystem keys. It can be used
47 * by the crypto HW kernel module which has its own way of managing
48 * keys.
50 * key length should be between 32 and 128 bytes long
52 int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen)
54 int rc;
56 rc = -EBUSY;
57 if (test_and_set_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags))
58 goto busy;
59 rc = -EINVAL;
60 if (keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
61 goto inval;
62 memcpy(evmkey, key, keylen);
63 evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_HMAC;
64 pr_info("key initialized\n");
65 return 0;
66 inval:
67 clear_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags);
68 busy:
69 pr_err("key initialization failed\n");
70 return rc;
72 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key);
74 static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type)
76 long rc;
77 char *algo;
78 struct crypto_shash **tfm;
79 struct shash_desc *desc;
81 if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
82 if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) {
83 pr_err("HMAC key is not set\n");
84 return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
86 tfm = &hmac_tfm;
87 algo = evm_hmac;
88 } else {
89 tfm = &hash_tfm;
90 algo = evm_hash;
93 if (*tfm == NULL) {
94 mutex_lock(&mutex);
95 if (*tfm)
96 goto out;
97 *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
98 if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
99 rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
100 pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
101 *tfm = NULL;
102 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
103 return ERR_PTR(rc);
105 if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
106 rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
107 if (rc) {
108 crypto_free_shash(*tfm);
109 *tfm = NULL;
110 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
111 return ERR_PTR(rc);
114 out:
115 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
118 desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
119 GFP_KERNEL);
120 if (!desc)
121 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
123 desc->tfm = *tfm;
124 desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
126 rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
127 if (rc) {
128 kfree(desc);
129 return ERR_PTR(rc);
131 return desc;
134 /* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
135 * specific info.
137 * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
138 * protection.)
140 static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
141 char *digest)
143 struct h_misc {
144 unsigned long ino;
145 __u32 generation;
146 uid_t uid;
147 gid_t gid;
148 umode_t mode;
149 } hmac_misc;
151 memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
152 hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
153 hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
154 /* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user
155 * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding
156 * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack
157 * where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount
158 * of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the
159 * filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because
160 * everything is signed.
162 hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
163 hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
164 hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
165 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
166 if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID)
167 crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
168 sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
169 crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
173 * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
175 * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
176 * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
177 * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
179 static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
180 const char *req_xattr_name,
181 const char *req_xattr_value,
182 size_t req_xattr_value_len,
183 char type, char *digest)
185 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
186 struct shash_desc *desc;
187 char **xattrname;
188 size_t xattr_size = 0;
189 char *xattr_value = NULL;
190 int error;
191 int size;
193 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
194 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
196 desc = init_desc(type);
197 if (IS_ERR(desc))
198 return PTR_ERR(desc);
200 error = -ENODATA;
201 for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
202 if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
203 && !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) {
204 error = 0;
205 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
206 req_xattr_value_len);
207 continue;
209 size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname,
210 &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
211 if (size == -ENOMEM) {
212 error = -ENOMEM;
213 goto out;
215 if (size < 0)
216 continue;
218 error = 0;
219 xattr_size = size;
220 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
222 hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, digest);
224 out:
225 kfree(xattr_value);
226 kfree(desc);
227 return error;
230 int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
231 const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
232 char *digest)
234 return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
235 req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest);
238 int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
239 const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
240 char *digest)
242 return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
243 req_xattr_value_len, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST, digest);
247 * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
249 * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
251 int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
252 const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
254 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
255 struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
256 int rc = 0;
258 rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
259 xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
260 if (rc == 0) {
261 xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
262 rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
263 &xattr_data,
264 sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
265 } else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
266 rc = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
268 return rc;
271 int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
272 char *hmac_val)
274 struct shash_desc *desc;
276 desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC);
277 if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
278 pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
279 return PTR_ERR(desc);
282 crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
283 hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, hmac_val);
284 kfree(desc);
285 return 0;
289 * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
291 int evm_init_key(void)
293 struct key *evm_key;
294 struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
295 int rc;
297 evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
298 if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
299 return -ENOENT;
301 down_read(&evm_key->sem);
302 ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0];
304 rc = evm_set_key(ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
306 /* burn the original key contents */
307 memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
308 up_read(&evm_key->sem);
309 key_put(evm_key);
310 return rc;