5 The dm-integrity target emulates a block device that has additional
6 per-sector tags that can be used for storing integrity information.
8 A general problem with storing integrity tags with every sector is that
9 writing the sector and the integrity tag must be atomic - i.e. in case of
10 crash, either both sector and integrity tag or none of them is written.
12 To guarantee write atomicity, the dm-integrity target uses journal, it
13 writes sector data and integrity tags into a journal, commits the journal
14 and then copies the data and integrity tags to their respective location.
16 The dm-integrity target can be used with the dm-crypt target - in this
17 situation the dm-crypt target creates the integrity data and passes them
18 to the dm-integrity target via bio_integrity_payload attached to the bio.
19 In this mode, the dm-crypt and dm-integrity targets provide authenticated
20 disk encryption - if the attacker modifies the encrypted device, an I/O
21 error is returned instead of random data.
23 The dm-integrity target can also be used as a standalone target, in this
24 mode it calculates and verifies the integrity tag internally. In this
25 mode, the dm-integrity target can be used to detect silent data
26 corruption on the disk or in the I/O path.
28 There's an alternate mode of operation where dm-integrity uses bitmap
29 instead of a journal. If a bit in the bitmap is 1, the corresponding
30 region's data and integrity tags are not synchronized - if the machine
31 crashes, the unsynchronized regions will be recalculated. The bitmap mode
32 is faster than the journal mode, because we don't have to write the data
33 twice, but it is also less reliable, because if data corruption happens
34 when the machine crashes, it may not be detected.
36 When loading the target for the first time, the kernel driver will format
37 the device. But it will only format the device if the superblock contains
38 zeroes. If the superblock is neither valid nor zeroed, the dm-integrity
39 target can't be loaded.
41 To use the target for the first time:
43 1. overwrite the superblock with zeroes
44 2. load the dm-integrity target with one-sector size, the kernel driver
45 will format the device
46 3. unload the dm-integrity target
47 4. read the "provided_data_sectors" value from the superblock
48 5. load the dm-integrity target with the the target size
49 "provided_data_sectors"
50 6. if you want to use dm-integrity with dm-crypt, load the dm-crypt target
51 with the size "provided_data_sectors"
56 1. the underlying block device
58 2. the number of reserved sector at the beginning of the device - the
59 dm-integrity won't read of write these sectors
61 3. the size of the integrity tag (if "-" is used, the size is taken from
62 the internal-hash algorithm)
66 D - direct writes (without journal)
67 in this mode, journaling is
68 not used and data sectors and integrity tags are written
69 separately. In case of crash, it is possible that the data
70 and integrity tag doesn't match.
72 data and integrity tags are written to the
73 journal and atomicity is guaranteed. In case of crash,
74 either both data and tag or none of them are written. The
75 journaled mode degrades write throughput twice because the
76 data have to be written twice.
77 B - bitmap mode - data and metadata are written without any
78 synchronization, the driver maintains a bitmap of dirty
79 regions where data and metadata don't match. This mode can
80 only be used with internal hash.
81 R - recovery mode - in this mode, journal is not replayed,
82 checksums are not checked and writes to the device are not
83 allowed. This mode is useful for data recovery if the
84 device cannot be activated in any of the other standard
87 5. the number of additional arguments
91 journal_sectors:number
92 The size of journal, this argument is used only if formatting the
93 device. If the device is already formatted, the value from the
96 interleave_sectors:number
97 The number of interleaved sectors. This values is rounded down to
98 a power of two. If the device is already formatted, the value from
99 the superblock is used.
102 Don't interleave the data and metadata on on device. Use a
103 separate device for metadata.
105 buffer_sectors:number
106 The number of sectors in one buffer. The value is rounded down to
109 The tag area is accessed using buffers, the buffer size is
110 configurable. The large buffer size means that the I/O size will
111 be larger, but there could be less I/Os issued.
113 journal_watermark:number
114 The journal watermark in percents. When the size of the journal
115 exceeds this watermark, the thread that flushes the journal will
119 Commit time in milliseconds. When this time passes, the journal is
120 written. The journal is also written immediatelly if the FLUSH
123 internal_hash:algorithm(:key) (the key is optional)
124 Use internal hash or crc.
125 When this argument is used, the dm-integrity target won't accept
126 integrity tags from the upper target, but it will automatically
127 generate and verify the integrity tags.
129 You can use a crc algorithm (such as crc32), then integrity target
130 will protect the data against accidental corruption.
131 You can also use a hmac algorithm (for example
132 "hmac(sha256):0123456789abcdef"), in this mode it will provide
133 cryptographic authentication of the data without encryption.
135 When this argument is not used, the integrity tags are accepted
136 from an upper layer target, such as dm-crypt. The upper layer
137 target should check the validity of the integrity tags.
140 Recalculate the integrity tags automatically. It is only valid
141 when using internal hash.
143 journal_crypt:algorithm(:key) (the key is optional)
144 Encrypt the journal using given algorithm to make sure that the
145 attacker can't read the journal. You can use a block cipher here
146 (such as "cbc(aes)") or a stream cipher (for example "chacha20",
147 "salsa20" or "ctr(aes)").
149 The journal contains history of last writes to the block device,
150 an attacker reading the journal could see the last sector nubmers
151 that were written. From the sector numbers, the attacker can infer
152 the size of files that were written. To protect against this
153 situation, you can encrypt the journal.
155 journal_mac:algorithm(:key) (the key is optional)
156 Protect sector numbers in the journal from accidental or malicious
157 modification. To protect against accidental modification, use a
158 crc algorithm, to protect against malicious modification, use a
159 hmac algorithm with a key.
161 This option is not needed when using internal-hash because in this
162 mode, the integrity of journal entries is checked when replaying
163 the journal. Thus, modified sector number would be detected at
167 The size of a data block in bytes. The larger the block size the
168 less overhead there is for per-block integrity metadata.
169 Supported values are 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096 bytes. If not
170 specified the default block size is 512 bytes.
172 sectors_per_bit:number
173 In the bitmap mode, this parameter specifies the number of
174 512-byte sectors that corresponds to one bitmap bit.
176 bitmap_flush_interval:number
177 The bitmap flush interval in milliseconds. The metadata buffers
178 are synchronized when this interval expires.
181 Use a smaller padding of the tag area that is more
182 space-efficient. If this option is not present, large padding is
183 used - that is for compatibility with older kernels.
186 The journal mode (D/J), buffer_sectors, journal_watermark, commit_time can
187 be changed when reloading the target (load an inactive table and swap the
188 tables with suspend and resume). The other arguments should not be changed
189 when reloading the target because the layout of disk data depend on them
190 and the reloaded target would be non-functional.
193 The layout of the formatted block device:
196 (they are not used by this target, they can be used for
197 storing LUKS metadata or for other purpose), the size of the reserved
198 area is specified in the target arguments
201 * magic string - identifies that the device was formatted
203 * log2(interleave sectors)
205 * the number of journal sections
206 * provided data sectors - the number of sectors that this target
207 provides (i.e. the size of the device minus the size of all
208 metadata and padding). The user of this target should not send
209 bios that access data beyond the "provided data sectors" limit.
211 SB_FLAG_HAVE_JOURNAL_MAC
212 - a flag is set if journal_mac is used
213 SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING
214 - recalculating is in progress
216 - journal area contains the bitmap of dirty
218 * log2(sectors per block)
219 * a position where recalculating finished
221 The journal is divided into sections, each section contains:
223 * metadata area (4kiB), it contains journal entries
225 - every journal entry contains:
227 * logical sector (specifies where the data and tag should
229 * last 8 bytes of data
230 * integrity tag (the size is specified in the superblock)
232 - every metadata sector ends with
234 * mac (8-bytes), all the macs in 8 metadata sectors form a
235 64-byte value. It is used to store hmac of sector
236 numbers in the journal section, to protect against a
237 possibility that the attacker tampers with sector
238 numbers in the journal.
241 * data area (the size is variable; it depends on how many journal
242 entries fit into the metadata area)
244 - every sector in the data area contains:
246 * data (504 bytes of data, the last 8 bytes are stored in
250 To test if the whole journal section was written correctly, every
251 512-byte sector of the journal ends with 8-byte commit id. If the
252 commit id matches on all sectors in a journal section, then it is
253 assumed that the section was written correctly. If the commit id
254 doesn't match, the section was written partially and it should not
257 * one or more runs of interleaved tags and data.
260 * tag area - it contains integrity tags. There is one tag for each
261 sector in the data area
262 * data area - it contains data sectors. The number of data sectors
263 in one run must be a power of two. log2 of this value is stored